Evaluation 2021/1

Independent Evaluation of SDC’s Performance in Market System Development in Agriculture 2013-2019
Independent Evaluation of

SDC’s Performance in Market System Development in Agriculture 2013 - 2019

Commissioned by the Evaluation and Corporate Controlling Division of the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC)

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<td>Geographic area</td>
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<td>Sector</td>
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<td>Date</td>
<td>October 2021</td>
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| Author              | PEMconsult a/s, 1403 Copenhagen, Denmark
                        | Eric Buhl-Nielsen (team leader), Susan Ulbaek, Ivan Naletilić, Anders Aalbaek, Lida Patricia Rodriguez, Mimi Louise Grønbech, Mohammad Jakariya |

Bern, October 2021
I Evaluation Process

Evaluations commissioned by the SDC’s Board of Directors were introduced in the SDC in 2002 with the aim of providing a more critical and independent assessment of the SDC activities. These Evaluations are conducted according to the OECD DAC Evaluation Standards and are part of the SDC’s concept for implementing Article 170 of the Swiss Constitution, which requires Swiss Federal Offices to analyse the effectiveness of their activities. The SDC’s Senior Management (consisting of the Director General and the heads of SDC’s departments) approves the Evaluation Program. The Evaluation and Corporate Controlling Division, which reports directly to the Director General, commissions the evaluation, taking care to recruit independent evaluators and manages the evaluation process.

The Evaluation and Corporate Controlling Division identified the primary intended users of the evaluation, and invited them to participate in a Core Learning Partnership (CLP). The Core Learning Partnership actively accompanied the evaluation process. It commented on the evaluation design (Approach Paper); it validated the evaluation methodology (Inception Report); and it provided feedback to the evaluation team on their preliminary findings. During a capitalization workshop and a presentation on the Draft Evaluation Report, the Core Learning Partnership had the opportunity to comment on the evaluation findings, conclusions and recommendations.

The evaluation was carried out according to the evaluation standards specified in the Terms of Reference.

Based on the Final Report of the Evaluators, the Senior Management Response (SMR) was approved by the SDC’s Board of Directors and signed by the SDC Director-General.

The SMR is published together with the Final Report of the Evaluators. Further details regarding the evaluation process are available in the evaluation report and its annexes.

Due to the Covid-19 Pandemic (and the associated health risks and travel restrictions), all involved units at SDC and the consultant decided in April 2020 that field missions were not feasible. The evaluation was conducted remotely with one exception, a limited field visit by a local consultant in Bangladesh.

Timetable

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<tr>
<th>Step</th>
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<tr>
<td>Approach Paper finalized</td>
<td>December 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementation of the evaluation</td>
<td>May 2020 – March 2021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Management Response in SDC</td>
<td>October 2021</td>
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II  Senior Management Response


SDC commissioned an independent evaluation of SDC’s performance in MSD in agriculture 2013-2019. The mandate was to provide evidence on the performance of MSD in agriculture programmes and projects of SDC, in particular on how they contribute to increasing income, supporting food security, reducing poverty, and improving resilience and livelihoods of smallholder farmers. The evaluation assessed the performance of SDC’s programmes and projects along the OECD DAC criteria of relevance, coherence, effectiveness / impact, efficiency, and sustainability.

The evaluation team had access to the full range of SDC documentation. It reviewed project documents and evaluations; it interviewed a large number of SDC and project staff as well as key stakeholders. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the team could not conduct field visits. However, in Bangladesh a local consultant was able to conduct on a limited scale field visits.

This Senior Management Response was submitted to the Board of Directors for approval and signed by the Director-General of SDC. It sets forth concrete measures and actions to be taken, including responsibilities and deadlines.

Assessment of the evaluation

The evaluation was conducted by a team of independent experts in accordance with international standards. The evaluation process was well managed and included close involvement of the Core Learning Partnership (CLP). The CLP comprised staff from all SDC departments, including from SDC’s thematic units Agriculture and Food Security (AFS) and Employment and Income (e+i), which is part of the Inclusive Economic Development (IED) unit. The evaluation report provides a timely and useful assessment of the activities SDC undertakes in the field of MSD in agriculture. The main objectives – assessing the relevance, coherence, effectiveness / impact, efficiency, and sustainability of SDC’s performance in MSD in agriculture have been met by the evaluators. SDC appreciates the comprehensiveness of the evaluation report, the differentiation according to context and the sound analysis of key elements of SDC’s performance in MSD in agriculture.

The report’s analysis and resulting recommendations are considered to be useful for strengthening the strategic orientation of MSD in agriculture within SDC. SDC’s Senior Management thanks the evaluation team and SDC staff involved for their effort and for a substantial and comprehensive report. It especially thanks the cooperation offices who contributed to the case studies. SDC’s Senior Management is committed to implementing the measures set out in the Senior Management Response.

Main findings

The overall findings of the evaluation are as follows:

- MSD is well served by a range of think tanks and processes. SDC has taken a proactive and leading role in contributing to MSD both globally and through implementation at project level.
- The approach has evolved to better respond to the SDGs by consciously addressing inclusiveness, gender equality and climate.
- There have been good results on additional income and outreach to beneficiaries usually well in excess of targets. However, the contribution to poverty reduction per household is often thinly spread.
• Notable and well documented results were achieved in creating system change at the intervention level especially in distribution channels and in embedding of services.
• The interventions were often narrow and incomplete from the stakeholder viewpoint and the risks from the wider political economy and external factors were not always translated at project level.
• Projects working alone found it challenging to advocate for change in policies, rules and regulations. Where there was evidence of Swiss Cooperation Offices (SCOs) making use of the projects and information base to enhance policy dialogue, results were promising.
• The project role of identifying and stimulating change in the markets was rarely owned by and only sometimes anchored in permanent organisations leaving learning gaps and threatening sustainability.
• The rigor of reporting varied considerably. Understanding, measuring and reporting on wider system changes was difficult.
• MSD was complex and demanding on project teams, SCOs and procurement processes.

Key elements of the Management Response

SDC’s Senior Management considers that MSD is a pertinent approach for the implementation of the International Cooperation Strategy 2021-2024, also known as the Dispatch on Switzerland’s International Cooperation 2021-2024. The evaluation provides evidence on how MSD can work in a concrete sector and what challenges it may face. SDC’s Senior Management notes that the approach has been refined over time. It has particularly been able to add value, when projects addressed market failures and externalities. Notably, these include gender inequalities, agro-ecological and environmental externalities and resilience and climate change related issues.

Out of the 7 recommendations, 5 are ‘fully agreed’ (green), 2 are ‘partially agreed’ (orange) and none are ‘disagreed’ (red). The key measures are summarised as follows:

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. <strong>Clarify the role of MSD in Swiss development cooperation in the future.</strong></td>
<td>Partially agreed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. <strong>Continue to support the development of the approach to better respond to the SDGs through enhancing inclusiveness, gender equality, and climate resilience.</strong></td>
<td>Fully agreed</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. <strong>Link the MSD projects and interventions to wider processes to gain coherence and critical mass.</strong></td>
<td>Fully agreed</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. <strong>Contribute more explicitly to private sector and market related policy and reforms.</strong></td>
<td>Fully agreed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. <strong>Seek and explore options for longer-term anchorage of the MSD approach.</strong></td>
<td>Partially agreed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. <strong>Sharpen project design, monitoring and reporting on drivers of change and system changes.</strong></td>
<td>Fully agreed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. <strong>Enhance SCOs’ role and develop capacity within SCOs, implementing agents and national entities to implement MSD in agriculture.</strong></td>
<td>Fully agreed</td>
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Bern, 12 October 2021

Patricia Danzi, SDC Director General

Annex: Overview of recommendations, management response and measures
Annex: Overview of recommendations, management response and measures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendation 1</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Clarify the role of MSD in Swiss development cooperation in the future.</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Rationale:</strong> SDC has been an active donor in support of MSD in agriculture and the evolution of the approach through many mainly smaller projects and intellectual input. As the world readies for the Food Systems Summit to take place in September 2021, it is relevant to consider the role of MSD in delivering the necessary transformation of the way the world produces, processes, and consumes food to achieve the SDGs and ensure food security and safety for everyone going forward. The MSD approach can contribute to making markets work for the poor by integrating smallholders (women and men) into sustainable food value chains and systems that can support food security for the individual smallholder as well as link smallholders better to markets. The evidence brought forward by this evaluation points to the importance of MSD interventions to be sizeable and long-lasting to result in deep and wide market system changes that are sustainable in all aspects. There need to be linkages to other processes and coherence between project and policy level to make markets work and anchorage needs to be considered to ensure continued market stimulation and replicability. This might entail setting priorities. There are various options to consider depending on where SDC wants to go with MSD from here. At one end of the spectrum there is the option to integrate MSD features – context focus, facilitation and integration of private sector-based solutions, local solutions, and ownership – across development cooperation and/or use the MSD approach in conjunction with community-based approaches to better addresses poverty in its multiple forms. At the other end of the spectrum, there is the option of stand-alone MSD engagements, possibly with a focus on also linking to global value chains through collaboration with large private sector actors that can provide demand and impetus for improved production and productivity.</td>
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<tr>
<td>The recommendation can be implemented through the following measures:</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Decide the focus of SDC’s support for MSD in agriculture building on the achievements so far to support the development of sustainable food systems;</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Consider which countries to provide significant support to MSD in agriculture as part of the medium-term cooperation strategies being developed.</td>
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<th>Management Response</th>
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<tr>
<td>Fully agree</td>
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MSD is and remains an important approach for SDC in agriculture (amongst other sectors). SDC will continue contributing to its development and applying it in its programmes and projects. The decision on whether or not this is done by integrating MSD features, use the approach in conjunction with community-based approaches or through stand-alone MSD engagements should be made case by case and depending on the respective local context. Where possible, linkages to global value chains through collaboration with large private sector actors should be explored further. However, partner countries are very diverse and SDC should refrain from mainstreaming “a one size fits all” MSD approach to the diversity of contexts and sectors, in which SDC is working. Priority setting should be done at the programme and project level and according to the prevailing country context. In theory, the MSD approach can be used everywhere and is considered particularly pertinent – as shown with this evaluation – when it comes to agriculture. The appropriateness of MSD is also assessed by using, among others, political economy analysis. When MSD is applied, the analysis of the market and (potential) actors is crucial and the feasibility of interventions within the agricultural sector will depend on the needs, actors and contexts and will need to be adapted, e.g. in |
| a) dense markets; |
| b) thin markets; |
| c) markets in fragile contexts; |
d) markets under pressure from cheap imports coming from (often neighbouring) emerging economies; or
e) markets where an urgent need for transformation in production, logistics and consumption is perceived.

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<th>Measures</th>
<th>Responsibility</th>
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<tr>
<td>Continue to fund and engage with the “Donor Committee for Enterprise Development” (DCED) and “Beam Exchange” as knowledge hubs to further develop the approach, generate knowledge and exchange with other donors and implementers.</td>
<td>IED and AFS</td>
<td>ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continue to prioritize the MSD approach in agriculture.</td>
<td>SCOs / Embassies supported by the respective geographic and thematic units IED and AFS</td>
<td>ongoing</td>
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**Recommendation 2**

**Continue to support the development of the approach to better respond to the SDGs through enhancing inclusiveness, gender equality, and climate resilience.**

**Rationale:** SDC has been at the forefront of supporting the evolution of MSD in agriculture and was also a lead donor in the adoption of the SDGs with their focus on inclusiveness – leave no-one behind – and sustainability. Through its longer-term support to MSD projects, SDC has also become one of the major donors to MSD in agriculture. Many of these projects, as outlined in this evaluation, have been seeking means of increasing the contribution and impact of MSD in agriculture to the SDGs. In particular, market weaknesses in agriculture are often linked to issues of inclusiveness, gender equality, environment, and climate resilience and which, although complex, potentially provide the most promising opportunities and entry points for the MSD approach.

The recommendation can be implemented through the following measures:

- Continue the engagement of the e+i and AFS networks within SDC [SDC headquarters];
- Continue to engage with the community of practice think tanks as well as implementers to promote experience exchange and research on how MSD can more effectively identify entry points, target, and contribute to market development and the SDGs through attention to inclusiveness, gender, environment, and climate resilience [SDC headquarters; community of practice think tanks; MSD project implementers];
- Incorporate inclusiveness, gender, environment and climate resilience into the objectives and result frameworks and reporting of new MSD projects moving into new phases [SDC headquarters and SCOs].

**Management Response**

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<tr>
<th>Fully agree</th>
<th>Partially agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
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In view of the degradation of agro-ecosystems, insufficient nutrition and increasingly difficult climatic conditions for agriculture, promoting agro-ecological and climate resilient services and business models as well as healthy and nutritious products is crucial. This is also in the interest of all market participants in MSD approaches in the regulation and development of support markets (e.g. service markets for farmers and along the value chain and input markets).
Thus, in principle, we fully agree with the recommendation. However, the basis for identifying MSD interventions (as part of the market assessment), that have a potential to benefit the poor, follows the graph below, i.e. relevance, feasibility and opportunity are imperative criteria that need to be fulfilled.

Adding additional restrictions makes a usually already small “intersection” of these criteria even smaller or disappear. SDC should therefore not overload projects with objectives. However, when market weaknesses in agriculture are linked to issues of inclusiveness, gender equality, environment, and climate resilience, and potentially provide promising opportunities and entry points for the MSD approach, this should certainly be seized. Furthermore, projects must be mindful that they do not cause, contribute to, maintain or promote negative impacts in the areas of human rights, inclusiveness, gender equality, environment, and climate resilience.

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<th>Measures</th>
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<th>Deadline</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>As suggested by the consultants:</td>
<td>SDC headquarters, in particular geographic units and concerned thematic focal points (e.g. e+i, gender, LNOB / poverty)</td>
<td>ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continue the engagement of the e+i and AFS networks within SDC to support the further development of the approach to better respond to the SDGs through enhancing inclusiveness, gender equality, and climate resilience.</td>
<td>SDC headquarters (in particular the thematic units IED and AFS)</td>
<td>ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continue to engage with the community of practice think tanks as well as implementers to promote experience exchange and research on how MSD can more effectively identify entry points, target and contribute to market development and the SDGs through attention to inclusiveness, gender, environment, and climate resilience.</td>
<td>SDC headquarters and SCOs</td>
<td>ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incorporate inclusiveness, gender, environment and climate resilience into the objectives, the result frameworks and the reporting of new MSD projects or phases.</td>
<td>IED</td>
<td>1st semester 2022</td>
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Recommendation 3

Link the MSD projects and interventions to wider processes to gain coherence and critical mass.

Rationale: Project-based interventions were often narrow and although potentially successful as interventions they were by themselves not enough to lead to sector-wide and transformational change. There were also risks from the wider political economy and external factors which are not always possible to deal with at the individual project level. In some cases, it was appropriate that the MSD in agriculture projects did not tackle aspects such as access to finance or delivery of essential social services but instead to link with or work with the knowledge that other efforts and processes were engaged in these areas.

The recommendation can be implemented through the following measures:

- Enhance as part of the design and ongoing adjustment of projects the exercise of mapping of relevant national and other support efforts to draw the boundaries of the MSD intervention [SCOs];
- Coordinate and map support efforts to enable a well-informed dialogue with government and other development partners to develop and exploit synergies [SCOs];
- Incorporate a more detailed and regularly updated risks assessment of not obtaining sufficient synergy and be prepared to withdraw from projects where this is not likely to be forthcoming [SCOs];
- Increase the degree to which MSD in agricultural efforts are co-financed and part of larger projects [SCO].

Management Response

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<tr>
<th>Fully agree</th>
<th>Partially agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>We fully agree with this recommendation. The implementation needs to be done by the SCO. We stress the importance of a thorough market assessment and collaboration between different projects within the same or different domains of a country programme.</td>
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<th>Measures</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Integrate the above mentioned recommendations related to project implementation into SDC’s MSD guidance. Guidance to be implemented by SCO.</td>
<td>IED SCO</td>
<td>1st semester 2022 ongoing</td>
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Recommendation 4

Contribute more explicitly to the private sector and market-related policy and reforms.

Rationale: Projects working alone found it challenging to advocate for change in policies, rules, and regulations. Projects did not often have changes in market-related policy and reforms as part of their objectives or results frame. Nor did they have the entry points or engage with the partners in the public sector that were influential in making change. Where there was evidence of SCO making use of the projects and information base to enhance policy dialogue, results were promising.

The recommendation can be implemented through the following measures:

- Work more explicitly with partners that are able to influence and affect market-related policy change and reforms [SCO; project implementing agents];
- Develop a policy and reform advocacy agenda and strategy for enhancing MSD in agriculture, making use of project-based information and evidence [SCO; project implementing agents];
- Identify actions on policy change and support to reforms into the result frameworks [SCO].
An effective policy dialogue is key to improve the rules regulating markets and needs to be part of any MSD projects. In order to identify the realistic space for policy dialogue, any calls for proposals for market facilitators of new MSD projects and any decisions for contributions to existing MSD projects must foresee specialized personnel and according activities in its project document and budget.

In addition, clear notions about the distribution of roles and responsibilities as well as the collaboration between implementers and the SCO/embassy regarding policy dialogue need to be established.

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<tr>
<td>Integrate above mentioned recommendations related to project implementation into SDC’s MSD Guidance to be implemented by SCO (in tender/budget/project document).</td>
<td>IED</td>
<td>1st semester 2022</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ensure an SDC project manager or senior staff is trained and disposes of sufficient time to dedicate to policy dialogue; or</td>
<td>SCO</td>
<td>ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensure project manager or senior staff of the partner organisation disposes of the topical and institutional competences to lead the policy dialogue.</td>
<td>SCO</td>
<td>ongoing</td>
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**Recommendation 5**

**Seek and explore options for longer-term anchorage of the MSD approach.**

**Rationale:** In the long term the sustainability and continued innovation of market development in agriculture will need to be anchored at the country level among permanent entities. This will promote learning and adaptation from within. In some cases, particularly where the institutional landscape is strong the anchorage can be safely distributed among business members organisations and the private sector and only require a light involvement of public bodies, but in other cases, this will not be the case.

The recommendation can be implemented through the following measures:

- Develop at country level, together with the relevant national entities and other development partners, options, and strategies for ensuring the mainstreaming of MSD in agriculture approaches [SCO, national entities both public and private];
- Enhance the exit strategies at the project and intervention level to include the capacity to respond, adapt and replicate the market innovation introduced [SCO, implementing agents, national entities].

**Management Response**

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In general, MSD interventions are designed sustainable: markets failures are “repaired” and continue to work differently after the project intervention. However, after the project end, the facilitation role of the project does not exist anymore and, thus, no more new markets are “repaired”, hence, more/continued innovation of market development is not necessarily given, unless a permanent entity takes over that role, which cannot be expected to the same extend in all contexts. After all, the need for an MSD project and thus the facilitative role of an implementer, often stems from the fact that national counterparts (from the private and/or public sector) are often not able (or willing) to play their role in fixing markets, e.g. via regulation or the delivery of services.
Applying MSD requires high competencies: specialists are rare and expensive even amongst implementing partners. Delegation to and anchoring at the level of national counterparts (private and public) needs to take this into account. In some cases it may not be possible. In all cases, it will require time and corresponding resources and should be planned as early as possible.

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<td>SDC will engage to further generate knowledge on how to successfully anchor MSD in agriculture approaches with national entities in collaboration with the MSD platform &quot;Beam Exchange&quot;. SDC will introduce this dimension into existing projects (where possible, e.g. via mid-term reviews) and new projects (via tender requirements and accordingly in the project document and budget): • Revise MSD guidance accordingly; • Implement accordingly.</td>
<td>IED and AFS</td>
<td>ongoing, webinar with best practise in 1st semester 2022</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IED</td>
<td>1st semester 2022</td>
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<td></td>
<td>SCO</td>
<td>ongoing</td>
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**Recommendation 6**

**Sharpen project design, monitoring and reporting on drivers of change and system changes.**

**Rationale:** The rigor of monitoring and reporting varied considerably. The reporting at the intervention level particularly when using DCED or equivalent result chains was stronger than reporting at the project level. Greater attention in project design, monitoring and reporting to drivers of change, leading to system changes and especially wider system changes often captured as outcomes need to be strengthened. The project result frameworks usually focussed on outreach numbers and accumulated income increases without looking for evidence on system change. The analysis provided served to confirm contractual obligations and was not sceptical and learning focussed.

The recommendation can be implemented through the following measures:

- Introduce evidence of system change in the result frameworks with greater detail provided using the more detailed intervention level result chains once they are designed [SCO, implementing entities];
- Continue and enhance mid-term reviews, potentially involving relevant national bodies for enhanced learning [SCO];
- Increase the adoption of DCED audits [SCO, implementing entities].

**Management Response**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Fully agree</th>
<th>Partially agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
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<tr>
<td>This recommendation is formulated in a sufficiently open manner and can be adopted with the inclusion of the following detail: DCED is the “Donor Committee for Enterprise Development”, of which SDC is a member. Thus, in general, large SDC projects should use the DCED standard and a Monitoring and Results Measurement System that lives up to that standard, incl. result chains. Applying a DECD standard equivalent result measurement, should be the exception, e.g. for smaller projects, and needs to be justified.</td>
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<tr>
<td>As suggested by the consultants: When planning and implementing projects: As soon as the more detailed intervention level result chains are designed use them to introduce evidence of</td>
<td>SCO</td>
<td>ongoing</td>
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system change in the result frameworks with greater detail.

Continue and enhance mid-term reviews, potentially involving relevant national bodies for enhanced learning;
Also:
• Revise MSD guidance accordingly.

Increase the adoption of DCED audits;
Also:
• Revise MSD guidance accordingly;
• Foresee budget in partial action to finance DCED audits and review if included in credit proposals.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendation 7</th>
<th>SCO</th>
<th>IED</th>
<th>Operation Committees SCO and SDC headquarters</th>
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<tr>
<td>Enhance SCO’s role and develop capacity within SCO, implementing agents and national entities to implement MSD in agriculture.</td>
<td>ongoing</td>
<td>1st semester 2022</td>
<td>2022 ongoing</td>
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Rationale: Where there was evidence of SCO making use of the projects and information base to enhance policy dialogue and especially where there was an active policy dialogue platform with other development partners, the results were promising. At the same time, the MSD projects were highly complex and demanding on the capacity of SCO and implementation partners.

The recommendation can be implemented through the following measures:
• Continue to rollout internal training and participation of SCO staff through the community of practice and think tank processes [SCO];
• Ensure that projects have resources and time to build internal capacity among implementing agents but also among partners and national entities [SCO, implementing agents, national entities];
• Encourage an adaptive management approach both in the flexibility of design as well as supervision of performance [SCO, implementing agents].

