



FINAL REPORT

EXTERNAL REVIEW OF ENABLING THE BUSINESS OF AGRICULTURE

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Submitted by Itad

Results in development

Acknowledgements

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Table of contents

Acknowledgements	2
Acronyms and abbreviations	ii
Executive summary	iv
1. Introduction	1
2. Review Approach	1
2.1. Review Questions	1
2.2. EBA Theory of Change	3
3. Context	5
3.1. Origins and timeline of the EBA	5
3.2. Political reform and the business environment	6
3.3. The influence of indices	8
3.4. Consensus on index contents	8
4. Methodology and Limitations	9
4.1. Data sources	9
4.1.1 Interviews	9
4.1.2 Online surveys	11
4.1.3 Website and social media analytics	12
4.1.4 Citation analysis	12
4.2. Analysis and synthesis	12
4.3. Limitations	12
5. Findings	13
5.1. How relevant are current EBA products and subject areas in terms of promoting uptake for improving the enabling environment for agriculture?	13
5.1.1 Products	13
5.1.2 Topics	16
5.1.3 Product Use	17
5.1.4 Conclusions	18
5.2. How effective has the EBA been in identifying and prioritising individuals and organisations that are influential with respect to the enabling environment for agriculture?	18
5.2.1 Conclusions	21
5.3. How effective and efficient are EBA's country/regional/global EDI activities at promoting uptake of EBA products?	22
5.3.1 Engagement case studies	24
5.3.2 Conclusions	26
5.4. How effective are the EBA team at identifying and utilising reform agendas within governments to promote uptake?	27
5.4.1 Conclusions	28

5.5.	How effective are EBA's country/regional/global products at influencing changes in policy, legislation or regulation and improving government processes?	28
5.5.1	Conclusions	31
5.6.	Where changes to policy, legislation or regulation have been influenced by EBA, how does this reform impact on the poor?	31
6.	Conclusions	32
7.	Lessons	34
8.	Recommendations Statement	35

Annexes

Annex 1. Terms of Reference	40
Annex 2. Bibliography	48
ANNEX 3. Literature Review	49
Annex 4. Persons interviewed	53
Annex 5. Case studies	56
Tanzania	56
Sudan	57
Annex 6. Online Survey	59
Annex 7. Web analysis	71
Annex 8. Citation analysis	72

List of Tables

Table 1. Review framework.....	2
Table 2. Breakdown of interviews by stakeholder type.....	9
Table 3. Engagement events chosen for global case studies.....	10
Table 4. Sample Response Rate for the Review's Online Surveys.....	11
Table 5. Downloaded products from EBA website Jan 2016-Dec 2017	14
Table 6. EBA website visits by country of origin.....	15
Table 7. Downloads by Topic from the EBA website Jan 2016 – Dec 2017 ^{1/}	17
Table 8: Case studies on engagement events	24
Table 9. Online survey results on EBA events	26

List of Figures

Figure 1. Revised Review Questions for the EBA external review	2
Figure 2. Revised Theory of Change for Enabling the Business of Agriculture	4
Figure 3. Simple Theory of Change presented by the EBA team	4
Figure 4. EBA timeline	6
Figure 5. Defining the agricultural enabling environment (AEE).....	7
Figure 6. EBA review design	9
Figure 7. Annual Report downloads 2016-17.....	13
Figure 8. Comparison of all page views for the EBA website from the month of report launch in 2016 and 2017.....	14
Figure 9. Visits per month to EBA website	15
Figure 10. Visits to EBA website by country on a per capita basis (Jan 2016-Dec 2017).....	16
Figure 11. Countries visited by EBA engagement events in 2017	20
Figure 12: Engagement events (including global, regional and country).....	22
Figure 13. Location of webinar participants (May 2016)	26
Figure 14 Tanzania EBA contribution to Policy reform	30
Figure 15. Timeline, responsibility and resource implications of recommendations	36

Acronyms and abbreviations

AAPC	Annual Agriculture Policy Conference (Tanzania)
AEE	Agricultural enabling environment
AFSTA	African Seed Trade Association
AGRA	African Green Revolution Alliance
ASA	World Bank Advisory Services and Analytics products
AU	African Union
BBA	Benchmarking the Business of Agriculture (former name of EBA)
BER	Business environment reform
BERF	Business Environment Reform Facility
BMO	Business membership organisation
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CSO	Civil society organisation
DAC	Development Assistance Committee (OECD)
DB	Doing Business
DBI	Doing Business Indicators
DCED	Donor Committee for Enterprise Development
DFID	(UK) Department for International Development
DTF	Distance to frontier
EAC	East African Community
EBA	Enabling the Business of Agriculture
EDI	Engagement, dissemination and influencing
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation (of the UN)
FST	Fertiliser Society of Tanzania
GDP	Gross domestic product
ICR	Investment climate reform
ICT	Information and communications technology
IFC	International Finance Corporation (a member of the World Bank Group)
INGO	International non-governmental organisation
KIPPR	Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis
KPP	Knowledge, policy, power
MIRA	Micro Reforms for African Agribusiness
NEPAD	New Partnership for African Development (a technical body of the AU)
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PAG	Policy Advisory Group

PPD	Public–private dialogue
REPOA	Policy Research for Development Tanzania.
RMT	Review management team
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SAGCOT	Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor for Tanzania
SHF	Smallholder farmer
TASTA	Tanzania Seed Trade Association
TOC	Theory of change
TOR	Terms of reference
TPSF	Tanzania Private Sector Foundation
ToR	Terms of reference
UK	United Kingdom
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UPOV	International Union for the Protection of Plants (<i>Union internationale pour la protection des obtentions végétales</i>)
US	United States (of America)
USA	United States of America
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VAT	Value-added tax
VFM	Value for money
WB	World Bank
WBCO	World Bank country office

Executive summary

Introduction

This document describes the findings of an independent review of the Enabling the Business of Agriculture (EBA) project. The review was commissioned by DFID to learn lessons from the first phase of the EBA project (2013-2016) and to provide recommendations for the follow-up phase (2017-21).

The purpose of the review is to assess how well the EBA engagement, dissemination and influencing (EDI) activities have promoted uptake of EBA-identified good practice, under what circumstances and how they can improve further in the future. The overall purpose of the review is to strengthen the EBA so that it successfully drives reforms in agribusiness-related policies and regulations, and so deliver greater agricultural growth in developing countries.

The methodology involved a review of background literature and EBA documents, interviews with 40 stakeholders, two online surveys and an analysis of the EBA website downloads.

A revised Theory of Change (TOC) has guided the design of the review. Six main review questions structured the evidence gathering and analysis.

The review used country case studies in Tanzania and Sudan to explore stories of change to capture how EBA engagements have led to uptake, reform and impact.

The EBA was piloted in 2013-14 in 10 countries. In 2015, data collection was scaled up to 40 countries. At the end of 2016, EBA developed 12 indicator topic areas to assess the enabling environment for agriculture across 62 countries. The third annual EBA report was released in February 2017. The project is expected to scale up data collection to 80 countries in 2019 as part of a second phase. Data will be published on a biennial basis, reducing costs and enabling the EBA team to devote more time to improvement and dissemination of the indicators.

Constructing an index of this nature is subject to many challenges, from purely technical to the wider political implications in terms of what types of reforms are promoted and who would

benefit most from them. The review acknowledges the major achievement of the EBA team in developing the index in a way that is broadly seen as technically sound, but also reflects on these wider aspects.

Findings



Relevance and use: The flagship Annual Report is by far the most important product the EBA has produced so far; it takes a great deal of time to produce and is downloaded much more often than other EBA products. It is widely perceived to be of high technical quality.

There is a demand for more short, technically simple products in future and also for more translations of materials into the main languages of countries covered by the index.

The web presence of the EBA is not rising as fast as expected, with page views and report downloads both falling slightly in 2017. However, the geographic dispersion of visitors is encouraging, with substantial interest from across Africa, Asia and Latin America.



Engagement: The selection of engagement events by the EBA team has been more opportunistic than strategic.

However, there is little evidence that developing a comprehensive strategy early on would have improved the outcomes of engagement. The exception is that reputational risks may have been mitigated if predictable INGO criticism, based on *Doing Business* criticism, had been anticipated.

National level uptake requires locally present organisations with an understanding of the reform landscape to promote the EBA with stakeholders, and to find ways to incorporate it into existing dialogue mechanisms. So far, these organisations have usually been donor or multilateral offices. The loss of engagement from 'collaborative' INGOs should be a serious concern (especially for DFID) because of the loss of a robust independent challenge and help in understanding likely impacts on smallholder farmers (SHFs).

Private sector engagement has been particularly effective particularly in reaching out to global

level industry associations and the largest national firms. The engagement with medium and smaller scale businesses has been more indirect (through trade associations for example) but this group, not having the lobbying strength or access to government of larger firms, has more to gain from the EBA data.

SHFs are usually not influential in reform processes but are an important group for different forms of engagement, since one of DFID's intentions in funding the EBA is to 'encourage transformative change to benefit...informal smallholder farmers'.



Uptake: The EBA is producing a high quality, rigorous set of comparable indices and analytical products, but so far complementary downstream policy engagement by other organisations (including DFID) and parts of the World Bank has been somewhat limited and *ad hoc*.

As the scale of interest in the EBA increases, it would be expected that there would be a broad shift from strategies with high variable costs (face-to-face engagement) to those with very low variable costs (web engagement, written analytical products). Static web engagement suggests that it may not yet be time for this shift to take place and that web-based products could be improved and made easier to access.

The EBA team's lack of specific expertise in knowledge management has meant that less evidence has been collected, about what works, than could have been.

Co-creation of products can be an important step in encouraging adoption and ownership, but the EBA team is less well placed than local actors to co-produce materials in partnership with national actors such as governments, the private sector or media.



Use of reform agendas: The effectiveness of EBA data in framing and supporting reform relies on locally present actors to identify and use government reform agendas, whether that is a World Bank country office, a donor or a coalition of domestic participants.

During engagement, governments sometimes request help in the form of concrete proposals for means to resolve problems identified by EBA

data. This was evident in both Sudan and Tanzania. In some cases, the World Bank is able to capitalise on this by delivering operational projects to answer these questions; in other cases, other donors may offer support where this fits with their programming priorities. However, this would be a good opportunity for EBA donors to offer a systematic roadmap for governments to follow for them to access the support they may need to diagnose problems and develop locally appropriate solutions.



Contribution to reform: After only three years of operation, EBA has delivered a set of high quality global reports and a series of country profiles in line with its deliverables. Impact on reforms is at an early stage. Where the country context is receptive, EBA has played a complementary role to existing reform processes, such as in Tanzania, and EBA products have been used as part of policy dialogue in 19 countries. Where the country context is less receptive, stronger engagement efforts and local champions may be needed.

With the support of donor country offices and actors such as AGRA, there are growing examples of where policy dialogue work around EBA evidence is linking to policy reforms. The importance of the comparative power of EBA findings is also widely recognised as a separate way to influence reform processes.

Because EBA provides a neutral assessment and does not make reform recommendations, there is a need for greater country-level analysis that can lead to a road map for action. The conclusion is that EBA alone is not sufficient to achieve reform and will require complementary work by actors both within the World Bank, the supporting donor system and independent actors such as think tanks and CSOs.

Conclusion. Overall, the EBA is a well-regarded, credible tool for measuring compliance with good practice in the agribusiness policy and regulatory environment. The EBA has developed new indicator topics areas and has also expanded to new countries. This represent a big accomplishment given the budget constraints and little scope for action outlined in the initial programme concept note. The continuing refinement of indicators and methodology will help improve EBA's relevance and uptake,

especially focusing on implementation and efficiency aspects of the regulatory environment including those most relevant to SHFs.

EBA is at a watershed moment now where it should begin to achieve the expected impacts on policy reform and eventual poverty alleviation during the next phase. Engagement in the past two years has expanded considerably, but EBA requires further complementary, country level donor action in order to achieve its reform potential. For this, it needs to consider not just linkages to World Bank country offices and operations but to other development partners and local think tanks and private sector actors.

Stakeholders often want to move from dialogue to action, but when governments lack policy capacity, the process may stall. Complementary donor efforts can provide support to building local capacity and help translate EBA results into useful policy actions relevant to the context particularly how they can be taken up at local government level or to meet needs of farmers, traders and others in the value chain.

There are also opportunities to facilitate and enhance other mechanisms within the wider agricultural enabling reform environment, including regional and continental mechanisms.

Five **lessons** are identified. These relate to managing the contribution from NGOs; defining Deep Dive analyses and who should do them; delineating a formal dissemination strategy at an appropriate stage of EBA evolution; obtaining more consistent levels of donor engagement and (in DFID's case) staffing; and finally, allowing sufficient time before third party research can drive greater adoption of EBA products.

A series of **recommendations** around EDI are presented that focus on the immediate future phase of the EBA (2017-21) and beyond.



1. Engagement strategy. Future engagement by the EBA team would benefit from a more strategic approach, while still responding to country and user needs. To be cost-effective, the EBA needs a clear vision of which EDI activities it should undertake and which are better suited to other organisations. Since legal and policy reform requires intensive effort at national level, the EBA team should favour a role of supporting local actors.

A new dissemination strategy should be drafted by end 2018 to articulate the approach of the EBA team to EDI and delineating the role of the team versus other actors. The strategy should contain the following elements (some of which are in the process of being addressed already): a focus on global and regional 'influencers' rather than on national level policymakers, selective demand-led national engagement, re-engagement with international NGOs, more open upstream engagement on indicator definition.



2. Engagement products. Expand the range of short, more accessible products, if necessary, through outsourcing so as to make EBA results better and more widely understood and used. Involve other stakeholders in the co-creation of these products using a variety of methods. EBA donors can undertake some of this work as has already been demonstrated by AGRA and USAID.



3. Driving uptake amongst donors. EBA donors and particularly DFID should drive uptake of EBA within their organisations more strongly, especially at country level, through retreats and giving the EBA higher recognition.



4. The wider reform system. The EBA team must continue to learn how reform happens and what are its consequences, particularly for poor farmers and consumers, to ensure the index delivers on its potential. Several tools can be deployed, such as country diagnostics, and cost-benefit and business feasibility studies. The establishment of a **global call-down facility**, possibly as a parallel project, to produce these kinds of products is likely to improve dissemination by giving more concrete incentives for governments to use learnings.



5. Evaluating impact. Subsequent monitoring and evaluation should seek to address how EBA-guided reforms are implemented and deliver poverty impact. Selected country level evaluations can look in detail at how reforms affect various types of agricultural businesses, including any differential impact on women and other disadvantaged groups. Techniques such as *episode studies*, *after action reviews* and *outcome mapping* could be useful. The global call-down facility may be used for this purpose.

1. Introduction

DFID commissioned Itad to undertake an independent review of the Enabling the Business of Agriculture (EBA) to learn lessons from the first phase of the EBA project (2013-2016) and to provide recommendations for the follow-up phase (2017-21). The terms of reference (ToR) (Annex 1) for the review state that the review should focus on how well the EBA engagement, dissemination and influencing (EDI) activities have promoted uptake of EBA-identified good practice, under what circumstances and how they can improve further in the future. The overall purpose of the review is therefore to strengthen the EBA so that it successfully drives reforms in agribusiness-related policies and regulations, and so deliver greater agricultural growth in developing countries.¹

The review took place from November 2017-March 2018. An inception period (7-20 November 2017) assessed the approach and methods described in the original Itad proposal and the resultant framework document provided the agreed direction and methodology for the review.²

This report is structured as follows. Chapter 2 presents the approach to the review, including the EBA Theory of Change and the Review Questions. Chapter 3 describes the evolution of the EBA index and its relationship with other similar indices including the Doing Business index. Chapter 4 sets out the design and methodology for the review. Chapter 5 contains the two case studies for Tanzania and Sudan. Chapter 6 then presents the review findings using the review questions as an organising structure. The review's conclusions, lessons and recommendations are finally set out in Chapters 7, 8 and 9.³ There are eight Annexes covering, the ToR, Bibliography, Literature Review, Persons Interviewed, and then four Annexes detailing findings from the Tanzania and Sudan Country Case Studies, Online Survey, Web Analysis and a Citation Analysis.

2. Review Approach

As noted in the Itad proposal, the review focuses on the EDI activities undertaken by the EBA team. It did not evaluate the EBA indicator methodology or test the assumption that the EBA index focuses on the laws and regulations that are the most important for reforming the agribusiness environment. It was also not feasible to evaluate the impact of the EBA-facilitated policy reform on smallholder farmers directly. Instead, the review assesses existing documentary evidence and key informant opinions from case studies to present a picture of the anticipated changes for farmers and businesses affected by EBA-facilitated policy reform.

2.1. Review Questions


The review sought to answer six broad questions (Figure 1). These were divided into two questions covering EBA *activities*, two questions covering EBA *immediate outcomes* and two questions covering EBA *intermediate outcomes and potential impact*. The questions encompassed several of the standard OECD DAC evaluation criteria: relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and impact.⁴

¹ DFID, EBA Business Case, 2015.

² Itad Ltd., Review Framework, January 2018,

³ The Review's Recommendations are also summarised in a separate Recommendations Statement as required by the ToR.

⁴ <http://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/daccriteriaforevaluatingdevelopmentassistance.htm>

Figure 1. Revised Review Questions for the EBA external review

In order to apply these questions to our review, each question was divided into sub-questions reflecting different levels (global, regional, country), different aspects (effectiveness, efficiency) and different stages of uptake. A review framework (Table 1) was then developed to identify the sources to be used and the data collection tools and analysis methodologies to be applied.

Table 1. Review framework

Question		Additional sources ⁵	Analytical approach
1	How relevant are current EBA products and subject areas in terms of promoting uptake for improving the enabling environment for agriculture?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Web analytics • Social media analytics 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Contribution analysis, • Analysis of web and social media data
1.1	Which products (index, publications, engagement events) have been most relevant and why?		
1.2	Which subject areas have been the most relevant and why?		
1.3	For which uses (promoting research, discourse or the use of the index by government) are the EBA's products most relevant?		
2	How effective has the EBA been in identifying and prioritising individuals and organisations that are influential with respect to the enabling environment for agriculture?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EBA influencing documents 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Stakeholder analysis
2.1	Who has been identified and prioritised?		
2.2	How strategic has this process been?		
2.3	What kind of influence do they have?		
2.4	Have any clear opportunities been missed?		
3	How effective and efficient are EBA's country/regional/global EDI activities at promoting uptake of EBA products?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Engagement budgets 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Contribution analysis,
3.1	What have been the most efficient forms of engagement?		


⁵ In addition to interviews and surveys. Interviews will inform all review questions. The questions using survey data are listed in **Error! Reference source not found.**

	Question	Additional sources ⁵	Analytical approach
3.2	How many people have been reached through different types of engagement?	• Engagement documents	• Analysis of web and social media data
3.3	How are products being used by researchers, CSOs, private sector and the media?	• Citation analysis	• Stakeholder Analysis
3.4	How widely are products being disseminated and discussed?	• Web analytics, social media analytics	
3.5	How are products being used within government policy processes and documents?	• Government policy, documents, laws, regulations	
3.6	What particular strategies have the EBA team used for EDI? Have they been effective?		
4	How effective are the EBA team at identifying and utilising reform agendas within governments to promote uptake?	• EBA influencing documents	• Contribution analysis
4.1	Which reform agendas have been identified?		• Bellwether interviews
4.2	How has the team engaged in each case?		
4.3	What have been the results of this engagement?		
5	How effective are EBA's country/regional/global products at influencing changes in policy, legislation or regulation and improving government processes?	• Written EBA products	• Bellwether interviews,
5.1	What demand-led context-specific products have been delivered?	• Government policy documents, laws, regulations	• Contribution analysis
5.2	What evidence of subsequent reform is there?		
5.3	What evidence is there of a causal link between product delivery and subsequent reform, and what else could have contributed to this reform?		
6	Where changes to policy, legislation or regulation have been influenced by EBA, how does this reform impact on the poor?	• Engagement documents,	• Contribution analysis
6.1	Where reforms have or may have been caused by EBA products, what impact have they had, particularly on the poor?	• EBA influencing documents	• Stories of change
6.2	Can 'Deep Dives' provide a useful tool to understand EBA results on policy and on the poor?		