Management Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fully agree</th>
<th>Partially agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SDC’s Senior Management supports this recommendation. SDC is a learning organisation that supports the capacity development of its staff. Innovative approaches and projects often demand an even higher level of expertise from SDC staff and its partners. MSD is an iterative approach that requires a good understanding of the MSD methodology from all actors involved, a willingness to engage in market learning processes, and the flexibility to support changes and adjustments to the projects. In choosing its donor partners for co-financing MSD projects, SDC will prefer donors that support adaptive and flexible management of MSD projects or defer leadership to a MSD competent donor.</td>
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| As suggested by the consultants: Continue to rollout internal training and participation of SCO staff through the community of practice and think tank processes; Also:
• SDC headquarter to more actively promote existing offers. | SCO | ongoing |
| | IED, AFS and geographic units | ongoing |
Ensure that project staff have MSD specific knowledge and experience and are able to build MSD capacities among local stakeholders and national entities (where necessary);

Also:
- Revise MSD guidance explicitly mentioning that capacity building should be covered in tender and project documents and foreseen in project budgets.

Encourage an adaptive management approach both in the flexibility of design as well as supervision of performance;

Also:
- Revise SDC MSD guidance accordingly.

Integrate the MSD guidance document into the Field Handbook as working aid.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>SCO</th>
<th>IED</th>
<th>1st semester 2022</th>
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<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>SCO</td>
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<td>IED</td>
<td>IED, AFS and Quality Assurance</td>
<td>2nd semester 2021</td>
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III Evaluators’ Final Report

Commissioned by the Evaluation and Corporate Controlling Division of the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC)

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Abbreviations and acronyms

AGAJ  Association of Georgian Agricultural Journalists
AF+S  Agriculture and Food Security
ASFI  Financial System Supervision Authority
BEAM  Building Effective and Accessible Markets
CBA   Cost Benefit Analysis
CEE   East domain
CFA   Coastal Farmers Association
CHF   Swiss Franc (1CHF= 0.88 Euro)
CLP   Core Learning Partnership
CRDC  Chars Research and Development Centre
DANIDA Danish International Development Agency
DFAT  Department for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia
DFID  Department for International Development, UK
DCED  Donor Committee for Enterprise Development¹
DOA   Department of Agriculture
EAO   Ethnic Armed Organization
EU    European Union
E+I   Employment and Income
FDA   Fisheries Development Association
GG    Global domain
GIZ   German Development Agency
HA/SHA Humanitarian domain
IFAD  International Fund for Agricultural Development
INIAF National Agricultural and Forestry Innovation Institute
KNU   Karen National Union
LuxDev Luxembourg Development Cooperation Agency
M4P   Markets for the Poor
M&E   Monitoring and Evaluation
MonRPPA Mon State Rubber Planters and Producers Association
MRM   Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism
MSD   Market Systems Development
MTR   Mid-term Review
NDP   National Development Programme
NGO   Non-Government Organisation
PROFIN Fundación para el Desarrollo Productivo y Financiero
RDA   Rural Development Academy
SAP   A data integration and software application
SC    South Domain

¹ DCED is a forum, which developed the DCED standard. The DCED Standard is a framework for enhancing the quality of monitoring, and ultimately of evaluation. It includes but also goes beyond result chains. In this report, we will use the terminology of DCED standard or equivalent result change to cover methodologies that include result changes that have equivalent standards as defined in the DCED standard.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SCO</td>
<td>Swiss Cooperation Office for the South Caucasus</td>
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<td>SCSB</td>
<td>Swiss Cooperation Strategy Bangladesh</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCSM</td>
<td>Swiss Cooperation Strategy Myanmar</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDC</td>
<td>Swiss Development Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDG</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Goal</td>
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<tr>
<td>SECO</td>
<td>State Secretariat for Economic Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sid</td>
<td>Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>SME</td>
<td>Small and medium enterprises</td>
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<tr>
<td>TA</td>
<td>Technical Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>ToC</td>
<td>Theory of Change</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOR</td>
<td>Terms of Reference</td>
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<tr>
<td>TVET</td>
<td>Vocational Education and Training</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNOPS</td>
<td>UN Operational Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>UPF</td>
<td>Family Production Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>WEE</td>
<td>Women Economic Empowerment</td>
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<tr>
<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Programmes and projects (where projects are referenced the acronyms and SDC codes below are used and underlined)

**Bangladesh**

- **Katalyst/7F-00521.04** Agri-business for Trade Competitiveness Project
- **M4C/7F-07952.02** Making Markets Work for the Jamuna, Padma and Teesta Chars
- **Samriddhi/7F-03402.03** Improved livelihoods for poor households in Northern and North-western Bangladesh
- **Shiree/7F-08455.01** Economic Empowerment of the Poorest
- **Shomosti/7F-09233.02** Prosperity for the Poor and Disadvantaged

**Bolivia**

- **Mercados Inclusivos/7F-08634.02** Rural Markets
- **Proseder/7F-06552.02** Program for Rural Economic Development Services – Promotion of Microinsurance covering agricultural production
- **PIC/7F-01051.03** Support to the Bolivian Agricultural Innovation System

**Georgia**

- **ALCP/7F-06629.03** Alliances Caucasus Programme
- **MOLI/7F-07857** Market Opportunities for Livelihood Improvement
- **RED/7F-07941** Rural Economic Development Program for the Southern Regions of Georgia
- **RDRL/7F-05549.02** Rural Development in the Region Racha – Lechkumi Project

**Mali**

- **OPF4/7F-04043.03** Accompagnement des organisations paysannes et le développement des systèmes de marché durables
- **PAFA/7F-05054** Programme de Développement Rural et Sécurité Alimentaire
- **PSEL-DELTA/7F-03751.04** Programme de Soutien aux Economies Locales du Delta Intérieur du Niger

**Myanmar**

- **GOMP/7F-09030.01** Community-led Coastal Management in the Gulf of Mottama
- **GRO/7F 08844.02** Generating Rubber Opportunities in Myanmar
- **LIFT/7F-07324.05** Livelihood and Food Security Trust Fund

**Other**

- **Bai Ala/7F-08418.02** Small Business and Income Creation Programme in Alay and Chon Alay (Kyrgyzstan)
- **Catalyst-2/7F-08391.01** Second phase of the CATALIST Project funded by EKN and SDC, implemented by IFDC and WUR
- **InovAgro/ 7F-06353.01** Innovation for Agribusiness
- **MARP/7F-08348.03** Market access for the rural poor - through value chain promotion program
- **PHM/7F-08498.02** Postharvest Management in Sub-Saharan Africa
- **PYMERURAL/7F-06102.02** Micro, small, and medium enterprise development in rural areas
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Purpose - This evaluation aims “to provide evidence on how well the Market Systems Development in agricultural (MSD in agriculture) in SDC has worked. It looks at how the projects have led to greater income and food security as well as reducing poverty, and improving resilience and livelihoods of smallholder farmers”. The findings will inform SDC future decision making. They will also enhance learning and inform the Swiss parliament and the public.

What was evaluated - MSD is an approach that seeks to improve the way markets work for the poor. The first step is to understand why the poor don’t participate fully in the market. The next step is to find changes in the market that will help the poor. And then, based on this insight, to support actions to change how the market works. These actions aim to change market functions and rules.

Whilst SDC does not have a MSD in agriculture programme as such, it has supported many projects that have used the MSD approach. In the period between 2013-2019, SDC funded 275 projects that had major elements of MSD in agriculture. Out of a total grant of CHF 684 million for these projects, CHF 279 million are directly MSD relevant.

Method - The evaluation has five questions and 20 indicators. The overall purpose and link to the five questions is shown below:

The evaluation used a range of different methods. The first step was to review the theory of change. A portfolio analysis was done to provide an overview. This also guided the choice of countries and projects to look at in greater depth. Five countries were selected for field work: Bangladesh, Bolivia, Georgia, Myanmar and Mali. A desk study of documents and earlier project reviews was carried out. Interviews were held with the Swiss Cooperation Office (SCO) and project managers. National partners and the farmers and other market actors were also interviewed. Due to Covid it was not possible to make field visits except in the case of Bangladesh. Instead, where possible, the team worked with local teams.
Conclusions

MSD as an approach was found to be sound and in line with SDC aims. SDC played a lead role in MSD both globally and through funding projects. SDC actively supported communities of practice. These included NGOs, think tanks and other donors. These communities of practice helped to make markets work better for the poor in many varied contexts. During the period, MSD evolved to better respond to the SDGs. There was an increasing recognition that the markets were weak in the areas of gender, environment, and climate. And it was in these areas that MSD had the best scope to make a difference.

There were good results in reaching out to and increasing income among the target groups. The results were usually well in excess of targets. However, the contribution to poverty reduction at the farmer level was often marginal. Notable results were achieved in creating system change at the level of single actions. The most common changes were better distribution channels and the embedding of agricultural advice during product sales. However, the actions were often narrow and not complete from the farmer point of view. There was a focus on a single-inputs such as seeds or fertiliser. Some projects expanded their scope over time by working with a number of self-reinforcing actions. These actions included output marketing, land security measures, and access to finance. Projects were better able to work across a range of actions when the project had multiple phases. It was not easy for projects to identify and mitigate the political economy risks.

Projects, working by themselves, did not find it easy to influence change in policies and rules. It was often not possible, at design stage and prior to market studies, to foresee what change was necessary. Thus, policy and rule change were not clearly in the project log frame. Project staff did not have the skill and confidence to propose rule change. The time scale for rule change was often beyond the project contract period. Government and other actors reasonably demanded solid evidence of the benefits before making any change. And in some cases, there were vested interests working against changes. The project themselves did not always have good entry points at national government level, although some projects did manage to create a close working relationship with local government. Nevertheless, some projects were able to deliver clear advocacy messages. When these were taken up by the SCO there were promising results.

The overall project role to identify and stimulate change in the markets was rarely owned by permanent organisations. This left learning gaps and threatened sustainability. The individual actions that involved embedded advice and improved distribution were often anchored with permanent in-country actors. These actors included private companies, farmers organisations, business associations and extension services. In some cases, capacity was generated to innovate and adapt to changing market conditions. There were also examples, such as in Georgia where the improved veterinary services crowded-in other actors and were replicated beyond the project area. It was rare that the champions were the government or other entities in the country itself. The MSD community of practice is increasingly recognising the difficulty of anchoring MSD beyond individual actions. Some projects sought out country level partners who could take the lead and continue MSD beyond the project. So far with mixed success.

The rigor of reports varied. It is not easy to measure and report on system change. Where the procedures of the Development Committee for Enterprise Development (DCED) were used the reporting was better. Project level reports were hampered by pre-set indicators and the logframe. This led projects to focus on achieving the output and outcome numbers rather than on making system changes. Mid-term reviews were useful for pointing to what could be done better. But they were often too early to be conclusive on system change. Cost benefit analysis was carried out for some projects but not the majority. A standard approach to cost benefit analysis based on clear assumptions was not adopted.
Overall, MSD was found to be complex. It was demanding on project teams and the SCOs. A high level of skill was needed to find market failures and define what to do. The actions had to stimulate the private sector without distorting the market. They also had to avoid the trap of the project becoming a permanent actor. Over several phases, projects built up their skill base. They achieved this either by training their own staff or building the capacity of local NGOs. This gave rise to a slow start. But it paid dividends over the years as considerable skills were built up within the projects. The high skill demand made it difficult to procure and contract project staff. This continues to be a constraint. SDC by funding several phases of projects over 10 years or more helped to build up skills. The multi-phase approach also increased the capacity of projects to adapt.

Recommendations

R1) Clarify the role of MSD in Swiss development cooperation in the future. **Rationale:** SDC has been active in supporting MSD in agriculture mainly through many relatively small projects. It has also contributed to MSD evolution through its internal networks and support to think tanks. MSD has the potential to make lasting contributions to transforming how the world produces, processes, and consumes food. MSD needs to work at scale and over the long term to result in market systems changes that are sustainable.

R2) Continue to support the development of the approach to better respond to the SDGs through enhancing inclusiveness, gender equality, and climate resilience. **Rationale:** Market weaknesses in agriculture are often linked to issues of gender equality, environment, and climate resilience. These areas, although complex, potentially provide the most promising opportunities and entry points for the MSD approach. They also strongly contribute to the SDGs.

R3) Link the MSD projects and interventions to wider processes to gain coherence and critical mass. **Rationale:** Project based actions were often narrow. They were often successful by themselves. But they did not often enough lead to sector wide change. It was not easy to deal with political economy or external risks at the individual project level.

R4) Contribute more explicitly to private sector and market related policy and reforms. **Rationale:** Projects working alone found it challenging to change policies, rules, and regulations. Projects were not set up to clearly support change in rules and regulations. They did not have the entry points or engage with the partners that were influential in making change. Where SCO worked closely with the projects and other donors, they were able to engage in policy dialogue with good results.

R5) Seek and explore options for longer term anchorage of the MSD approach. **Rationale:** It is not easy or even possible to seek a single anchorage point for MSD in agriculture. Country-based actors are needed to anchor, sustain, and scale the approach beyond the life of the project. This will promote learning and adaptation from within.

R6) Sharpen project design, monitoring and reporting on drivers of change and system changes. **Rationale:** The rigor of monitoring and reporting varied considerably. The reporting was stronger when using the DCED or equivalent results chain. Reporting was too focussed on serving contractual obligations. It was not sufficiently sceptical to deliver the highest levels of accountability and learning. A stronger focus on systems changes was needed. This in turn would require acceptance of greater flexibility and adaptability in delivering such changes.
R7) Enhance SCO role and develop capacity within SCO, implementing agents and national entities to implement MSD in agriculture. Rationale: MSD in agriculture projects were highly complex and demanding on the capacity of SCO and implementing partners. Where the SCO had the capacity to engage in policy dialogue the results were promising.

Detailed measures for implementing these recommendations can be found in chapter four. An overview of conclusions and recommendations and lessons learnt is given below. Chapter four outlines the factors that influence the success of MSD in agriculture.

Overview of conclusions and recommendations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conclusions</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C1) MSD is well served by an active community of practice. SCO took a proactive role in contributing to MSD both globally and through implementation at the project level.</td>
<td>R1) Clarify the role of MSD in Swiss development cooperation in the future.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2) MSD in agriculture has evolved as an approach and where flexibility applied has proven its relevance for making markets work better for the poor, in many but not all contexts.</td>
<td>R2) Continue to support the development of the approach to better respond to the SDGs through enhanced inclusiveness, gender equality, and climate resilience.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3) The approach evolved to better respond to the SDGs - inclusiveness, gender equality and climate.</td>
<td>R3) Lack the MSD projects and interventions to wider processes to gain coherence and critical mass.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C4) There have been good results on additional income and outreach to target population - usually well in excess of targets. However, the contribution to poverty per household is often thinly spread.</td>
<td>R4) Contribute more explicitly to the private sector and market-related policy and reforms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C5) Notable results have been reported in creating system change at the intervention level especially in distribution channels and embedding of services. However, the wider market impact and sustainability of such changes was difficult to assess.</td>
<td>R5) Seek and explore options for longer-term anchorage of the MSD approach.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C6) The interventions were often narrow and incomplete from the stakeholder point of view and the risks from the wider political economy and external factors where not always translated at the project level.</td>
<td>R6) Sharpen project design, monitoring and reporting on drivers of change and system changes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C7) Projects working alone found it challenging to advocate for change in policies, rules, and regulations. Where there was evidence of the SCO making use of the project and information base to enhance policy dialogue, results were promising.</td>
<td>R7) Enhance SCO role and develop capacity within SCO, implementing agents and national entities to implement MSD in agriculture.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C8) The rigour of reporting varied considerably. Understanding, measuring, and reporting on wider systems changes was difficult.</td>
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## Overview of lessons learnt

| Relevance and coherence | Contribution to policy and reforms requires a deliberate and systematic approach and a strategic choice of partners as well as a close link between the project and the SCO because they have different roles.  
Poverty – MSD contributes to poverty alleviation when a farmer and market perspective is combined and when it is well-coordinated with other efforts.  
Gender – a “women economic empowerment” approach that targets and engages with women as economic actors has been effective.  
System changes at the intervention level need to be linked to other systems changes brought about by the project as well as wider policy changes in order to be effective. They depended on the role of the project to facilitate linkages with other actors and provide seed funding incl. for capacity building. |
|------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Results, effectiveness, impact | The MSD approach is highly relevant as a part of the wider effort of improving development cooperation with its focus on local context, local ownership and solutions, and facilitation.  
The MSD approach potentially has the greatest relevance and added value when applied to address issues of inclusiveness, gender, and environment.  
The MSD approach can be successfully applied to a wide range of contexts. But in weaker and thin markets the level and timescale of engagement would need to be longer. And, in the areas of extreme poverty, public welfare programmes or direct interventions for the poorest are needed. |
| Cooperation efficiency | The demand on the skill set of the project implementors and SCOs was high and remains an impediment to achieving results and scaling up the approach.  
Flexibility and adaptability are important factors of success of MSD projects, and SCO offices need to be confident of the MSD approach to recognize the level of flexibility needed for projects to adapt to the circumstances and timescale. |
| Sustainability | Narrow and fragmented interventions, profit-driven by market actors, could lead to immediate results. But wider initiatives and changes in the rules and regulations and practices of others that are beyond the project reach are needed to enhance impact and sustainability  
Attention to climate end environmental impacts is indispensable for sustainability. |
1 Assessment of the scope of the evaluation

Scope of the evaluation

The main purpose of this evaluation is “to provide evidence on the performance of Market Systems Development in Agricultural (MSD in agriculture) programmes in SDC, in particular on how they contribute to increasing income, supporting food security, reducing poverty, and improving resilience and livelihoods of smallholder farmers”. The findings and recommendations are expected to inform SDC’s strategic and operational decision making, to enhance institutional learning and to inform SDC’s constituency, the Swiss parliament and the public.

The Terms of Reference (TOR) further notes that the evaluation shall assess to which extent SDC’s operationalisation of the MSD in agriculture approach ensures that: i) (Relevance) SDC’s activities respond to relevant challenges in developing agricultural market systems and contribute to poverty alleviation, inclusion of target populations, and targeting the vulnerable, including the poor and women; ii) (Coherence) SDC’s programs/projects are consistent with partner countries’ development priorities, country assistance strategies and Dispatches on Switzerland's International Cooperation; iii) (Effectiveness/Impact) The expected results are being achieved and the areas of success in need of improvement are being appropriately addressed; iv) (Efficiency) The Market Systems Approach has been efficiently managed (by SDC and its implementing partners) in order to reach high leverage effects (outreach and scaling-up); v) (Sustainability) The sustainability of the activities and good agricultural practices (i.e., ecologically sustainable, climate change resilient, and agro-ecological sound) are achieved. The evaluation shall further assess the degree and results of SDC’s international engagement in MSD in agriculture further development, learning and knowledge exchange. The evaluation will provide findings, conclusions, and recommendations on whether and how SDC’s approaches can be strengthened from a strategic and operational point of view.

The TOR make it clear that all 4 domains of South Cooperation; East Cooperation; Global and Humanitarian Cooperation are included. Geographically the focus is on priority countries/regions of which there are 21 in South Cooperation, 9 in East and 16 in the Humanitarian domain. The time scale for the evaluation is 2013 to 2019.

Methodology

The TOR presented 5 tentative evaluation questions with some 30 sub-questions. The questions from the TOR were considered in light of the theory of change and found to be appropriate and likely to be insightful. They were slightly adjusted and re-ordered and complemented by a set of indicators. A more detailed presentation of the sources of data, methodology and instruments is available in Annex B and the inception report (June 2020). The questions were clustered, as in the TOR, under relevance, coherence, effectiveness/impact, efficiency, and sustainability. The questions and indicators are presented in this report in chapter 3 under findings. A combination of five different approaches and methods were used in this evaluation: Analysis of the theory of change and verification of the evaluation questions; Portfolio analysis with a selection of desk and field samples; Desk study of normative documents and meta-evaluation/review documents; Interviews with stakeholders. Due to the Covid pandemic, it was not possible to make field visits and instead where possible the team worked with local consultants and/or benefitted from recent reviews.

Sample selection – For the South, East and Humanitarian domains, the selection process identified a long list of countries that were shortened down to desk sample and finally to 5 countries that were evaluated in greater detail. The five countries selected were Bangladesh, Bolivia, Georgia, Mali, and Myanmar. The criteria for country selection were
the level of MSD in agriculture-related expenditure and the presence of projects that represent a range of topics and were well documented. Within the selected countries a number of projects are selected based on criteria noted above such as the size of the project, the level of completion, the presence of earlier reviews and evaluations and ensuring that a range of topics and contract partners was obtained. The country and project sample were furthermore guided by discussions in the core learning platform. Seventeen projects were selected for detailed analysis and stakeholder interview among the five selected countries. A further sixteen projects were examined covering a further 14 countries based mainly on earlier evaluations and reviews. The country analysis in the five selected led to a country case study report and for each country, one or more intervention-based case study was prepared, selected from the sample of projects in the country on the basis of the quality of evidence and insight into the evaluation questions. Project assessment sheets based on an SDC standard were also prepared for each of the projects examined as part of the country analysis.

Limitations of this evaluation - The main limitations related to i) the large number of interventions over an 8-year period, ii) the complexity of issues underlying the performance of MSD engagement and iii) the availability of data and people for interviews. To mitigate these limitations, we: i) undertook a detailed portfolio analysis and expanded the range of projects we looked at to select the sample and the case studies; ii) we ensured that the quality of evidence was clearly documented and triangulated, and the context of the engagement well understood; iii) ensured an early definition of the document requests and maintained close cooperation with the evaluation unit and the SDC country offices in this regard. Covid-19 was a major limitation as it meant that the teams could not visit the countries as expected. Instead, and in mitigation, much more attention was put on expanding the sample beyond the 5 countries especially on projects that had had recent reviews and evaluations. In this way, the team benefitted from the field-work carried out at project level in a much more extensive way that the team itself could have hoped to achieve in the original 5 days allocated per country. In one country, Bangladesh, it was possible to conduct some limited field level checks and meet directly with the target population.

2 SDC engagement in market systems development

2.1 Overview of MSD and the underlying theory of change

The MSD – or M4P - rationale is that market interventions can lead to systemic change, eventually leading to poverty reduction. This is illustrated in figure 2.1 below from the M4P operational Guide (2015):

In the endeavour to reconstruct the theory of change for the MSD in agriculture, the illustration below (figure 2.2) has been created to unpack the specific SDC contributions and interventions leading to the desired outcomes. It builds on the narrative from various SDC reports as well as the M4P concept, as depicted in the figure above.

![Figure 2.1 Strategic framework for market system development (Springfield Centre 2015)](image-url)
The Theory of Change (ToC) identifies a number of generic inputs that results in outputs arising from the SDC contribution. The outputs reflect the interventions supported by SDC which when working together lead to the achievement of the desired systemic changes in the market system.