2.2. EBA Theory of Change

The review followed a theory-based evaluation approach, exploring the underlying causal relationships and mechanisms that link the EBA's activities with intended immediate and intermediate outcomes and impact. The theory of change (TOC) in **Error! Reference source not found.** elaborates these links and includes several assumptions that capture EBA's dependence on external supportive conditions. These assumptions relate to how EBA require other aspects of policy reform to occur. For example, the use of EBA products and data by researchers recognises the importance of obtaining greater recognition as a result of its citation in peer reviewed literature.⁶ Additional assumptions speak to the importance of the influence of the wider political economy on the successful uptake of indices.

⁶ Besley, T., Law, regulation, and the business climate: the nature and influence of the World Bank, Doing Business project, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 29,3, 2015.

Figure 2. Revised Theory of Change for Enabling the Business of Agriculture

It is useful to compare this TOC to a TOC presented by the EBA team (Figure 3).⁷

Figure 3. Theory of Change presented by the EBA team

⁷ This Figure was shared with the EAB Review Team following the draft report submission in March 2018.

This latter TOC is interesting in that it focuses on the dissemination of the EBA and the expectation that complementary work by operational teams within the World Bank leading to Advisory Services and Analytics products (ASA) and projects as an integral and necessary component of the results chain. The role of World Bank operational projects (and to some extent identification of operational opportunities) are outside the scope of the EBA team's work.


An ever-present challenge during this review has been to reflect on where the line should fall between the work of the EBA team and the wider agricultural reform system. Unpacking the impact phase further is also an area to be explored – particularly how changes in the regulatory environment will be implemented and then affect the final beneficiaries, in particular smallholder farmers (SHF) with capacity for developing their farming as a business.

3. Context

3.1. Origins and timeline of the EBA

The EBA has emerged as the first multi-donor project to collect data on indicators that measure legal barriers and transaction costs for businesses operating across agricultural value chains. The project was initiated in response to a demand from a G8 meeting in 2012. As shown in Figure 4, a pilot exercise was conducted in 2013–14 in 10 countries, under the former title 'Benchmarking the Business of Agriculture' (BBA).⁸ In 2015, data collection was scaled up to 40 countries, under the current name. At the end of 2016, EBA developed 12 indicator topic areas to assess the enabling environment for agriculture across 62 countries. The third annual EBA report was released on 7 February 2017. The project is expected to scale up data collection to 80 countries in 2019 as part of a second phase, through which data will be collected and published on a biennial basis, reducing costs and enabling the EBA team to devote more time to improvement and dissemination of the indicators. Throughout its conception and early development, the EBA has been heavily influenced by the World Bank's Doing Business index (DBI), which uses a similar methodology to compare the enabling environment for business across 190 countries and has been operating since 2003.


⁸ The 10 pilot countries were: Ethiopia, Guatemala, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, the Philippines, Rwanda, Spain, Uganda and Ukraine.

Figure 4. EBA timeline

3.2. Political reform and the business environment

The Donor Committee for Enterprise Development (DCED) practical guide for donors, *Supporting Business Environment Reforms*⁹, defines the business environment as ‘a complex of policy, legal, institutional, and regulatory conditions that govern business activities’ — a subset of the overall investment climate (Figure 5). The agricultural enabling environment (AEE), in turn, is a subset of the business environment. Most cross-cutting business environment and investment climate concerns also apply to agricultural firms and smallholders to a greater or lesser extent, but they have a particular interest in a set of technical areas covered by the EBA (including seed, machinery, fertiliser, etc.). Other EBA subject areas look at the particular effects that general business environment issues have on the agricultural sector (access to finance, ICT, markets, transport, etc.).

⁹ DCED, *Supporting Business Environment Reforms. Practical Guidance for Development Agencies*, 2008
Itad
May, 2018

Figure 5. Defining the agricultural enabling environment (AEE)

Source: adapted from DCED, 2008, p2.

This relationship is important, because many lessons that have been learned in the broader Business Environment Reform (BER) sphere — especially about making the process of reform successful — also apply to AEE issues, although agriculture-specific technical expertise is also required. For instance, in 2016 Fintrac reviewed more than 100 US government interventions that involved agricultural enabling environment reform efforts over the previous five years. Their report includes a synthesis of common challenges and strategies, which contain issues that are very familiar in both BER and the wider political reform literature (Box 1).¹⁰

Box 1 Business Environment Reform

There is a wide range of evidence available on the process of BER. The World Bank and DFID are two of the leading publishers of evidence and learning in this area. DFID has accelerated this by establishing the Business Environment Reform Facility (BERF) in 2016 which has included a small number of publications either specific to agriculture or incorporating an agricultural sector analysis.¹¹

In addition to its learning resources DFID has a large well-established pipeline of country-level BER programmes totalling £42m annually by 2017. Around a third of DFID-funded programmes are implemented by the World Bank Group with the remainder implemented by consultancies or directly by DFID country offices.¹²

Established guidance on the process of implementing BER programmes normally also applies to agriculture-specific reform. The previously mentioned DCED guidance for donors is based on 15 core principles. Since then the trend has been for DFID published and funded guidance to lay increasing emphasis on locally-led politically smart adaptive and systemic interventions in both BER and wider ICR.¹³ A notable feature of this literature is its rejection of technocratic ‘best practice’ based on developed countries’ experience in favour of locally adapted ‘best fit’ solutions.¹⁴

¹⁰ Fintrac, 2016, pp22–23.

¹¹ The most closely focused are White and Ayleward, 2016; Mansfield and Mautner Markhof, 2016.

¹² Hetherington, D., 2017, pp1 and 16.

¹³ Laric, 2012; Manuel, 2015, 2016; DFID, 2009, Davies, 2017. Flagship World Bank publications have also covered these trends; see for example World Bank, 2015, chapter 11.

¹⁴ Manuel, 2015, p9, 2016, p3; Laric, 2012, p5.

3.3. The influence of indices

Annex 3 summarises the available literature on the theory relating to the reasons and mechanisms that indices obtain influence. This theory heavily influenced the TOC developed during the inception of this review (see **Error! Reference source not found.**). This analysis concludes with a set of questions that will help to explain the level of uptake and longevity of an index, namely:

- How ownership of the index has been promoted among key stakeholders.
- How risks around re-interpretation or politicisation (real or perceived) are managed.
- To what extent the communication outreach process combines emergent opportunities with longer-term strategic objectives.
- To what extent political context has been taken into consideration in promoting and using the EBA index, and
- To what extent communication materials have been translated and adapted for different actors.

3.4. Consensus on index contents

Although the technical quality of the EBA index is beyond the scope of this evaluation, this is important for the uptake of any index that it is perceived as representing a consensus of stakeholders (as discussed in Annex 3). This requires that:

- Such a consensus exists, and
- That EBA indicators reflect it to the satisfaction of all users.

The review has found some variation even in *the perception of the extent* of consensus. In general, some within the World Bank perceived a higher level of agreement than critics of the index. In fact, a small number of World Bank officials expressed the opinion that criticism of the index stemmed primarily from critics' lack of technical understanding. Needless to say, critics (and many other interviewees, including DFID staff) strongly disagreed with this appraisal.

However, there is broad agreement that the level of consensus varies starkly between different sections of the index. The most significant differences of opinion relate to seeds, fertiliser and machinery — although land is likely to feature on this list once it is scored. Among the cross-cutting themes, environmental sustainability is also hotly contested.

It is worth noting that even if the items that are measured by an index are not contested, there can easily be a perception of bias if the index excludes some aspects of a subject — even if the reason for this exclusion is that *they are* contested. A founding lesson behind the creation of the DB index is 'what gets measured gets done'.¹⁵ An index that measures only the aspects of a subject that are of interest to a particular stakeholder class may therefore be seen as biased, and be expected to lead to reform that only benefits that class. One example of this raised by several interviewees is that the EBA index on machinery only measures policy relating to tractors. Some stakeholders argue that tractor policy is of minimal interest to SHFs in most developing countries, and that policy relating to the dissemination of simpler forms of appropriate technology is more important to this group. Even if the reasons for selecting tractor policy are technical (its cross-country comparability, ease of data collection or consensus on what good tractor policy looks like, for example) this choice may still be seen as biased, or likely to have an inequitable effect.

¹⁵ World Bank, 2004, p17.
Itad
May, 2018

In conclusion, it is worth bearing in mind that:


- There are real differences of opinion between agricultural experts on several issues covered by the EBA index.
- Even when the composition of a sub-index is chosen for purely technical (rather than political) reasons, the sub-index may favour some groups more than others, and consequently be perceived as biased.
- Perception of bias in an index presents a reputational risk to its authors and funders and is likely to inhibit its uptake and use.

4. Methodology and Limitations

4.1. Data sources

Evidence was gathered using the following data collection methods: interviews, online surveys, web analysis, document review and citations analysis. Case studies of two countries (Tanzania and Sudan) were used to gather an in-depth understanding of how EBA dissemination has occurred (Annex 5)¹⁶, and five dissemination events (Table 8) were also examined to assess the quality of EBA engagement with a variety of stakeholders. During analysis, these findings from the global and country level interviews and surveys were coded against the evaluation questions. Finally, the coded results were then synthesised to build up a triangulated basis for the findings.

Figure 6. EBA review design



4.1.1 Interviews

Preliminary interviews were conducted with the EBA team in Washington and with EBA donors (Gates Foundation, DFID, USAID)¹⁷. A second round of interviews obtained views from a broad yet balanced set of stakeholders.¹⁸ Overall 40 interviews were completed (Table 2). The list of persons interviewed is given in Annex 4.

Table 2. Breakdown of interviews by stakeholder type

Type of stakeholder	Desired sample	# interviewed	Difference	
EBA team	6	4	-2	Members of the EBA team only
EBA donor	8	6	-2	Donors that have contributed funding directly to the EBA project
Global				

¹⁶ Ethiopia was meant to be a third case study, but it proved impossible to obtain sufficient interviews to complete this case.

¹⁷ The Netherlands and Denmark, who had both ceased funding of the EBA in 2016, were contacted but were not available for interview.

¹⁸ All but one of the interviews was conducted remotely and were recorded and transcribed in a summary note.

Multilateral	6	6	0	Multilaterals, including members of the World Bank (including country offices) that are not directly working on EBA
Private sector	3	3	0	International firms and international apex organisations
CSO	3	7	+4	Organisations with relevant global experience that do not fit into other categories
Media	3	1	-2	International media, including print, radio, TV, online
Expert/ Researcher	6	6	0	Individuals producing independent (of the World Bank) analysis on agricultural policy, including academics, think tanks, institutes etc.
National				Government officials, politicians and advisors in developing countries
Government	6	2	-4	Local and international firms with a significant national presence, including apex organisations, chambers of commerce (even if government-allied)
Private sector	6	3	-3	Local media including radio, TV, print and freelance journalists
CSO	6	1	-5	Organisations with relevant experience that don't fit into other categories
Media	3	0	-3	Individuals with relevant national experience that don't fit into other categories
Expert /researcher	6	2	-4	Members of the EBA team only
Total	62	41	-21	Donors that have contributed funding directly to the EBA project

Interviews for the country case studies covered a range of EBA EDI activities: launch events, in-depth discussions with targeted country governments, briefing notes for specific governments, and engagement with a country government on a specific reform area. The two case study countries of Tanzania and Sudan are DFID priority countries. Tanzania reflects a situation where there is a well-structured agricultural policy environment and development partner operations are ongoing, while Sudan in contrast has limited development partner operational activity but there is an appetite from government and the private sector for policy advice and reform in order to stimulate future development partner investments.

Case study of global engagements: the assessment of outreach focused on four case studies, each examining a particular type of engagement activity: a national policy conference in Tanzania, two policy workshops in Kenya and Tanzania, a continental trade association meeting in Senegal, and an EBA webinar. The events varied in terms their number of participants and topic but were all held within the past two years (Table 3).

Table 3. Engagement events chosen for global case studies

Engagement	Place and dates	Stakeholder category	Details
EBA launch event	Tanzania, March, 2017	Government, Bank, CSOs, Private Sector	Country level launch of EBA report with 200 participants.
EBA workshops	Tanzania and Kenya October 2017	Government., Bank, AGRA, private sector	Two workshops on policy implications of EBA results. 40 participants at each
African Seed Trade Association (AFSTA) Annual Congress	Dakar, Senegal March 3, 2017	Private sector	The EBA team presented a session on ' <i>the Seed Market in Africa: challenges and prospects</i> '. The event had an attendance of over 300 delegates representing the seed sector. Delegates came from 47 countries from all over the World.

EBA 2016: Comparing regulatory practices.	Webinar May 12, 2016	Various countries and stakeholders	To provide feedback from 200 participants on EBA's methodological approaches and clarifying questions to strengthen the research effort and its outputs.
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4.1.2 Online surveys

Two online surveys were administered in order to obtain views on a subset of review questions from a larger sample of stakeholders than would be possible using interviews. The survey was short, relying primarily on multiple-choice questions. The first round contacted members of EBA's global experts list. The second round included attendees at the five dissemination events in Table 3.

Analysis of the survey results shows that for the global experts' groups, the pattern of respondents matches the original full list. Over half are based in the US and the majority work for the World Bank Group or other international organisations. Only five respondents are from Africa and six from Asia, while a minority are from CSOs, private sector or academia.

For the events, given the location (in Tanzania, Kenya, Senegal and webinar), the representation is very different, with donors representing only 3%, while the private sector were nearly half of the respondents, followed by government and NGO staff.

Table 4. Sample Response Rate for the Review's Online Surveys

	Target audience	Response	Response Rate
Online Survey			
Global	173	28	16%
Event	704	103	15%
3rd Annual Agricultural Policy Conference, Tanzania	209	19	9%
African Seed Trade Association (AFSTA), Senegal	319	36	11%
AGRILINKS- EBA webinar	98	21	21%
WB-EBA Dissemination Workshop, Tanzania	33	11	33%
WB-EBA Dissemination Workshop, Kenya	45	16	36%

4.1.3 Website and social media analytics

Data on downloads from the EBA website provided by the EBA team covered various aspects, including profile and location of website users, users and returning users per month, number of evidence products/documents downloaded, page views per month from EBA's resource database, website pages most visited. No twitter or other social media account is maintained by EBA.

4.1.4 Citation analysis

A brief citation analysis was undertaken of available research publications that draw on EBA data or products. The citation analysis measured the relative importance or impact of EBA publications by counting the number of times they have been cited by other works, and the type of document in which they have been cited (i.e. journal article, grey literature, press or online article, etc.).

4.2. Analysis and synthesis

Interviews provided the key evidence base for the review. The semi-structured interview approach, as described above, covered various review questions depending on the interviewee. The output from the first round of interviews with primary stakeholders was a series of transcripts containing contribution stories which detail how the EBA team and its donors think EBA products contribute to change through their EDI work. Our analysis assembled these stories and then compared them with the views of a range of external stakeholders in the second round of interviews (such as policymakers and key influencers). This phase of the analysis involved coding and summarising areas of similarity or difference in the stories and identifying which kinds of stakeholders hold different views.

The online survey results were also collated and tabulated by relevant variables, including stakeholder category, country of response and topic area.

The synthesis stage drew together the evidence from the various data sources. The analysis was structured around the six review questions and the evidence coded accordingly. Evidence from interviews was triangulated with documentary evidence, web analysis, online survey results and external literature. This process has led to an evidence-based assessment of what EBA outcomes have been achieved, the extent to which EBA made a contribution and the role that other actors and factors played.

4.3. Limitations

Key limitations and mitigation measures are as follows:

Sampling: the actual number of completed interviews fell short of the target due to unavailability of respondents and the difficulty of reaching stakeholders over the December/January period. This has somewhat limited the evidence base especially from media and national CSOs (largely because of the lack of interviews in Ethiopia). However, the balance across other stakeholder groups is close to the original sample plan.

The online survey responses (at 16% and 15% for the global and the event respondents) were fairly low though not untypical of such surveys. When disaggregated by categories such as employer or event, the sample sizes are small and should not be considered statistically representative. The overall sample results and the qualitative responses nevertheless provided useful insights.

Bias may arise from the online surveys because those responding to the surveys may have a more positive bias towards EBA than those who did not respond. Steps were taken to minimise such bias for the interviews by (i) challenging respondents to describe other factors beyond EBA EDI activities that contribute to the outcomes, and (ii) by ensuring we sampled respondents (such as the Oakland Institute) that had critical perspectives on the EBA.

5. Findings

5.1. How relevant are current EBA products and subject areas in terms of promoting uptake for improving the enabling environment for agriculture?

1.1: Which products have been most relevant and why?

1.2: Which subject areas have been the most relevant and why?


1.3: For which uses are the EBA's products most relevant?

5.1.1 Products

Overall EBA products are becoming better known by various stakeholders in target countries and through global events, particularly with private sector actors, donors, researchers and civil society that have a connection with the project.


The flagship Annual Reports are the most well-known and downloaded products accounting for over three-quarters of all downloads from the EBA website (Figure 7 and Table 5).

Figure 7. Annual Report downloads 2016-17



The popularity of the 2017 report currently greatly exceeds that of the 2016 report, reflecting users' preference for recent data. When compared over the period of their respective launches, the 2017 report has a higher spike in the first month, but fewer downloads overall (16% fewer over its first 11 months, see Figure 8). The page view figures show similar levels comparing 2016 and 2017 (Figure 8) indicating a slight reduction in traffic (-2.5%), significantly below the 10% growth target set by DFID.¹⁹


¹⁹ DFID, EBA WB-DFID Partnership for Enabling the Business of Agriculture Trust Fund, Logframe Output 3.2, 2016. The logframe establishes 2016 as the base year, but does not list a baseline figure, and sets both 10% growth and 30,000 page views as targets for October 2017. If our methodology is to be used by DFID (no source for the data is given) then the baseline should probably have been set at a higher level.

Figure 8. Comparison of all page views for the EBA website from the month of report launch in 2016 and 2017**Table 5. Downloaded products from EBA website Jan 2016-Dec 2017**

Report	Downloads	Percent
Annual Reports/highlights	15,071	82%
Databases	767	4%
Methodology	742	4%
Country reports	446	2%
Topic reports	611	3%
Others	647	4%
Total	18,284	100%

Overall, the download of EBA products has flat-lined in the past two years, apart from the period when the Annual Reports are released.

It is interesting to compare these download figures with those from the EBA's most vocal critic, the Oakland Institute. According to their Policy Director, their main reports (three reports, one brief) on the EBA were downloaded close to 10,000 times in total between the different websites over three years. Related Facebook posts reached between 100,000 and 200,000 people. The Our Land Our Business video has been seen over 20,000 times on YouTube. In general, the online reach of EBA criticism is comparable to that of the EBA, although it is skewed far more towards brief products and videos, shared via social media, and away from detailed analytical reports (unlike the EBA itself).


Figure 9. Visits per month to EBA website

The pattern of **visits by country** shows that while North America dominates (with US 35%), visits from African countries come third (Table 6 and Figure 10). Indeed, when the USA is stripped out of the data, African countries account for 28% of visits, which is an encouraging level of engagement.

Table 6. EBA website visits by country of origin

Region	Percent of visits	Country count
North America ^{1/}	37%	23
Europe	20%	43
Africa	18%	52
Asia	14%	30
Russia and Former Republics	4%	12
South America	4%	19
Middle East	1%	12
Australia & Pacific	1%	10
Total	100%	201

^{1/} United States accounts for 35% of these

Figure 10. Visits to EBA website by country on a per capita basis (Jan 2016-Dec 2017)

While the Annual Reports are regarded as well written, comprehensive and clearly illustrated, they are also seen by some observers as difficult to digest for target policymakers, slow to release, and a major expense of time and effort for the EBA team. Therefore, the decision to move to two-yearly reporting will therefore ease pressure on the EBA team and allow them time to produce other interim outputs in line with agreed DFID Trust Fund deliverables.