The market system is illustrated in figure 2.3. The third column of the ToC simplifies the systemic changes that are meant to take place in the core value chain itself, in the support functions, in rules and regulations. In turn, the core value chain or market starts upstream with raw material producers – in the case of MSD in agriculture with farmers – and/or then agro-processors, that for example sell to distributors and wholesalers, who in turn sell to outlets and shops who finally sell to the end consumer. Surrounding the core value chain are the support functions on the one hand, and the rules and regulations on the other (“the doughnut”). The support functions can deliver various services and assistance, and facilitate the functioning of the core market, such as with transport and access to finance. The rules and regulations present the framework in terms of the business environment, including of course laws, regulations, standards, etc. but also informal rules such as culture, social rules, and behaviour.

**Figure 2.2 Reconstructed Theory of Change (ToC)**

*SDC systems of quality at entry and programme design ensures relevance and match of delivery with demands/needs
* SDC human and financial resources are adequate
* Choice of partnership and project partners conducive
* SDC agricultural MSD programmes and projects of all 4 SDC-domains (South Cooperation, Cooperation with Eastern Europe, Humanitarian Aid, and Global Cooperation) implemented adhering to a MSD approach

Interventions catalyse positive and sustained changes: Stakeholders buy-in in the facilitation process and up-scale facilitated without further donor support and interventions by external agents. Interventions are designed to consider poor disadvantaged and excluded populations. Replication or scaling-up takes place

*BEAM stands for Building Effective & Accessible Markets - a platform for knowledge exchange/learning about using market systems approaches to reduce poverty
SDC has assessed that their projects are evolving from relatively supply-driven intervention approaches towards inclusive market system development. Earlier approaches to value chain development may have had a more narrow and linear view of the core market, whereas the more recent market systems development approach seeks to be comprehensive by including all (or most) factors that affect a well-functioning market. The evaluation looks at how the MSD in agriculture is implemented and where there have been changes in practice over the period under the evaluation scope. It is however assessed that there are no significant changes in the theoretical concept of the market system in the period under review.

Although the general approach has been broadly consistent there are differences in how it is practiced at project level and perhaps also shifts over time. As remarked by one Core Learning Partnership (CLP) member, in some projects the facilitation character is less present and implementation more directed towards key farmers. Generally, over time and within projects, there have been shifts between institutional focus to change the system and implementation focus to prove that the approach can work and provide a physical basis for scaling up. The evaluation sought to uncover the rationale of the choice of different approaches selected, and whether there is a pattern concerning the interpretation of the MSD approach and the achievements of the projects.

As explained in the SDC Approach Paper for the evaluation, the key outcomes are increasing income, supporting food security, reducing poverty, and improving the resilience and livelihoods of smallholder farmers. These outcomes can be considered as desirable ends in themselves. These outcomes result from the systemic changes that can be considered as intermediate outcomes as a means rather than an end.

Concerning the impact level, Switzerland has adopted seven common, strategic objectives by which to guide its activities: Goal 4 is to promote sustainable economic growth. It is assumed that this goal covers the MSD in agriculture strategically. Moreover, the relevant SDG namely SDG 1 - Poverty reduction and SDG 8 - Jobs and income are hence equally presented at impact level in the reconstructed ToC (figure 2.2). A number of assumptions are presented below the ToC diagram. These are organised in groups to depict where they sit in the ToC for the next level to be achieved. The assumptions were reviewed during the desk phase based on a closer review of the sample of projects chosen.

Finally, the blue dots with numbers represent the evaluation questions and their illustrated position in the ToC. These will be discussed in Section 3.

---

4 Dispatch on Switzerland’s International Cooperation 2017–2020
2.2 Portfolio analysis

SDC provided an SAP database project portfolio with a total of 595 projects across 80 countries that had a potential element of MSD in agriculture. Based on the inception study findings and CLP discussions this was narrowed down to include projects labelled under any of the following three sectors: Agriculture VCD (till 2016) (12739); Agricultural services & market (20024); Trade policy & market system (20216). This leads to a portfolio of 275 projects and 527 contracts under MSD in agriculture. The 275 projects had a total project expenditure 2013-2018 of CHF 684 million, of which CHF 279 million are labelled specifically to the three MSD in agriculture sectors. Based on this a portfolio analysis has been done across domains, sectors, contract partner groups, and countries/regions examining the expenditure patterns and annual trends. A more detailed analysis is presented in Annex A.

The average percentage of project funding assigned to the three MSD in agriculture sectors is 41%, varying from 20% to 100%, and many projects being 100% Agriculture VCD (till 2016). For instance, a large IFAD programme is allocated CHF 74 mill. but only 30% to MSD in agriculture while the M71 PAFA Sikasso project in Mali with CHF 8.4 mill is 100% MSD in agriculture.

Between 2011 and 2019 (planned), annual expenditure on MSD in agriculture has fluctuated between CHF 58 and 39 million, with a slightly declining trend after 2016. However, this could partly be due to the way (new) projects are categorised against codes.

Most projects are within the CHF 1-5 million range, but a small group of large projects have been allocated significant amounts above CHF 5 million, accounting for a very large portion (41.8%) of the total expenditure. Three projects administered by IFAD, UNOPS, and Caritas were allocated CHF 22, 14, and 12 million, respectively. At the other extreme, 85 projects have an MSD in agriculture element but zero or negative MSD in agriculture expenditure in the period, and another large group of 49 small projects (up to CHF 100,000) had an aggregated MSD in agriculture expenditure of CHF 1.3 million (4.0% of the total expenditure) in the period.

The analysis found MSD in agriculture funded activities across the five domains (South, East, Global, Humanitarian, and SDC Services) as shown in figure 2.4. The South domain has by far the largest portfolio in terms of MSD in agriculture expenditure, with the East and Global domains in the mid-range. Only a handful of projects are funded under SDC Services with one large project funded through Caritas of CHF 12 mill for MSD in agriculture.

Figure 2.4 also shows MSD in agriculture expenditure per sector for the three selected sectors (or themes). The sector “Agriculture VCD (till 2016)” dominates the portfolio. Many activities labelled “Agriculture VCD (till 2016)” are still active in 2018 (and beyond). The labels “Agricultural services & market” and “Trade policy & market system” have only been assigned from 2013 and are largely replacing...
“Agriculture VCD (till 2016)”. They are now slowly gaining traction. It can be noted, as can be seen in Annex A, that MSD in agriculture appears to have reduced since 2016, which might be a sign that with the stopping of the “Agriculture VCD” one of the clearest markers for the MSD approach might have been lost.

An analysis of contract partner groups across all the domains and sectors together is shown in figure 2.5. Non-profit and non-governmental organisations dominate with a combined 53% of MSD in agriculture project volume. UN and other international organisations account for 24% while private sector companies (organisations) account for 14%. The analysis in Annex A also shows a declining dominance by Swiss non-profit organisations, which are to a greater degree being supplemented by international NGOs. UN organisations are getting more funding (especially IFAD), and foreign state institutions are also on the increase.

**Figure 2.5 Total expenditure per partner**

![Expenditure per partner group (CHF), and share (%)](image)

Figure 2.6 shows the expenditure per country/region during 2013-2018 across all domains. Purely looking at MSD in agriculture expenditure, the following countries stand out: West Africa: Mali, Benin, and Burkina Faso; Asia: Nepal, Myanmar, Bangladesh, and Mongolia; Latin America: Honduras, Bolivia, Cuba, and Haiti; and Europe: Georgia and Armenia.
Figure 2.6 MSD in agriculture expenditure per country (region)
3 Findings on the evaluation questions

The TOR present five tentative evaluation questions with close to 30 sub-questions. During the inception phase, these were distilled down to 5 questions supported by 20 indicators. The evaluation aimed to respond to three core questions posed by the evaluation office and CLP:

- How adequate/good is MSD in agriculture (for agricultural projects)?
- How good is SDC at applying it?
- Has SDC been involved in the development of MSD in agriculture and if so, how influential has SDC been?

These are summarized and linked to the evaluation questions of the TOR as shown below in figure 3.1:

Figure 3.1 Core and evaluation question

The findings under each question grouped by relevance, coherence effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, and impact are summarised below. The indicators that linked to individual findings are given brackets at the end of each finding and where quotes are made an anonymous code is used.
3.1 Relevance

**Q1 Relevance**

Was the SDC’s MSD in agriculture approach relevant for responding to the needs of the target group?^{5}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators:</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1 The notion that SDC adopted, and contributed to the evolution of a MSD approach, was evidence-based and well-founded bearing in mind international experience;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 The MSD approach was responsive to the income and employment challenges and opportunities for target populations, the disadvantaged and poor, also considering gender;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3 The MSD approach was responsive to the resilience challenges and opportunities (in economic, social, and environmental terms) of target populations, the disadvantaged and poor, also considering gender;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4 The MSD approach was responsive to the challenges and opportunities in the market system for creation of an enabling environment for pro-poor and inclusive market systems.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Summary of findings:**
- The MSD approach has evolved and is continuing to evolve (i1.1);
- Although greater clarity and an increasing body of experience is being gained, there are still conceptual uncertainties in the approach and in how MSD is applied in practice. (i1.1);
- Although the international body of evidence on MSD and its impact on poverty and system change is developing there are still gaps. (i1.2/3);
- The SDC MSD related projects clearly targeted and were largely (but not entirely) responsive to the challenges faced by the target population (disadvantaged and poor), also considering gender. (i1.2/3);
- The SDC MSD related projects were adapted to highly differing economic situations. (i.1.4);
- The focus and evidence base are stronger at the intervention level than at the project level and enabling environment where the importance of the political and macro economy tended to be overlooked (i.1.4).

The MSD approach has evolved and is continuing to evolve. MSD is served by a vibrant community of practice at the project implementation level and a number of knowledge hubs such as BEAM, the Springfield Centre and DCED. Many of the NGOs that are involved in implementing the approach take an active role in evolving the approach and they have also developed their own guidelines and operational manuals. Over the period since 2013, MSD has evolved and is continuing to evolve. Major areas of development involve: deepening the evidence base for MSD; understanding how to identify and better assess system change; applying MSD so that where relevant it can contribute more broadly to the Sustainable Development Goals including environment, gender, and inclusiveness; mainstreaming the application of MSD so that it has relevance for the public sector as well as private sector actors and; linking with wider efforts that aim at improving social services, infrastructure and access to finance; and linking to policy changes.

SDC’s contribution to the evolution of the MSD approach has been constructive. By supporting knowledge hubs SDC has contributed towards developing a streamlined and learning approach across a wide community of practice. SDC has contributed financially to these knowledge hubs. They have also contributed through their networks such as the E+I, and through active participation in various working groups. An SDC staff member, for example, is the lead editor on the Operational Guide for Making Markets Work for the Poor – otherwise known as the “Red Book”. SDC has also contributed to the MSD through funding projects on the ground. SDC is one of the leading donors in MSD and whilst it is difficult to specify what proportion of the global funding of MSD is supported by SDC, it is noteworthy that a large proportion of the projects under DCED audit procedures are funded by SDC and that 19 out of the close to 90 MSD projects registered by BEAM are SDC funded. Some observers note that a number of the other donors who strongly supported

^{5} Note a fifth indicator on the adaption of the MSD has been moved to evaluation question 4 on efficiency.
MSD in the past are now tending to channel funds via large private sector equity fund arrangements, which offer faster disbursement of funds with less transaction costs for donors. SDC however, has been one of the most steadfast funders and supporters of the approach and has become one of the leading donors in this field.

The knowledge management, evolution and dissemination of the MSD approach is not limited to a few knowledge hubs supported by donors but has widened to include a growing range of actors including NGOs, think tanks and consultancies who contribute to the development of best practice and offer training and other resources. The evaluation encountered SDC projects that have benefitted considerably from these NGOs and consultancies in the developing sound result chains and intervention logics including ALCP [7F-06629.03/Georgia], and GOM [7F-09030.01, Myanmar]. (11.1)

Although greater clarity and an increasing body of experience is being gained, there are still conceptual uncertainties in the approach and in how MSD is applied in practice. Guidelines and documents such as the “red book” have distilled experience and present an increasingly clear and consistent framework to guide practitioners. But topics such as how to define and measure system change are still an ongoing challenge and it is noteworthy that this was the area that was found weakest in a recent summary of DCED audits (see figure 3.2). How to define and measure system change is also a feature of ongoing discussion in BEAM and among other think tanks.

When a project can be said to be adopting an MSD approach and when it is not is unclear. The approach has evolved to acknowledge the relevance of public sector functions such as agricultural extension as well as civil society actions through community-based actions but how to engage with them is often less clear. The importance of markets and the private sector have long been recognised in poverty orientated development cooperation and many hybrid approaches have developed. Most agricultural development projects have some but not all of the MSD elements. Understandably, the MSD approach does not set out a minimum threshold of criteria or red lines that define when MSD is being applied and when it is not. This makes it difficult to determine how well the MSD as an “approach” has worked because it is not clear if low performance is due to an MSD approach not working or whether it is due to the MSD approach not being properly applied. In this way, the MSD approach becomes difficult to refute. MSD can also be seen as contributing to and learning from the wider debate about “good development practice”. Rather than seeing MSD as a very special or unique approach, it can also be interpreted as part of a general drive towards better aid; summarised as follows: Understand root causes; acknowledge the importance and drive of private sector incentives; work with...
sustainability in mind/support locally driven solutions/support capabilities rather than fix problems; focus on ownership and legitimacy at all levels; enhance adaptability – try, verify and adapt – and be flexible with changing dynamics and; manage risks proactively. In the words of one project manager: “MSD is common sense; it is just good practice.” (ED01)

Increasingly there is a tendency to move away from viewing MSD as a specific approach that can only be applied as an MSD project and instead seek ways for mainstreaming elements of the approach in all agriculture projects (and beyond). Thus, for the purpose of this evaluation, it is found more meaningful to explore the context, factors and elements of the approach, which tend to lead to success or failure. (i 1.1)

Although the international body of evidence on MSD and its impact on poverty and system change is developing there are still gaps. As the number of evaluations and reviews of MSD related projects increases, the evidence base is improving. These evaluations and review are also complemented by the development of case studies and the active community of MSD practitioners. BEAM assemble and map the evidence on an annual basis. An extract of the 2019 BEAM evidence report is shown in figure 3.3 where there is strong evidence of an impact on poverty across a range of interventions and to date a weaker evidence base for systemic change. It has not been easy for BEAM or others to synthesize evidence based purely on project reporting because the effects are long term, attribution is highly complex for a facilitation approach and evidence of failures rarely comes to light. (i1.2-3)

The SDC MSD related projects clearly targeted and were largely (but not entirely) responsive to the challenges faced by their target population (disadvantaged and poor), also considering gender. Virtually all the projects examined objectives that clearly targeted the poor and disadvantaged – although precise definition of these groups was often lacking. This is also reflected by the project assessment analysis as shown in figure 3.4 below:

Figure 3.4 Project analysis assessment – poverty- question 1 in the standard SDC format

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relevance (i1.2,1.3) n=17</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Project analysis assessment
Question (i): The extent to which the objectives of the projects/programmes are consistent with the demands and the needs of the target groups incl. a description of the target groups and their specific needs (e.g., gender, specific, marginalized groups)
Relating to indicators 1.2 & 1.3
Key: HS: Fully consistent and target group-specific; S: Largely consistent; US: Only partly consistent; HUS: Marginally or not at all consistent

The SDC MSD related projects clearly targeted and were largely (but not entirely) responsive to the challenges faced by their target population (disadvantaged and poor), also considering gender. Virtually all the projects examined objectives that clearly targeted the poor and disadvantaged – although precise definition of these groups was often lacking. This is also reflected by the project assessment analysis as shown in figure 3.4 below:

Projects, understandably, did not generally target the poorest of the poor, as access to land and assets and a capacity to take some agricultural risk were necessary for the approach to work. A few such as the Market for Chars project (M4C) in Bangladesh [7F-07952.02] targeted those emerging from extreme poverty. This was promoted and fostered by the overall SDC objectives at the global and country-level as well as the MSD approach and its predecessor the M4P, which aimed at “working in weak socio-economic systems to improve the position of the disadvantaged within them.” [Springfield Centre, the red book, 2015]. It was also noteworthy that the majority of projects were implemented by NGOs who had strong traditions of working with the poor and usually in the same country, which ensured a long-term and deeper contextual understanding of poverty and its causes.
As noted by a number of analysts (DFAT, 2019) there were concerns that earlier attempts at an exclusive private sector approach had the tendency to engage with intermediaries and overlook the need for empowerment, especially of women. There was also a tendency to underemphasize in the earlier approaches the potential imbalance in market power, which could work in the favour of intermediaries and against the poorest farmers. Some studies have noted that by encouraging certain agricultural practices (e.g., monocultures) greater borrowing and leveraging the approach might inadvertently reduce resilience to economic shocks and natural disasters (IDS 2017). It was not found, based on the available reporting and interviews made, that SDC supported projects in the sample were disadvantaging the poor in the market but neither was there often a strong screening or analysis of the potentially distorting effects that could occur in highly complex systems. In general, the targeting of subsidies was directed to intermediaries and the poverty effect was reliant on lead farmers and a trickle-down effect to the less endowed groups that was plausible but not commonly tested, an example is the case of rubber tappers in Myanmar [7F 08844.02/GRO (see box 3.1)]. In many other cases such as in Kyrgyzstan [7F-08418.02/Bai Ala] although the cumulative impact in terms of income increase driven by market changes was impressive, the apparent impact per household was very little and not enough by itself to contribute to lifting people out of poverty – these topics are discussed further under evaluation question 3.

All the projects examined addressed gender to varying extents. A few projects adopted an explicit Women Economic Empowerment approach, which focussed on empowerment and exercise of rights as a first step in building up market resilience (this is also expanded on under evaluation question 3). A number of projects selected value chains that specifically targeted women, for example, the PYMERURAL [7F-06102.02] in Honduras and Nicaragua selected baking products as one of the value chains, which tapped a latent entrepreneurial spirit that created a steady income stream for women [Innovabridge, 2015] (i1.2/3)

The SDC MSD related projects were adapted to highly differing economic situations. The MSD approach in SDC projects like those supported by other donors was applied in highly different economic contexts both in dynamic emerging countries with high population density such as Bangladesh and in more remote contexts There is also evidence of the approach being applied in fragile and conflict situations such as Myanmar and Mali where markets, even if constrained, are still a lifeline for the poor and a potential pathway for mitigating conflict and enhancing cooperation. These findings are reflected more widely in an examination of 12 case studies including some not financed by SDC where it is noted “Our examples illustrate that MSD can be successfully applied to a wide range of contexts. The approach has worked in densely populated, dynamic Asian countries. But it has worked also in isolated small island nations in the Pacific, in post-conflict economies, in transition economies, in economies facing the ‘resource curse’, and in economies characterised by high transaction costs and a lack of transparency” [Bekkers et al, 2020]. However, it would

Box 3.1 MSD potential in conflict environments based on the GRO project in Myanmar

Because the MSD approach involved market actors, the approach could in some instances reach farmers and small holders in areas where the government had difficulties to access or facilitate such access. In the case Myanmar, the Generating Rubber Opportunities GRO was able to reach into areas under the control of Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAO) working though regional Rubber Associations. In Kayin State, GRO facilitated Kayin RPPA to implement trainings and interventions in mixed controlled and EAO-controlled areas. In one township under mixed control, Kayin RPPA successfully advocated with the Karen National Union (KNU) Forest Dept to reduce land taxation levied on rubber farmers who are required to pay taxes both the KNU and the State Government. Similarly, the RPPA collaborated with the State level Department of Agriculture and KNU Liaison Office to permit travel of Department of Agriculture personnel into KNU controlled areas to deliver extension services to rubber small holders. The role of the project in reaching farmers in EAO controlled areas was appreciated by the Department of Agriculture.
appear from the few cases examined, that in weaker markets the level and timescale of engagement would need to be longer and there is a danger of the projects becoming, at least in the beginning, a significant actor and threaten sustainability. At least one project in Georgia [7F-05549.02/RDRL] had to withdraw in part due to a perception that in the area chosen the market was too thin for a catalytic type of approach to work, and a project in Kyrgyzstan [7F-08418.02/Bai Ala] was not extended partly for the same reasons.

The M4C project in Bangladesh [7F-07952.02] targeted the Chars, which are islands subject to flooding and erosion and with poor infrastructure and very low connectivity to the market. The economy, with high levels of extreme poverty, was based on subsistence farming and remittances from migrant labourers. The project entered as a follow up to a massive multi-million dollar external effort known as the Chars Livelihood Project, which provided animals and equipment to destitute farmers, improved infrastructure and in many cases also contributed to strengthening the resilience of local housing by raising them on stilts. By providing assets, the farmers were converted from operating on a subsistence basis to having the potential to operate as economic actors. This and other examples from Bangladesh, Bolivia and beyond indicate that in the more extreme cases, social welfare and other public programmes are needed either in advance or together with the MDS approach if it is likely to be successful. A number of MSD projects, e.g., Shomosti [7F-09233.02, Bangladesh], have attempted to also provide some element of social services under a hybrid approach especially where other external initiatives were not present. The evidence is less clear on whether this type of hybrid has been successful or not. A study by DFAT (Australia) looking at earlier recommendations for adopting a dual “market and social services” approach concluded that there was no strong evidence for the hybrid model being more successful. In part, this might be because the scale of social services and public investment needed was beyond the objectives, project boundaries, resources and skill set of what a typical MSD project could be expected to deliver. In some cases, the projects such as Mercados Inclusivos [7F-08634.02., Bolivia] focussed on the multi-dimensional nature of poverty by raising awareness and improving access to already available social services as well as access to finance at the local and micro-level - rather than attempt a parallel provision. (i1.4-5)

The focus and evidence base are stronger at the intervention level than at the project/enabling environment level where the importance of the political and macro-economy tended to be overlooked. The feasibility phase of the projects was often found weak or even missing - a finding that was also reflected in IFAD and projects funded by other agencies (IFAD, 2019). Some projects had intervention specific results chains, which tended to look at feasibility issues but in a narrow sense. In the analogy presented in a publication supported by SDC and other donors (Miehlbradt, A. et al, 2020) there was a strong focus on the narrow torch light view (intervention level) but less attention given to the helicopter view (project level) i.e., more attention on immediate results rather than systemic change. This may also be partly due to contractual commitments to deliver immediate results and the need for well-documented results to form the basis for developing compelling cases for making market system changes.