Other products are much less downloaded. Topic reports, country reports, databases and methodology papers together account for 14% of downloads. However, feedback from our interviews and surveys indicate that topic and country reports in particular are seen as relevant and useful. Some interviewees reported receiving hard copies of country reports during engagement events, so access of these via the website understates their reach. There appears to be little knowledge or use so far of recent additions like data modelling tools.

From interviews, there are mixed views about the **quality of the EBA website**, from being easy to use to being rather inaccessible. More technical audiences such as researchers find the website easy to use while other users with a less technical background find the site more difficult to navigate. While it contains a great deal of information about EBA sources and the EBA downloads, some web pages are not kept fully up-to-date, for example the news page listing EBA events contain details of events that are some six months old.

5.1.2 Topics

Table 7 lists the most popular product downloads for nine EBA topics. The pattern mostly reflects the phasing in of topics over the past three years. Seed is the most popular topic by far, reflecting its importance in all arable agricultural systems and the size of the industry supplying seeds and also perhaps a higher level of critical attention from NGOs. Interviews with seed industry representatives reflected their engagement with the EBA and it is seen as well aligned to corporate advocacy needs. At the other end of the scale, the machinery topic is the least downloaded (apart from gender, livestock and water which are not shown because the download data is limited to the top 40 items). With its focus on tractors, this topic has received criticism from NGOs concerned about relevance to smallholders. But other views from Tanzania and Sudan note the relevance of tractor regulations to the sector.

Table 7. Downloads by Topic from the EBA website Jan 2016 – Dec 2017 ^{1/}

Topics ^{2/}		
1. <i>Seed</i>	515	41%
2. <i>Finance</i>	182	14%
3. <i>Fertiliser</i>	162	13%
4. <i>Transport</i>	99	8%
5. <i>Markets</i>	80	6%
6. <i>Land</i>	73	6%
7. <i>ICT</i>	57	5%
8. <i>Environment</i>	50	4%
9. <i>Machinery</i>	48	4%
Total	1,266	100%

^{1/} The data set was restricted to the top 40 downloads only. The figures include topic and topic methodology reports.

^{2/} Italicised topics were also included in the 2016 Annual Report.

Comments on transport included the concern that the index concentrates on regional rather than in-country aspects, with the need to measure rural road quality.

There was a strong welcome for the four new topics introduced in 2017. Land and livestock were regarded as critical issues, and good experts had been utilised to provide data. However, the variety of livestock systems especially between richer and poorer countries was considered problematic, and regional comparisons therefore the most relevant. Gender and environment were regarded as work in progress. NGO voices expressed frustration at the delay in their introduction. There were several voices that felt these topics should not be treated as standalone topics but should be integrated across the other topics.

Finally, a broad issue raised by NGOs and some national actors was that while the methodology was well explained, the basis for indicator selection and how the data was processed was less transparent. This may be a result of limited exposure to the EBA by some event attendees.

5.1.3 Product Use

The World Bank makes use of EBA in several ways – for both its analytical work and its lending. It is one of a number of diagnostic tools utilised in its Maximising Finance for Development initiative. USAID and Gates Foundation and other agencies such as FAO report that they make good internal use of EBA data to track progress of operations at country level, to be aware of regulatory trends. DFID has also seen the potential though it is less clear that they make as much use of the EBA data. AGRA sees EBA data as very relevant when initiating policy dialogue. Private sector actors use EBA results in lobbying and investment planning and for background research. INGOs were critical of the first two annual reports partly because they were resistant to a lack of attention to smallholder farmer needs and partly because of low attention to gender aspects and sustainability – topics that have since been introduced. However, the case studies show that at country level some NGOs are accessing the reports especially country level data and use the EBA data as core or additional inputs to conduct research or write articles.

The inclusion of **distance-to-frontier rankings** receive a mixed response from stakeholders. Some regard these as a critical element of the EBA because they drive competition between countries especially within regions or countries at similar stages of development and draw the attention of senior policymakers as well as the public. Others however, view such rankings as misleading and even meaningless, mainly because it is very difficult to compare very different economies especially those that do not all easily fit into the standard business models used in the EBA.

Finally, while a number of published articles have been produced, in general, based on our interviews and citations analysis (Annex 8), third party research has been limited so far.

5.1.4 Conclusions

The flagship Annual Report is by far the most important product the EBA produces; it takes a great deal of time to produce and is downloaded much more often than other EBA products. It is widely perceived to be of high technical quality.

Overall, the web presence of the EBA is not rising, with page views and report downloads both falling slightly in 2017. However, web analytics suggest that the geographic dispersion of visitors is encouraging, with substantial interest from across Africa, Asia and Latin America.

Many interviewees hoped that the EBA would produce more short, technically simple information products in future. There is a clear demand for more translations of materials into the main languages of countries covered by the index. EBA critics have had much more success sharing brief products and videos than detailed analytical reports.

According to web data, there has been most interest in the seed, finance and fertiliser sub-indices. Seeds and fertiliser have been particularly controversial topics, so it is likely that some of the interest in these areas is from critics of the index.

5.2. How effective has the EBA been in identifying and prioritising individuals and organisations that are influential with respect to the enabling environment for agriculture?

2.1: Who has been identified and prioritised?

2.2: How strategic has this process been?

2.3: What kind of influence do [the people identified and prioritised] have?

2.4: Have any clear opportunities been missed [i.e. people not prioritised that should have been]?

Identification and prioritisation happens simultaneously at the global and national level. As discussed in Annex 3, engagement with globally influential stakeholders is important to improve recognition and credibility of the index. However, actual reform happens at the national level, so the EBA team have had to decide the extent to which they should promote the index to groups of national stakeholders in order to accelerate uptake within policy dialogue and formation.

General

The EBA team has not used a particularly strategic approach to selecting individuals or organisations to target through engagement events. Their *Stakeholder Engagement Plan* is a brief, high level document that does not go beyond a simple list of target stakeholder groups.²⁰ Rather than target particular individuals or organisations, the team have opportunistically attended engagement events that they judged would provide cost-effective opportunities to reach groups of stakeholders.

It is unclear how helpful any strategy is in identifying individuals that will be important for reform. At the national level, some business environment reform programmes have warned against prioritising stakeholders through any process short of broad engagement, noting that ‘preconceived ideas about the “optimal” partner have been proved wrong’ and ‘it has been surprising which organisations’ have turned out to be the most effective supporters of reform, even within government.²¹ The EBA team’s opportunism may have been more appropriate than a detailed strategy at the early stages of EBA’s evolution. Now that the EBA has a better understanding of the stakeholders involved, it would be beneficial to plan engagement in more detail. It is also important to make the distinction between *internal* engagement within the World Bank and EBA donors —

²⁰ EBA team, 2015, p2.

²¹ Hetherington, 2017, pp19–20. See also Davies, 2017, p15.

where targets for dissemination should be easier to identify — and *external* engagement with those outside these systems.

Global

Awareness of the EBA has been strong among a large number of international NGOs (INGOs), who have spread information about the index within their community more proactively than any other stakeholder group. Reactions to the index have been mixed. Broadly, INGOs fit into two categories, ‘opposed’ and ‘collaborative’. The opposed group is based on an organisational network that had been active in advocacy against World Bank policy and projects, including Doing Business, prior to the creation of the EBA. Engagement with this group has been difficult. Some organisations have refused engagement requests; others have used engagement events to raise awareness of their views outside of the World Bank. This is the one area in which a proactive engagement strategy was clearly warranted. The likelihood of hostile advocacy should have been predictable based on the Doing Business experience and earlier, more inclusive engagement with this sector may have persuaded more organisations to take a collaborative rather than an opposed stance.


A much smaller group of INGOs has actively collaborated with the EBA team, helping them to navigate complex stakeholder networks and providing technical feedback on the content of indicators, which appears to have resulted in tangible improvements. This group is ambivalent towards the indicators, seeing the potential benefit of a high-quality index but concerned that an index that does not, for example, properly address gender issues or environmental sustainability could do more harm than good. Until 2017, this group believed that engagement with the team could be a cost-effective means of spending their own funds to improve the quality of the index and thereby improve outcomes for SHFs. However, they always viewed their own engagement as expensive, they have never received support from a donor for this work, and many of their proposals were ignored, leading them to collectively decide to cease engaging in 2017.

Perhaps the most surprising challenge in global engagement has been dissemination of the EBA index within the World Bank Group and some EBA donors. The EBA team has acknowledged that internal dissemination can be more difficult than external. USAID has been the most proactive in generating materials based on the EBA, producing 17 ‘data snapshots’, each summarising the index for an individual economy. However, uptake and use by country offices of the World Bank, USAID and DFID has been mixed. Use and promotion centrally within DFID seems to have lagged behind that in USAID and the Gates Foundation.

Companies are primarily interested in the jurisdictions in which they operate, so have mostly been analysed as national-level actors (even when they work in multiple countries). However, there are also international business membership organisations (BMOs), typically organised along sector lines, that are active at the continental and global level in influencing industry thinking and international norms. The engagement event case studies include a seed sector event in Senegal. This type of event gives an opportunity to examine a sub-index in greater detail, with scrutiny from more sector experts, than is possible at events covering the whole of the EBA, though even here participants found some of the content too technical. Some attendees also perceived that the event was pitched at larger international firms rather than the smaller national firms in attendance.

National

The EBA team have conducted an impressive amount of direct engagement with stakeholders in national reform processes and have covered a large number of countries (darker shading in Figure 11).

Figure 11. Countries visited by EBA engagement events in 2017

Understandably, identification and prioritisation of stakeholders within a national context is almost impossible remotely. Our case studies suggest that the EBA team used locally present counterparts, where practical, to guide their identification and prioritisation. These counterparts were usually locally present donors, diplomats and multilaterals (including World Bank country offices). Many interviewees emphasised the need for a national level strategy to guide engagement, and the success of each national engagement is likely to be closely linked with the existence of locally present partners, and their understanding of the local political economy and familiarity with stakeholders. Interviewees indicated that DFID country office staff members were sometimes involved in relevant discussions, but none were available for interview.

Engagement with the private sector in BER is almost always skewed by the fact that the companies with the most time and money to engage, and the greatest influence with government, tend to be formal, large, urban and male-owned and -managed. This bias has affected both the EBA's engagement and the conduct of this review. Even with a local presence it remains difficult to counteract this bias; to do so when engaging with a large number of countries from a central base is almost impossible. Based on interview evidence, the EBA team has been effective in identifying large, influential firms and raising their awareness of the index. This is further illustrated by the fact that the private sector represented more than 45% of respondents to our event attendee survey.

The EBA approach has been to assess regulatory and policy reforms affecting agricultural service providers rather than producers directly. The theory is that easing the cost of doing business for these businesses will lead to greater savings or profits for producers, whether at the large- or small-scale end of production. EBA expects producers to be market-ready, with the capacity to respond to a 'more enabled environment'. While this makes data collection much easier, the approach is contested by those who believe that smallholders face significantly different needs and constraints than larger firms, and smallholders should be prioritised in donor programmes that aim to reduce poverty. This is revisited under Section 5.6, but for the question of engagement, it has been very difficult to involve SHFs in the development and roll out of EBA so far, and also difficult to incorporate their views into this review.

The image of the World Bank (and international institutions more generally) varies considerably between governments in EBA countries. Naturally this affects how receptive government officials are to the EBA, and national engagement should reflect this. Interviews also identified the interplay of government institutions required for successful reform. While reform in tax or transport may be a priority for the ministry of agriculture, the power to reform is likely to lie primarily with a ministry of finance or transportation, for whom the issue may be of lower priority, and an agricultural index may be of less obvious interest. Case studies also illustrated how

the prior existence of good inter-ministerial and public–private coordination mechanisms can ease dissemination of a tool like the EBA considerably.

Subnational

The difficulties already mentioned in relation to national level engagement are compounded for subnational engagement. Some aspects of the AEE are often partially under the jurisdiction of subnational governments, including taxation, land rights, licences and permits. The EBA’s current face-to-face engagement strategies are not suitable to scaling to subnational engagement, beyond perhaps the highest subnational divisions in the largest countries (i.e. those covered by pilot state level reports in countries such as India). Nor would it be feasible for the EBA team to identify or prioritise subnational stakeholders in most countries.

Missed opportunities

Interviewees raised three main missed opportunities:

- Most frequently mentioned would have been to exploit the influence of World Bank staff and EBA donors by disseminating the index effectively through these networks, and consequently for country offices to advocate in a context-sensitive way.
- Secondly, a lack of resources devoted to early engagement has meant that stakeholders felt that engagement was superficial and did not meaningfully take feedback on board.
- Finally, one interviewee believed that short, simplified, translated products could have been effective in generating national media interest (a neglected target), which could have amplified recognition of the EBA far beyond the reach achievable through engagement events.

5.2.1 Conclusions

National level uptake requires locally present organisations, with an understanding of the reform landscape, to promote the EBA with stakeholders and find ways to incorporate it into existing dialogue and coordination mechanisms. So far these organisations have usually been donor or multilateral offices.

Selection of engagement events, while being demand-driven and aimed at contexts where the EBA’s utility would be recognised, has been opportunistic rather than strategic. In general there is little evidence that developing a comprehensive strategy early on would have improved the outcomes of engagement (and may have been counterproductive). The exception is that reputational risks may have been mitigated if predictable INGO criticism based on Doing Business criticism had been anticipated.

The loss of engagement from ‘collaborative’ INGOs should be a serious concern (especially for DFID) because of the loss of a robust independent challenge and help in understanding likely impact on SHFs.

Private sector engagement has been effective particularly in reaching out to global level industry associations and the largest national firms. The engagement with medium and smaller scale businesses has been indirect (through trade associations, for example), but this group, not having the resources, lobbying strength, and privileged access to government of larger firms, potentially has more to gain from the EBA data. SHFs are usually not influential in reform processes but are an important group for different forms of engagement, since one of DFID’s intentions in funding the EBA is to ‘encourage transformative change to benefit...informal smallholder farmers’.²²

²² Business case, p1.
Itad
May, 2018

5.3. How effective and efficient are EBA's country/regional/global EDI activities at promoting uptake of EBA products?

3.1: What have been the most efficient forms of engagement?

3.2: How many people have been reached through different types of engagements?

3.3: How are products being used by researchers, CSOs, private sector and the media?

3.4: How widely are products being disseminated and discussed?

3.5: How are products being used within government policy processes and documents?


3.6: What particular strategies have the EBA team used for EDI? Have they been effective?

Strategies, effectiveness and reach

The 2017 DFID draft annual review of EBA recommends that in future the EBA team 'disaggregates financial reporting on different stages of programme activities to show the specific comparative costs of data collection, report preparation and dissemination.'²³ Our review was not able to access disaggregated figures. This data is important as DFID continues to assess which activities should be programmed through the EBA team and which activities are better placed within its complementary programmes (whether for value for money (VFM) or other reasons).

Dissemination clearly takes value for money into account, with the EBA team taking advantage of existing high-profile events to directly reach a large (often international) audience without the costs of convening an event. However, the EBA team's primary competence lies in their exceptional level of technical knowledge, rather than as specialists in promotion or dissemination. USAID have chosen to develop their own products based on EBA data. Other EBA donors may be better placed to produce tailored products that are based on the EBA but oriented towards reform, because the EBA team needs to maintain a neutral position, and because additional local knowledge is needed to customise products for a particular target audience. In particular, locally present donors may be in a better position to encourage or support *co-creation of products* with national governments, BMOs and other local actors.²⁴ Once DFID has access to financial reporting in this area, and is therefore able to compare the cost of various dissemination activities through the EBA team with alternative mechanisms, it will be better placed to develop its own strategy.

Figure 12: Engagement events (including global, regional and country)



The EBA team is rapidly improving the data it collects on the reach of its engagement (Figure 12). In 2017, 56 events were held, for which participant numbers were recorded or estimated for 40. An estimated 5,104 people attended these 40 events, which varied in size from 3 to 1,200 people. 2,036 participants attended events in Africa, with most of the remainder joining events in North America and Europe. Little data is available on

²³ Recommendation 6, p15.

²⁴ See Annex 3 for more information on the importance of co-creation as a means to greater adoption and ownership.

participant numbers for the 43 events held in 2016. Data on the reach of written and online products is covered in Section 5.1.

The main elements of the EBA team's strategy for EDI appear:

- To be country-led: to follow engagement advice from a locally present donor or World Bank country office where available, especially to fit into the calendar of national level PPD events.
- To leverage existing regional and international dialogue events to reach a large, relevant audience at minimal cost.
- To emphasise face-to-face engagement: given the resources available, the EBA team has covered a large, geographically diverse set of events.

A fairly minor component of the engagement strategy is noteworthy due to the number of INGOs that independently drew attention to it. INGOs commented that at times they were given a public relations professional as a primary contact.²⁵ This was universally perceived as a signal that their views were not valued and would be ignored, which damaged both good and bad pre-existing relationships. For INGOs that were carefully considering whether the cost they incurred through analysis and engagement was justified by the level of influence they expected to have in improving the EBA indicators, this signal was important.

How is the EBA being used?

Use of the EBA by the global media has been minimal (drawing on our online search we have identified 26 online and press articles from 2014 to 2017). National coverage in case study countries has been limited to reporting on launch events (often by reproducing press releases verbatim).²⁶ In Sudan, the World Bank country office published press releases on national engagement, without which there may have been no local coverage at all.

A summary of academic publications that have used or referred to EBA data is given in Annex 8. Overall, the uptake and use of the EBA by academics and think tanks has been modest: EBA has been cited in 34 documents and out of them 8 have used the EBA data to conduct some descriptive or econometric analysis. However, the experience of Doing Business was that use of the index in academic publications accelerated significantly about four years after the publication of the first report (equivalent to 2019 for the EBA). A UK think tank interviewed explained that relevant experts were aware of the EBA but were not considering using it at present. Another expert suggested that there was not yet a sufficient time-series of data for researchers to have interest. Another expert indicated that the cross-country analysis offered by this type of index can be useful but should not necessarily be taken as a means of comparing countries to motivate policy change.

Donors

USAID has used the EBA in national 'data snapshots' in 17 countries, in addition to blog posts and a report on the use of EBA to support harmonisation of seed regulation in SADC. Country level staff in USAID and IFC use EBA as part of a range of diagnostic tools and reference points for in-country policy dialogue, noting its helpful 'granularity'.

The World Bank has used EBA data as part of the internal country briefings it provides to staff members on mission to countries covered by the index. The Gates Foundation has found similar uses for the index. The comparability of EBA data makes it particularly suited to this type of use within organisations that work across many countries.

²⁵ This comment was received from INGOs in both groups described in Section 5.2, both 'opposed' and 'collaborative'.

²⁶ E.g. Sudan Media Centre (SMC), 2017.

At present it seems that DFID's use of the EBA indicators is more limited, both centrally and in country contexts. However, it was not possible to interview any country office staff, so it was not possible to confirm that this is the case for country offices.

Government

Across all case studies, government officials have proved the most difficult stakeholder group to include in our interviews. As such the evidence gathered on the extent of use of the EBA within government systems and documents has been limited. Of the government respondents to the event survey, 15% had used the EBA prior to the event they attended, and 35% had used it since.²⁷ This selection is likely to be heavily biased towards respondents interested in the EBA.

Private Sector

As detailed in the case studies in Annex 5, there is evidence of uptake by private sector organisations for lobbying in Tanzania, whereas in Sudan, large companies had been made aware of the EBA but had not subsequently used the index.

5.3.1 Engagement case studies

As part of the evaluation, information was collected through interviews and an online survey on a selection of engagement events, intended to illustrate the variety of events attended by the EBA team. Findings are summarised in Table 8.


Table 8: Case studies on engagement events

Launch event		Country level launch of EBA report
Country:	Tanzania	This launch was an example of the EBA team taking advantage of a major national policy conference to reach a wide range of important stakeholders. Some regarded the launch as 'ceremonial', with limited discussion, while others viewed it to be relevant, clear, efficient and representative — according to our survey, it received the best ratings in all categories except for results.
Date:	March 2017	
Attendees:	200 mixed (government, CSOs, World Bank, private sector)	
Workshop		Policy implications of EBA results
Country:	Tanzania	This workshop was conceived as a follow-up to the launch earlier in the year (see above), to enable focused dialogue on four of EBA's reform areas: seeds, markets, fertiliser and finance. AGRA convened the event through MIRA, and in addition to a central representative of the EBA team, World Bank and USAID country office representatives attended.
Date:	October 2017	
Attendees:	40 mixed	
		Feedback on the event was broadly positive, though some participants noted that the EBA had not fully captured the situation in Tanzania.

²⁷ Including the 15% who had already used it prior to the event. n=20.

Workshop		Policy implications of EBA results
Country:	Kenya	<p>The EBA report was presented during a small agribusiness development event. Based on event feedback, the presentation was well received. Many comments from attendees encouraged more consultation and dialogue with the private sector, sector organisations such as the Tanzania Seed Traders Association (TASTA) and Fertiliser Society of Tanzania (FST) and think tanks such as the Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis (KIPPRA).</p> <p>Participants emphasised that the main challenge in Kenya is implementation rather than putting laws into place. An index therefore has to measure the practical reality in order to be relevant. They also expressed concern that clear planning was needed if any practical action were to follow on from the discussion.</p>
Date:	October 2017	
Attendees:	40 mixed	
Seed		African Seed Trade Association (AFSTA) annual conference
Country:	Senegal	<p>Again, the EBA team took advantage of a major annual event for the seed sector to present the index to a plenary of delegates. The presentation was well received, although the EBA seed chapter covers only maize, so not of interest to all present.</p> <p>Concerns were raised about the lack of follow-up. International sector associations like AFTSA have an important role in lobbying individual governments for reform. Partnering with such organisations to make their advocacy more effective can provide a more sustainable and cost-effective route to reform than donor-brokered reform processes.²⁸</p> <p>The presentation was well attended and featured a positive Q&A session, though some attendees found the content rather technical, and the process for selecting indicators unclear.</p> <p>Some felt that the EBA was pitched more at the larger companies at the event, who already have their own resources to lobby. This kind of event is less able to assist smaller, national seed firms.</p> <p>This event received the lowest rating for results and follow-up for any event in our survey.</p>
Date:	March 2017	
Attendees:	300 private sector	
Webinar		Comparing good regulatory practices
Country:	N/A	<p>In 2016, the EBA team conducted a webinar with a detailed description of the methodology for each topic, translated into French, Spanish and Russian. The objective of the session was to go beyond raising awareness, to obtain feedback that could be used to further improve the indicators before the 2017 dataset was collected. Transcripts for the presentation and chat, and a recording of the event, were published online following the event. The event attracted a geographically diverse audience, including strong representation from Sub-Saharan Africa and South America (see Figure 13).</p> <p>Despite the unusual nature of the webinar compared to typical engagement events conducted by the EBA team, the feedback provided in our online survey was similar to other events: the event received strong ratings overall, with the lowest score given for results and follow-up.</p>
Date:	May 2016	
Attendees:	200 mixed, including CSOs and academics	

²⁸ DFID has used this market systems approach to improving the effectiveness of the reform system in BER programmes in Nigeria (ENABLE and ENABLE II) and Zimbabwe (BEEP), with positive results.

Figure 13. Location of webinar participants (May 2016)

As part of the online survey, attendees were asked to rate the event they attended against five criteria, on a scale of 1 (least effective) to 5 (most effective). The results are [below]. In general, the results are very positive, with a clear majority of scores between 4 and 5. The weakest area is ‘results’, or ‘did any follow-up result from the meeting?’ reflecting the fact that most events are not an integral part of an established PPD process. This should not be seen as a criticism of EBA engagement, but rather a reminder that EBA dissemination must be accompanied by national level dialogue in order to feed in to practical reform.

Table 9. Online survey results on EBA events

Event	Results	Efficiency	Clarity	Representativeness	Relevance	Count
3rd Annual Agricultural Policy Conference, Tanzania	3.4	4.7	4.4	4.2	4.8	19
EBA Dissemination Workshop, Tanzania	3.7	4.4	4.2	3.7	4.3	11
EBA Dissemination Workshop, Kenya	2.3	4.2	4.1	3.4	4.2	16
African Seed Trade Association, Senegal	2.7	4.3	4.2	3.5	4.4	36
AGRILINKS — Enabling the Business of Agriculture webinar	2.5	3.9	4.0	3.5	3.9	21
Total	2.9	4.3	4.2	3.6	4.3	103

5.3.2 Conclusions

The EBA is producing a high quality, rigorous set of comparable indices and analytical products, but so far complementary downstream policy engagement by other organisations (including DFID) and parts of the World Bank has been limited and *ad hoc*.

As the scale of interest in the EBA increases, it would be expected that there would be a broad shift from strategies with high variable costs (face-to-face engagement) to those with very low variable costs (web engagement, written analytical products and translations). Between 2016 and 2017, web engagement has been

roughly static, suggesting that it may not yet be time for this shift to take place and that web-based products could be improved and made easier to access.

The use of public relations expertise in managing contact with INGOs has had a negative effect on various relationships and has been perceived as a sign that the EBA team wishes to use engagement only to disseminate their product rather than as a two-way dialogue.

The EBA team's lack of specific expertise in knowledge management has meant that less evidence has been collected about what works than could have been the case.

Co-creation of products can be an important step in encouraging adoption and ownership, but the EBA team is less well placed than locally present actors to co-produce materials in partnership with national governments, BMOs, the private sector or media.

5.4. How effective are the EBA team at identifying and utilising reform agendas within governments to promote uptake?²⁹

4.1: Which reform agendas have been identified?

4.2: How has the team engaged in each case?

4.3: What have been the results of this engagement?

Drawing on our two case studies, the main reform areas identified by either the EBA team or this review are:

- In Sudan:
 - fertiliser standards
 - financial inclusion
 - seed variety registration and quality control.³⁰
- In Tanzania:
 - tax reform (elimination, reduction and rationalisation), including crop cess
 - digitisation of regulatory documents and processes
 - seed registration and quality control.

Tanzania and Sudan offer a clear distinction in the level of institutional structure around business and agricultural environment reform. Tanzania has a High-Level Public–Private Dialogue on Doing Business, and an Annual Agricultural Policy Conference, which was used to launch the EBA report in 2017 (see Annex 5 for more details). In contrast, Sudan's fora for cross-government and public–private engagement are still under development, and dialogue is currently more likely to be ad hoc and informal.

Nevertheless, engagement by the EBA team has been fairly similar in both cases. They have been guided by locally present actors; in both cases World Bank country offices that have taken an active interest both in reform and in promoting the EBA. In support, the EBA team provided country briefs, and attended launch events, whether they were bespoke (Sudan) or in the margins of mainstream dialogue events (Tanzania). In both cases, the main result of the EBA team's engagement has been to help to frame issues, facilitating further dialogue and action by government, the private sector and local donor offices (in these cases, particularly of the World Bank). In Sudan, EBA data was used by a trust fund steering committee in deciding to

²⁹ This section focuses on country case studies in Tanzania and Sudan. An additional case study was attempted in Ethiopia, selected as a country where engagement has been more difficult, but insufficient evidence was obtained to be able to draw firm conclusions.

³⁰ This agenda is identified in DFID's draft 2017 annual review (appendix 3) but was not mentioned by interviewees.

support early actions towards reform for financial inclusion. In Tanzania, private sector organisations used EBA data independently to lobby for positive change and to oppose retroactive change to fertiliser procurement policy. Although Ethiopia did not form a case study, the experience there according to one interviewee was that the EBA was seen as a heavy data extraction process with insufficient follow-up engagement by the EBA team. EBA was competing in a crowded reform environment, and there was insufficient consultation with key government offices.

Other interviewees expressed concern about the World Bank's understanding of the reform process, particularly legal and parliamentary processes later in the reform process, where reforms often stall.

In general, interviewees did not expect that the EBA team would lead in either identifying reform agendas or providing intensive support to them. Where donors were expected to be active in reform, the expectation was that country offices would lead in this role. This is in accordance with the EBA team's implicit Theory of Change, that an operational opportunity would be exploited by an operational project to drive reform rather than further engagement from the EBA team (Figure 2). The main expectation that engagement audiences had of the EBA team, that was not met, was of practical guidance. In Sudan in particular, event attendees asked specifically what reforms were needed to address problems highlighted by the index, and expected to receive more concrete guidance than they were given.

Considering the EBA team's lack of familiarity with national contexts, the impracticality of conducting political economy analysis, and the World Bank's need to remain politically neutral, it is appropriate that this sort of guidance was not provided. However, this does appear to be a strong entry point for a next phase of donor support, and a means of making EBA promotion more action-oriented. The survey revealed that event participants perceived there to be the most room for improvement in terms of engagement events leading to follow-up and results.³¹

5.4.1 Conclusions

This review's focus on the EBA team as the most appropriate actor to identify and use national reform agendas was inappropriate. The effectiveness of EBA data in framing and supporting reform relies on locally present actors to identify and use government reform agendas, whether that is a World Bank country office, a donor or a coalition of domestic participants.

During engagement, governments sometimes request help in the form of concrete proposals for means to resolve problems identified by EBA data. This was more evident in Sudan, where capacity for policy formation is less developed. In some cases the World Bank is probably able to capitalise on this by delivering operational projects to answer these questions; in other cases other donors may offer support where it fits with their programming priorities. However, this would be a good opportunity for EBA donors to offer a systematic roadmap for governments to follow, to access the support they may need to diagnose problems and develop locally appropriate solutions.

5.5. How effective are EBA's country/regional/global products at influencing changes in policy, legislation or regulation and improving government processes?

5.1: *What demand-led, context-specific products have been delivered?*

5.2: *What evidence of subsequent reform is there?*

5.3: *What evidence is there of a causal link between product delivery and subsequent reform?*

³¹ Events survey, question 3.

This section looks at whether and how the EBA has influenced changes in agricultural policy or legislative reform. This task is tempered by the fact that in general it is rather early to expect EBA to have a great deal of influence given it has only been in use for three years, and that only the 10 countries in the pilot phase from 2015 have had three years of results.

Apart from the flagship Annual Reports, according to the last DFID Review, EBA has produced a number of specific products relevant to country level reform processes, with 62 country profiles developed.³² USAID has also produced 17 country summaries available on its agri-links website covering its Feed the Future Enabling Environment for Food Security Project countries.³³ The EBA team has recently introduced a 'reform tracker' to monitor the take up of reforms around target indicators linked to EBA results.³⁴

As a consequence of these products and the engagement activities discussed earlier, the EBA team's own overall assessment is that in the 34 countries where EBA dissemination work has taken place, EBA products have been used as part of policy dialogue in 19 countries.³⁵ This compares well with the target set in the DFID Business Case of 10 countries using EBA to inform policy improvements by 2016.³⁶ Of these 19 countries, two have shown improved policy scores (Sudan and Vietnam) indicating that according to at least the metrics captured by EBA, reforms have occurred related to specific areas tracked by the EBA. The same 'pipeline' report also indicates that in a third of the countries reached, the World Bank has incorporated EBA data into its policy operations and its analytical work.

Causal link

Our case studies (Annex 5) do show evidence that EBA has contributed to existing reform processes (with more progress in Tanzania than Sudan), but that it was not critical or central to them. In Tanzania, a large number of taxes and duties were reduced in 2017 in areas highlighted by EBA. Most commentators argue that while EBA was not a critical factor, it may have speeded up these reforms. Some further reforms that have taken place such as seed registration with UPOV, and in East Africa as well as in SADC, have taken place but not been captured by EBA yet.

In Sudan, EBA has found fertile ground in an environment where a reform-minded government is seeking to attract investment into the agricultural sector. Two areas have shown a link with the EBA. First, a fertiliser law was formulated using EBA data but it has not been passed yet, and second the area around financial inclusion, where EBA data helped frame the dialogue. EBA's introduction of livestock as a topic has also been welcomed.

While an explicit and direct causal link may not be seen in the case studies, or from other interviews, the case studies do enable the level of contribution by EBA to the reform process to be delineated.

While the EBA team as currently constituted has no mandate to give direct reform advice, from the evidence in 5.3 and 5.4 above it is clear that EBA results are being deployed by a range of actors involved in policy dialogue. Within the World Bank itself, EBA data is used to brief senior managers, providing headline data for country briefs. Senior World Bank staff draw on EBA results in discussions with leading government policy actors. USAID and Gates Foundation staff also use EBA data in their internal briefings and in dialogue with stakeholders in their respective target countries. DFID on the other hand seems to have made less use of the EBA products at country level. Interviews highlighted several countries where EBA results and particularly rankings had influenced national actors: Rwanda, Burkina Faso, Vietnam, Tanzania, Malawi. But the majority believe that such host governments were already keen on reform action.

³² DFID, Draft EBA Review 2017, p12.

³³ www.agrilinks.org


³⁴ World Bank, Trumbic and Youssefi, Powerpoint Presentation, November 2017.

³⁵ EBA uptake pipeline

³⁶ DFID, EBA Business Case 2013-16, p.1

The contribution story in Tanzania does indicate that the kinds of reforms that have taken place fit with the kinds of evidence produced by EBA. The link between EBA dissemination, the appetite for and relevance of EBA data to existing national policy advice priorities, uptake by policy machinery that feed subsequently to laws being passed is fairly clear. Figure 14 illustrates how the existing reform processes and institutions (in blue) have been supported by EBA products and action (in green).

Figure 14 Tanzania EBA contribution to Policy reform



EBA was used in Tanzania to inform the government's internal *blueprint* reform document, an internal tool for reform planning. Some reforms already introduced by the Tanzania government (such as on seeds) were yet to be captured by EBA.

One of the most common messages in interviews with a wide range of stakeholders is that the EBA index is insufficient for reform. Many interviewees contextualise this as additional actions that governments or donors should take in order to build on the EBA to implement reform. The World Bank recognises explicitly that operational teams and country offices need to use the EBA to identify opportunities for which they can design projects that would lead to reform (Figure 3). There is evidence that USAID and projects such as MIRA (funded by the Gates Foundation) have also incorporated EBA data into country-level reform efforts.

The power of comparison

When discussing the usefulness of the index, interviewees routinely referred to the comparability of the index and uses of the data that took advantage of that comparability.

At the national level, stakeholders were often interested in the EBA's ability to identify similar countries that were performing better on a particular sub-index. They would see this as an opportunity to identify practices that had already been adapted to a similar policy environment, which their own country could learn from.

However, organisations that work across countries have a particular need for comparable data, and this was reflected in many interviews. Members of World Bank staff and other donors use EBA data as an introduction to a country's AEE, since it provides a clear reference against other environments with which they are familiar. The index has potential uses in policies and programmes that span multiple countries. This implies that expanding the number of countries covered by the EBA is necessary.

This usefulness to donors can have a tangible effect on reform. In the Sudan case study, for instance, EBA data provided a framework in which government and donors could discuss reform priorities and opportunities. The fact that the government's interest in improving financial inclusion was also reflected in the EBA's analysis helped to enable access to a trust fund to support corrective steps.

A common frustration of interviewees is that the EBA's analysis is not directly linked to **a roadmap for action**, meaning that EBA workshops can lead to a lack of follow-up. But the EBA index is well suited to form the basis of complementary support provided by donors wishing to encourage reform. If governments could use a low EBA sector score as evidence to access donor support in a priority reform area, it would provide an opportunity

for governments and donors alike to transform the momentum created by the EBA index to a practical roadmap for technical assistance and ultimately to reform.

Other interviewees viewed the perceived objectivity of the index as an important factor in its usefulness for lobbying. Simple analysis of the impact of a reform on a country's EBA score could be used either to make the case for a progressive reform or to identify unwanted reforms as retroactive. The Tanzania case study found early examples of this usage. It is notable that in BER more broadly, DFID has designed programmes in Nigeria and Zimbabwe that view strengthening business membership organisation (BMO) advocacy as central to achieving sustainable improvements in the reform system. Such a model could be relevant for future donor support to EBA.

5.5.1 Conclusions

After only three years of operation, EBA has delivered a set of high quality global reports and a series of country profiles in line with its deliverables. Impact on reforms is at an early stage. Where the country context is receptive, EBA has played a complementary role to existing reform processes. Where the country context is less receptive, stronger engagement efforts and local champions may be needed.

With the support of donor country offices and actors such as AGRA, there are growing examples of where policy dialogue work around EBA evidence is linking to policy reforms. The importance of the comparative power of EBA findings using DTF scores is also widely recognised as a separate way to influence reform processes.

Because EBA provides a neutral assessment and does not make reform recommendations, there is a need for greater country level analysis that can lead to a road map for action. The conclusion is that EBA alone is not sufficient to achieve reform and will require complementary work by actors both within the World Bank, the supporting donor system and independent actors such as think tanks and CSOs.

5.6. Where changes to policy, legislation or regulation have been influenced by EBA, how does this reform impact on the poor?³⁷

6.1: Where reforms have or may have been caused by EBA products, what impact have they had, particularly on the poor?

6.2: Can 'Deep Dives' provide a useful tool to understand EBA results on policy and on the poor?

EBA contains a large range of topics and indicators many of which may have the potential to impact on the what may be termed 'market-ready' farmers (whether small, medium or large scale). EBA tends to focus on 'measuring laws and regulations that affect agribusiness firms that provide agricultural inputs, goods and services'.³⁸ In order to achieve cross-country comparison, the topics use standardised business models. These are typically of medium-sized scale and would in some cases exclude the typical experience of the smaller producer, trader or processor. For example, the seed topic focuses on the formal seed sector rather than informal farmer self-produced seed, the machinery topic examines companies that import tractors, the fertiliser report examines regulations affecting imports of inorganic products and not organic locally-produced fertiliser. The EBA reports also do not explore how the chosen topics and indicators have the potential to achieve impact on smallholders, although how they affect gender and sustainability aspects are now included.

³⁷ As already noted, we will not evaluate the impact of the EBA-facilitated policy reform on smallholder farmers directly. Instead, we assess existing documentary evidence and key informant opinions from case studies to present a picture of the anticipated changes for farmers and businesses affected by EBA-facilitated policy reform.

³⁸ EBA 2017, p.xiv

That is not to say, however, that smallholder farmers could not benefit in principle from improved regulations in the areas selected by the EBA. Most interviewees in Tanzania, Sudan and elsewhere noted that this group of farmers could gain as much as medium- and large-scale farmers from better standards and a more timely and lower cost regulatory environment.

None of those interviewed suggested that the EBA had yet shown an impact on small farmers. But five interviewees felt that EBA had the potential to assist small farmers since it addressed their concerns. The availability of better-certified seed and not 'fake' seed, the adequate labelling of fertiliser and removal of falsely labelled bags, more transparent and lower cost financial services, are all examples of conditions that would in principle benefit smallholders.

Key constraints were around the capacity of government, especially local government, to implement reforms that had been placed on the statute book. Four interviewees considered that the index had not yet been designed to address needs of small holders, so that until a re-design took place it was unlikely to benefit small farmers.

Deep Dives

Deep Dives were a DFID requested requirement under the first phase of the EBA. According to DFID they would provide a wider contextual analysis of EBA findings in cross-country studies that would bring new benchmarks.³⁹ The concept, according to various interviewees, was never finally agreed across the donor group nor the EBA team, and none have been done. The issue of who would do such studies and what their purpose would be is yet to be resolved, and the EBA team also do not have the resources or feel it is part of their role.