The influence of the macro-economic situation, although touched on in some of the market research (e.g., in the ACLP project in Georgia [7F-06629.03]), was not a common feature of projects. A project in Myanmar [7F-08844.01.02, GRO/Myanmar] also overlooked the macro-economic risks associated with rubber price volatility, which is of course beyond the reach of the project but also threatens to render the entire project unfeasible. Projects identified risks in different areas, including programme, and institutional. But only seldom was there follow-up on how those risks evolved in practice and whether mitigating actions were taken. In the Great Lakes Region, for example, the issue that the project would only indirectly address the poorest of the poor was identified as a risk, this was not followed up in the reporting and it was not clear what was done to mitigate the situation if anything
In Myanmar, the risk to the project [7F-08844.01.02, GRO/Myanmar] that other donors would come in with subsidies for the production was mentioned in both phase 1 and 2, but this is not followed up in subsequent reporting and it is not clear whether the project did anything/had to do anything to avert this. (i1.4).

3.2 Coherence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q2 Coherence</th>
<th>Indicators:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Was the SDC’s programs/projects consistent with partner countries’ development priorities, country assistance strategies and Dispatches on Switzerland’s International Cooperation?</td>
<td>2.1 SDC’s operational and institutional MSD approaches were consistent with the objectives set out by the Dispatches;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.2 Synergies with other SDC approaches and interventions (e.g., TVET, local economic development) were made use of where appropriate;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.3 SDC’s strategies and programmes were systematically and sufficiently aligned and complementary to the context and strategies in the partner countries;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.4 SDC’s strategies and programmes were systematically and sufficiently aligned and complementary to other donors’ strategic plans.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary of findings
- The projects were consistent with and supportive of SDC global objectives and strategies although sometimes weak in some of the transversal themes. (i2.1);
- There was generally good synergy with the SDC country strategy and projects. (i2.2);
- Although MSD was usually in line with government policy and strategy, most projects did not have a strong engagement with government actors. (i2.3);
- A number of external evaluations and internal project reflections point to the importance and benefit of involving government more – especially local government. (i2.2/3);
- Advocacy for policy change was recognised as weak in earlier phases of the cooperation but has tended to improve with more attention given to policy in later years. (i2.3);
- Many projects were co-financed. Working with other donors has helped to streamline approaches and avoid distortions. (i2.4).

The projects were consistent with and supportive of SDC global objectives and strategies although sometimes weak in some of the transversal themes. As outlined under evaluation question 1, with their focus on the poorest areas and on ensuring a sustainable path out of poverty, the MSD projects were strongly aligned to the overall objectives of Swiss Development Cooperation. In terms of gender, environment and climate change, the picture is mixed – earlier projects were less well aligned. These topics were generally considered at the design stage but not always implemented as intended at least in the initial phases. In some cases, this can be traced back to a perception among some projects, but not all, that the transversal subjects did not respond to immediate market demand and in such cases, they should not be imposed on private sectors or others. The wider topic of inclusion and the contribution to transversal topics is discussed later under evaluation questions 3 and 5. (i2.1)

There was generally good synergy with the SDC country strategy and projects. Generally, the projects were aligned to the SDC country strategy for cooperation usually falling under the economic development sector. In Georgia, economic development was one of three areas of focus in the SDC cooperation from 2013 to 2020. The MSD projects built on long term Swiss support to the livestock sector as well as complementing other initiatives supported by SDC such as the national animal identification and traceability system. Although it was not found relevant for the MSD projects to promote access to finance, a wider SDC project working with the banking sector was launched which promises to fill the gap. There was also evidence of a spillover effect as the SDC financed support to UN Women took up the concept of women rooms under the auspices of local government initiated by one of the SDC projects [ALCP/7F-06629.03]. In Mali, the MSD projects supported the overall country strategy aim of supporting the re-building of the state and
particularly through sustainable and balanced development and better participation of the population, especially young people, in political processes enabling them to improve their living conditions in a situation of social cohesion and peace. The MSD projects by focussing on youth and job creation also supported the complementarity between humanitarian and development phases. In Myanmar, the GRO project [7F-08844.02] supported wider country efforts at land titling and the GMOP project [7F-09030.01] supported the technical education and training thrust of many of the SDC projects. (i2.2)

Although MSD was usually in line with government policy and strategy, most projects did not have a strong engagement with government actors. A project-by-project assessment found that the projects were for the most part consistent and aligned with government policy – as evident in the project assessment (see figure 3.5) However, the projects tended to work relatively independently of government, especially in the earlier years. In part, for some projects this was because they were filling a gap left by agricultural extension services and it was necessary to strongly signal a new approach that avoided government bureaucracy, political interference, and the tendency in some countries for government to set up parallel input delivery systems and marketing channels. Over the years, many projects, such as the M4C in Bangladesh [7F-07952.02] adopted a more nuanced approach and the importance of influencing and aligning with government policy and actions was increasingly recognised.

In some instances, governments found it difficult to understand the MSD approach. E.g., in Myanmar, the MSD projects [GRO/7F-08844.02; GoMP/7F-09030.01] were formally well aligned to government and state-level policies. However, the GRO project being the closest to an MSD approach in Myanmar initially faced difficulties in establishing working partnerships as there was an expectation from participants about financing. In particular, the Government saw itself as a service provider and found it difficult to adjust to the new role as a facilitator of an enabling environment for the private sector. The GRO 2nd phase foresaw the building of a community of practice for pro-poor market systems development involving Government, NGOs, donors, and research organisations. However, this never took off.

In the case of Bolivia, the national policy context was not conducive to working with the private sector. Initially, the government was cautious about growing the role of the private sector, which made it more difficult to apply the MSD approach. In general, the projects were supportive of the overall government economic and social development plans but the level of dialogue on the change that was possible was limited. In the case of PIC [Bolivia/7F-01051.03], the government institutions were potentially losers in a process of changing from vertical top-down models of promoting innovation to the adoption of horizontal and bottom-up models. In the case of Proseder [7F-06552.02], in the earlier phases, the government started a highly subsidised system of agricultural insurance that undermined the projects attempts to facilitate a market-based solution. Despite these challenges, the projects did manage to adapt to the situation and over a period of time gained the confidence of government institutions. In the sectors where it worked, the bottom-up SDC projects served to complement the government approach, which was more top-down. In Georgia, the projects worked in close harmony with and supported government policy in agriculture especially within disease control, food safety and certification. All the three projects...
examined in Georgia engaged actively with local government. However, in some cases the projects, due probably to their resources and dynamism appeared, at least temporarily, to be in the driving seat. (i2.3)

A number of external evaluations and internal project reflections point to the importance and benefit of involving government more – especially local government. Some of the market functions in agriculture and many of the regulations have a common and even public good nature and belong at least partially in the public sphere. In most countries, there are elements of the agricultural extension and research service, which are in the public sector although not often functioning well despite decades of external support. To some extent, MSD was borne out of frustration with these sometimes inefficient and top-down systems but at the same time, it is not feasible or wise to attempt to replace them entirely. Some elements and in particular changes in rules and regulations will always retain a need for government engagement. Whilst most projects acknowledge this (particularly the later generation of projects), it was not always that they found an easy mechanism to make such engagement work. Alignment at the local government level was more promising. An evaluation of an MSD project in Armenia [7F-03199.04&.05] found that the project was able to work closely with a local government reform effort that was also supported by an SDC governance project. There are also examples in Bangladesh, Bolivia, and Georgia where the projects were able to establish a much higher degree of operational alignment with local government than what was possible at the national level.

There are also examples of projects working in the same agricultural value chain in the same regions in Northern Mozambique choosing very different strategies for engagement with local government and government agricultural extension services. Where the regional Post-Harvest Management project chose to work with public agricultural extension services, the InovAgro project decided for a purely private-sector approach, with seed companies and agro-dealers delivering the extension services. In many cases, there was a risk that innovations were donor and project initiated and owned rather than driven and owned by in-country actors. These factors have sustainability implications, which are discussed further under 3.5. sustainability. (i2.2/3)

Advocacy for policy change was recognised as weak in earlier phases of the cooperation but has tended to improve with more attention given to policy in later years. A thoughtful reflection by one of the projects implementing agencies involved in the Samriddhi project in Bangladesh [7F-03402.03] noted that in the first years of applying MSD the advocacy on making changes on regulation and rules was weak. This was attributed partly because it was not designed as part of the project and partly because the project staff did not have the familiarity and skills to engage with government at local or central level: “most national level and policy related market constraints identified by Samriddhi have either been dropped or they achieved little results…mainly due to lack of explicit focus on advocacy from the start of the project and lack of practical experience of the staff in dealing
with public sector agencies.” (Helvetas, 2014). In later years and later phases of the projects there was a tendency to make a more systematic attempt at advocating for policy change, often in support of sustaining system changes. The regional post-harvest management project [7F-08498.02] was an example where explicit attention was given to policy changes on increasing the emphasis on post-harvest management techniques in extension messages via agents and other means such as radio as well as a variety of other means (see box 3.2). It was noted in a capitalisation study (Felber, G. & Witteveen, A., 2019) that many high-level government and policy leaders were well informed and talk about post-harvest management at different events and in the media. Moreover, it was recognised that the project facilitation of multi-stakeholder policy dialogue had contributed to the integration of post-harvest management at the national policy level either as a standalone strategy or integration in existing policies. But it was also noted that in many countries the drafting of by-laws and strategies was executed by external consultants. And even when this was done in a participatory and consultative process, it weakened ownership. The study found that in most of the countries visited, the allocation of public funds to post-harvest management strategies was inadequate giving a mismatch between policy and practice. Another example was the OPF project in Mali [7F-04043] where the strengthening of farmer organisations, especially in phase 2 and 3, promoted changes in the agricultural policy approach that better responded to farmer concerns and supported their organisations. (i2.3)

Many projects were co-financed. Working with other donors has helped to streamline approaches and avoid distortions. As shown in figure 3.6, eleven out of nineteen projects in the country level sample of projects were co-financed by other donors. Of these two were contributions to multi-donor trust funds. As also shown in figure 3.6, SDC was the lead donor for close to two-thirds of the projects that they co-financed. The co-funding ensured that donors adopted a similar approach to supporting market-based changes and also meant that the projects could operate at the scale that was needed to make a difference in a country as complex and large as for example, Bangladesh.
The presence of many MSD donors has both positive and negative effects. In the Great Lakes region, numerous other organizations are active, providing opportunities for collaboration or sometimes requiring coordination. CATALIST worked with a range of partners, sharing skills and resources to reach goals that ‘belong’ to the community. The SDC country evaluation of Tanzania (SDC, 2014) notes the potential advantage of co-financing in terms of ensuring streamlined approaches to promoting systems change: “The new initiative on launching a multi-donor Agriculture Markets Development Trust is developed in partnership with Danida, Irish Aid and Sida. This donor-led initiative has the potential to streamline M4P approaches on selected value chains and to contribute to knowledge management.” Co-funding reduces the risk of confusion brought about by the presence of projects and donors with different approaches. Where projects were not co-financed there was sometimes a lack of mapping of other relevant donor support and as a consequence inadequate coordination as noted in a review of the Market Access for the Rural Poor Through Value Chain Promotion project in Vietnam (MARP, 7F-08348.01.03) (Charbonneau et al 2015).

In some countries there were negative effects, for example where the competition was for highly qualified national partners who had a market relevance and who preferred to partner with donors that offered generous levels of subsidy. This was particularly the case in the Western Balkans for example where one project review (7F-08467.02) noted “Food Processing is a rather maturing sector in Kosovo, which has received and continues to receive substantial support from projects, as well as from large government subsidy schemes. Consequently, the objective to achieve systemic change is more difficult for a project in a crowded and somewhat distorted market”. (i2.4)

### 3.3 Effectiveness/Impact

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effectiveness/Impact Indicators:</th>
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<tr>
<td>3.1 Expected results at output and outcome level were achieved (including analysis of contributing factors);</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.2 Evidence of the impact on the target group, end beneficiaries and market players, e.g., on income, quality of life, gender equality (including analysis of contributing factors);</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.3 Evidence of systemic changes in functions and rules (including analysis of contributing factors);</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.4 Evidence of scale up (including analysis of contributing factors);</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.5 Evidence of unintended outcomes and impact.</td>
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**Summary**
- Generally, projects reached their targets or were likely to reach targets. However, the impact on poverty reduction was mixed. (i3.1);
- The poor were reached but there is limited evidence of the projects reaching the poorest – even where this was foreseen. (i3.1 and 3.2);
• There was attention to gender and good examples of changes that impact positively on
gender equality when women engaged as market actors on equal terms as men, and where
specific actions were involved. (i3.2);
• It is difficult to capture and measure system change – and the log frames are not helping
this. (i3.3);
• There are examples of systems changes reported by the projects at the intervention level
for all projects reviewed – they were often narrow and overwhelmingly in the production
phase (often involving embedded services). (i3.3);
• There were examples of systems changes brought about by projects, that had a potential
for replication and scaling. They often involved linkages to wider processes, incl. policy
level. (i3.3 and 3.4);
• Effectiveness (and sustainability) of projects depended on the selection and building the
capacity of market actors, yet capacity building was challenging and poorly defined. (i3.3,
3.5);
• In general, there is limited attention to unintended outcomes and impacts, such as market
distortions, risks related to choices of business partners and capacity building, changes in
power relations ships – community and household level – during implementation. (i3.5);
• Projects responded well to the situation brought about by the Covid-19 pandemic, including
by strengthening the use of technology and collaboration between market actors, and
leveraging lead farmer roles.

Generally, projects reached their targets or were likely to do. However, the impact on
poverty reduction was mixed. Targets across a range of outcomes were reached and
often exceeded. They included number of beneficiaries, productivity and yield increases
leading to income increases. The number of beneficiaries is impressive in many projects.
In the Great Lakes region, the Catalyst-2 project [7F- 08391] had a target of reaching
300,000 primary beneficiaries (defined as “a farmer with a proper application of at least two
essential cropping essentials”) and ended up reaching 311,342 farmers, and an additional
estimated number of “secondary” beneficiaries of 700,000 farmers. In Bangladesh, Katalyst
[7F-00521.01 to 04] reached 1.65 million farmers, micro, small and medium scale
entrepreneurs – amounting to 122 pct. of access outreach targets. Other projects in more
thinly populated geographies had smaller but still quite large outreach – InovAgro in
Northern Mozambique [7F-06353.03] aims to reach 30,000 smallholders and is well under
way to achieving that goal.

All projects had as their ultimate goal to improve the income of smallholders. There were
impressive results with regards to the increase in income. In Bolivia, Mercados Inclusivos
[7F-08634.02.01] in particular recorded impressive results in the first phase of the project
(2014-17), including an increase of 72% in the net incomes of 13,000 farming households,
32 per cent of them headed by women. It was also reported that 18,000 farming households
improved their employment/self-employment conditions. In the case of the Catalyst-2
project [7F- 08391], farm incomes in Rwanda rose by 20 pct. in DRC, 17 pct. in Rwanda,
and stagnated in Burundi. Although this was lower than the targeted increase of 30 pct., it
did lead to significant increases in food security and allowed smallholders to invest further
in productive assets, houses, and school fees.

However, in many projects, the contribution to poverty reduction through income increases
is often marginal. This was the case even for a flagship project such as the M4C
[7F-07952.02] which in a 6-year period between 2013-2109 led to an accumulated income
close to CHF 20 million for about 124,000 households, which is little more than 2 CHF
per household per month. In Mozambique, InovAgro 2nd phase [7F-06353.02] led to a similar
increase in smallholder income at about 25 CHF a year. In 2020, due to good prices,
the income increased by CHF 100. Across the different projects in Georgia, the increase in
income, as an average across income beneficiaries amounted to less than CHF 50 per year,
which was not enough to impact significantly on poverty reduction. These were averages
within the group of beneficiaries farmers. So some farmers will have had higher income increases. There were different ways of calculating the income increase across the projects and sometimes within the project and it was not easy to separate direct and indirect beneficiaries and there may be a time-lag where income increases would only materialise after years of improved farming. The increase in income had to be assessed over a period of time to allow for short term fluctuations related to factors beyond the control of the projects, not least price fluctuations and shifting weather conditions.

The limited impact on poverty reduction in some cases could to some extent be explained as the result of narrow interventions and the size of the interventions. In the case of Georgia, although improving veterinarian services was important, wider changes have to happen to improve income on a larger scale. In the case of InovAgro, the project initially focussed mainly on improved seeds in four-five value chains, which was then expanded to also the dissemination of knowledge on improved agricultural practices with regards to use of fertilizer and chemicals as well as making such inputs available in remote areas. Some of the contributing factors to reaching the targets could include: i) the setting of realistic targets at the design stage; ii) the understandable incentive of projects, without restoring to distortion, to measure in a way that shows targets being reached (this could be a factor behind the often very closely reached targets). There was a danger that the project became overly sensitive to the definition of the targets and directed at attaining the targets rather than the wider objectives. But, beyond these measurements and reporting related factors there was also the presence of strong project design and project implementation practice and in particular, success in the identification and realisation of high potential MSD interventions.

The poor were reached but there is limited evidence of the projects reaching the poorest – even where this was foreseen. The poverty focus of the project is often addressed through the location of the project with many projects in remote and thinly populated regions, where the poverty incidence is higher than the national average. Also, the choice of value chain and technologies to be applied had an impact on who would benefit. By their very nature, MSD projects worked with assets holders and there was evidence that the approach often favored the more economically active among the farmers in a community, at least as first movers – those that can afford to take a risk. They were the farmers selected for pilots and demonstration plots. Some projects defined the target groups as poorer smallholder men and women. E.g., InovAgro [7F-06353.03] defined the target group as poor men and women small-scale farmers living on less than USD 1.9 a day/max. 1.5 ha. In practice during implementation, the project did not address this issue based on a belief that for market actors to show an interest in thinly populated and poor regions, the focus would initially have to be on economically viable smallholders, and by developing a market for these farmers, there would then be a market that poorer households could graduate into. Only by the end of phase 3, the project was beginning to look into whether the agricultural inputs were in fact too expensive for the target group through gross margin analyses to understand how farmers with different sizes of land owning, using all or none of the inputs, perform in terms of profitability and sustainability.

In Myanmar, the Generating Rubber Opportunities [7F-08844.02] defined target population as smallholder rubber farmers and tappers (landless, often migrants, of which 70 pct. women). As improvement in well-being derived from increased land security, and improved productivity and quality of rubber, the tappers are envisaged to benefit through trickle down. Due to the low rubber world market prices since 2011, the profitability of rubber production was under heavy pressure leaving smallholder rubber farmers to depend on loans from the government to get through the non-tapping season. For the project, this led to the conundrum of at the same time improving the livelihood of the tappers – the most vulnerable participants in the value chain – and ensuring that the “profitability” of the smallholder rubber production was not further eroded. Acting according to market incentives, the tappers were
themselves finding alternative income opportunities outside the rubber sector, leading to labour shortages in the smallholder rubber business. In another project in Myanmar, the Gulf of Mottama project [7F-09030.01] defined its target group as vulnerable men and women. The project is a hybrid project where the community based natural resource governance project was complemented with an MSD approach in the agriculture and fish value chains. However, it also included grant financed activities to support economic activities for people with no assets through linkages to Vocational Education and Training (TVET) and the establishment of a microcredit scheme and water, sanitation facilities. Another hybrid project was in Mali, where the OPF project [7F-04043.03] worked with farmers associations to support agriculture related training of youth in diverse areas such as fish farming, veterinary services etc., as well as financial management and business planning allowing these young people to establish themselves as agri-SMEs that would then support market driven development. (See the case study on Youth).

Other thematic evaluations found that reaching the absolute poorest, when this was intended by the project, created difficulties in an MSD approach (IFAD 2019). To reach the poorest a thorough understanding of their situation, including the barriers they are particularly experiencing, power relations within the community and the market that work against inclusion, as well as specifically designed interventions to address these barriers, were needed. The MSD approach, unlike for example livelihood approaches, tended to design its interventions from the view of the market system rather than the view of the individual farmer. This is a deliberate trade-off that is inherent in the approach. This evaluation points to recent evolutions of the approach that are not only successfully adjusting this trade-off but also finding that an inclusive and gender-based approach is identifying areas of market weakness and new opportunities and niches for the projects to add value.

There is attention to gender and good examples of changes that impact positively on gender equality when women engage as market actors on equal terms as men and where specific actions were involved. Gender equality is an important feature of Swiss Development Cooperation. In 2012, the SDC employment and income network was responsible for a note on “Women’s Economic Empowerment (WEE) and Making Markets Work for the Poor”, stressing the imperative to bring WEE into the project cycle at the beginning as part of the market systems analyses including the core market, the support functions, rules, and regulations; into the results chains; and include direct interventions targeted at underlying constraints to women’s equal participation in market systems. All projects define target groups as men and women, and often the barriers to gender equality are mentioned in the project documentation, but usually with no specific follow-up in the results chain. Some of the best examples of projects where gender equality is fully integrated into the project include Bolivia (Mercados Inclusivos [7F-08634.02.01]) where there is a focus on development and dissemination of time-saving technologies for women; attention to childcare and mainstreaming of gender so that the system actors themselves were the ones who incorporated gender issues. This project is also an example of a project addressing more deeply rooted inequalities related to access to finance by women through a combination of financial training as well as promoting innovative microfinance, insurance, and micro-insurance products. In this case, gender equality was driven by the partner Sida. In Georgia, the ALCP project [7F-06629.03] promoted the Women’s room concept that has been replicated in Georgia but also in Armenia. The project also initiated the National Women’s Business Forum and arranged an exit strategy in 2019 that left the forum continuing to function.

In other projects, attention to gender equality came late in the process. Gender and Women’s Economic Empowerment strategies were developed later in the process often on request from SDC or other donors. Even in projects and value chains, where women were significant actors, as small-holders, workers, and traders, such as the Great Lakes Region
Catalyst -2 [7F- 08391]; Generating Rubber Opportunities in Myanmar [7F-08844.02]; and InovAgro [7F-06353.03] in Mozambique there was a time-lag between the start of the project and actions to address gender inequality. This lag appears to be based on a notion not to overburden the market actors whom the project worked with, failing to realise that the market failure pertains to women being left out, and that women are themselves important economic actors and by not including women a significant potential for growing markets is missed out on. In the earlier phases, projects in Bangladesh found it difficult to contribute meaningfully to women’s economic empowerment. Many of the most economically promising value chains such as fish and maize were male-dominated. Learning from this experience, the projects in later phases started to deliberately target value chains and interventions within the value chains that had a greater potential for involving women. This led to greater involvement and empowerment of women. Examples include the potential of marketing compost and the raising of small ruminants.

It is difficult to capture and measure system change – and the log frames are not helping this. First of all, there is no agreement on what constitutes a system change – nor an agreed threshold for how big a change should be to qualify as a system change – or whether a system change can only be accepted as a system change once it has proved its sustainability. In this report we have considered a wide definition based on what projects have reported as system changes being well aware that such system changes, as will be seen under 3.5 sustainability, often could not be proven to meet the litmus test criteria related to sustainability. Generally, most projects report system changes at the intervention level sometimes captured as an output/outcome indicator. Reporting on broad system changes – most often changes in the supporting system – are sometimes captured as an outcome indicator. The project-level reporting of system changes was rarely accompanied with qualitative explanations as to how the changes came about, what was driving the change, who owned it, how changes interlinked also with positive and negative changes in the broader context. In some of the projects, especially those adopting the rigorous DCED standards, this analysis was presented as part of the intervention results chains. However, even where this was the case, a project-level results framework more focussed on the changes that lead to the desired outputs and outcomes and analyses of the causal linkages would help projects to better understand and assess what drives systems changes, and possibly also to better understand whether the system change can be sustained. At the project reporting level, there was a tendency to equate successful broad system changes with reaching the overall targets e.g., number of beneficiaries.

Nevertheless, among the sampled projects there were a few with informative reporting focussing on explaining the system changes often spiced up with case studies. InovAgro [7F-06353.03] had extensive reporting of that sort. The level of rigorous monitoring of especially the impact, the consideration of the counterfactual and “difference in differences” type analysis, as well as the assessment of the intervention logic and the prospects of sustainability and absence or presence of distortive effects that are a feature of DCED audits, had not been fully undertaken by any of the projects sampled. Interestingly, the system change framework to understand market dynamics and the depth and breadth of systems changes – Adopt, Adapt, Expand and Respond (AAER Framework) – as defined in the Red Book, was hardly ever used. Of the sampled projects, it was really only Katalyst Bangladesh that used the framework, and explained its use in three case-studies stressing two roles of the framework: 1) Articulation of the programme vision and how the project expected the programme to bring about change in each of the areas- Adopt, Adapt, Expand and Respond; 2) as a tool for monitoring and reflection and guidance to action to change the programme in order to reach its goals.6

The difficulty of defining and assessing system change is well documented. Recent thinking reflected on the BEAM Exchange and in a recent article points to the use of complementary lenses to understand systems changes and why they are occurring: an intervention lens to assess the adoption and spread of the changes introduced in the system, and a helicopter lens to assess wider changes in the main and supporting functions. Taken together the two lenses give a picture of systems changes. The article concludes that enhancing learning and accountability on system change and the contribution of the project to such changes is best brought about through honest enquiry rather than attempting a mechanical analysis. Good reporting from a project will require drawing on both lenses and using a mix of qualitative and quantitative data differentiating between empirical evidence and interpretation. One issue about systems change is that there may be a time-lag before they really take on – suggesting that more extensive use of post-evaluations or even real-time evaluation could be useful, even essential, for understanding systems changes. (i3.3)

There are examples reported of systems changes at the intervention level – often they are narrow mainly in the production phase (often involving embedded services). System changes reported in the sampled projects related to projects facilitating/catalysing collaboration between different actors (public and private sector) to provide services and inputs to farmers. Most system changes involved the capacity building of private sector actors – companies, retailers, farmer’s associations, and business member organisations - engaging in distribution of agricultural input and providing embedded extension services. In some instances, this was backed by capacity building of associations to advocate on behalf of smallholders to impact wider system changes in the supporting environment. Reported system changes also included changed practices of farmers (men and women) with regards to the use of agricultural inputs (fertilizers (chemical and organic), improved seeds, and pesticides) as well as other improved farming technology and practices. The role of the project was to catalyse/facilitate linkages between the actors, build capacity, and provide seed money on a cost-sharing basis to the market actors as an incentive to change behaviour. In most cases, the projects, usually in later phases, also addressed down-stream marketing of the product by engaging traders to be more active in buying product from smallholders.

System changes often required a long period of exploration and trial and error. The projects in Bangladesh explored and piloted a wide range of interventions before arriving at those that were successful. As noted by a former Katalyst staff member “Not everything we tried was sustainable – about 20% was successful creating 80% of benefits. We dropped many sectors e.g., the floriculture sector and the timber sector– because it was not possible to address the range of issues being faced by such sectors. Where projects were open to starting with a wide range of sectors, they had the opportunity to test out and find areas where the MSD approach was likely to be successful. Projects such as Katalyst [7F-00521.04] tended in later phases to focus on fewer, more potentially successful interventions and to consolidate support around them and to ensure a higher level of interconnection between the interventions so that they were mutually reinforcing, e.g .,by supporting interventions upstream and downstream in the value chain. An example is the vegetable sector where in moving from phase 2 to phase 3, Katalyst complemented the focus on better commercialising the provision of input in terms of seed, fertilizer and embedded extension services to also looking at the potential for improved post-harvesting techniques and marketing of produce, for example through the use of digital platforms.

Important contributing factors appeared to have been the quality and regular updating of the market research to ensure that changes in the immediate context were captured, combined with active project facilitation with a focus on capacity building of intermediaries, coupled with connecting various actors and ensuring their cooperation to make the market

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system work at the level of the intervention. This always required subsidies either in the form of support for capacity building or direct cost-sharing of additional costs incurred by the private sector actors as an incentive to change behaviours and address real and perceived market failures. Such cost-sharing come in many forms and sizes and it is not clear from the project reporting what determined decisions for subsidies. Subsidies were intended to get the project going and begin to show results, but once introduced they have in some instances proved hard to phase out. This is discussed further under 3.5 sustainability.

There are examples of systems changes brought about by projects, that had a potential for replication and scaling. They often involved linkages to wider processes, including policy level. The Post-harvest Management project [7F-08498.02], covering several countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, contributed to a range of systems changes based on enhanced public-private sector collaboration that led to improved handling and storage of crops, including by involving private sector actors to develop and deliver storage bags, the inclusion of knowledge on technologies related to storage in local government extension services and training institutes, and facilitation of multi-stakeholder policy dialogue in collaboration with other donors. This contributed to the integration of post-harvest management at the national policy level, be it as a standalone strategy or integrated into existing policies. Policy dialogue on post-harvest management at the national level was very much supported by policies at the level of the African Union that recognized post-harvest management as a mean to address food security problems. InovAgro was another project that has supported a range of systems changes for farmers' use of improved seeds in Mozambique. The project brought in a market approach to distribution of seeds when the government system of free distribution of improved seeds to poor households collapsed. At the policy level, a multi-stakeholder forum was supported to influence and develop seed policy and regulations with the government, and at the intervention level, seed companies and agro-dealers were capacitated to deliver the seeds and knowledge in poor and thinly developed markets, and private commodity traders were brought in to buy the product. Already now, commodity buyers who were not part of the projects seem to have replicated the idea of buying centres in thinly populated areas providing farmers with more selling opportunities. In this case and other examples in Georgia and Bangladesh, there was hard evidence of crowding in of new actors (who were not involved in project-based cost-sharing partnership) and this is a strong indication that the system change was brought about without distortive effects on competition.

Some projects promoted systems changes related to access to finance and insurance e.g., in Bolivia and Bangladesh. In Bolivia, the project [Prosder -7F-06552.01-02] persuaded insurance companies to design micro insurances that responded to the needs of poor farmers allowing them to cope with increased risks from climate variabilities. M4C [7F-07952.02] supported microfinance institutions to design, test and expand seasonal loan products relevant to the chars. In this way they promoted mobile financial services to address one of the service needs i.e., a transaction with an understanding that it will create leeway for other financial services in future. M4C cooperated with the Microcredit Regulatory Authority to remove regulatory constraints and provided incentives for the Microfinance institutions to offer the loans. Improvements in the financial systems to better serve poorer people in a number of projects from Bangladesh to Bolivia lent themselves to scaling.

A few projects addressed land tenure security and land ownership issues to enhance farmers' (men and women) incentives to invest in the land and improve opportunities to use the land as collateral for borrowing for further investment. Where this led to land ownership security, this was a long-term sustainable improvement for the people affected. InovAgro

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8 “wider processes” means national programmes and strategies and reforms some of which might also be supported by donors
piloted a new and cost-effective model for land titling in Northern Mozambique that had the potential of being a game-changer in creating awareness amongst smallholders of the importance of land certification and titling in a country where wholesale of land to foreign investors threatens smallholders, as well as bringing titles to many more smallholders fast through working with local NGOs and training of paralegals. According to the project, this model was now being looked into by other donors.

Communication proved an effective channel for scaling and possibly enhancing sustainability. In Georgia, improving the information environment – through providing market research and training of agricultural journalists as well as developing content for radio and television allowed the “good news” to spread. Also, in the Great Lakes Region Catalist-2, effective and systematic communication of agricultural relevant information was an important factor for reaching 1 million people. Communication was also used effectively to bring knowledge to women that could not participate in the activities by asking other women to explain on the radio the benefits of changed practices and their knowledge. The use of information technology and the development of apps providing market-relevant information has been employed with success in a number of projects from Bolivia to Mozambique and Myanmar.

**Effectiveness (and sustainability) of projects depended on the selection and building the capacity of market actors, yet capacity building was challenging and poorly defined.** Most projects had criteria for the selection of companies and associations to work with and spent a good deal of effort in selecting partners. However, it is often not reported on, nor is it reported what the incentives or decision-making process that led these companies to engage in partnerships where others did not, neither is it reported when such partnerships break down, making it difficult to learn at least outside of the project team. The approach implied that the project played a facilitative, catalytic role vis-à-vis market actors. In most projects reviewed, working with market actors required investments in capacity building to carry out new tasks and receive funding from the project. However, in most projects, capacity building was vaguely defined - a black box - often referred to as a number of workshops and training and reported in the log frame. That is remarkable given the importance of changing mindset and development of the capacity of market actors – be they companies, associations, or local NGOs – in implementing and sustaining the activities. From the interviews, it has been clear that the projects themselves play a larger role, working with people, connecting actors, driving processes forward etc., and that interactions with partners were much wider and deeper than what gets reported. This makes it difficult to learn from successes and failures. It is not clear that the MSD approach drew on the quite extensive knowledge being generated elsewhere on institutional and capacity building as long term, locally driven, incremental, iterative change processes focusing on problem-solving and innovative solutions. Furthermore, it is not clear that the projects had the tools to assess capacity improvements making it difficult to address sustainability.

In general, there is limited attention to unintended outcomes and impacts, such as market distortions, risks related to choices of business partners and capacity building, changes in power relations – community and household level – during implementation. The potential for market distortion in the selecting and support of partners, not least commercial partners, was not generally screened – a finding that is echoed in some of the DCED audits. In many ways the choice of partners constitutes a risk to the project – it can be a reputational risk if the partner turns out to be corrupt or socially unacceptable – a financial risk or a sustainability risk. Nevertheless, risks related to partners are seldom brought out in the risk frameworks and never discussed in the reporting.

Questions related to projects’ social impact at the community level were almost never a factor that is reported on. Choice of private sector partners and choice of model farmers had the potential of cementing or disrupting social structures, which in itself could have
lasting positive or negative impacts. Similarly, project activities may impact power dynamics at the household levels. These changes were sometimes picked up in impact studies by the end of a project when it was too late to remedy potential negative consequences, but never as part of regular reporting and action. (See e.g., Impact Evaluation of InovAgro program in Northern Mozambique (IFPRI October 2020 – draft))

Projects responded well to the situation brought about by the Covid-19 pandemic including by strengthening the use of technology and collaboration between market actors and leveraging lead farmer roles. SCOs were capacitated to respond flexibly to the Covid-19 pandemic. The Covid-19 crisis and the various restrictions adopted in countries of operations immediately led projects to more extensive use of IT. In Bolivia, Mercados Inclusivos [7F-08634.02.01] intensified and expanded already existing e-solutions, including strengthening on-line market information sharing, creation of virtual centres for the collection of demand e.g. cattle feed to allow farmers to continue bulk purchase in order to secure lower prices, expansion of on-line payments in the financial system, expansion of the insurance policies to cover also risks related to Covid-19, and strengthened monitoring of needs and impacts of Covid-19 to allow the project to respond fast (see case study). In Myanmar, both projects (Generating Rubber Opportunities (GRO) in Myanmar [7F-08844.02] and the Gulf of Mottama project (GoMP) [7F-09030.02] had made more extensive use of social media to spread knowledge and information and use of distance learning for the training classes. The digital solutions that had been tried out are expected to be integrated into the way the projects deliver in the future, as this can be used to reach farmers/smallholders in remote areas more effectively. More use of distance learning helped GRO reach ethnic and remote groups and opened for better participation of women that often cannot spare the time for participating. GRO was already providing knowledge on the Awba Htwet farmer application and it was considered to expand this to include interactive learning. Similarly, GoMP expanded the use of apps for buyer-seller contacts for fish. In Myanmar, the SCO office also decided that the GoMP in 2020 should redirect 250,000 CHF for Covid-19 related measures, including cash for poor families dependent on remittances, as migrant workers returned from Thailand and Malaysia. Supported by SCO, the project by the end of 2020 was looking into expanding this to provide cash for work for the migrant workers still present in the community to exploit their competences not least in the construction sector, e.g., to build schools and roads that the communities badly needed.

In Mozambique, the business model promoted by InovAgro [7F-06353.03] was in danger due to travel and assembly restrictions. InovAgro promoted improved seeds from the southern African region, Covid-19 led to seed scarcity as the seed companies were unable to travel and provide the agro-dealers with seed and knowledge, threatening to undermine the gains in market systems development on the input side. In addition, farmers were barred from travelling to distant agri-shops or participate in fairs to buy seeds and other inputs reducing demand. On the output marketing side, the commodity buyers were barred from travelling and buying produce. InovAgro responded by strengthening the linkage between the seed companies and the agro-dealers, so the agro-dealers can act as the long arm of the seed companies requiring trust and strong relations. Seed companies were also given additional support to train and empower more lead farmers to ensure the cascading down of the seeds and knowledge to try and keep up demand. Seed companies and agro-dealers also started using village-based agents/lead farmers for the “last mile” sale of seeds. To ensure the continuation of farmers’ access to markets, the number of buying points were expanded also using mobile buying units. The project itself concluded “While the full economic impact of Covid-19 is still uncertain, it compounds existing and on-going risks that are exacerbating weak market systems. … The specialization of roles, which has been strengthened leading up to and during the Covid-19 pandemic, will see seed producers
innovating on route to market strategies by leveraging agro-retailers for input distribution and using village-based agents for last mile sales. 9 (i4.4)

3.4 Efficiency

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<tr>
<th>Q4 Efficiency Was the market systems approach efficiently managed?</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicators:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1 SDC’s procedures (general and financial in particular) and ways of collaboration are conducive to implementing MSD in agriculture in partner countries or regions;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2 Cost-benefit analyses have been presented and provides evidence for implementing MSD in agriculture approaches;</td>
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<tr>
<td>4.3 SDC and its implementing partners use adequate financial and human resources for effectively implementing MSD in agriculture programs;</td>
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<tr>
<td>4.4 Evidence that the SDC’s strategies and programs demonstrate flexibility and adaptability if/when needed.</td>
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**Summary of findings**

- The MSD approach is complex and was highly demanding on project management, staff, and partners – the complexity and the effect on project efficiency were often underestimated. (i4.1/3);
- The high skill demand and the relatively unconventional approaches of MSD had implications for the procurement of project management agents/partners. (i4.1/3);
- Where SCO offices were confident of the MSD approach and project performance, they showed sufficient flexibility to enable the MSD approach to adapt to the circumstances and time scale. (i4.4);
- The SDC multi-phased approach provided continuity over many years and was important for creating cumulative results and enabling an adaptative approach. (i4.1);
- Cost benefit analysis has been done to varying degrees but was insufficiently standardised. (i4.2);
- Overall, across an assessment of 15 projects it can be concluded that the approaches and strategies applied were well suited and efficient with some exceptions. (i4.1).

**The MSD approach is complex and was highly demanding on project management, staff, and partners – the complexity and the effect on project efficiency were often underestimated.** The projects were demanding as regards project management skills as they sought to make relatively complex interventions in untested areas. It was not easy to manage and be pragmatic about the trade-off between too much prior study and not enough. An example is the promotion of agricultural insurance for poor farmers in Bolivia, which proved to be more complex than expected [Ortiz et al, 2015/7F-06552.02/Proseder]. In most cases, it was necessary to design and carefully negotiate cost-sharing arrangements that went beyond pure facilitation due to a number of reasons including the legacy and presence of international projects where there were expectations of significant subsidies; the relative poverty of the target groups and the need to cover the additional risk associated with introducing innovations. A pure “teaching and preaching” approach was unlikely to attract sufficient interest and commitment. The government, private sector, and other actors also needed proof that changes were likely to work before they would commit to them. These factors led to a need for the projects to be skilful enough to make significant interventions, but without becoming permanent actors. It also required the project to experiment and pilot different approaches and to judge when to pull out of intervention and when to continue. The demands on project staff and management were high, a finding not just for SDC financed MSD projects but also more generally as noted in other evaluations (Sida, 2018; DFAT, 2019; IFAD, 2019). The demand for skills and the cost of those skills remains a threat to scaling up approaches and anchoring them in country institutions such as government systems. 9

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as government, business associations, business development service providers or universities – a topic that is further discussed in chapter 5.4.

Although the approach was demanding on skills, over several phases the projects developed considerable capacity. For example, in the GRO project in Myanmar [7F-08844.02] by phase 2, the implementation partners had a good understanding of an MSD approach, which led to improved coordination and collaboration between stakeholders. For most projects, the capacity of local partners had to be built up through intensive training during the first phase also because most local NGOs were more used to the traditional community empowerment approaches rather than engaging in cost-sharing with intermediaries. Whilst this gives rise to a slow start, it paid dividends over the years as considerable skills were built up within the project organisations. Although some of these skills were disbanded once the project stopped, they were also available for new projects examples include the Samriddhi [7F-03402.03] Katalyst [7F-00521.04] projects in Bangladesh where the skills were retained by the NGO and could be used on other projects both those financed by SDC, other donors and from internal funds. It is also noteworthy, as mentioned in chapter 3.1 under relevance, that the international NGOs developed their internal capacity development and operational guidelines for applying MSD introducing lessons learnt and innovations. (i4.1/3)

The high skill demand and the relatively unconventional approaches of MSD had implications for the procurement of project management agents/partners. The recruitment and investment in staff and the proficiency of the project management are probably the most influential drivers on the efficiency of the project. The BEAM evidence review (BEAM, 2020) notes two success factors for MSD projects: i) a strong team and ii) solid monitoring and evaluation. It is especially challenging to find the right partners for MSD. Some implementing partners have capacity on MSD at the headquarters level but less so at the project level. NGOs are traditionally better at the production than the processing/market phases and better at community development than engaging with markets. However, most of the NGOs involved in the SDC MSD project have long recognised the importance of the market and the private sector and have been able to adapt and provide thought leadership on MSD.

Intensive effort and development of internal project guidelines were found to be a hallmark of the flagship projects such as ALCP [7F-0662903/Georgia], Katalyst [7F-00521.04/Bangladesh] and Mercados Inclusivos [7F-08634.02/Bolivia]. Another feature of these projects was the development of robust results frameworks and monitoring and evaluation systems that were DCED compliant. Many NGOs have started to develop their own MSD guidelines – Helvetas and Swisscontact - and internal evaluations of the approach (Mercy Corps, 2017).

The SCOs also have skill and resource challenges, as noted by one evaluation: “The SDC management team has very limited resource to oversee, lead and drive, and provide strategic guidance to the work of individual NGOs” (Charbonneau et al, 2015/ 7F-08348.01.03/ MARP/Vietnam). The contractual nature of the projects can also create difficulties in collaboration with other projects, especially those financed by other donors but also those financed by SDC. In part, this is because such inter-project collaboration, if not foreseen, can dilute responsibility and make it more difficult to hold a particular contractor to account. This may explain why the InovAgro project [7F-06353.01/Mozambique] and the PHM [7F-08498.02/regional] implemented by different contractors were not as coordinated in their approach even though they both operated with the same type of actors in Northern Mozambique and potentially the same trained farmers. The effect of the contractual arrangements on coordination was also found in other development cooperation programmes (DFAT, 2019). The procurement systems also meant that it was difficult for potential implementors to co-create the projects, although this becomes easier when
moving from phase to phase. Moreover, procurement limits to the extension of contracts over phases, whilst well-conceived from the viewpoint of transparency, will also be demanding on the processes potentially leading to delays. (i4.1/3)

Where SCO offices were confident of the MSD approach and project performance, they showed sufficient flexibility to enable the MSD approach to adapt to the circumstances and time scale. MSD projects are not easy to monitor and supervise. The emphasis on facilitation and promoting change complicates accountability and requires significant levels of trust. The presence of targets creates a temptation to create more immediate change by direct intervention rather than by making changes in the systems. The interface between the SCO and the project was found to be an area that influences project efficiency. The contractual nature of the project set up is probably also a factor in influencing the style of project reporting which (understandably) often appears highly affirmative and justifying rather than pointing to where things have been marginal in effect or have gone wrong and need adjustment. The tendency not to report on failure is a feature, which although not unique to MSD is noted in the BEAM evidence review (BEAM, 2020). Many of the Swiss Cooperation Offices have developed considerable MSD skills over the years through a combination of training courses and actively managing MSD projects. These skills, which are important in ensuring effective supervision need to be regularly updated especially where there is staff turnover. Experience has shown that it is not straightforward to delegate the supervision to other organisations under a contribution modality. The LIFT projects in Myanmar [7F-07324.05] were an example where the contribution model put a considerable burden on fund management in terms of supervising and promoting the MSD approach. MSD projects require a considerable set of skills within the supervising body. (i4.1)

The SDC multi-phased approach provided continuity over many years and was important for creating cumulative results and enabling an adaptive approach. The MSD projects took time to get going as in-depth market research and identification of willing partners was needed. Most of the interventions also took time to mature, once started. The phased approach provided an opportunity to set clear goals whilst allowing for longer-term piloting and learning. It also ensured that lessons could be learnt and the approach adapted. Most projects made significant changes in the value chains and intervention areas that they targeted especially between phases. This allowed them to respond to opportunities as they arose. It is possible to adapt the project during implementation, but it does require more negotiations with the SDC and the outcomes cannot change. The GRO project in Myanmar [7F-08844.02] for example had room to adapt during project implementation. When the project discovered that a 30-year land lease opportunity for rubber plantations in forest areas was not used by the farmers, the project then designed an intervention that allowed smallholders to access this opportunity for securing the land.