Nevertheless, stakeholders generally feel that some form of in-depth contextual analysis around the EBA topics in a national or regional setting would be extremely valuable in order to explore how and why EBA results may be relevant or why they may not. The Gates Foundation has commissioned several country studies that in their view perform this kind of function.

6. Conclusions

- The EBA team has developed a well-regarded, credible tool for measuring compliance with widely accepted good practice in the agribusiness policy and regulatory environment. It is highly regarded by the majority of interviewees as a basis for comparison between economies and a guide to key areas of reform.
- Face-to-face engagement has been extensive, with broad geographical coverage. The EBA team has taken advantage of existing relevant events and incorporated local knowledge of stakeholder networks to incrementally reach larger relevant audiences. While this process has been guided by only a limited stakeholder engagement plan (a plan that could have benefited from a more thorough review of past experiences and a more comprehensive EDI strategy), there is no evidence that this has reduced its effectiveness during the initial implementation period.
- It is still too early to say whether the EBA has had a substantial influence on reform. But it has become an effective tool in policy dialogue in a third of countries covered. It is seen as credible, even by its critics, even if it is not yet seen by them as addressing a poverty agenda.
- An important finding of this review is that from the evidence so far, the EBA requires complementary, country and regional level donor action in order to achieve its reform potential. The EBA team track the incorporation of EBA data into subsequent World Bank country operations. But it is limiting to view the theory of change (TOC) of the EBA in isolation from the actions of others, and much more helpful to see how

³⁹ DFID Annual Review, 2014.

the EBA can facilitate and enhance mechanisms within a wider TOC for agricultural enabling environment reform.

- There is still a lack of evidence about the mechanisms by which AEE reform helps (or hinders), and more vulnerable subgroups such as women, and there are good reasons to expect this to vary by country. Smallholders have a very limited voice in reform processes, so efforts are necessary to learn their views and ensure their interests are understood. However, the EBA has a powerful potential to highlight the needs of smallholders and smaller firms, who generally do not have the resources to lobby government to seek reform directly — if the index accurately reflects their interests.
- The EBA will naturally draw reform attention to the areas that it covers, though important aspects of the AEE are excluded for methodological reasons — some of which are particularly important to smallholders. Complementary donor reform efforts must ensure that the EBA does not unduly bias reform efforts towards those covered by the EBA at the expense of smallholder farmers.
- Further adaptation of the topics and methodology is needed to improve the relevance, usefulness and acceptance of the index.
- National engagement events often provide a natural entry point for donor support to country-level analysis or technical assistance in support of reform. Stakeholders often want to move from dialogue to action, but when governments lack policy capacity, the process may stall.

7. Lessons

The review has identified five lessons from the experience of the first phase of EBA that can inform the next phase.

Lesson 1 INGO engagement

Early consultation with international non-government agencies (INGOs) can provide valuable inputs into the design of an index like the EBA. However, the relationship needs to be managed effectively such that the INGOs feel their inputs and involvement are acknowledged, and their analysis and proposals are used where appropriate to inform the EBA design. Also, the INGO role should not replace that of DFID in communicating key DFID policy concerns.

Lesson 2 Deep Dives

The idea of conducting **Deep Dives** was not fully defined or agreed across donors or the EBA team, yet the underlying value of undertaking supporting contextual analysis to benefit the application of EBA data in national and regional settings is widely agreed. If DFID was committed to this, a clearer approach, targeted funding and wider agreement with other donors would have helped. It may also have been helpful to consider more carefully whether the EBA team was best placed to deliver this analysis.

Lesson 3 Dissemination strategy

While a formal **dissemination strategy** may not have been appropriate for the early stages of the EBA, as opportunistic engagement may have been the best way to discover relevant stakeholders, a more formal strategy is helpful now that the EBA index has matured and is being rolled out to a large number of countries. There is a greater need to delineate responsibilities for dissemination both internally within the World Bank and externally to global, regional and national actors.

Lesson 4 Engagement by the EBA donors

Involvement by the **EBA donors have shown varying levels of engagement**, especially in terms of staffing, the active use of the index internally and interest in aspects such as Deep Dives. Closer cooperation between donors would have been helpful and in DFID's case more consistent staffing and greater use and promotion of the EBA products within the department would have helped the EBA to achieve its aims.

Lesson 5 Third-party research using EBA data

The expectation that **third-party research** using EBA data would be a key driver to greater adoption of the EBA products and reform influence is not something that will happen quickly. The slower rollout in terms of country coverage compared to the World Bank's Doing Business Index, and other factors such as lower media attention and the existence of other similar indices, means that the use of EBA data will require more time before academic research picks up.

8. Recommendations Statement

The review's recommendations have been prepared with the input of the EBA team and DFID⁴⁰. They have been grouped into five areas. These concern: the EBA engagement strategy, EBA products, the role of the EBA donors, and the wider reform system. The recommendations are sequenced to fit in with current agreed deliverables in the current phase (2017-21)⁴¹ and beyond.

Sequencing is often closely linked to funding and existing donor agreements on deliverables. Almost all of the recommendations could begin to be put into place immediately, if additional resources were available to the EBA team or if agreement was reached with donors to divert resources from other agreed deliverables.⁴² Therefore highlights which recommendations have funding implications, such that the EBA team would not be able to enact them until additional resources were made available.






Other recommendations, particularly those relating to the wider reform system, would be more appropriately executed by donors than the EBA team. This is also emphasised in Figure 15.

⁴⁰ As requested by the ToR


⁴¹ Though the DFID logframe runs from 2017-19

⁴² This may require adjustments for example to the DFID 2012 business case or its 2017-19 logframe.

Figure 15. Timeline, responsibility and resource implications of recommendations

	Recommendations	2018	2019	2020	2021	Beyond
1. Engagement strategy 	1.1 The EBA team should focus more on global and regional ‘influencers’ rather than on national level policymakers.					
	1.2 Alongside this, continue selective national engagement , in line with agreed deliverables under the Donor Trust Fund.					
	1.3 Share a strategy for driving uptake within the World Bank , across both Operational and Advisory Services and Analytics work.					
	1.4 Re-engage with INGOs in a way that addresses their core concerns.					
	1.5 The team can build further towards a more open upstream engagement on indicator definition in order to look at sub-topics of greater relevance to smallholder farmers and ensure that gender and sustainability are embedded across topics.					
2. Engagement of products 	2.1 Development of shorter and more accessible engagement products .					
	2.2 Influencing theory suggests that co-creation is an important means to increase local ownership and adoption.					
3. EBA donor's promotion of EBA 	3. EBA donors and particularly DFID should share their own strategies for driving uptake within their organisations , especially in country offices, which highlight how the EBA team can support this.					
4. Wider reform system 	4. The EBA team must continue to learn how reform happens and what are its consequences , particularly for poor farmers and consumers , to ensure the index delivers on its potential.					
5. Evaluating impact 	5. Testing EBA's Theory of Change critical assumptions (i.e. how reforms occur, the role of the index in reform, etc.) must be an important component of the EBA's evaluation strategy.					

Key

 EBA responsible, no funding implications expected

 Donors responsible

 Combination: EBA partly responsible if additional funding is made available, donors partly responsible



1. Engagement strategy

While there has been effective and opportunistic engagement over the review period, future engagement by the EBA team would benefit from a more strategic approach, while still responding to country and user needs. Critical to the cost-effectiveness of the EBA team is maintaining a clear vision of which EDI activities the EBA team is best placed to take responsibility for and which are better suited to other organisations. The fact that legal and policy reform requires intensive efforts at the national level means that the EBA team should favour a role supporting locally present actors. A new **dissemination strategy** should therefore be drafted updating the 2015 version in order to articulate the approach of the EBA team to EDI and delineating the role of the team versus other actors. The strategy should contain the following elements:

1.1 The EBA team should focus more on global and regional ‘influencers’ rather than on national level policymakers. These could comprise:

- Senior management as well as country office staff in the World Bank, USAID, DFID and Gates Foundation.
- Continental and regional agriculture organisations like COMESA, the EAC and the AU (particularly NEPAD), who can help to build ownership.
- Large private sector actors/trade associations representing relevant topics (such as the African Seed Association and the International Seed Association).

1.2 Alongside this, continue **selective national engagement**, in line with agreed deliverables under the Donor Trust Fund. The EBA team should focus on opportunistic demand-led engagement where a local office or government requests support with a specific reform agenda. National level engagement is critical, but should be driven by locally present actors.

1.3 Share a strategy for driving uptake **within the World Bank**, across both Operational and Advisory Services and Analytics work. This would set out how different arms of the World Bank Group would be expected to support dissemination and influencing using the EBA.

1.4 **Re-engage with INGOs** in a way that addresses their core concerns. They would require some financial support from donors and an engagement process that makes their investment of time and resources worthwhile (so that they have appropriate influence and therefore impact). The same strategy should provide room for engagement from think tanks and academics where there is interest. NGOs have done a lot to ensure that the EBA responds to DFID’s priorities — without them, DFID would need to spend much more time on analysis and engagement. Engaging with the Self Help Africa group and some of the larger INGOs — such as Christian Aid and Practical Action — would be appropriate.

1.5 A number of deliverables have been agreed with DFID around efforts to re-engage with CSOs (NGOs, media, academia) including the EBA team participating in CSO conferences and inviting CSOs to EBA events. The team can build further towards a **more open upstream engagement on indicator definition** in order to look at sub-topics of greater relevance to SHFs, and ensure that gender and sustainability are embedded across topics. This could be pursued by involving CSO experts in the Topic Advisory Groups that advise the EBA team on the different topics and the selection and definition of indicators. These teams of topic experts are critical for indicator development, which is at the heart of the EBA’s work and the existing membership does not include this category of stakeholder.

The planned shift in emphasis to measuring implementation and efficiency of regulations is appropriate.



2. Engagement products

In general, the EBA team excels in providing robust, comprehensive, technical products. Gaps exist where stakeholder groups need shorter, more accessible products. It may be beneficial and more

cost-effective to **outsource the delivery of some products** to specialists, and this might be done by the EBA team or by its donors. Ideally the scope of such consultancy would include partnering with local organisations to reduce the cost of some products (e.g. for local events and translations).

2.1 The following products would be effective in broadening access to EBA information:

- Short, less-technical documentation aimed at ministers and their advisors.
- Local translations, including into Arabic and Swahili (these suggestions are based on our case studies, others would be appropriate).
- Short videos and some use of social media.
- Information products and fragments designed to be incorporated into others' products, e.g. for use in government briefings, WB operations.
- Regional comparison products, based on countries' established perceptions of comparable economies, that focus on identifying or drawing attention to locally adapted practices that could be replicated.
- Lower cost national events, for example if there is demand for sub-national dissemination events, or events with a greater dialogue objective.

2.2 Influencing theory suggests that **co-creation is an important means to increase local ownership** and adoption. Co-creation simply refers to the creation of analysis or advocacy products in collaboration between either the EBA team or a donor on the one side, and a national stakeholder such as a government or BMO on the other. Co-creation could take a range of different forms, including:

- Providing document fragments or graphics designed for easy inclusion in government briefings or BMO advocacy.
- Providing tools that enable users to generate their own statistics in areas of interest, such as the reform simulator.
- Donors incorporating EBA data into joint project documents.
- Embedded government advisors using EBA data in analysis and briefings.
- Provision of tailored analysis by the EBA team in response to requests from governments, BMOs, NGOs, donor country offices, etc.
- Incorporation by government of the EBA into policy or results management documents and frameworks.

There is a need for the EBA team to manage the potential reputational risk of being perceived to be the co-authors of partisan advocacy or low quality publications, but no index can control the ways in which it will be used by others and standard disclaimers should be sufficient.

For the most part, proactively encouraging co-creation will be more feasible for donor and World Bank country offices than the EBA team. The EBA can continue to make it easy for national stakeholders to request additional or tailored analysis, but even here, country offices can play an important role in facilitating requests.



3. EBA donors' promotion of EBA

EBA donors and particularly DFID should share their own strategies for **driving uptake within their organisations**, especially in country offices, which highlight how the EBA team can support this. For DFID, for instance, this could include presentation of the EBA to relevant cadres at annual retreats, more consistent staffing and higher-level recognition. This should go beyond raising awareness to specifying ways in which the EBA should be used in routine activities, such as dialogue with government.



4. The wider reform system

The EBA team must continue to learn how reform happens and what are its consequences, particularly for poor farmers and consumers, to ensure the index delivers on its potential.

The wider reform system would benefit from the following tools to support reform. The EBA team may have a limited role in supporting these, and the onus should fall more on other actors including the broader donor community that either has provided funding for the EBA or could in future. Donors may be interested in supplying some of these products, for instance through establishing a call-down facility as a parallel project to the EBA:

- Country diagnostic, identifying local priorities and feasible, locally tailored strategies to address them.
- Political economy analysis.
- Lessons from reforms or good practices in similar economies.
- Cost–benefit analysis on existing proposals (including retrograde proposals).
- Feasibility studies for agribusiness investments.
- Synthesis of evidence from wider business environment reform literature and experience to provide tailored country level advice.

The establishment of a **global call-down facility** to produce these kinds of products is likely also to improve dissemination by giving more concrete incentives for governments to learn about the EBA and to incorporate it into dialogue with donors. In general, products should be developed by a partnership including a local organisation with international support.



5. Evaluating impact

The EBA's Theory of Change contains critical assumptions relating to how reforms occur, the role of the index in reform, the congruence of interests of commercial farms and smallholders, and the impact of reform on smallholder farmers and poor consumers. Testing these assumptions must be an important component of the EBA's evaluation strategy.

The current TOC also needs further unpacking at the impact level to explore how the delivered reforms will be implemented and lead to poverty reduction. Subsequent monitoring and evaluation⁴³ should seek to address this area, as the EBA matures and delivers change that leads to these impacts.

This would require a set of evaluations, each looking at a particular reform or set of reforms in a single country, exploring how reforms occur, the contribution of EBA products and co-created products, and the impact of reform on smallholder farmers and poor consumers, including any differential impact on women and other disadvantaged groups. Techniques such as *episode studies*, *after action reviews* and *outcome mapping* could be useful.

However, these are questions that are also of great importance to everybody interested in reform at the national level. It may be that the EBA team can partner with other organisations to ensure that the contribution of EBA products is investigated as part of the creation of more comprehensive and widely useful products. A global call-down facility (as described in Recommendation 3) may also be able to deliver this type of evaluation.

⁴³ And may need reflecting in the DFID EBA logframe
Itad
May, 2018

Annex 1. Terms of Reference

For External Review of the Enabling the Business of Agriculture (EBA) – 2017

The Department for International Development (DFID) seeks to appoint an Independent Review Body (IRB) to design and implement a review of the Enabling the Business of Agriculture (EBA) programme. The EBA is a multi-donor programme of the World Bank (WB) which DFID funding contributes to. The IRB will be appointed to develop a review of the EBA's dissemination and engagement within the agricultural sector, particularly with governments, as well as within the World Bank and how it influences partners and promotes the uptake of its good practice.

Acronyms

CSO	– Civil Service Organisation
DAC	– Development Assistance Committee
DFID	– Department for International Development
EBA	– Enabling the Business of Agriculture
EDI	– engaging, dissemination and influencing
EDW	– Engagement and Dissemination Workshop
FCO	– Foreign and Commonwealth Office
ICT	– Information Communication Technology
IRB	– Independent Review Body
RMG	– Review Management Group
RRC	– Review Reference Group
WB	– World Bank

Background and Context

The EBA

The EBA programme uses indicators to assess the enabling environment for agriculture across 62 countries and 12 topic areas. The programme aims to incentivise policy-makers to streamline regulations and improve the enabling environment for agriculture. Countries are scored by how well their legislation mirrors best practice and are designed to provide governments and businesses data about the agricultural enabling environment. This set of indicators aims to produce positive change through two principle mechanisms;

- i) Identifying and understanding how the enabling environment of agriculture varies across the world and what good practice looks like.
- ii) Utilising the data and associated research the EBA team produces to engage governments and interested parties across the world to work towards producing a more enabling business environment for agriculture.

The EBA sits within the WB and is a joint programme by the WB's Agriculture Global Practice and Global Indicators group. The EBA is a relatively new project which has undergone a rapid increase in scope both in terms of indicators and geographies over its pilot phase. The programme benchmarked 62 countries in the 2017 report (published in February 2017) and is expected to increase to 80 for its next reporting period (report due early 2019). The EBA currently conducts analyses across 12 topic areas including indicators on regulations for seed, fertiliser, machinery, finance, markets, transport, ICT and water alongside two overarching themes, gender and environmental sustainability. The development of land and livestock indicators continues to be refined, with a pilot covering 24 countries in the latest report. Two types of indicators have been developed thus far; legal

indicators which are the predominant focus, and efficiency indicators; combined these are used to understand the enabling environment for agriculture production across the world.

Though the EBA is still changing, for instance through further expansion in geographical scope, the programme is entering a second stage; increasingly focusing on dissemination and incremental improvements to the indicators and products. As a part of this change engagement, dissemination and influencing (EDI) and the subsequent uptake of good practice advocated by the EBA, is increasingly important as a measure of success for the programme. To aid this change the flagship EBA report has moved from annual to biannual publication. This review is designed to work in tandem with the scope of this change from annual to biannual production of the EBA report.

The programmes increased focus on EDI, with the anticipated outcome of change in agricultural legislation and governance in the enabling environment being essential to the success of the EBA. It is through positive changes to the enabling environment that promote increased investment into agriculture and subsequently, an increase in incomes for small-holders and agribusiness across the developing world, that economic transformation will be achieved. As such the EBA's success is dependent upon the successful translation of its indicators into improving the agricultural enabling environment. To do this the EBA seeks to engage with a wide range of actors in the agricultural field; academia, civil society organisations (CSO's), multilateral organisations, journalists, businesses and governments; hereon in described as interested parties. It is essential that good communication and an excellent EDI strategy is in place to leverage the influence of these target groups to enable, produce and reinforce positive change.

The IRB will provide an independent and rigorous assessment of the EBA's, EDI activities. To undertake this work, the IRB will be required to work in consultation with the EBA team and with the steering committee set up by DFID to aid the progress of the review.

The second phase of the EBA is funded by the Melinda and Bill Gates Foundation, USAID and DFID, with DFID having around a 40% burden share.

Purpose and Objectives

The purpose of the review is to understand how effective the EBA's engagement, dissemination and influencing (EDI) activities have been in promoting uptake of EBA identified good practice, under what circumstances and how they can further improve. The EBA is currently undergoing a change in focus and speed of development as it moves from annual reporting to biannual. This presents an opportunity to focus on how the team undertake the process of EDI, how successful it is in promoting uptake and how it can be improved to ensure the maximum impact of the programme.

The objectives of the review are to;

- i) Evaluate the current success the EBA has had in advancing the use of its indicators by interested parties⁴⁴ when making organisational decisions.
- ii) Evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency with which the EBA team identify and strategically prioritise individuals and groups to engage with, disseminate and influence.
- iii) Evaluate the effectiveness of the EBA team in stimulating legislative change and improving government processes with respect to agriculture and agribusiness.
- iv) Produce recommendations for the improvement of each of the three objectives above. These recommendations should be influenced by lessons learned from similar programmes and previous activities.

It is imperative that the review allows the EBA team and DFID to understand and improve future performance in the aforementioned areas utilising evidence from all interested parties.

Due to the ongoing development of the programme, what success looks like with respect to EDI and the objectives described above, will need to be discussed, defined, and refined, with DFID and input provided by the EBA team throughout the review. The IRB will be expected to take into account the resources the EBA team have had and

⁴⁴ Interested parties are considered to be Academia, Civil Society Organisations, International organisations, journalists, private sector and governments.

the context the team have been working within when undertaking activities that are investigated within this review.