The presence of multiple phases allowed projects to reflect over their strategy and in most cases resulted in the projects seeking to make change higher up the value chain i.e., changing the focus from producers to the providers of services to the producers e.g., one of the projects in Georgia [Moli/7F-07857] shifted from working with farm-level enterprises to working with feed mill operators. The same shift was present in the M4C project [7F-07952.02/Bangladesh] which interacted with farmer groups in the first phase and then with intermediaries in the second phase. (i4.1)

Cost-benefit analysis has been done to varying degrees but was insufficiently standardised. The projects present a variety of cost-benefit type analysis. Some are based on external impact assessments, others on assumptions derived from sample cases for different interventions and then extrapolated to cover all project interventions e.g., Georgia, Moli/7F-07857]. In general, the analysis varies across projects and in some cases across reporting years. Standardised methodologies were not applied and clearer statements on the underlying assumptions were needed so that analysis could be reproduced (e.g., on
direct and indirect beneficiaries and on distinguishing between revenue and income) and greater verification on the quality of data. Without this, it is difficult and hazardous to conclude confidently on the economic results. Nevertheless, it can be said that the analysis as presented shows that most projects have a positive cost-benefit ratio. The cost-benefit ratio was positive across the individual investments made using project grants but also for the project as a whole, which includes the project staffing and facilitation costs, which often amount to half of the entire project cost. A recent review (Bekkers et al, 2020) of 12 cases including several financed by SDC noted: “benefits greatly surpassing the costs of the initial investments”.

Nevertheless, as noted above it is not easy to fully assess the value for money as has also been found by a range of MSD evaluations over the years. In some cases, the cost-benefit ratio is highly dependent on external factors. For example, the cost-benefit analysis of the GoMP project in Myanmar [7F-09030.01] reports that the benefits for fishermen and fish collectors are marginal and at risk from a range of external factors. The sensitivity analysis showed that the model is highly sensitive to fish price fluctuations, and to declining fish stock. The BEAM Evidence Review (BEAM, 2019) notes that the value for money of individual interventions is often impressive but the picture is not clear at project level, a finding also reflected in an evaluation of Australian financed MSD project (DFAT, 2019). This also reflects the fact that many projects find that only 1 in 5 interventions attempted or considered turn out to be successful.

The project analysis assessments across the sample of projects reveal that the cost-effectiveness was relatively high (question 8 in the SDC standard project analysis format) as the majority of projects scored high mostly through qualitative analysis (figure 3.7). But only a few projects had a demonstrated cost-effectiveness assessment or benefit ratio calculated.
Overall, across an assessment of 15 projects, it can be concluded that the approaches and strategies applied were well suited and efficient with some exceptions. All projects assessed had project management, monitoring and steering mechanisms in place, which were effectively used for the efficient implementation of activities (see figure 3.9). Although the internal project arrangements were in place it was not always that the approaches and strategies applied were best suited. Figure 3.10 shows that whilst the majority of projects were efficient in this regard a number were not. In one case this was because there were delays as the preparation phase to build capacities on MSD was not long enough which led later to low efficiency during implementation [Mali/OPFA/7F-04043.03]. In Myanmar, there were some delays experienced due to staff changes and the departure of one of the national implementing partners [Myanmar/GOMP/7F-09030]. In other cases, low levels of efficiency arose due to factors external to the project. In one case inefficiency arose from low capacity among partners especially regional government [Mali/PAFA/7F-05054]. In another, it arose due to changes in approach over multiple phases in moving between supporting producer platforms which did not turn out to be sustainable and then later working as part of a large WB support project which attempted to institutionalise the approach [Bolivia/PIC/7F-01051.03]. There is a tendency within SDC to fund MSD via relatively small projects outsourced to highly skilled NGOs. Whilst the experience is in general positive, there were not many attempts to consider other approaches such as the use of challenge funds or funding via reputable business member organisations or others.

### 3.5 Sustainability

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<th>Q5 Sustainability</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Have good agricultural practices and market systems development been sustained or likely to be sustained?</td>
<td>5.1 The interventions were financially and technically sustained/ likely to be sustainable (including analysis of contributing factors);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.2 The social, environmental/climate sustainability issues were addressed by MSD in agriculture programs (including analysis of contributing factors);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.3 The market systems development changes have been sustained /likely to be sustainable (including analysis of contributing factors).</td>
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**Summary**

- Sustainability is a key concept in the MSD approach – but with few post evaluations available, the assessment was difficult, and learning constrained. The bar for sustainability in the MSD approach is very high (i5.1/3);
- There were examples of sustainable system changes, defined as changes that were scaled and replicated beyond the project (i 5.3);
- Sustainability also depends on systems changes e.g., in supporting systems, and factors beyond the project reach. (i.5.1.);
- Sustainability of systems changes at intervention level and beyond was to a large extent dependent on the sustainability of the changed behaviours of actors – often brought about by support for capacity building and cost-sharing of incremental costs (i 5.1/3);
- There was an increasing level of attention given to sustainability by linking more and anchoring interventions in more permanent bodies, including farmers associations, government, and universities (i 5.1):
- The project role of identifying and stimulating change in the markets was rarely owned, and only in one/few instances anchored in permanent organisations leaving learning gaps and threatening sustainability (i5.3);
- The long term and phased approach allowed for attention to sustainability as the last phase can be used for consolidation and orderly exit (i5.3);
- Although difficult to measure, there is evidence that the MSD approach built social capital and empowerment which have contributed to the prospects of sustainability (i5.2);
Attention to environmental sustainability and climate impacts was evident in some projects but not in all, and in some cases with negative implications (i5.2).

Sustainability is a key concept in the MSD approach – but with few post evaluations available, the assessment was difficult, and learning constrained. The bar for sustainability in the MSD approach is very high. Sustainability requires not only that the benefits continue after the exit of the project, but also that the market system changes are picked up wider in the market, and that the market players are capacitated to innovate and empowered to maintain and adapt the improvements into the future with changes in risks and opportunities. As noted above, assessing systems change is challenging – more so is assessing the sustainability of these changes based on this definition. This finding is supported by others. The DFAT evaluation simply states that “Overall the sustainability of MSD outcomes (whether at an intervention level or market systems-level) cannot be determined.”10 Adding to the challenges, there is also the built-in test and trial method of applying the MSD approach – it is recognised right from the outset of the project that not every intervention will be sustainable, so it would not be fair to the approach to expect that. Clarifying what works and what does not work in the longer term is seriously hampered by the lack of post evaluations (2-3 years after the end of project) as recommended by DCED. (i5.1/3)

There were examples of sustainable system changes, defined as changes that were scaled and replicated beyond the project. An example of a system change that was scaled and replicated was the experience from Georgia [ALCP 7F-06622] and the use of embedded services. ROKI, a national veterinary drug supplier supported by the project extended its services to an increasing number of village pharmacies. By the end of the second phase in 2017, it was reported by the project that some 14 pharmacies had been improved through “crowding in” effects serving an additional unsupported group of over 19,000 farmers – findings that are supported by DCED and other external stakeholders since then the services have expanded to over 400,000 farmers). Another well documented example is from Bangladesh [Katalyst 7F-00521.01 to 04] where vegetable seeds were sold in mini tamper proof packets and combined with embedded services being provided by a retail network which enabled smallholders to access quality seed and advice on how to cultivate, harvest and market the produce. In both cases, there has been crowding in with other companies copying the innovations and extending them nationwide. Important contributing factors for the success of these projects were a combination of project-related factors such as skill-full project management and facilitation, and long-term engagement; project design factors, such as anchorage in private companies and business associations that were already engaged in the market as well as linkages to the government also relying on government-funded extension services to ensure a deep and wide market; and in the case of Georgia a conducive external environment supporting the changes and creating demand, specifically compliant to EU food safety regulations.

In general, for most of the projects sampled it was too early to assess the sustainability of interventions, or there was not enough information available after the end of the project to make an informed assessment. (i5.3)

Sustainability often depends on wider systems changes e.g., in supporting systems, and factors beyond the project reach. From the outset, some projects sought broader systems changes by working simultaneously on supporting systems such as policies, rules, and regulations for the functioning of the market as well as changes at the intervention level. Other projects started from the intervention level, in the process discovering that for changes in market systems interventions to be sustainable, supporting systems need to

10 DFAT: Synthesis review of DFAT-funded Market Systems Development Initiatives, Main report 2019
change. There appears to have been learning as to the importance of setting the boundaries of the intervention in a way that support market systems development with an increasing focus on the supporting factors for the intervention. There are good examples of changes in the supporting environment as noted under 3.3. Effectiveness/Impact, which would have the potential to contribute to enhancing the overall sustainability of the interventions, but they were too early to assess.

For example, the Postharvest Management Project [7F-08498.02] had prospects for sustainability with its systems-wide approach involving policy and educational anchorage of postharvest knowledge, the involvement of the public and private sector local actors, increasing interest from other donors; and then factors beyond the project, which enhances Postharvest Management relevance, namely increased pan-African attention to postharvest measures brought about by increased focus on food security and interest in systematic drying and hermetic storage, as this reduces aflatoxin contamination brought about by more and unpredictable rain in some countries. But there are also projects for which the supporting environment is not conducive, seriously questioning the sustainability and viability of the market systems changes that might be brought about. The Myanmar Generating Rubber Opportunities project [7F-08842-02] is such an example. Even if the project succeeds in improving the quality of rubber and the productivity of smallholder rubber farms, the continuing constraints in the global rubber market including low world market prices bring the long-term sustainability of the intervention in doubt. This point underscores the importance of context and understanding the risks and opportunities that go beyond the immediate project sphere when considering the long-term sustainability of the interventions. (i5.1)

Sustainability of systems changes at intervention level and beyond was to a large extent dependent on the sustainability of the changed behaviours of actors – often brought about by support for capacity building and cost-sharing of incremental costs. Subsidies were used in all projects to address market failures and provide risk cover for private sector actors and private sector associations – but not always with a sufficiently clear vision of when subsidies should be phased out and what would happen when subsidies ceased. All projects sampled supported capacity building and additional costs incurred by the private sector, often as part of a cost-sharing arrangement where the project typically covered a declining level of 70/30 to 30/70 per cent of the cost and the private sector the rest. Although projects recognised the importance of scaling down subsidies, in practice it was easier to start the subsidies than to end them. Many projects were observed to provide subsidies right up to the point of project exit, as reported in the final report on Great Lakes CATALIST-2 [7F-80391], Mozambique InovAgro [07-06353-03], PIC [7F--01051.03] and PROSEDER [7F-06552.02] in Bolivia. This left little time for the project to observe the reactions of the private sector actors when subsidies were withdrawn.

There are examples of private sector actors continuing and scaling activities after the project support ends as noted above. But there are also examples of private sector actors returning to earlier business models once the support dries out. For example, in Bangladesh, the M4C [7F-07952.01 to 02] supported distributors found that they could meet their targets on the mainland and hence they stopped servicing the Chars as the costs were too large without the project subsidies. From the Bangladesh field trip report: The traders also shared that it was only for M4C that they have visited places like Char where they have to walk miles to reach the market. Since they were under a contract and committed to the project, they have visited those Char markets frequently in the project period. But recently they are reluctant to go to the Char as they think they can already meet their target in the mainland and is enough for the company’s profit margin, going to the Char would be time-consuming. In most of the sampled projects, it was too early or there was not enough evidence to draw a conclusion. For example, in the case of InovAgro, in the last year of phase 3, it was still
considering how to ensure the sustainability of the embedded services of the seed companies. In most cases, continuing the activities will depend on the continued demand for private sector services from farmers and hence the uptake of the systems changes brought about, as well as the size of the market. Contributing factors for the sustainability of private sector actor behavior changes include supporting over longer periods of time; addressing market systems development from many angles; supporting both the upstream and downstream parts of the value chain; linking to policy processes and supporting projects that are large and well connected to other processes. These factors combine to create a higher potential for scale, sustainability, and self-replication as they are more likely to have resulted in market wide changes that go beyond individual interventions.

A number of projects worked through farmers associations and provided training both for capacity building of the institutions themselves in advocacy and for their new role in extension services – sometimes based on cost-sharing. In some contexts, associations played an important role in advocacy, e.g., influencing fisheries policies and ensuring their implementation – Myanmar Gulf of Mottama GoMP [7F-09030.02] (see case study). Where working through associations led to the built-up of local knowledge and ownership as in the case of Myanmar GoMP, and also the Great Lakes and the Postharvest Management project, building the capacity of associations played a role in local anchoring of knowledge that could support the sustainability of the use of new farm practices. Some projects from early on, built-in financial sustainability measures by supporting associations to generate income to continue the services. In Myanmar, the Gulf of Mottama project [7F-09030.02] from the start worked to build the capacity of farmers and fishers associations, including income-generating activities from engaging in bulk selling of product that generated additional income for the farmers that was then shared between the farmers and the association. In contrast, also in Myanmar, the Rubber Association in Mon State [7F-08842-02], stated that extension services could not be continued without subsidies from this project or another one. This was also reflected in a final report for a project in the Great Lakes region [Catalyst/7F -08391.01] noting that “the comprehensive nature of the project – combining technology, training, and linkages – have provided a basis for sustainability, for example local organisations which led implementation have the capacity to sustain CATALIST initiatives (with assistance from future programs) long after the project closes.”

A deeper understanding of other factors that underpin the changed behaviours of market actors is needed. New research on “Actor Behaviour Change” suggests that behaviour change is impacted by a range of factors beyond profit often associated with ease of change – incl. familiarity, risks, and time-lag to benefits accrue.11 There is some evidence amongst the sampled projects to suggest that the smaller the technological leap, the easier it is to ensure uptake amongst farmers, and adopt and expand for private sector actors as the risk is perceived to be smaller and there is familiarity. The Postharvest Management projects [7F-08498.02] found good sustainability when it came to hermetic bags rather than metal silos due to familiarity amongst farmers and agro-dealers, as well as limitations in the value chain for the production of metal silos. InovAgro had plans of mechanisation that did not take off. And the project then focused its efforts on improved seeds which were less risky both for farmers and private sector actors. (i5.1/3)

There was an increasing level of attention given to sustainability by linking more and anchoring interventions in more permanent bodies, including farmers associations, government, and universities. Sustainability was increasingly addressed through anchorage of interventions with more permanent bodies often in the process fostering public-private collaboration, and for many projects, local government was an important

partner. Institutional anchoring of knowledge and capacities within extension services in government, local government, farmers, and business associations was visible in many projects. The Postharvest Management project in Sub-Saharan Africa [7F-08498.02] worked closely with local government extension services, associations, and the private sector to provide services. Also, in Bangladesh, the projects worked with the private sector and agricultural extension to provide services to the farmers as well as supported the introduction of agri-business into the curriculum and courses of universities. There were also cases of interventions such as information sharing being transferred and anchored in permanent bodies such as the capacity for provision of in-depth agricultural information being transferred to the Georgian Association of Journalists [MOLI, 7F-07857]. These provide examples of system change at the individual intervention level being anchored in permanent bodies – usually across many different organisations depending on the nature of the interventions.

Sustainability of the technological advancements was in some projects promoted through bringing in research institutes of anchoring projects with universities. In Bolivia, across all projects, it was evident that the role of universities has been important for sustainability as they are knowledge custodians and capable of generating research and continuing the approach started by the projects being permanent institutions in the country. Examples include the beans [PIC 7F-01051.03] and Mercados Inclusivos [7F-08634.02.01] on technologies for climate change. In Myanmar, the Generating Rubber Opportunities (GRO) [7F-08842-02] brought in the international research institute CIRAD to facilitate the long-term presence of an international agricultural research organisation to support the development of a national research and development programme for rubber and strengthen capacity at the institutional level (e.g., Department of Agriculture and academic institutions). CIRAD currently has one expert based in Myanmar. It is anticipated that CIRAD will retain expertise and coordination in Myanmar beyond the end of the GRO Project and will generate funding from other donors to continue its work. (i5.1)

The project role of identifying and stimulating change in the markets was rarely owned, and only in one/few instances anchored in permanent organisations leaving learning gaps and threatening sustainability. Although there is extensive attention to institutional anchoring of various aspects of the systems changes as evidenced above, the role of the project as the innovative facilitator of processes and convener of the market and public sector actors disappears once the project ends. Learning may take place in the project and shared with other donors for example through the BEAM Exchange. For the country, there are important learning gaps as it pursues agricultural development and poverty reduction through market development and private sector engagement. Also, opportunities arising from enhancing synergies between often quite successful but narrow and fragmented interventions will be missed. It is noteworthy that the champions for MSD are mainly external cooperation agencies working through projects. This finding is also echoed by the IFAD evaluation of engagement in pro-poor value chains where it was noted that most projects did not assess well the preparedness of local actors for adopting MSD like approaches (IFAD, 2019).

Among the sampled projects, the M4C project [7F-07952.01 to 02] stands out for having a permanent institutional anchorage, but this project is expected to continue to receive donor-funding from other sources than SDC. Learning from the experience of earlier projects, the MSD approach in Bangladesh has been moving from a situation where MSD was owned by externally funded projects to one where it is starting to take root locally. A concerted effort was made among SDC and the MSD community in Bangladesh to engage actively with the government and those that had a long-term presence in the country beyond the individual intervention level. The clearest example of this is the M4C project [7F-07952.02] which showcases the latest iteration of the MSD approach being applied in extremely difficult and poverty hit areas. The project implementation unit although managed by an
international NGO was located in the premises of an autonomous government agricultural research institute, the Char Development Research Centre. Through the centre, the government contributes to the programme and some activities and publications are done jointly. More interestingly, the centre is learning and starting to experiment with cost-sharing partnerships with the private sector using MSD like approaches that would previously have been thought impossible for a government body. Beyond the project itself, the M4C project working in cooperation with SDC has been successful in advocating for market development approaches at the policy level with the M4C approaches being highlighted in the Bangladesh Economic Review (2017) published by the Ministry of Finance and in the Vision 41 - Perspective Plan of GoB from 2021-2041 which represents a highly influential and forward-looking economic perspective. Another example was the PIC project in Bolivia [7F-01051.03] where after a number of phases the project and its function of promoting continuous innovation was implemented through the national institute for agricultural innovation (INIAF) under a process led by the World Bank through a large loan and then finally handed over.

The anchorage of the MSD approach has been a growing issue and a number of attempts at finding in-country and permanent bodies to take it on have experimented with varying degrees of success. (i2.3)

Although difficult to measure, there is evidence that the MSD approach built social capital and empowerment, which have contributed to the prospects of sustainability. By working through farmers and business partners' association, MSD projects helped build social capital and voice for farmers and businesses in local and national policy development. In Myanmar, the support for the Fisheries Development Association in the Gulf of Mottama [7F-09030.02], led to the empowerment of fishermen to work with the Government to addressing fishing with illegal nets (see case story). In the Great Lakes region, CATALIST -2 [7F-80391] the final report notes that the project has generated human and social capital contributing to sustainability, as men and women producers have been capacitated to run their farms like businesses, planning and making decisions about investment and consumption. For women, there had been improvements in terms of increased income, but there was still some way to go before women would be equally represented in decision making e.g., in farmers unions/associations. (i5.2)

The long term and phased approach allowed for attention to sustainability as the last phase can be used for consolidation and orderly exit. Exit considerations and the envisaged conditions for project withdrawal are not well documented ex-ante, although in some instances the decisions taken on withdrawal of projects are well argued, e.g., in the case of Georgia, RED [7F-07941] was stopped after only one phase in part because the main funder pulled out but also in recognition that as it supported larger more commercialised entities a shorter duration sufficed. In other cases, decisions to withdraw is related to changes in SDC strategy. This was the case for CATALIST -2 [7F-80391] in the Great Lakes region, as the attention shifted more towards regional integration and peacebuilding, and the project was not found to respond well enough to the new strategic focus. There is a balance to be struck between supporting for too long, creating dependency on the project and withdrawing too early - before the changes become sustainable and self-replicating. It is a commendable feature of SDC cooperation projects that they run over in 2-3 phases over a time span of 10-12 years and sometimes longer. This approach allows for an orderly exit as the last phase can be used for a planned exit and focus on consolidation of the activities. In practice this is not so easy, as projects often work in very difficult and thin markets where efforts to deepen and expand the market continue until the last day of the projects, suggesting that a longer time horizon was needed. There is some attention given to exit strategy at the intervention level and financial sustainability issues also receive attention as discussed above – but on the whole, the opportunity provided by the 3 phased approach does not seem to be exploited well to plan for exits. (i5.3)
Attention to environmental sustainability and climate impacts was evident in some projects but not in all, and in some cases with negative implications. With a focus on production and income generation, some projects overlooked or deliberately took an approach that issues related to sustainability and climate change adaptation were of a secondary order to getting the markets to function, whereas in reality attention to climate and environmental impacts would be indispensable for the future sustainability of the activities. The Beneficiary Assessment study of Katalyst [7F-00521.01 to 04] found that the promotion of mono cultivation of maize has had serious negative implications for long-term soil quality and health, biodiversity, and overall functioning of the ecosystems of the area. Being a deep-rooted crop heavily dependent on irrigation, chemical fertilisers and pesticides, maize was found in the situation of the Chars to contaminate water bodies, drain the soil of vital nutrients, destroy non-pest organisms, reduce the water table and, overall, imbalance agro-ecological systems. The cultivation of input-intensive varieties of crops like maize was found to lower the resilience of the farmers.

In the Great Lakes CATALIST-2 project [7F-800391] climate change effects became more apparent during the years for the project, with rains becoming more erratic; farmers finding they had sown too early or too late as well as recurrent droughts. The project duration was too short to clearly discern trends related to climate change, but land scarcity and the tendency to switch from traditional systems to monocultures (for markets) made smallholder farmers ever more vulnerable to adverse climate effects, and failure to include climate-smart agricultural practices like landscaping had a negative impact on the outcomes. In Northern Mozambique that is highly impacted by extreme weather – droughts and floods – InovAgro [7F-06353.03] identified climate change as a risk and did promote drought-resistant seeds on demand from farmers, but none of the many other features of climate-smart agriculture was included in the project. In Myanmar, although the Generating Rubber Opportunities [7F-08842-02] has a goal of an environmentally sensitive market system for rubber, the project documentation (log frame) did not clarify how this will be achieved, and the project itself was reluctant to move towards sustainable rubber production mainly due to the investments this would require.

But there are also good examples, where environment and climate change issues are incorporated into projects and an important part of the project fabric from the start, underscoring that there is nothing in the MSD approach that hinders the integration of climate change adaptation and resilience consideration into the projects. The contributing factors in such cases are the understanding of the impact of climate variability on the incomes together with the resilience of the farmers. Helvetas, one of the main MSD project implementors, took the initiative to develop guidelines for integrating climate risks and vulnerabilities into market systems to better identify proactive, preventive, or preparatory measures that can reduce risks and possibly contribute to climate resilience. The Postharvest Management projects supported resilience and climate change adaptation through the promotion of crop varieties with higher drought resistance, using seeds less susceptible to infestation, and the use of early maturing seeds that enabled farmers to harvest in the short rainy season. In Mali, support for food security [PAFA 7-F05054] was designed to contribute to environmentally sustainable production with a clear focus on contributing to agricultural biodiversity and use of climate-smart practices with extensive use of environmental screenings and continued monitoring of risks associated with climate and environmental impacts. In Bolivia, PROSDER [7F-06552.01-02] developed agricultural insurance to increase the resilience of farmers related to climate variability. In Georgia, the projects focused on the opportunity to improve disease control, food safety and certification

12 https://www.shareweb.ch/site/Poverty-Wellbeing/Documents/Katalyst%20Beneficiary%20Assessment%20Final.pdf
because this was an area where system changes would bring early results, better enable export, and provide a route towards improving record keeping and business practices. As well as being profitable the interventions have improved environmental performance through the reduction of disease, better hygiene practice and overall compliance with environmental standards. The contributing factor for this change was the desire to qualify for exports to the EU for which certain standards have to be fulfilled.