Scope

The review will look at the EBA's key products and internal documentation that outlines how the team engage disseminate, influence and promote uptake. The review will evaluate EDI at the global scale, led by non-country specific EBA activities, as well as three specific case studies focused on country scale geographies:⁴⁵

- i) An instance of successful EDI and therefore uptake of EBA identified good practice with a country government.⁴⁶
- ii) An instance of slower moving/stalled engagement with a country government.
- iii) An instance where no successful uptake has so far taken place, but where the EBA has taken part in EDI activity.

The global and national approach will ensure the review covers how the set of indicators influence change between countries, and the aforementioned interested parties, as well as evaluating EDI in the geographies where the desired uptake will occur. The review of the two scales should be completed in such a way as to understand the whole of the EDI and uptake process, from key global products to country level engagements.

Note: It is not essential that the review undertakes country visits.

Review Questions

The IRB will evaluate within the Scope and will focus on the Purpose and Objectives described above; the effect the EBA team has had in engaging, dissemination and influencing with its products, and promoting uptake of good practice. The review will focus on the following questions at both the global and country scale with recommendations for improvement produced for each question;

- How effective has the EBA been in identifying and influencing individuals and organisations that are influential with respect to the enabling environment for agriculture?
- How relevant are current EBA products and subject areas at promoting uptake for an improved enabling environment?
- How effective and efficient are country/regional engagements at promoting uptake and in those countries where changes to legislation have taken place, have they reached the poor?
- How effective are the EBA team at identifying and utilising reform agendas within governments to promote uptake?
- How effective and efficient are the current EBA products at engaging, disseminating, influencing and promoting uptake amongst partners and governments?
- How effective are demand-led country and context specific products produced by the EBA at influencing reform agendas and promoting uptake, and how do successful interventions affect the poor?

Methodology

The IRB will be expected to develop a comprehensive review framework, a draft of which will be produced within the bid. This will be further developed during the inception stage with consultation and help from the EBA team. The proposed review framework should include details on the nature of the evidence to be used, the proposed methodology, and efforts to mitigate identified review challenges.

Bidders are free to propose the most appropriate design and should ensure that the proposed design and methods reflect the following:

- The EBA team has been constrained in focusing on EDI and uptake due to their focus on scaling-up from the concept phase to collecting data covering 10 topics in 62 countries.
- The EBA is entering a second stage, where it produces reports every two years rather than every year. The programme is also working towards producing a full set of efficiency indicators to understand the reality of the enabling environment for Agriculture.

⁴⁵ The countries that make up the country case studies will be identified during the inception phase, in conjunction with the EBA team.

⁴⁶ This can be an example of a solid commitment to reform legislation.

- That DFID is committed to the introduction of Deep Dives⁴⁷ to enable a greater understanding of the enabling environment. The review design should recommend how these should be implemented and refine what they encompass.
- DFID is commissioning the review to identify lessons and good practice, both for the improvement of the EBA and as a public good for the wider department and development partners who want to engage, disseminate and influence.
- Bidders must specify the data collection methods that are to be undertaken throughout the process, including likely sample sizes, and the representation of the various interested parties. It is expected that any long-distance travel to be undertaken is placed within the tender, though overseas travel is not expected.
- Bidders are expected to display all the required qualifications and experience outlined within section eleven. If there are not present within the organisation they should identify external review/evaluation specialists where relevant.
- The bidder's methodology must make it clear how the review will ensure quality is maintained. The methodology should strive to provide results that can be compared between the global and the three country case studies.
- The IRB must comply with both the DAC Quality Standards for Development Evaluation and DFID's Ethical Guidance for Research and Evaluation in undertaking this review.

There will be an inception phase at the beginning of the review, during which the details of the proposal submitted will be confirmed.

Outputs

The outputs of the review will consist of;

A report – this will be the main document produced by the independent review and should detail the process and conclusions of the review, as well as the independently produced recommendations. It is expected that the review report will include details and results to respond to all the objectives and review questions set out within this document, unless by prior agreement with the RMG through the Review Framework.

The review report will include the following elements:

- Executive Summary – highlighting the main findings, conclusions, recommendations;
- Introduction – Including contextual information about the purpose and limitations of the EBA;
- Description of the Theory of Change of the EBA;
- Methodology;
- The review findings;
- Conclusions and lessons learned;
- Recommendations

Recommendations Statement – this is expected to include all the recommendations in the full report but focused on actionable and time bound changes that the EBA team can enact. The recommendations within this statement are expected to be forward looking and agreed with the RMG's input, to ensure they are relevant and actionable by the EBA team. The statement is expected to be short, actionable and relevant and engrained within the purpose of this review and linked to lessons learned from similar endeavours.

Engagement and Dissemination Workshop – An Engagement and Dissemination Workshop (EDW) will be held to engage the EBA team. The EDW will be designed for DFID members of staff and other relevant individuals to disseminate the findings of the IRB's report and statement. The EDW is expected to cover the review but focus on promoting good practice in relation to engagement, dissemination, influencing and promoting the uptake of the EBA's work.

⁴⁷ Deep Dives are discrete pieces of work that contextualise the enabling environment around one of the EBA's indicators within a specific geographical area.

Within the Report, Statement and Workshop elements of the outputs, innovative methods of dissemination and engagement are welcome and encouraged to improve the take-up of the results of this review.

Budget

DFID will expect ITAD to demonstrate excellent value for money when budgeting for this programme and should only apply costs that have been included in Section 5 of the contract as necessary to deliver the programme outputs.

Proposed Timeline

Month	Activity	Notes
September 2017	Tenders Evaluated	
November 2017	Inception Stage	The review framework is finalised with the Review Management Group
November 2017	Work Plan Begins	The review begins with regular contact with the RMG
February 2018	Draft Report Produced	The RRG and EBA are provided the report for Quality Assurance and to provide recommendations and feedback.
March 2018.	Final Report Produced	The RRG and the EBA are provided 2017 with the final report
March 2018	Workshop	The workshop is provided to DFID and the EBA

Governance and Management Arrangements and Responsibilities

The review will be governed utilising two groups, a Review Management Group (RMG) responsible for the day to day activities of the review, and the Review Reference Group (RRG) which is responsible for quality assurance of the review and its outputs.

The Review Management Group (RMG): An RMG will be formed and staffed by a member of DFID and relevant members of the EBA team. The RMG will manage the day-to-day operation of the review and will facilitate the work of the IRB. The group will expect to be in regular contact with the IRB, with a formal meeting once a fortnight, and will be the body's main point of contact. The RMG will expect to review all the outputs of the IRB alongside the recommendations of the RRG. The IRB will facilitate and be expected to ensure the recommendations produced are relevant to the EBA team and are actionable by the EBA with the support of donors.

The IRB is to retain its independence at all time whilst ensuring its outputs and recommendations are relevant and able to be acted upon.

The Review Reference Group (RRG): An RRG will be formed of an Evaluation advisor from DFID as well as member(s) of DFID's Agriculture Team. The RRG will meet at critical points of the reviews design, implementation and output stage to ensure the technical details and rigour of the review. The group will do this by evaluating the outputs of the IRB to ensure quality and technical integrity is maintained. It will provide comments on the quality of these outputs to the RMG in writing. The RMG will be expected to incorporate recommendations, or otherwise explain why they will not be incorporated, in writing. The RRG is expected to meet to assess the technical strength of the bids to this tender; they will also contribute to the framework produced at the end of the inception phase.

The RRG will act as an advisor to the RMG and will not be responsible for the day to day operation of the review.

Implementers:

- i. **Independent Review Board (IRB):** The IRB will be the external body appointed by DFID to undertake the review of the programme and the production of the outputs as outlined within this document. The IRB will report to the RMG at regular intervals and will be expected to work with the EBA team

to ensure recommendations are of optimal use for improving the engagement, dissemination and influence of the programme and its uptake.

- ii. **Enabling the Business of Agriculture (EBA) team:** The EBA team will facilitate data collection by the IRB and provide any guidance needed by the IRB to undertake their review. This will include, but not limited to, identifying suitable interventions, specific areas for review and guidance with respect to how the EBA team undertakes the activities of interest to the IRB. The exact role the EBA team will play will be agreed within the review framework which will be agreed by the RMG with advice from the RRG prior to the review beginning. The review framework will be produced by the IRB after initial discussions with the EBA, DFID and the RMG.

The roles and responsibilities of those involved will be as follows:

IRB

The IRB will be responsible for conducting the review and producing all the outputs outlined within this document; namely the Report, the Recommendations Statement, and the Engagement and Dissemination workshop.

The IRB team will define a thorough outline of the work to be undertaken within the draft Review Framework produced during tender. The framework will be updated during the inception stage before commencing with the review. This will involve outlining the methodology, how to address the agreed review questions and any further questions that are identified. It will also determine the data requirements, the organisations, individuals and interested parties that are to be included and finalise the review timeline.

The IRB team will be expected to consult with the EBA team and the wider RMG to ensure their choice in interested parties to include are relevant but will remain independent throughout. The IRB will work with the EBA team for data acquisition that is particularly pertinent to how the EBA is currently undertaking EDI, as well as for identifying relevant sources of data.

The IRB will produce and be fully responsible for the outputs identified within the output section. Any data or material which is produced by the service provider as part of this programme shall be the property of the service provider but DFID shall have a world-wide, non-exclusive, irrevocable, royalty-free license to use all the material.

EBA

The EBA team along with the RMG will facilitate the progress of the review. In particular the EBA team shall help identify suitable individuals within the World Bank and interested parties for the IRB without prejudgement to their usability by the IRB, except utilising the IRB's criteria for identifying who best to talk to. The EBA will work in collaboration with the IRB to collect and analyse any data that the EBA has collected that is of interest to the IRB.

Existing Information Sources

The IRB will predominantly work from the EBA teams dissemination products and internal documents. The following is a list of key documents that should be considered and are publicly available:

- EBA 2017, 2016 and 2015 report
- EBA's indicators and technical specifications
- EBA's country profiles (to be published imminently)
- Press Releases
- Website information
- Research being undertaken (not published)
- DFID's Business Case
- DFID's Annual Review's
- DFID's logframe
- Doing Business documentation – a programme the EBA was modelled on

The IRB will be expected to consult with a much larger array of documentation than that outlined above.

Skills and Qualifications

It is imperative that the IRB team have the following expertise and/or experience:

- Experience evaluating EDI dependent programmes or organisations;
- Thorough understanding of EDI in the developing world;
- Thorough understanding of the policy-making process, preferably in agriculture, agribusiness or rural development;
- An understanding of the difficulty and the need for innovation in evaluating and measuring processes based on EDI;
- A thorough and in-depth knowledge of mixed method evaluation, theory-based evaluation and relevant quantitative and qualitative methods; and
- Experience in designing multi-scale, multi-stakeholder evaluations.

The IRB team will also need to display expertise and/or experience:

- Evaluating indicator led programmes to EDI;
- Conducting process and performance evaluations;
- Knowledge and experience of Theories of Change;
- A strong communication record; and
- Providing excellent value for money.

Proposed Contents of Submitted Bid

The bid should include a review framework that includes; a draft review matrix and a table which includes the question, the method used and the data. The framework should also include details about the review questions, including any additional questions, how these questions will be addressed, the methodology and likely data requirements. The bid should also include the method to be used, the personnel to be included with a copy of their CV, experience and skills, fee rates, costs and expenses. The review framework will be updated during the inception stage to include the input of the EBA team to identify interested parties to approach and other details.

The basis upon which the review bids will be chosen is included within the procurement documents provided.

Reporting and Contracting Arrangements

DFID will be contracting the IRB, who will report to David Renshaw and Iris Krebber. Bidders should propose a payment plan using payment by results (outputs).

Intended Audience

The target audience for the review includes the EBA team, DFID, partner governments, institutions, researchers, policymakers, other donors, civil society and other organisations working in the field of policy advice for international development. DFID will be the recipient of services for the review.

Logistics and Procedures

The IRB will be responsible for all logistical arrangements for members of the review team. The EBA will facilitate convening of meetings and site visits where necessary. All relevant expenses should be covered by the review contract budget. It is expected that travel will only be forecast within the tender budget for appropriate methodical reasons.

Duty of Care

The Supplier is responsible for the safety and well-being of their personnel (as defined in section 2 of the contract) and Third Parties affected by their activities under this contract, including appropriate security arrangements. They will be responsible for the provision of suitable security arrangements for their domestic and business property. DFID will share available information with the supplier on security status and developments in-country where appropriate.

If overseas travel is required all security personnel will be offered a security briefing by the British Embassy/DFID on arrival. All such personnel must register with their respective Embassies to ensure that they are included in emergency procedures. A copy of the DFID visitor notes (and a further copy each time these are updated), which the supplier may use to brief their personnel on arrival.

The supplier is responsible for ensuring appropriate safety and security briefings for all of their personnel working under this contract and ensuring that their personnel register and receive briefing as outlined above. Travel advice is also available on the FCO website and the supplier must ensure they (and their personnel) are up to date with the latest position.

This procurement may require the supplier to operate in flood and seismically active zones considered at high risk of earthquakes. Minor tremors are not uncommon. Earthquakes are impossible to predict and can result in major devastation and loss of life. The supplier should be comfortable working in such an environment and should be capable of deploying to any areas required within the region in order to deliver the contract (subject to travel clearance being granted).

This procurement may require the supplier to operate in conflict-affected areas and parts of it are highly insecure. Travel to many zones within the region will be subject to travel clearance from the UK government in advance. The security situation is volatile and subject to change at short notice. The supplier should be comfortable working in such an environment and should be capable of deploying to any areas required within the region in order to deliver the contract (subject to travel clearance being granted).

The supplier is responsible for ensuring that appropriate arrangements, processes and procedures are in place for their personnel, taking into account the environment they will be working in and the level of risk involved in delivery of the contract (such as working in dangerous, fragile and hostile environments etc.). The supplier must ensure their personnel receive the required level of training.

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
ANNEX 3. Literature Review

Background

Over the last decade, there has been a notable increase in the design and use of indices as a source for informing public, private or ‘third sector’ decision-making processes (Davis et. al. 2012).⁴⁸ At the same time, little attention has been focused on the empirical conditions of the production, release and use of these indices. Meanwhile, attempts have been made to generate broader theories that help to explain the functions and utility of indices. Dutta (2012), for example, draws on supply and demand hypotheses in governance indicators to provide a framework that explains their generation and use.⁴⁹ The findings of this study are inconclusive — neither a pure demand nor supply focus is able to cater for the complexities that inform the generation and use of indices.

An actor-based approach, developed by Buthe (2012), offers a different perspective by focusing on four qualitatively different constituencies at play in the generation and use of indices: Rule-makers (suppliers), rule-demanders, targets and stakeholders (see figure A1).⁵⁰ For the purposes of this brief indicative review of the evidence relating to the generation and use of index data, this multi-stakeholder conceptual model will be used to frame emerging findings. This conceptual model can be used to inform our approach as it demonstrates where groups overlap, and thereby makes visible the power relationships that might be influencing the generation and use of indices (see also Table A1).

Figure A1: Multi-stakeholder conceptual model for actors in an index landscape (Buthe 2012)



Rule-makers (suppliers), according to Bradley (2015), are influenced by four possible motivations: financial gain, reputational gain, ideological or altruistic influences or research (for the sake of evidence-building).⁵¹ As demonstrated by Bradley in a case study of the Freedom House indicators, institutions are rarely immune to

⁴⁸ Merry, Sally Engle, Kevin E. Davis, and Benedict Kingsbury, eds. (2015) *The Quiet Power of Indicators: Measuring governance, corruption, and rule of law*. Cambridge University Press

⁴⁹ Dutta, N. (2012) *Accountability in the Generation of Governance Indicators*, in Davis et. al. (2012)

⁵⁰ Buthe, T. (2012) *Beyond Supply and Demand: A political-ecological conceptual model*, in Davis et. al. (2012)

⁵¹ Bradley, C. (2015) *International Organisations and the Production of Indicators: The case of Freedom House*, in Merry et. al (2015)

criticisms based on these four motivational areas. In addition to being perceived as driven by donor demands (the US government), the Index was subject to criticism based on broader ideological assumptions and biases. On the other hand, Freedom House's engagement with specific users (see below) and dedication to transparent academic rigour brought it a stronger authority in governance circles.

Rule-demanders are stakeholders that seek scientific measures of performance outcomes to either 'name and shame' poor performance, to use as a lever for political influence, or to draw upon for information needs. Depending on context, rule-demanders can be government regulatory authorities, journalists, academia or bodies situated within rule-makers themselves. The rule-demanders — as the actor often most able to control resource flows — have a crucial role to play in defining the terms and value-added that an index can bring to a decision-making environment. In the example of the Doing Business Index (2003), a key success factor was the close association of academics and employees of the World Bank several years prior during the development of the World Bank Development Report (2001). Through much previous debate and research, this group of individuals understood the evidence gaps in private sector development. They were therefore able to cast light on the probable demands of policymakers not covered in pre-existing datasets (Besley, 2015).


The **targets and users** of an index are also critical in controlling their generation and use. Targets, such as policymakers or sector regulators, routinely draw upon index scores to provide a foundation for evidence-based decision making (Besley 2015, Merry et. al. 2015).^{52 53} Nevertheless, while policy makers are an obvious target in the flow of index-based evidence, discussions around the role of journalists and academics as index users tend to overwhelm those of policymakers in the literature. The importance of scientific validation as a crucial step in legitimising and consolidating an index is consistently highlighted as a major factor for its success in the key literature. Figure A1 illustrates the rise in scientific publications focusing on — or drawing significantly from — the Doing Business Index.

Table A1: Mapping of Bradley's framework onto stakeholder categories as used within this review

Bradley framework	Stakeholder categories used in this review
Rule-makers	EBA team
Rule-demanders	EBA donors Researchers Media CSOs Private sector
Targets	Government
Users	EBA donors Researchers Media CSOs Private sector

⁵² Merry, S. E., Davis, K. E., & Kingsbury, B. (Eds.) (2015). 'The Quiet Power of Indicators: Measuring governance, corruption, and rule of law' Cambridge University Press

⁵³ Besley, T. (2015) 'Law, regulation, and the business climate: The nature and influence of the World Bank Doing Business project.' *The Journal of Economic Perspectives* 29.3 : 99-120.

Figure A2: citations associated with the DBI over time⁵⁴

As noted by Akech (2015), academic credibility is not only vital in providing a robust evidence base, but also in the face of potential politicisation.⁵⁵ On the other hand, high visibility associated with significant user uptake can bring its own set of risks. For instance, in the Doing Business project, certain controversies were reflected in the area of employing workers which led to them being removed from the overall ranking. A further set of criteria on the disclosure of assets and income by politicians was also removed as a result of external contestation (Besley 2015). The Enabling the Business of Agriculture Index has also itself been subject to some contestation amongst targets and users. The Oakland Institute, together with over 150 signatories for example, has contested the EBA index in terms of its alleged narrow definition of what constitutes ‘good practice’ to regulate seed systems.⁵⁶ Similarly, Practical Action has suggested the EBA index could have a stronger poverty focus and be more consultative in its development phases.⁵⁷

In summary, the conceptual actor-focused model outlined by Buthe (2012) provides valuable entry points in unpacking the landscape relating to index generation and use. The framework provides a political economy lens by facilitating discussions around power relations amongst actors having interests in generating or using indices. However, it should also be pointed out that the literature that examines evidence-based policymaking more broadly covers several more dimensions that may be of relevance to the generation and use of indices. The Knowledge, Policy, Power (KPP) framework for instance (Jones et. al. 2012) provides several additional analytical possibilities that are not fully accounted for in an actor-focused model.⁵⁸ Most importantly, the KPP framework

⁵⁴ Data taken from a compilation of research on Doing Business by the World Bank, retrieved from <http://www.doingbusiness.org/research/>. Only articles for which a publication year was listed are included (178 out of 317). Note that this represents a small portion of all publications using DB indicators, which are elsewhere estimated to number 2,000 peer-reviewed articles and 5,000 working papers since 2003 (Besley, 2015, Law, regulation, and the business climate: the nature and influence of the World Bank Doing Business project, p100).

⁵⁵ Akech, M. (2015) Evaluating the Impact of Indicators on Governance Discourses in Kenya

⁵⁶ Oakland Institute (2017) calling on the World Bank to end the Enabling Business in Agriculture; (2017) Down on the Seed - The world bank enables Corporate takeover of seeds

⁵⁷ Practical Action Blog. ‘What’s next for ‘Enabling the Business of Agriculture?’’, available at: <https://practicalaction.org/blog/news/whats-next-for-enabling-the-business-of-agriculture/> [accessed 2017]

⁵⁸ Jones, H., Jones, N. A., Shaxson, L., and Walker, D. (2012). Knowledge, policy and power in international development: a practical guide. Policy Press.

draws out the political context, types of evidence and type of knowledge translation in addition to actor-focused considerations.

The KPP framework considers the political institutions that promote or restrict evidence, as well as the importance of windows of opportunity in reform processes. Similarly, when looking at ‘types of evidence’, the KPP framework appreciates that certain categories of data are more readily contested or approved by policymakers. As noted in Davis et. al. (2012) certain ‘technical’ indices based on vaccination data tend to have more traction than governance indices which by their very nature are more political. Finally, the KPP framework considers the importance of ‘knowledge translation’ in evidence flows. Davis et. al. (2012), for example, discusses how indices can be re-labelled or ‘trans-mutated’ in their reception and daily use, and that ‘promulgators’ are required to facilitate the communication outreach — and hence uptake — of indices. In reviewing the EBA, therefore, we should consider the risk that a lack of understanding of the limitations of the index on the part of government users may have led to the indicators being used in ways that may be inadvisable. The knowledge translation lens in the KPP tool (see also K* framework) addresses these concerns by understanding that dissemination is only one component amongst a wider ladder of activities that can promote uptake, including undertaking an intermediary role between actors who are unfamiliar with each other, providing translation services (language and technical jargon), offering a convening space where actors can discuss evidence and innovating new forms of evidence to demonstrate to others.

In summary, there are a few embryonic frameworks for reviewing the landscape of indices, amongst a wider arena of important but fragmented empirical lessons about their generation and use. Chief amongst these lessons are the importance of:

- Context mapping.
- Obtaining ownership and buy-in from key constituencies (particularly academics).
- Recognising the potential risks associated with the misuse or misinterpretation of indices.

Detailed evidence concerning ‘what works’ in relation to political context mapping, understanding the function of different types of evidence and the role of knowledge translation, is however generally lacking in the literature. Finally, aside from a small number of references, the literature does not feature a notable appreciation of the open-ended, non-linear and multi-factorial nature of linking evidence to policy.

Consequently, these indicative findings can guide the next phase of the review as they stress some of the key criteria that facilitate the uptake and longevity of an index. Amongst our next steps, for example, the following phases can seek to investigate:

- How ownership of the index has been promoted among key stakeholders.
- How risks around re-interpretation or politicisation (real or perceived) are managed.
- To what extent the communication outreach process combines emergent opportunities with longer-term strategic objectives.
- To what extent political context has been taken into consideration in promoting and using the EBA index, and
- To what extent communication materials have been translated and adapted for different actors.

These questions will not need to be added to the review questions but will rather contribute to the analytical process. More tangibly, they will inform the key informant interview scripts and the guidelines for synthesising the primary and secondary evidence.

Annex 4. Persons interviewed

Organisation name	Name of contact	Position	Country	Type of stakeholder	Bellwether informant	Sampling selection method	Type of interview
World Bank	Sara Iqbal	Manager EBA project, Global Indicators Group	United States	EBA team	No	Purposive	Global
World Bank	Tea Trumbic	Project coordinator	United States	EBA team	No	Purposive	Global
World Bank	Federica Saliola	Former EBA manager	United States	EBA team	No	Purposive	Global
World Bank	Cesar Chaparro Yedro	Project Coordinator	United States	EBA team	No	Purposive	Global
World Bank	Holger Kray	Head of Africa Agriculture Policy Unit	United States	Multilateral	Yes	Purposive	Global
DFID	David Renshaw	Graduate Placement in Growth and Resilience Department	United Kingdom	EBA donor	No	Purposive	Global
DFID	Iris Krebber	Head of Agriculture, DG Economic Development	United Kingdom	EBA donor	Yes	Purposive	Global
USAID	Kelley Cormier	Acting Division Chief and agricultural economist in the Office of Market and Partnership Innovations in USAID's Bureau for Food Security	United States	EBA donor	Yes	Purposive	Global
BMGF	Alan Rennison	Senior Programme Officer	United States	EBA donor	Yes	Purposive	Global
SAGCOT	Geoffrey Kirenga	CEO Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT)	Tanzania	Government	Yes	Purposive	Country case studies
World Bank	Sarah Simons	Senior Agricultural Specialist	Tanzania	Multilateral	No	Snowball	Country case studies
USAID	Harold Carey	Private Sector Team Lead	Tanzania	EBA donor	No	Purposive	Country case studies
World Bank	Andrew Goodland	Program Leader	Ethiopia	EBA donor	Yes	Snowball	Country case studies
Access to Seed Index	Sanne Helderman	Senior Research Lead	Netherlands	Global experts	No	Snowball	Global
Limagrain	Jean-Christophe Gouache	Corporate Vice President for International Affairs	United Kingdom	Global private sector	No	Purposive	Global

Organisation name	Name of contact	Position	Country	Type of stakeholder	Bellwether informant	Sampling selection method	Type of interview
International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants	Benjamin Rivoire	Senior Program Officer	Switzerland	Global experts	No	Purposive	Global
International Seed Association	Michael Keller	Secretary General	Switzerland	Global private sector	Yes	Snowball	Global
International Growth Centre	David Spielman	Senior Research Fellow IFPRI	United Kingdom	Global Researcher	No	Purposive	Global
Formerly Practical Action	Alison Griffith	Senior Policy and Practice Advisor for Markets and Private Sector	United Kingdom	Global CSO	Yes	Purposive	Global
Christian Aid	Kato Lambrechts	Senior Advocacy and Policy Officer for Africa	United Kingdom	Global CSO	No	Snowball	Global
FAO	Jean Balié	Programme Manager, Monitoring and Analysing Food and Agricultural Policies (MAFAP)	Italy	Multilateral	No	Snowball	Global
Oakland Institute	Frederic Mousseau	Policy Director	United States	Global CSO	No	Purposive	Global
FAO	Carlos Arthur Da Silva	Retired	Brazil	Global Researcher	No	Snowball	Global
DFID	Duncan Barker	Agricultural Research Team	United Kingdom	Global Researcher	No	Snowball	Global
AGRA	Joseph Rusike	MIRA manager	Kenya	Global CSO	No	Snowball	Global
IFC	Hans Shrader	Manager of the Livestock version of the MIRA project (L-MIRA)	Kenya	Multilateral	No	Snowball	Global
The Rules	Martin Kirk	Cofounder and director of strategy for The Rules	United Kingdom	Global CSO	No	Snowball	Global
The Rules	Alnoor Ladha	Co-founder, Executive Director	United Kingdom	Global CSO	No	Snowball	Global
Formerly Self-Help Africa	Claire Hickson	Manging Director of Trio Policy	United Kingdom	Global CSO	No	Snowball	Global
World Bank	Xavier Furtado	Country Rep to Sudan (ex)	Sudan	Multilateral	Yes	Snowball	Country case studies

Organisation name	Name of contact	Position	Country	Type of stakeholder	Bellwether informant	Sampling selection method	Type of interview
Independent	Mohamed Osman Hussein	Consultant	Sudan	National expert or researcher	Yes	Snowball	Country case studies
Tanzania Private Sector Forum	Gilead Teri	Director Research	Tanzania	National CSO	Yes	Snowball	Country case studies
REPOA	Blandina Kilama	Senior Researcher	Tanzania	National expert or researcher	No	Snowball	Country case studies
CTC Group	Prof. Mamoun I. Dawelbeit		Sudan	National private sector	No	Snowball	Country case studies
DAL Group	Husameldin Alnasri		Sudan	National private sector	No	Snowball	Country case studies
ODI	Giles Henley		United Kingdom	Global Researcher	No	Snowball	Global
Ministry of Animal Resources	Dr Omer Al-Dirani	Livestock value chain	Sudan	Government	Yes	Snowball	Country case studies
Ben & Jerry's Foundation	Jeff Furman	Trustee	United States	Global media	No	Purposive	Global
Haggar Group	Anthony Haggar	CEO	Sudan	National private sector	No	Snowball	Country case studies
Dutch Embassy to Sudan	Esther Loeffen	PSD and agriculture	Sudan (now Burundi)		Yes	Snowball	Country case studies
AFSTA	Grace Gitu	Technical Manager	Kenya	Global private sector	No	Snowball	Engagement event
World Bank	Christian Delgado	Retiree	United States	Multilateral	No	Snowball	Global

Annex 5. Case studies

Tanzania⁵⁹

Tanzania was added to the EBA in the 2016 round. The EBA 2017 report was launched in Tanzania at the Annual Agriculture Policy Conference (AAPC) in March 2017. Engagement events by the EBA team in Tanzania took place in March 2015,⁶⁰ May 2016,⁶¹ February 2017,⁶² and October 2017.⁶³ This represents a fairly high level of engagement compared to other countries.⁶⁴

Tanzania has a fairly well organised framework and institutional arrangements for agricultural policy dialogue. Over the past 20 years work has progressed at developing a sector-wide planning and investment approach, with four ministries involved in various sector development programmes (ASDP1, ASDP2). A Policy Advisory Group (PAG) is one of various for a to exchange views of government, development partners and others. Agricultural investment facilitation agencies such as Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor for Tanzania (SAGCOT) appreciate the importance of the insights that EBA can bring to improve investor confidence and government appreciation of what will enable business investment in the sector.

The exposure of the EBA in Tanzania in 2016-17 has been above average. The main event was the launch of the 2017 report in March 2017, with about 200 participants at the AAPC conference, drawn from a wide spectrum of stakeholders.⁶⁵ The World Bank country office (WBCO) has also been quite active in following up EBA output, with the agricultural specialist giving presentations, engaging in dialogue with officials and attending relevant events. Local think tanks such as the Tanzania Private Sector Foundation (TPSF) have used EBA material to develop policy proposals. TPSF noted that 'EBA is instrumental in providing the data for our TPSF proposals. We gave (officials) data on very specific reforms that we would want them to make, the data element was very important - the detailed and in depth numbers are quite unique'. For the WBCO, EBA is a 'hugely valuable tool' as an entry point for dialogue. EBA's comparative index is seen as powerful because senior officials are concerned about Tanzania's relative performance with its neighbours.

While EBA has a credible image of a high quality, well-researched product, the annual report is a big, hard-to-digest document and it would help to customise it for use by government and policy actors like Agricultural Council of Tanzania, TPSF, REPOA and others. EBA is seen as a fundamental report within the sector but at national level it doesn't receive the same attention as the 'Doing Business' report, especially since the agricultural sector is of relatively low political priority.

The most relevant topics are thought to be seeds, machinery, markets, finance, fertiliser, ICT, gender and land⁶⁶. While EBA's relevance has been strong on seed⁶⁷ and finance issues, fertiliser has proved a problematic area not because of the EBA approach but due to the current government's introduction of bulk procurement, which has overridden moves to assist competition and improve regulation.

EBA's dissemination strategy remains somewhat opportunistic, with responsibilities divided between Washington and the WBCO. The EBA 'power base' remains in Washington, and the WBCO has had to communicate with the team there closely

⁵⁹ Six interviews were conducted with Tanzanian stakeholders (out of 10 contacted), covering development partners, CSOs and government.

⁶⁰ The EBA team conducted a dialogue with 20 civil society, private sector and development partners in Dar es Salaam to receive feedback on the current EBA indicators and dataset.

⁶¹ The objective of the mission was to present the EBA 2016 Report and its findings, to engage in relevant policy discussions and/or to prepare for further dissemination activity. Meetings were held with several stakeholders representing CSOs, the private sector and bilateral agencies, to review the EBA 2016 Report, discuss its findings for Tanzania and deliberate on use of EBA data for Tanzanian policy discussions which were conducted during the mission. Meetings with the WBCO to discuss messaging and dissemination strategies for EBA in Tanzania have also taken place.

⁶² The regional launch of EBA 2017 Report, at the 3rd Annual Agricultural Policy Conference. The report presented 250 participants at the conference organised by the Policy Analysis Group in collaboration with Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries. In collaboration with Sarah Simons at the Country Office, the EBA team led a workshop with 30 representatives from the public sector and international and regional development agencies. Farbot also held a meeting with CSOs.

⁶³ EBA team be presented at an event organised by AGRA with MALF, private sector organisations and development partners. Discussions were also held with the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Investment. Data collection also took place and meetings with data providers.

⁶⁴ Based on the EBA events record, Tanzania received a total of five visits in 2016-17, more than any other African country in that period.

⁶⁵ 3rd AAPC Proceedings, 'The Role of Agri-food Systems in Promoting Industrialization in Tanzania: enhancing linkage of upstream and downstream value chain activities in the context of agriculture transformation', April 2017

⁶⁶ Events survey results, Table A2 in Annex 6

⁶⁷ TPSF has used EBA data in specific areas such as on seed registration and finds it the only source of such information.

to ensure local priorities are addressed. ‘There needs to be a strategy to elevate the use of EBA within government to explain what this is, how it is measured, how it can be useful to the government in terms of setting priorities and getting the development partners behind these priorities’ (USAID). A more creative approach is required especially where resources are limited, including use of different tools and media.

A greater role could also be played by local actors in not just providing but analysing data. Regional organisations could also be more involved (such as E. Africa Grain Council, various bilateral trade fora, COMESA, African Seed Trade Association). There is a need to explain and understand the methodology. Providing updates between the main annual (now biennial) reports will improve policy makers confidence in the accuracy of the EBA data.

The WB and USAID continue to play an active role in using EBA material, and have found good awareness amongst seed, fertiliser and agri-machinery companies and parastatals, who are all quoting figures from the EBA reports. AGRA (with Gates funding) has also played an active role in following up on EBA products, organising workshops that bring together smaller groups of key actors in specific sub-sectors, to work on implementation issues.⁶⁸ Still there is more promotion needed to ensure that a wider audience understands the EBA more fully. While policy analysis groups like TPSF and Policy Research for Development (REPOA) know about EBA products, they have not yet started conducting independent research and are not familiar with the specific tools and data sets that are available on the EBA website.

The EBA has contributed towards already active reform processes by providing focussed evidence and has given an empirical reference in reform dialogue. It has been directly responsible for the move to place regulatory documents online and make forms downloadable. More than 80 different taxes were removed during the course of 2017 such as the VAT exemption on spares for machinery. The biggest change particularly for small scale producers was the reduction in the produce tax or cess. ‘Cess should have been reduced to zero but in fact it was reduced to 3% but this is still a positive step’ (WBCO). In relation to seed, important reforms include regulations regarding seed variety registration and quality control, registration to UPOV and accepting seed varieties across SADC countries. The view of interviewees is that EBA has underpinned these reforms rather than being a leading force. ‘EBA was part of the evidence base to help the conversation or help the recommendations become successful – but difficult to say if they would have happened or not without EBA’ (TPSF). Indeed, the EBA report actually missed some of the reforms that took place in 2016-17, because the informants used to gather EBA data were not always close enough to the regulatory agencies involved.

In terms of impact on the poor, most observers feel that EBA is addressing the concerns and frustrations of smallholders as much as it is the medium and large-scale farmers. A key issue is the separation between the status of regulatory frameworks and the on-the-ground reality. For example, Tanzania scores well on EBA’s finance topic, but most farmers do not access finance, a situation that can cause confusion at EBA events where there is little time for detailed discussion. EBA is also measuring reforms at national level but in Tanzania the authority with the mandate to implement is often local government. So how does a tool like the EBA which is not set up to measure at this level, effectively measure the impacts of implementation?

Finally, the use of Deep Dive studies is seen as necessary in order to take the EBA to the next stage, but there were no agreed approaches on how they could be done. It would be ideal if done locally, through a local NGO/think tank focusing on agricultural policy. However, there is a reputational risk for the EBA product. Using an international team may not deliver the desired results unless Tanzanians were involved and it would also be cost prohibitive. There is a balance to be struck in terms of maintaining the quality and integrity of the EBA alongside getting real and valuable information from farmers on the ground.

Sudan⁶⁹

In common with many developing countries, agriculture and livestock are important for Sudan, contributing about 35–40% of GDP. However, the secession of South Sudan has reduced oil production by more than three quarters, a commodity that had previously contributed more than half of government revenue and 95% of exports. Agriculture is an area in which Sudan has historically excelled, but agricultural policy and legislation have been neglected in recent decades due to conflict

⁶⁸ For example, the EBA workshop convened by AGRA in Dar es Salaam, October 2017

⁶⁹ Seven interviews were conducted with stakeholders from Sudan (out of 19 contacted), covering the private sector, government, the diplomatic community, local experts and the World Bank.

and the latitude offered by abundant oil. Now, with the shortfall in government revenue and domestic scarcity of foreign currency, agricultural growth has rapidly become a high priority for both government and the private sector.

Sudan's relationship with the World Bank and US government has been a second important contextual factor. Sudan has been highly indebted for a considerable period, entering non-accrual status with the World Bank in 1994. By 2015, 84% of the country's external debt was in arrears. Sudan qualifies for debt relief, but would need to 'come to an amicable understanding with its main creditors'.⁷⁰ In addition, the US applied comprehensive sanctions to Sudan in 1997, and extended them in 2006. These were eased, but not removed, in early 2017. Trade sanctions continue to have various practical effects on the agricultural sector's ability to obtain inputs, as raised by interviewees. The Sudanese government clearly understands that positive international engagement, including with the World Bank, could unlock significant gains — including much greater access to private foreign investment.

The lack of active lending by the World Bank has also had a profound effect on the relationship between the government and the World Bank country office. The country office was able to facilitate small-scale funding, but this was accompanied by much more staff scrutiny and engagement with government and other stakeholders than would normally be the case. In keeping with DFID's experience that business environment reform requires 'more time and less money',⁷¹ this seems to have been positive — interviewees outside the World Bank commented that their lack of lending was highly fortunate.

Altogether, the context for EBA uptake is very good. The government is keen to restore the country's past successes in agriculture and livestock, and recognises that refreshing a neglected policy environment is an important part of this. At the same time, constructive engagement with the international community is seen as an end in itself. In parallel, large, highly integrated corporate groups see investment in agricultural exports as a means of obtaining the scarce foreign currency that they need for their wider operations, and have used their privileged access to government to communicate their concerns and priorities. They recognise the importance of donors in the future of agricultural rejuvenation, and appreciate that the EBA provides a language to discuss their needs.

The Sudanese government is perceived by interviewees to be highly reform-minded, hampered by its capacity rather than its motivation to complete and implement reform. Some suggested that recent reforms have been over-ambitious, with implementation capacity insufficient to keep pace with new measures, or to mitigate negative consequences.

Interviewees discussed recent and ongoing reforms in the areas of:

- **Fertiliser**, including a new law and regulations, now being implemented by the standards authority.
- **Financial inclusion**, including a financial inclusion survey and legislative framework for warehouse receipts.

Interviewees reported that the EBA is mainly being used by the government and donors (including the UNDP and FAO). Government and donors were represented in the steering committee of a trust fund that used the EBA to discuss problems in financial inclusion; the index was seen as a valuable means of framing the issue, though not decisive in driving reform. There were reports of active use by domestic academics, but none were available for interview. Larger companies were happy to attend EBA launch events, but had not subsequently used EBA data in their frequent conversations with government counterparts. The government was enthusiastic about the extension of the index to cover livestock in future iterations, not only as a separate subject area, but integrated into transport, markets and other areas. They were primarily interested in using the index to identify opportunities to learn from other African economies with large livestock sectors, although they also expressed interest in using the indicators in government targets in future. Concerns were raised about the incomparability of livestock sectors in differing economies (primarily between higher and lower income countries) and expressed hope that future analysis would adopt appropriate international comparisons.