The project's understanding of risks and opportunities related to the integration of environment, climate and resilience into the project design appeared to be the major factor for when this was done and not. Where projects considered the context, the scale of the impact on the target group of climate variabilities and unsustainable agro-systems, these aspects were worked into the project design from the start. By integrating environment and climate concerns, the project addressed a market failure as private sector actors could not be expected to have the knowledge nor the financial possibilities for testing new technologies – hence the raison d'être of the project became its ability to bring in new ways of strengthening environmentally sustainable agricultural production and climate resilience. (i5.2).

4 Conclusions and recommendations

Based on the findings across the five evaluation questions a set of conclusions and recommendations are presented below. These are supplemented by a summary of lessons learnt on the MSD approach beyond the SDC support.

Figure 4.1 Summary of conclusions and recommendations

<table>
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<th>Conclusions</th>
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<td>C1) MSD is well served by an active community of practice, SDC took a proactive role in contributing to MSD both globally and through implementation at the project level.</td>
<td>R1) Clarify the role of MSD in Swiss development cooperation in the future.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2) MSD in agriculture has evolved as an approach and where flexibility applied has proven its relevance for making markets work better for the poor, in many but not all contexts.</td>
<td>R2) Continue to support the development of the approach to better respond to the SDGs through enhancing inclusiveness, gender equality, and climate resilience.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3) The approach evolved to better respond to the SDGs - inclusiveness, gender equality and climate.</td>
<td>R3) Link the MSD projects and interventions to wider processes to gain coherence and critical mass.</td>
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<tr>
<td>C4) There have been good results on additional income and outreach to target population - usually well in excess of targets. However, the contribution to poverty per household is often thinly spread.</td>
<td>R4) Contribute more explicitly to the private sector and market-related policy and reforms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C5) Notable results have been reported in creating system change at the intervention level especially in distribution channels and embedding of services. However, the wider market impact and sustainability of such changes was difficult to assess.</td>
<td>R5) Seek and explore options for longer-term anchorage of the MSD approach.</td>
</tr>
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<td>C6) The interventions were often narrow and incomplete from the stakeholder point of view and the risks from the wider political economy and external factors where not always translated at the project level.</td>
<td>R6) Sharpen project design, monitoring and reporting on drivers of change and system changes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C7) Projects working alone found it challenging to advocate for change in policies, rules, and regulations. Where there was evidence of the SDO making use of the projects and information base to enhance policy dialogue, results were promising.</td>
<td>R7) Enhance SDO role and develop capacity within SDO, implementing agents and national entities to implement MSD in agriculture.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C8) The rigor of reporting varied considerably. Understanding, measuring, and reporting on wider systems changes was difficult. C9) MSD was complex and demanding on project teams, the SDOs and procurement processes.
4.1 Conclusions

Conclusion 1 MSD is well served by an active community of practice. SDC took a proactive role in contributing to MSD both globally and through implementation at the project level. By supporting knowledge hubs such as BEAM, the Springfield Centre and DCED, SDC has contributed towards developing a streamlined but also evolving MSD approach across a wide community of practice. The knowledge management, evolution and dissemination of the MSD approach is not limited to a few knowledge hubs supported by donors but has widened to include a growing range of actors including NGOs, think tanks and consultancies who contribute to the development of best practice and offer training and other resources. This has improved the prospects of coherence in terms of harmonisation with other donors, alignment with national policies and clarity in how the approach and projects contributed to the wider objectives of Swiss development cooperation. The knowledge hubs, led by BEAM have provided active learning, information exchange and training resource that has contributed to project level efficiency and effectiveness. Although difficult to calculate, the knowledge hubs and SDC support to them have very likely brought benefits that are many times their cost. As well as contributing financially to these knowledge hubs, SDC also contributed through their networks such as the Employment and Income (E+I) and Agriculture and Food Security (AF+S) networks and active participation in various working groups. Most importantly, SDC has contributed to MSD through funding projects on the ground. Over the years, SDC has become one of the most steadfast funders and long-term supporters of the approach with close to 20% of the MSD projects registered by BEAM being funded or co-funded by SDC.

Conclusion 2 MSD in agriculture has evolved as an approach and where flexibly applied has proven its relevance for making markets work better for the poor, in many but not all contexts. Supported by the community of practice and lessons learnt at the field level, MSD in agriculture has influenced wider development cooperation practice in how to engage with markets and the private sector. It has also itself evolved, benefitted from, and engaged with the emerging insights of development cooperation. Over the years it has been applied and adapted to many contexts with an increasing focus not just on the private sector but also the public sector, as well as how it can influence rules and regulations that support the enabling environment. In later years, the approach evolved to better seek out greater synergy with other efforts and explore means of clustering interventions and reaching greater critical mass. The MSD in agriculture projects supported by SDC explicitly targeted the poorer farmers, in many cases those at or below the national and internationally recognised poverty levels. Over the years and through a number of cases MSD has demonstrated its ability to improve the access of the poor to markets. The approach was successfully applied in highly different economic contexts both in dynamic emerging countries with high population density such as Bangladesh and in more remote, low-density contexts such as Potosí in Bolivia or Ajar in Georgia. There is also evidence of the approach being applied in fragile and conflict-affected situations such as Myanmar and Mali where markets, even if constrained, are still lifeblood for the poor and a potential pathway for mitigating conflict and enhancing cooperation.

Conclusion 3 The approach evolved to better respond to the SDGs - inclusiveness, gender equality and climate. There was an increasing recognition that it was in the areas of inclusion, gender, environment, and climate that the market was weakest and the opportunity for a market development approach to make a difference, greatest. Alongside this, there was also a recognition that for the poorer groups, including women and the disadvantaged, additional direct interventions are needed. The presence of externalities within the environment and climate, the short decision horizon associated with high levels of poverty and cultural barriers to gender equality were increasingly recognised as not barriers to markets and a distraction to the application of MSD. Instead, there is a growing
recognition that they represent the areas where markets are failing for the poor and external market facilitation is necessary and can make a difference.

Nevertheless, the approach is to some extent dependent on the target group being ready and capable of being economic actors, having access to land and at least some farming assets. There is an increasing recognition that in some cases poor farmers and especially women, and not just the market intermediaries, need to be further empowered before they are ready to fully engage with and benefit from market access. In general, the approach focused on the income stream of one commodity. It was not based on a farmer perspective that prioritised resilience and food security across all farm activities. In practice and response to the need for flexibility, hybrid approaches were adopted that tried to bridge these gaps. It would appear, from the cases examined, that in some weaker markets, the engagement would need to link with or be complemented by other social welfare and livelihood type initiatives. A successful linkage with such a programme took place in Bangladesh where the M4C [7F-07952.02] project targeted extreme poverty in the Chars area by building on earlier social welfare initiatives. In other cases, it was recognised that the macro-economic and political economy context, the migration of youth and the lack of comparative advantages of agriculture were simply too averse to lead to results. At least one project in Georgia [7F-05549.02/RDRL] had to withdraw in part due to a perception that in the area chosen the market was too thin for a catalytic type of approach to work and a project in Kyrgyzstan [7F-08418.02/Bai Ala] was not extended partly for the same reasons.

Conclusion 4 There have been good results on additional income and outreach to target population - usually well in excess of targets. However, the contribution to poverty per household is often thinly spread. Targets across a range of outcomes were reached and often exceeded. They included the number of beneficiaries, productivity and yield increases leading to higher incomes. In particular, the outreach numbers are impressive: In Bangladesh Katalyst [F7-00521.04] reached 1.45 million people corresponding to 122 pct. of the target, Catalyst-2 in the Great Lakes region reached 311,342 farmers compared to the targeted 300,000, and in Mozambique on the thinly populated north, InovAgro is on its way to reach the targeted 30,000 smallholders. There were impressive results with regards to increases in income. In Bolivia, Mercados Inclusivos [7F-08634.02] in particular recorded impressive results in the first phase of the project (2014-17), including an increase of 72% in the net incomes of 13,000 farming households, 32 per cent of them headed by women. In the case of the Catalyst-2 project [7F-08391], farm incomes in Rwanda rose by 20 pct. in DRC, 17 pct. in Rwanda, and stagnated in Burundi. Although this was lower than the targeted increase of 30 pct., it did lead to significant increases in food security and allowed smallholders to invest further in productive assets, houses, and school fees.

However, in many projects, the contribution to poverty reduction through income increases is often marginal. This was the case even for a flagship project such as the M4C [7F-07952.02] which in a 6-year period between 2013-2019 led to an accumulated income of close to CHF 20 million for about 124,000 households, which is little more than 2 CHF per household per month. In Mozambique, InovAgro 2nd phase[7F-06353.02] led to a similar increase in smallholder income at about 25 CHF a year. In 2020, due to good prices, the income increased to CHF 100. Across the different projects in Georgia, the increase in income, as an average across income beneficiaries amounted to less than CHF 50 per year, which was not enough to impact significantly on poverty reduction. These were averages, so within the group of beneficiary farmers there would be some that gained greater income depending on which interventions they were involved in and how well they have been able to enhance productivity and expand production and income including since the intervention.

Conclusion 5 Notable results have been reported in creating system change at the intervention level especially in distribution channels and embedding of services.
However, the wider market impact and sustainability of such changes was difficult to assess. There are many reported system changes at the intervention level. System changes reported in the sampled projects related to projects facilitating/catalysing collaboration between different actors (public and private sector) to provide services and inputs to farmers. Most system changes involved the capacity building of private sector actors – companies, retailers, farmer’s associations, and business member organisations - engaging in the distribution of agricultural input and providing embedded extension services often triggered by a cost-sharing partnership with the project. System changes also included changed practices of farmers (men and women) e.g., with regards to the use of agricultural inputs (fertilizers (chemical and organic), improved seeds, and pesticides) as well as other improved farming techniques. System changes often required a long period of exploration and trial and error. The projects in Bangladesh explored and piloted a wide range of interventions before arriving at those that were successful. There were examples reported of systems changes at the policy level often involving multi-stakeholder dialogues with the government, private sector, and associations, as well as other donors.

In general, it was difficult to assess the sustainability of such changes and in particular, whether the markets systems changes implied a sustainable shift in behaviours of markets actors to a new way of working with and including poor farmers in the market. It was, not surprisingly, easier to find evidence of which success at the individual intervention level and more difficult to find evidence of this leading to market-wide change. Assessing what worked and what did not work required post evaluations, which were not available. There were a few examples of interventions that were scaled and replicated beyond the project where the system changes at the intervention level were replicated by companies not involved with the project and extended nationwide.

Conclusion 6 The interventions were often narrow and incomplete from the stakeholder point of view and the risks from the wider political economy and external factors where not always translated at the project level. Despite the MSD approach laying out the importance of understanding the full market system impacting farmers, interventions were often designed narrow from the start with a high emphasis on production input, and sometimes only one input e.g., seeds in Mozambique or fertiliser in Great Lakes Region. In their later phases, some projects gradually developed by adding other interventions as constraints to market development become clearer. Such additional interventions covered a wide range of activities from output marketing, policy level input, to land security measures, and access to finance depending on where the project analyses suggested market constraints. For this to happen – projects depended on capable staff, a long enough time frame and funding. This was the case with Katalyst in Bangladesh, which over a period of 17 years managed to make contributions to market systems changes based on solid analyses of market constraints, underscoring the importance of continued monitoring and understanding market dynamics to be able to respond to opportunities and challenges. In most circumstances, intensive support to build capacity and empower farmers, as well as their associations as economic actors, were required, which challenged replicability in absence of similar projects or other support. The projects identified risks at various risks levels – policy, institutional, project levels, but they were seldom reported on, and it is not clear to what extent the individual projects actively sought to mitigate these risks. As is the case with projects in agriculture, they are heavily impacted by changes in prices and in weather conditions. Even where prices were highly averse to the long-term sustainability of the overall project, as was the case of the support for rubber smallholders in Myanmar, this risk was not fully acknowledged nor addressed at the project level.

Conclusion 7 Projects working alone found it challenging to advocate for change in policies, rules, and regulations. Where there was evidence of the SCO making use of the projects and information base to enhance policy dialogue, results were promising. The majority of interventions were related to making a system-like change in
the supporting functions rather than attempting changes in rules. A number of projects recognised a weakness in their delivery of advocacy for policy and rule change. There were a number of factors behind this. Firstly, policy and rule change were not clearly designed as part of the projects or integrated into the log frame, partly because it was not possible at the design stage to foresee what was necessary. Project staff did not have the skill and confidence to develop, propose and advocate for rule changes. The time scale and feasibility for rule changes were often beyond the contractual project period at least when considered phase by phase. The government and other actors reasonably demanded compelling evidence of the benefits before making any change and in some cases, vested interests working against changes were likely to be present. The project themselves did not always have good entry points at the government level, although some projects did create a close working relationship with the local government. Where the projects were able to deliver clear advocacy messages that were then taken by the SCO and presented through wider policy dialogue platforms, there were some promising developments. An example is the M4C project working in cooperation with SDC, which has been successful in advocating for market development approaches at the policy level with the M4C approaches being highlighted in the Bangladesh Economic Review (2017) published by the Ministry of Finance and in the Vision 41 - Perspective Plan of GoB from 2021-2041, which represents a highly influential and forward-looking economic perspective. Another example is the improvements in access to finance and insurance products in Bolivia, which owe their success in promoting changes in rules and regulations to high-quality advocacy and close engagement with the SCO.

Conclusion 8 The project role of identifying and stimulating change in the markets was rarely owned by and only sometimes anchored in permanent organisations – leaving learning gaps and threatening sustainability. Most interventions, especially those involving embedded services and improved distribution were anchored in permanent in-country entities usually either private companies, farmers’ or business associations or extension services. There were a few examples of system change at the individual intervention level being anchored in permanent bodies sometimes with a demonstrated capacity to further innovate and adapt in a changing market and to crowd in and replicate – a well-documented example is the provision of veterinary services under the ALCP Project in Georgia [7F-0662903]. Sustainability of the technological changes was in some instances promoted by bringing in research institutes or anchoring technological development with universities.

However, anchorage of the promotion of MSD throughout the sector as a whole was not often evident. Ownership, commitment, and capacity to continue the MSD approach – the innovative facilitator of processes and convener of actors - and to find new areas where system changes can be made were held within the projects – leaving learning gaps and threatening wider replicability beyond the relatively narrow interventions. Overall, it is noteworthy that the champions for MSD are mainly cooperation agencies of foreign countries, rather than the government or other entities in the country itself (e.g. extension organisations, research bodies, NGOs, business associations).

This issue of anchorage beyond the individual intervention has been gaining recognition and in the later phases of some projects, there were examples of attempts to select more concentrated interventions that were mutually reinforcing and even to locally anchor the market systems development approach as a whole. In the example of the PIC project in Bolivia [7F-01051.03] and the M4C project in Bangladesh, there was a move towards anchoring the approach in semi-autonomous public sector research bodies with varying degrees of success. Other donors have responded by supporting new NGOs or trust funds that could, in the future, develop as apex business member organisations. In some contexts, for example, such as the western Ukraine with the presence of strong farmer and business
associations and service providers, the institutional landscape could be judged sufficiently comprehensive and robust to rely on the fragmented anchorage at the intervention level.

There is no easy solution to the transfer of the MSD as an approach to country actors. Projects have access to the capacity building and cost-sharing subsidies and also benefit from the highly capacitated staff that seem essential, in practice, to make the approach work. Consideration about how to avoid dependence on a continual stream of projects was generally missing. Whilst projects can contribute to longer-term anchorage the issue is also wider than the individual project. The topic was generally not yet taken up actively enough at the SCO, donor coordination and policy dialogue level.

Conclusion 9 The rigor of reporting varied considerably. Understanding, measuring, and reporting on wider systems changes was difficult. The rigor of reporting varied considerably and evidence was often scattered and difficult to verify. Cost-benefit analysis was carried out for some projects but not the majority and a standardised approach based on clear underlying assumptions was not adopted. Projects were constrained by predetermined indicators and the logical framework, leading projects to focus on the output and outcome numbers rather than the drivers of change and changes in systems that the projects sought to support. Reporting was not sceptical and failures were rarely identified. Outside of the contractual confines of individual projects, the project implementing entities did have an active reflection on learning and many of them have contributed to the body of experience on MSD via the community of practice and think tanks and they have developed internal guidance based on lessons learnt. In general, understanding, measuring, and reporting on wider systems changes and contribution towards transformative effects was particularly difficult. DCED results chains and audits were a positive feature where applied. Mid-term reviews were very useful for guiding enabling adaptations between phases but they were often too early to be conclusive on system change.

Conclusion 10 MSD was complex and demanding on project teams, the SCOs and procurement processes. A high level of skill was needed to identify market failures and define sustainable interventions. The interventions had to stimulate the private sector without risking market distortion. They also had to avoid the trap of the project becoming a permanent actor. It was not easy to find a pragmatic balance between studying too much or too little. This complex made it challenging to find the right partners for MSD both internationally and at the country level. The demand for skills and especially the relatively high salaries needed to retain these skills remains a threat to scaling up approaches and anchoring them in country institutions such as government, business associations, business development service providers or universities. Over several phases, projects generally built up their skill base and either trained their own staff or built the capacity of local NGOs. Whilst this gave rise to a slow start it paid dividends over the years as considerable skills were built up within the project organisations. The high skill demand and the relatively unconventional approaches of MSD had implications for the procurement and contracting of project management agents/partners. This is especially important as the proficiency of project management has been identified as one of the most influential drivers of project efficiency. It is noteworthy that there is a tendency within SDC to fund MSD via relatively small projects outsourced to highly skilled NGOs. Whilst the experience is in general positive there has not been many attempts to consider other approaches such as the use of challenge funds or funding via reputable business member organisations or others.

SDC’s approach of funding several phases of projects over 10 years or more was not only a factor in allowing the build-up of skills but also contributed to increasing the adaptive capacity of projects, especially between phases. MSD projects are not easy to monitor and supervise. The emphasis on facilitation and promoting change complicates accountability and requires significant levels of trust. The presence of targets creates a temptation to create more immediate change by direct intervention rather than by making changes in the
systems. The interface between the SCO and the project was found to be an area that influences project efficiency. Many of the Swiss Cooperation Offices have developed considerable MSD skills over the years through a combination of training courses and actively managing MSD projects. These skills, which are important in ensuring effective supervision need to be regularly updated especially where there is staff turnover.

4.2 Recommendations

R1) Clarify the role of MSD in Swiss development cooperation in the future.
Rationale: SDC has been an active donor in support of MSD in agriculture and the evolution of the approach through many mainly smaller projects and intellectual input. As the World readies for the Food Systems Summit to take place in September 2021, it is relevant to consider the role of MSD in delivering the necessary transformation of the way the world produces, processes, and consumes food to achieve the SDGs and ensure food security and safety for everyone going forward. The MSD approach can contribute to making markets work for the poor by integrating smallholders (women and men) into sustainable food value chains and systems that can support food security for the individual smallholder as well as link smallholders better to markets. The evidence brought forward by this evaluation points to the importance of MSD interventions to be sizeable and long-lasting to result in deep and wide market systems changes that are sustainable in all aspects. There need to be linkages to other processes and coherence between project and policy level to make markets work and anchorage needs to be considered to ensure continued market stimulation and replicability. This might entail setting priorities. There are various options to consider depending on where SDC wants to go with MSD from here. At one end of the spectrum there is the option to integrate MSD features – context focus, facilitation and integration of private sector-based solutions, local solutions, and ownership – across development cooperation and/or use the MSD approach in conjunction with community-based approaches to better addresses poverty in its multiple forms. At the other end of the spectrum, there is the option of stand-alone MSD engagements, possibly with a focus on also linking to global value chains through collaboration with large private sector actors that can provide demand and impetus for improved production and productivity.

This recommendation is linked to the following conclusions: #1,5,6,7,8

The recommendation can be implemented through the following measures:

- Decide the focus of SDC support for MSD in agriculture building on the achievements so far to support the development of sustainable food systems;
- Consider which countries to provide significant support to MSD in agriculture as part of the medium-term cooperation strategies being developed.

R2) Continue to support the development of the approach to better respond to the SDGs through enhancing inclusiveness, gender equality, and climate resilience.
Rationale: SDC has been at the forefront of supporting the evolution of MSD in agriculture and was also a lead donor in the adoption of the SDGs with their focus on inclusiveness – leave no-one behind - and sustainability. Through its longer-term support to MSD projects, SDC has also become one of the major donors to MSD in agriculture. Many of these projects, as outlined in this evaluation, have been seeking means of increasing the contribution and impact of MSD in agriculture to the SDGs. In particular, market weaknesses in agriculture are often linked to issues of inclusiveness, gender equality, environment, and climate resilience and which, although complex, potentially provide the most promising opportunities and entry points for the MSD approach.

This recommendation is linked to the following conclusions: #3,4,6

The recommendation can be implemented through the following measures:
• Continue the engagement of the E+I and AF+S networks within SDC [SDC headquarters];
• Continue to engage with the community of practice think tanks as well as implementors to promote experience exchange and research on how MSD can more effectively identify entry points, target, and contribute to market development and the SDGs through attention to inclusiveness, gender, environment, and climate resilience [SDC headquarters; community of practice think tanks; MSD project implementors];
• Incorporate inclusiveness, gender, environment and climate resilience into the objectives and result frameworks and reporting of new MSD projects or projects moving into new phases [SDC headquarters and SCOs].

R3) Link the MSD projects and interventions to wider processes to gain coherence and critical mass.

Rationale: Project-based interventions were often narrow and although potentially successful as interventions they were by themselves not enough to lead to sector-wide and transformational change. There were also risks from the wider political economy and external factors, which are not always possible to deal with at the individual project level. In some cases, it was appropriate that the MSD in agriculture project did not tackle aspects such as access to finance or delivery of essential social services but instead to link with or work with the knowledge that other efforts and processes were engaged in these areas.