Domestic interviewees generally believed they had a clear understanding of the priorities for domestic reform, and that the EBA would add little to their analysis of what the challenges and priorities were. The importance of political economy was raised, with the likelihood that many reforms that could be expected to benefit SHFs would actually result only in gains to other members in the supply chain. The dominance of large firms in public-private dialogue was widely acknowledged,⁷² suggesting that a country diagnostic could be useful, if it looked more deeply into SHFs' interests, and the political economy constraints that might subvert well-meaning reform. Interviewees from the private sector suggested that there was value even in collecting existing analysis into a single, coherent document, due to the general underdevelopment of the policy environment.

⁷⁰ World Bank, 2017, §Context.

⁷¹ Hetherington, 2017, p3.

⁷² See also FAO, 2015, p21: 'Smallholder farmers and pastoralists and their representatives do not usually participate in policy-making processes.'

Annex 6. Online Survey

Two online surveys were conducted to gather views on a subset of review questions from a larger sample of stakeholders. The table below summarises the sampling frame and response rates for the two surveys:

Table A2: Response Rate for the Review's Online Surveys

	Target audience (sample size)	Number of Responses	Response Rate
Online Survey			
1. Global survey	173	28	16%
2. Event survey:	704	103	15%
- 3rd Annual Agricultural Policy Conference, Tanzania	209	19	
- African Seed Trade Association (AFSTA), Senegal	319	36	
- AGRILINKS- EBA webinar	98	21	
- WB-EBA Dissemination Workshop, Tanzania	33	11	
- WB-EBA Dissemination Workshop, Kenya	45	16	

Global Survey


A total of 28 people responded the survey. The global survey included 8 questions and gathered information in four areas:

- General information of the respondents (i.e. type and country of stakeholder)
- Use of EBA products
- Relevance of EBA
- Future improvements of EBA.


The main results are presented below:

General information

1. Type of stakeholder




2. Country of stakeholders




Use of EBA products

3. What have you used EBA's products for? Please note that EBA products include: EBA annual reports, country profiles, the EBA website, EBA databases, etc




4. How have you or your organisation used EBA's products?



Relevance of EBA

5. Please rate the EBA activities according to how relevant they have been to your work, on a scale from 1 (not at all relevant) to 5 (extremely relevant).




6. Rate the EBA subject areas that have been most relevant to your work on a 1-5 scale from 1 (not at all relevant) to 5 (extremely relevant). If you do not know for a subject area, please leave that row blank.



Future improvements to EBA

7. How else should the EBA team promote the use of EBA products better? (optional)



8. How could the EBA be improved? (optional)

Promotion

- Increased promotion of EBA findings.

Indicators

- Further development of the indicators in the livestock topic.
- More clarity for law and water indicators.
- Several indicators, particularly inputs should be re-thought.
- Regular reviews of indicators.

Other comments


- EBA has strong bias towards international trade and multinational companies. It should focus on the functioning of in-country agricultural markets and assess non-regulatory policies such as pricing and marketing as well.
- Look beyond regulations and policies.
- Further efforts can be done to make it useful for countries, so that governmental and non-governmental organizations do not see EBA only as an instrument to scrutinize them, but also as tool for supporting their own decision making.

Events survey

A total of 103 attendees of the five different events selected responded to the survey. The global survey included 12 questions and gathered information in six areas:

- General information of the respondents (i.e. type and country of stakeholder)
- Use of EBA products
- Relevance of EBA
- Reform in your country
- Reform and its effects
- Future improvements of EBA.


The figure below shows the number of respondents and their countries of origin/work for each of the events selected for this review.




The figures below show the results of the survey for each of the questions.

General information

1. Who do you work for?




2. In which country do you work?



Relevance of EBA


- 3. You attended the event 'name of event' in 'name of the country', which introduced the World Bank's Enabling the Business of Agriculture project (EBA). On a scale from 1 (not at all) to 5 (definitely), please answer the following questions about how successful the presentation and subsequent discussion was:**

n=103




- 4. Had you used the EBA before this event?**

n=103




5. Have you used the EBA since this event?




Reform in your country

6. Are you aware of any significant reforms to agricultural policy, law or regulation in the last 2 years in your country?




7. In your country, do you think that the EBA has contributed to any reform of agricultural policy, law or regulation?




Reform and its effects


8. What aspect(s) of the EBA have been most important in influencing the reform process in your country? Please tick all that apply.



9. Which EBA topics have been most relevant for reform purposes in your country?



10. Where the EBA has influenced reform, what effect has the reform had...



What have the main effects been?


The effects indicated in the responses are summarised in the table below:

Table A3: Main effects of Reform


Type of stakeholder	Country	Main effects
Private sector	Burkina Faso	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> To meet international standards
Private sector	Kenya	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Easing of cross-border trade in seed but with a few challenges.
Private sector	Ghana	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The private sector is now taking the production role of the seed industry while the public Sector is taken over the policy aspect Some element of local seed production has emerged It is a little bit easier to import seed
Private sector	Tanzania	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increased availability of appropriate data for policy making

Future improvements to EBA

11. How else should the EBA team promote the use of the EBA?




12. How could the EBA be improved to make it more effective in supporting reform in your country?




Annex 7. Web analysis

• Top products downloaded




• Top five website pages visited



Annex 8. Citation analysis


A citation analysis has been conducted to measure the relative importance or impact of EBA publications by counting the number of times they have been cited by other works, and the type of document in which they have been cited (i.e. journal article, grey literature, press or online article, etc.). We have followed the following steps to conduct the citation analysis:



Analysis of evidence

Third party research using the EBA has been limited and the results of the analysis show that a total of 34 documents (grey literature: 15; WBG reports: seven; journal articles: nine and books: three), have cited either 'BBA' or 'EBA' from 2014 to 2017. Nearly 50 percent of the documents citing EBA were published in 2017.

EBA citations




Only eight papers have used the EBA data to conduct some type of analysis (i.e. descriptive or econometric analysis).

Type of document	2016	2017	Total
Journal article	0	2	2
WBG report	1	1	2
Grey literature	2	2	4
Total	3	5	8

Online and press articles

Overall 26 online and press articles citing either EBA or BBA were identified using google engine and google alerts⁷³ from 2014 to 2018.

Citation of EBA in online and press articles



⁷³ A google alert was set up in November 2017 and a total of 10 press and online articles were identified. Itad May, 2018

List of grey literature, WBG reports, books and journal articles identified for the citation analysis

* Papers and reports where the EBA project is mentioned but does not appear in references.

No	Article	Year	Type of document	EBA data used for analysis	WBG publication	Search string
1	Boettiger, S., Denis, N. and Sanghavi, S. (2017). 'Readiness for agricultural transformation', McKinsey Center for Agricultural Transformation, November 2017.	2017	Grey literature	Yes	No	EBA/Enabling the Business of Agriculture
2	*Christiaensen, L. and Lawin G. (2017). 'Jobs Diagnostic Côte d'Ivoire: Chapter 3: Maximising Agriculture's Contribution to the Job Agenda', World Bank, Washington, DC.	2017	WBG report	No	Yes	EBA/Enabling the Business of Agriculture
3	Divanbeigi, R. and Chen, R. (2017) 'Can Regulation Promote Financial Inclusion?' World Bank, Washington, D.C.	2017	Grey literature	Yes	Yes	EBA/Enabling the Business of Agriculture
4	Divanbeigi, R. and Saliola, F. (2017). 'Regulatory Constraints to Agricultural Productivity', World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper 8199, Washington, DC.	2017	WBG report	Yes	Yes	EBA/Enabling the Business of Agriculture
5	Durkin, A. (2017). 'Growing markets, growing incomes: Leveraging trade facilitation for farmers', The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, March 2017.	2017	Grey literature	No	No	EBA/Enabling the Business of Agriculture
6	Fraser, E. and Mittal A. (2017). 'Chapter 11: The truth about land grabs: A review of the Oakland Institute's reports on large-scale land investments in the twenty-first century', Foreign Capital Flows and Economic Development in Africa, 221-245.	2017	Book	No	No	EBA/Enabling the Business of Agriculture
7	Ignatova, J. A. (2017). 'The 'philanthropic' gene: Biocapital and the new green revolution in Africa', <i>Third World Quarterly</i> , 38(10), 2258–2275.	2017	Journal Article	No	No	EBA/Enabling the Business of Agriculture
8	Kallon, E., Schaefer, K. A., Frewer, F. (2017). 'Towards an Enabling Regulatory Environment for Livestock Health', <i>International Animal Health Journal</i> , 4(4), 56-61.	2017	Journal Article	Yes	No	EBA/Enabling the Business of Agriculture
9	Kuhlmann K. and Flowers K. (2017). 'The Human Face of Trade and Food Security: Lessons on the Enabling Environment from Kenya and India', CSIS Global Food Security Project, CSIS, Washington, DC.	2017	Grey literature	No	No	EBA/Enabling the Business of Agriculture
10	The Oakland Institute (2017). 'Down on the seed: The World Bank enables corporate takeover of seeds'.	2017	Grey literature	No	No	EBA/Enabling the Business of Agriculture
11	*Shishodia M., Babu S. C. (2017). 'Agribusiness competitiveness: Applying analytics, typology, and measurements to Africa', IFPRI Discussion Paper 1648.	2017	Journal Article	No	No	EBA/Enabling the Business of Agriculture

No	Article	Year	Type of document	EBA data used for analysis	WBG publication	Search string
12	Spann, M. (2017). 'Politics of poverty: The post-2015 sustainable development goals and the business of agriculture', <i>Globalizations</i> , 14 (3), 360–378.	2017	Journal Article	No	No	EBA/Enabling the Business of Agriculture
13	Spielman, D. J. and Smale, M. (2017). 'Policy Options to Accelerate Variety Change Among Smallholder Farmers in South Asia and Africa South of the Sahara', IFPRI Discussion Paper 1666.	2017	Journal Article	Yes	No	EBA/Enabling the Business of Agriculture
14	Townsend, R., Benfica, R. M., Prasann, A., Lee, M. (2017). 'Future of Food: Shaping the Food System to Deliver Jobs.', World Bank, Washington, DC.	2017	WBG report	No	Yes	EBA/Enabling the Business of Agriculture
15	*Wirz, J., Kunz P., Hurter U. (2017). 'Seed as a Commons, Breeding as a source for real economy, law and culture', Goetheanum and Fund for Crop Development, Dornach, Feldbach, Switzerland.	2017	Grey literature	No	No	EBA/Enabling the Business of Agriculture
16	World Bank Group (2017). 'United Republic of Tanzania Systematic Country Diagnostic: To the Next Level of Development', World Bank, Washington, DC	2017	WBG report	No	Yes	EBA/Enabling the Business of Agriculture
17	Divanbeigi, R., Paustian, N. and Loayza, N. (2016) 'Structural transformation of the agricultural sector: A primer'. Research & Policy Briefs; no. 2. Washington, D.C. World Bank Group.	2016	WBG report	No	Yes	EBA/Enabling the Business of Agriculture
18	Durkin, A. and Flowers K. (2016). 'Benchmarking the business of agriculture', CSIS Global Food Security Project, CSIS, Washington, DC.	2016	Grey literature	No	No	EBA/Enabling the Business of Agriculture
19	Herzfeld, T., Kulyk, I., Wolz, A. (2016). 'Deliverable 4.4: Report on institution and supply chain performance', Leibniz Institute of Agricultural Development in Transition Economies (IAMO).	2016	Grey literature	Yes	No	EBA/Enabling the Business of Agriculture
20	Mansfield, D. and Mauter Markof, M. (2016) 'Diagnostic Review of Business Environment Constraints: Sudan' Business Environment Reform Facility, DFID.	2016	Grey literature	No	No	EBA/Enabling the Business of Agriculture
21	*Oehmke, J. (2016). 'Mutual Accountability Opens Private Sector Opportunities in African Agriculture', Agricultural and Applied Economics Association (AAEA), Choices, 31(4).	2016	Grey literature	No	No	EBA/Enabling the Business of Agriculture
22	*Prato, S. (2016). 'Editorial: Financing for Development: The Progress Money Cannot Buy', <i>Development</i> , 59 (1–4).	2016	Journal Article	No	No	EBA/Enabling the Business of Agriculture
23	Divanbeigi, R. and Saliola, F. (2016) 'Regulation and the Transformation of Agriculture,' available at: http://www.fao.org/3/a-bp140e.pdf	2016	Grey literature	Yes	Yes	EBA/Enabling the Business of Agriculture

No	Article	Year	Type of document	EBA data used for analysis	WBG publication	Search string
24	Sedlak, O. et al. (2016). 'Access to finance for micro, small and medium business units in Serbian agribusiness', <i>Ekonomika poljoprivrede</i> , 63(4), 1219- 1235.	2016	Journal Article	No	No	EBA/Enabling the Business of Agriculture
25	The Oakland Institute (2014) 'The Unholy Alliance Five western donors shape Pro-corporate agenda for African Agriculture'.	2016	Grey literature	No	No	EBA/Enabling the Business of Agriculture
26	World Bank Group (2016). 'Africa's Pulse, No 14 (October 2016)', World Bank, Washington, DC.	2016	WBG report	Yes	Yes	EBA/Enabling the Business of Agriculture
27	Bonan J., Pareglio S. and Rotondi, V. (2015). 'The role of impact evaluation of agricultural development projects', <i>Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Sociali</i> , 4, 369-380.	2015	Journal Article	No	No	EBA/Enabling the Business of Agriculture
28	*Independent Evaluation Group (2015) 'Investment Climate Reforms: An Independent Evaluation of World Bank Group Support to Reforms of Business Regulations', Washington, DC: World Bank. (BBA)	2015	WBG report	No	Yes	BBA/Benchmarking the Business of Agriculture
29	*Nyambura, R. (2015). 'Agrarian Transformation(s) in Africa: What's in it for Women in Rural Africa?', <i>Development</i> , 58(2-3), 306-313.	2015	Journal Article	No	No	EBA/Enabling the Business of Agriculture
30	Mohammad Ali, S. (2015) Development, Poverty and Power in Pakistan, The Impact of state and donor intervention on farmers, Routledge. (BBA)	2015	Book	No	No	BBA/Benchmarking the Business of Agriculture
31	The Oakland Institute (2014) 'Wilful Blindness: How World Bank's country rankings impoverish small holder farmers'. (BBA)	2014	Grey literature	No	No	EBA/Enabling the Business of Agriculture
32	The Oakland Institute (2014) 'New name, same game: World's Bank Enabling the Business of Agriculture'.	2014	Grey literature	No	No	EBA/Enabling the Business of Agriculture
33	*Sabahi, B. Birch, N., Laird, I. (2014) 'Revolution in the International Rule of Law: Essays in Honour of Don Wallace, Jr.', Jurys Publishing. (BBA)	2014	Book	No	No	BBA/Benchmarking the Business of Agriculture
34	Reytar, K., Hanson, C. and Henninger, N. (2014) 'Indicators of Sustainable Agriculture: A Scoping Analysis', Working Paper, World Resources Institute.	2014	Grey literature	No	No	BBA/Benchmarking the Business of Agriculture

List of online and press articles

No.	Article	Year	Type of publication	Search string	Search method
1	Africa Independent Television (2018) Nigeria Rejects World Bank Report	2018	Online article	EBA/Enabling the Business of Agriculture	Google alerts
2	AGRA (2018) AGRA ranks Nigeria among countries with agribusiness-friendly regulations	2018	Online article	EBA/Enabling the Business of Agriculture	Google alerts
3	Ghana Web (2018) World Bank Launches Business of Agriculture Report	2018	Press article	EBA/Enabling the Business of Agriculture	Google alerts
4	Ghana Web (2018) Ghana Performs Poorly In World Bank's 'Enabling The Business Of Agriculture' Report	2018	Press article	EBA/Enabling the Business of Agriculture	Google alerts
5	Graphic Online (2018) World Bank launches Business of Agriculture Report	2018	Press article	EBA/Enabling the Business of Agriculture	Google alerts
6	Graphic Online (2018) Low market, transport impede agriculture in Ghana	2018	Press article	EBA/Enabling the Business of Agriculture	Google alerts
7	Sundiata Post (2018) EBA 2017 Report will improve agribusiness reforms in Nigeria	2018	Press article	EBA/Enabling the Business of Agriculture	Google alerts
8	Vanguard (2018) World Bank Group scores Nigeria agriculture sub-sector low	2018	Press article	EBA/Enabling the Business of Agriculture	Google alerts
9	Canfield, M. (2017) 'Why do the World Bank's new indicators, 'Enabling the Business of Agriculture' pose a threat to African agriculture?' Community Alliance for Global Justice.	2017	Online article	EBA/Enabling the Business of Agriculture	Google
10	Griffith, A. (2017) What's next for 'Enabling the Business of Agriculture?' Practical Action	2017	Online article	EBA/Enabling the Business of Agriculture	Google
11	Mathew, B. and Todhunter, C. (2017) 'Challenging Neoliberal Dogma: Pushing Indian Farmers into Bankruptcy Isn't Development'	2017	Online article	EBA/Enabling the Business of Agriculture	Google
12	Bankruptcy Isn't 'Development' Global Research	2017	Online article	EBA/Enabling the Business of Agriculture	Google
13	The Indian Express (2017) Redesigning policy: The right crop nutrient solution	2017	Press article	EBA/Enabling the Business of Agriculture	Google alerts
14	The Herald (2017) Government interventions boost maize yields	2017	Press article	EBA/Enabling the Business of Agriculture	Google alerts
15	Todhunter, C. (2017) 'Foreign Capital Dictates India's Development Agenda: Cultural Imperialism and the Seeds of Catastrophe, Ripping Up India's Social Fabric', Global Research	2017	Online article	EBA/Enabling the Business of Agriculture	Google

No.	Article	Year	Type of publication	Search string	Search method
16	Todhunter, C. (2017) Food, Agriculture and the Global Ecology: Rolling Back the Tide of Pesticide Poison, Corruption and Looming Mass Extinction, Global Research,	2017	Online article	EBA/Enabling the Business of Agriculture	Google
17	World Bank Group (2017) Better Agriculture regulations could help feed world's growing population	2017	Online article	EBA/Enabling the Business of Agriculture	Google
18	Brettonwoods Project (2017) World Bank's agriculture initiative criticised.	2017	Online article	EBA/Enabling the Business of Agriculture	Google
19	Kirk, P. (2017) The World Bank and the Battle for the Future of Farming, Common Dream	2017	Online article	EBA/Enabling the Business of Agriculture	Google
20	Zimbabwe Daily (2017) 'Removing constraints to boost the Business of Agriculture in Zimbabwe'	2017	Press article	EBA/Enabling the Business of Agriculture	Google
21	Amelinckx, A. (2016), 'Western Donors Support Big Agriculture in Africa', Modern Farmer	2016	Online article	EBA/Enabling the Business of Agriculture	Google
22	The Guardian (2015) 'The World Bank's race to the bottom'	2015	Press article	EBA/Enabling the Business of Agriculture	Google
23	CafeBabel (2014) World vs. Bank: The Business of Agriculture and the Podium of Inequality.	2014	Online article	BBA/Benchmarking the Business of Agriculture	Google
24	The Express Tribune (2014) Dangers of 'benchmarking the business of agriculture'	2014	Press article	BBA/Benchmarking the Business of Agriculture	Google
25	The Guardian, (2014) 'World Bank's new agriculture project threatens food security, warn experts'	2014	Press article	EBA/Enabling the Business of Agriculture	Google
26	Mousseau, F. (2014) World Bank indicators rig the field against farmers' rights, Right Finance.	2014	Online article	BBA/Benchmarking the Business of Agriculture	Google