This recommendation is linked to the following conclusions: #4,5,6

The recommendation can be implemented through the following measures:
• Enhance as part of the design and ongoing adjustment of projects the exercise of mapping of relevant national and other support efforts to draw the boundaries of the MSD intervention [SCOs];
• Coordinate and map support efforts to enable a well-informed dialogue with government and other development partners to develop and exploit synergies [SCOs];
• Incorporate a more detailed and regularly updated risks assessment of not obtaining sufficient synergy and be prepared to withdraw from projects where this is not likely to be forthcoming [SCOs];
• Increase the degree to which MSD in agricultural efforts are co-financed and part of larger projects [SCO].

R4) Contribute more explicitly to the private sector and market-related policy and reforms.

Rationale: Projects working alone found it challenging to advocate for change in policies, rules, and regulations. Projects did not often have changes in market-related policy and reforms as part of their objectives or results frame. Nor did they have the entry points or engage with the partners in the public sector that were influential in making change. Where there was evidence of SCO making use of the projects and information base to enhance policy dialogue, results were promising.

This recommendation is linked to the following conclusions: #5,6,7

The recommendation can be implemented through the following measures:
• Work more explicitly with partners that are able to influence and affect market-related policy change and reforms. [SCO; project implementing agents];
• Develop policy and reform advocacy agenda and strategy for enhancing MSD in agriculture, making use of project-based information and evidence [SCO; project implementing agents];
• Identify actions on policy change and support to reforms into the results frameworks [SCO].
R5) Seek and explore options for longer-term anchorage of the MSD approach.

**Rationale:** In the long term the sustainability and continued innovation of market development in agriculture will need to be anchored at the country level among permanent entities. This will promote learning and adaptation from within. In some cases, particularly where the institutional landscape is strong the anchorage can be safely distributed among business members organisations and the private sector and only require a light involvement of public bodies, but in other cases, this will not be the case.

This recommendation is linked to the following conclusions: #8

The recommendation can be implemented through the following measures:

- Develop at country level, together with the relevant national entities and other development partners, options, and strategies for ensuring the mainstreaming of MSD in agriculture approaches [SCO, national entities both public and private];
- Enhance the exit strategies at the project and intervention level to include the capacity to respond, adapt and replicate the market innovation introduced [SCO, implementing agents, national entities].

R6) Sharpen project design, monitoring and reporting on drivers of change and system changes.

**Rationale:** The rigor of monitoring and reporting varied considerably. The reporting at the intervention level particularly when using DCED or equivalent results chains was stronger than reporting at the project level. Greater attention in project design, monitoring and reporting to drivers of change, leading to systems changes and especially wider systems changes often captured as outcomes need to be strengthened. The project results frameworks usually focussed on outreach numbers and accumulated income increases without looking for evidence on system change. The analysis provided served to confirm contractual obligations and was not sceptical and learning focussed.

This recommendation is linked to the following conclusions: #9

The recommendation can be implemented through the following measures:

- Introduce evidence of system change in the results frameworks with greater detail provided using the more detailed intervention level results chains once they are designed [SCO, implementing entities];
- Continue and enhance mid-term reviews, potentially involving relevant national bodies for enhanced learning [SCO];
- Increase the adoption of DCED audits [SCO, implementing entities].

R7) Enhance SCO role and develop capacity within SCO, implementing agents and national entities to implement MSD in agriculture

**Rationale:** Where there was evidence of SCO making use of the projects and information base to enhance policy dialogue and especially where there was an active policy dialogue platform with other development partners, the results were promising. At the same time, the MSD projects were highly complex and demanding on the capacity of SCO and implementation partners.

This recommendation is linked to the following conclusions: #7,10

The recommendation can be implemented through the following measures:

- Continue to rollout internal training and participation of SCO staff through the community of practice and think tank processes [SCO];
- Ensure that projects have resources and time to build internal capacity among implementing agents but also among partners and national entities [SCO, implementing agents, national entities];
• Encourage an adaptive management approach both in the flexibility of design as well as supervision of performance [SCO, implementing agents].

4.3 Summary of learning across the evaluation

The lessons learnt serve to summarise the context, factors and elements of the approach, which tend to lead to success or failure.

| Relevance and Coherence | - The MSD approach is highly relevant as a part of the wider effort of doing development differently and better with its focus on local context, local ownership and solutions, and facilitation;  
- The MSD approach potentially has the greatest relevance and added value when applied to address issues of inclusiveness, gender, climate and environment because they are the areas where market weakness can best benefit from external facilitation;  
- The MSD approach can be successfully applied to a wide range of contexts but in weaker and thin markets the level and timescale of engagement would need to be longer, and in the areas of extreme poverty public welfare programmes or direct interventions for the poorest are needed either in advance or together with the MSD approach;  
- Factors that led to higher relevance and coherence: an engaged and active community of practice; linkage to wider processes and programmes; multi-phased, flexible, and adaptable approach over many years; clear identification of ambition level and poverty group; partnering with local NGOs understanding the root causes of poverty; co-funding of project with other donors; increasing interest of other donors; early engagement with government institutions (especially local);  
- Factors that led to poorer coherence: lack of dialogue with government, poor understanding of the MSD approach within governmental institutions and/or non-acceptance of the approach as a desirable development model. |
| Results and Effectiveness/Impact | - Contribution to policy and reforms requires a deliberate and systematic approach and a strategic choice of partners as well as a close link between the project and the SCO because they have different roles;  
- Poverty – MSD contributes to poverty alleviation when a farmer and market perspective is combined and when it is well-coordinated with other efforts;  
- Gender – a WEE approach that targets and engages with women as economic actors has been effective;  
- System changes at the intervention level need to be linked to other systems changes brought about by the project as well as wider policy changes to be effective. They depended on the role of the project to facilitate linkages with other actors and provide seed funding incl. for capacity building;  
- Factors that led to greater effectiveness and results: detailed and iterative market diagnosis and selection of high-potential MSD interventions; trial and error approach to finding out the best way to reach desired results; strong design and implementation practice; focus on potentially economically viable small-holders; multi-stakeholder policy dialogue; timely attention to gender equality; and communication widely of the practices, choice of technologies that made systems change easier for all actors;  
- Factors that reduced effectiveness in creating wider system changes: policy dialogue not part of interventions and/or unskilled MSD staff to advocate for policy changes; attention on immediate results rather than systemic change. |
| Cooperation efficiency | - The demand on the skill set of the project implementors and SCOs was high and remains an impediment to achieving results and scaling up the approach;  
- Flexibility and adaptability are important factors of success of MSD projects, and SCO offices need to be confident of the MSD approach to recognize the level of flexibility needed for projects to adapt to the circumstances and timescale;  
- Factors that led to efficiency: high capacity of SCOs and implementing partners; robust results framework and strong M&E system; interventions higher up in the value chain and cost-sharing partnerships with the private sectors; multi-phased |
### Sustainability

- Narrow and fragmented interventions profit-driven by market actors could lead to immediate results, but for sustainability would frequently be reliant on wider initiatives and changes in the rules and regulations and practices of others that are beyond the project reach;
- Attention to climate end environmental impacts is indispensable for sustainability;
- **Factors** that led to greater sustainability: the market and the market context; multi-phased approach over many years; innovations anchored in permanent private companies and business associations with links to the government; systems wide approach involving supporting functions, rules, and regulations; institutional anchoring in permanent bodies and local ownership; integration of social capital into market development; ensuring that impact of climate variability on the incomes and resilience of the farmers are integrated into the project;
- **Factors** that led to weaker prospects for sustainability: lack of understanding of risks and opportunities that go beyond the immediate project sphere; increased attention to immediate results; lack of sustainable financing mechanisms for the continuation of supported activities; limited and weak markets.
Annex A  Portfolio analysis

SDC provided an SAP database project portfolio with a total of 595 projects across 80 countries. A portfolio analysis has been done across domains, themes, contract partner groups, and countries/regions examining the expenditure patterns and distribution of project size. A regional, country and project/activity level analysis is presented below.

The data extract from the SAP database includes SDC projects with MSD in agriculture related activities as defined by sector. The basic element (a line in the Excel dataset) in the data extract represent a project activity, which is uniquely identified by e.g., project, phase, partner type, and country. Each project activity is assigned (up to) three sectors with a percentage given to each sector, totalling 100%. In this portfolio analysis, Agricultural Market System Development is defined as projects labelled under any of the following three sectors:

- Agriculture VCD (till 2016) (12739)
- Agricultural services & market (20024)
- Trade policy & market system (20216)

The SAP database pivot query had to be run separately for each MSD in agriculture sector, extracting all lines with MSD in agriculture activities. Those three queries were then combined into one new dataset to enable new pivot queries, analysing all three sectors together, e.g., per sector, domain, partner group, and country.

Out of the total SAP database of 595 projects, the total data extract for MSD in agriculture includes 275 projects and 527 activities. Most of these projects also include activities from other sectors than MSD in agriculture. Non-MSD in agriculture activities is not included in the data extract. This implies that even if a project shows no expenditure for a given year, the project may have had expenditure on non-MSD in agriculture activities. Some projects are labelled with two or three of the chosen MSD in agriculture sectors; sometimes with a negative expenditure on one sector and a positive on another. The 275 projects had a total project expenditure 2013-2018 of CHF 684 mill., of which CHF 279 mill. are labelled to the three MSD in agriculture sectors.

Looking at individual projects and activities for the period 2013-2018, some show net zero or negative expenditure. This could be, e.g., repayment of unspent advances, and sometimes happens several years after activities have stopped. A total of 190 individual projects — with 420 MSD in agriculture activities/lines — have a net positive expenditure on the three sectors in the period 2013-2018, totalling CHF 280 mill.

It was considered only using the reduced dataset of 190 project with net positive expenditure for analysing expenditure according to domain, sector, country, and partner group. However, the pivot table approach does not immediately enable selecting only some projects and then extracting data, say per domain, in one operation. It would therefore require manually deleting all projects with net zero or negative total expenditure in the period. This can be done but would introduce an allowance for human error, and the process would be difficult to document and replicate. Therefore, the full MSD in agriculture dataset extract of 275 projects has been used. The difference between the total MSD in agriculture expenditure in the 275 projects and the 190 projects with positive net expenditure is CHF 930,000 or 0.3% and can be ignored in the further analysis.

A1 Portfolio analysis – Annual expenditure

The development in annual spending on MSD in agriculture shown in Figure A1, including an extended period from 2011 to 2019 (planned) to better show continuity / trends.

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14 Six other sectors (codes) were also considered but that after consultation with the evaluation unit and based on the analysis provided in the approach paper it was decided that a more accurate picture of AMSD was represented by use of just the three codes.
Between 2011 and 2019 (planned), annual expenditure on MSD in agriculture has fluctuated between CHF 58 and 39 million, perhaps with a declining trend after 2016. However, this could partly be due to the way (new) projects are labelled.

**A2 Portfolio analysis – Project size**

The size distribution of the 275 projects is shown in Table A1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project allocation size</th>
<th>Projects n / %</th>
<th>Total allocation CHF / %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt;0&lt;sup&gt;15&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-100,000</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100,001-500,000</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500,001-1,000,000</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,000,001-5,000,000</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;5,000,000</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total MSD in agriculture</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Most projects are within the 1-5 mill. range but a small group of large projects have been allocated significant amounts above CHF 5 mill., accounting for a very large portion (41.8%) of the total expenditure. Three projects administered by IFAD, UNOPS, and Caritas were allocated CHF 22, 14, and 12 million, respectively. At the other extreme, 85 projects have an MSD in agriculture element but zero or negative MSD in agriculture expenditure in the period, and another large group of 49 small projects (up to CHF 100,000) had an aggregated MSD in agriculture expenditure of CHF 1.3 million (4.0% of the total expenditure) in the period.

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<sup>15</sup> The negative expenditure relates to funds that are returned due to non-expenditure.
The many, very small projects (in terms of funding) raise the question whether part of the portfolio is sufficiently MSD in agriculture focused for delivering impact. Alternatively, SDC could be exerting huge leverage, funding catalytic projects, and getting significant value for little money.

**How MSD in agriculture heavy are the projects?**
The total project expenditure 2013-2018 on the 275 projects were CHF 684 million, of which CHF 279 million were coded MSD in agriculture. The average percentage assigned to the three MSD in agriculture sectors is 41%, varying from 20% to 100%, and many projects being 100% Agriculture VCD (till 2016). For instance, the large IFAD programme is allocated CHF 74 mill. but only 30% to MSD in agriculture while the M71 PAFA Sikasso project in Mali with CHF 8.4 mill is 100% MSD in agriculture.

**A3 Portfolio analysis – Domains**
The analysis found MSD in agriculture funded activities across five domains: South, East, Global, Humanitarian, and SDC Services. Overall expenditure across the five domains is shown in Figure A3a.

**Figure A3a MSD in agriculture expenditure per domain, overall**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domain</th>
<th>Spending per domain, 2013-2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDC Services</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The South domain has by far the largest portfolio in terms of MSD in agriculture expenditure, with the East and Global domains in the mid-range. Only a handful of projects are funded under SDC Services with one large project funded through Caritas of CHF 12 mill for MSD in agriculture.

Annual MSD in agriculture expenditure 2013-2018 across the five Domains is shown in Table A3 and figure A3b.
Table A3 Annual MSD in agriculture expenditure per domain

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>32,691,063</td>
<td>30,813,869</td>
<td>34,765,877</td>
<td>36,595,128</td>
<td>33,033,817</td>
<td>26,248,313</td>
<td>194,148,067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td>5,116,640</td>
<td>5,658,878</td>
<td>6,436,485</td>
<td>6,940,034</td>
<td>3,920,429</td>
<td>4,389,938</td>
<td>32,462,403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global</td>
<td>4,788,924</td>
<td>5,143,467</td>
<td>4,946,518</td>
<td>5,837,198</td>
<td>5,920,289</td>
<td>6,854,131</td>
<td>33,490,523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian</td>
<td>212,110</td>
<td>1,170,664</td>
<td>2,265,764</td>
<td>1,040,690</td>
<td>1,233,626</td>
<td>1,151,577</td>
<td>7,074,436</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDC Services</td>
<td>2,999,874</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
<td>3,070,000</td>
<td>3,029,852</td>
<td>-30,000</td>
<td>132,000</td>
<td>12,201,726</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total</td>
<td>45,808,611</td>
<td>45,786,878</td>
<td>51,484,644</td>
<td>53,442,902</td>
<td>44,078,161</td>
<td>38,775,958</td>
<td>279,377,154</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table A3 and Figure A3b on annual expenditure per domain does not show great fluctuations in the relative emphasis on different domains, except some fluctuation on SDC Services. However, this domain is only represented by a few projects, so this fluctuation is difficult to conclude on.
A4 Portfolio analysis – Sectors

Figure A4a shows MSD in agriculture expenditure per sector for the three selected sectors (or themes).

Figure A4a MSD in agriculture expenditure per sector

The sector “Agriculture VCD (till 2016)” dominates the portfolio, partly for reasons discussed below.

The annual expenditure per sector is shown in Table A4 and Figure A4b.

Table A4 Annual expenditure per MSD in agriculture sector 2013-2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
<th>2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture VCD (till 2016)</td>
<td>44,046,987</td>
<td>43,047,035</td>
<td>43,249,998</td>
<td>45,210,061</td>
<td>29,133,085</td>
<td>22,783,217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural services &amp; market</td>
<td>887,124</td>
<td>1,936,829</td>
<td>6,924,754</td>
<td>7,046,836</td>
<td>13,704,447</td>
<td>13,049,475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade policy &amp; market system</td>
<td>874,500</td>
<td>803,014</td>
<td>1,309,892</td>
<td>1,186,005</td>
<td>1,240,629</td>
<td>2,943,266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total</td>
<td>45,808,611</td>
<td>45,786,878</td>
<td>51,484,644</td>
<td>53,442,902</td>
<td>44,078,161</td>
<td>38,775,958</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Despite the title, many activities labelled “Agriculture VCD (till 2016)” are still active in 2018 (and beyond) because there is still expenditure for the years after 2016 on projects that were originally started before the end of 2016. The labels “Agricultural services & market” and “Trade policy & market system” have only been assigned from 2013 and are largely replacing “Agriculture VCD (till 2016)”. They are now slowly gaining traction.
A5 Portfolio Analysis – contract partner groups

The contract partner groups' analysis is done for all the domains and sectors together and looks at total and annual expenditure in use of contract partner groups over the period 2013 to 2018.

**Figure A5a Total expenditure per partner group**

![Expenditure per partner group (CHF), and share (%)](image)

Non-profit and non-governmental organisations dominate with a combined 53% of MSD in agriculture project volume. UN and other international organisations account for 24% while private sector companies (/organisations?) account for 13%.

Table A5 and Figure A5b both show annual expenditure per partner group.

**Table A5 Annual expenditure per partner group**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Academic &amp; Research Org. Internat.</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Financial Institutions</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Contract Partners</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Gov. Org. Internat./Foreign</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>64.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other International Organizations</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Sector</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>38.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Institutions FOREIGN</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Institutions SWISS</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swiss Academic &amp; Research Inst.</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swiss Non-profit Organisations</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>84.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Organizations</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>59.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total</td>
<td>45.8</td>
<td>45.8</td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>53.4</td>
<td>44.1</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>279.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The analysis shows a strongly declining dominance by Swiss non-profit organisations, which are to a greater degree being supplemented by international NGOs. UN organisations are getting more funding (especially IFAD), and foreign state institutions are also on the increase (bilateral sector support?). MSD in agriculture funding through private sector companies/organisations fluctuates, accounting for between CHF 5 and 8 million of the total portfolio.

SDC only implements a small part of the MSD in agriculture portfolio directly (e.g. through the embassies). A large proportion of SDC funding is channelled through a few large UN and NGO projects and organisations. SDC might have less control over implementation after committing funds, but could on the other hand gain huge leverage, e.g. turning IFAD more towards the MSD in agriculture approach.
A6 Portfolio Analysis – Countries

Figure A6 shows the expenditure per country/region 2013-2018 across all domains, excluding “Not specified” (22m), “Global” (16m), and “Switzerland” (negligible), as well as countries/regions with net zero or negative expenditure.

Figure A6 MSD in agriculture expenditure per country (region)

Purely looking at MSD in agriculture expenditure, the following countries stand out: West Africa: Mali, Benin, and Burkina Faso; Asia: Nepal, Myanmar, Bangladesh, and Mongolia; Latin America: Honduras, Bolivia, Cuba and Haiti; and Europe: Georgia and Armenia. It was noted that the expenditure in the Great Lakes was not recorded as a key project in that region was not marked with one of the 3 chosen markers (instead focus was put on “agricultural production” and “Labour markets” which respond to the title of the project but do not capture the MSD in agriculture and value chain aspects.). Expenditure in Mozambique may also be underestimated due to the high % given to the “agricultural production” marker compared to one of the 3 chosen markers. These examples were found through inspection by the CLP and it would appear that apart from these cases, the chosen markers have picked up the most important projects.
A7 Portfolio Analysis – Domains + Countries

Figures A7a-d show total MSD in agriculture expenditure 2013-2018 per country/region within the three main domains, South, East, and Humanitarian, as well as for South Domain per country within regions. Expenditure for the domain SDC Services (CHF 12 mill.) were not allocated to specific countries.

Figure A7a MSD in agriculture expenditure within South Domain, by region (2013-2018)

Figure A7b MSD in agriculture expenditure, South Domain, by country within regions (2013-2018)
Figure A7c MSD in agriculture expenditure within East Domain, by country (region) (2013-2018)

Figure A7d MSD in agriculture expenditure within Humanitarian Domain, by country (region) (2013-2018)
A8 Portfolio Analysis – Type of support

Figures A8a-b show total MSD in agriculture expenditure 2013-2018 per type of support. Project/Programme contribution (41%) and Mandate with fiduciary funds (35%) dominate the portfolio, with Core Contribution (13%) also important.

Figure A8a MSD in agriculture expenditure per type of support (2013-2018)

Figure A8b Trend in MSD in agriculture expenditure per type of support (2013-2018)
Annex B  Methodology and Sample

B1  Methodology

Overview
A combination of five different approaches and methods were used in this evaluation:

- Analysis of the theory of change
- Portfolio analysis and sampling
- Desk study of normative documents and meta evaluation/review documents
- Interviews with stakeholders
- Country and project level analysis (physical visit limited due to Covid-19)

Analysis of theory of change - A generic theory of change that summarise the SDC contribution across the South, East, Global and Humanitarian domains was undertaken and is summarised in chapter 2. The theory of change are based on the information in the TOR, the portfolio analysis, and the normative documents available under the 4 domains. These documents consist mainly of country strategies for the geographic domains (South and East); a set of concept notes and operational guidance for MSD in agriculture developed by SDC and others such as the Springfield centre; as well as documents on the global programme for food security. MSD in agriculture engagement is complex and spread over the four domains. The approach, as practiced, has also evolved over the years from 2010 to 2017 and will vary from country to country. For these reasons, the intention and value of re-constructing the theory of change based on normative documents has mainly been to familiarise the evaluators with the concepts and context for SDC cooperation within MSD in agriculture rather than to provide a rigid framework for analysis. The theory of change was also used for fine tuning and adjusting the evaluation questions and indicators.

Portfolio analysis and sample selection - The portfolio analysis is outlined in chapter 2 with details given in Annex A. The portfolio analysis served to provide insight across the broad spectrum of all SDC engagement with the three MSD in agriculture related sector codes as described in Annex A. The main findings and implications for the evaluation are summarised in chapter 2. A second purpose of the portfolio analysis is to provide a basis for selection of a sample of countries and projects.

A stratified, purposive sampling approach was adopted in order to capture a diversity and representativity of geographic location, age of project and type of implementing partner. Also important has been to take into consideration the availability of earlier reviews and evaluations and the likely insight that the project might provide on how MSD in agriculture has been practiced.

For the South, East and Humanitarian domains, the selection process involves identifying a long list of countries that can then be shortened down to desk sample and finally a potential field level sample. Within those countries it was considered important that regional activities and also global domain activities were also included and that the choice of countries represented those that have had a significant level of MSD in agriculture related expenditure and have projects that represent a range of topics. The five countries selected were Bangladesh, Bolivia, Georgia, Mali, and Myanmar.

Within the selected countries a number of projects are selected based on criteria noted above such as: the size of project, the level of completion, the presence of earlier reviews and evaluations and ensuring that a range of topics and contract partners is obtained. The country sample was furthermore guided by discussions in the CLP2 meeting on 7 May 2020 and subsequent feedback and follow up.

The operational criteria for country and project sample selection were:
The countries

Seventeen projects were selected for detailed analysis and stakeholder interview among the five selected countries. A further sixteen projects were examined covering a further 14 countries based mainly on earlier evaluations and reviews. An overview of the countries and projects selected are shown in figure B1 below.

**Figure B.1 Number projects in the five selected countries and list of other projects desk reviewed**

Core contributions and support functions

Following normal evaluation unit practice, the evaluation did not include core contributions for NGOs and multilateral organizations. Further, the evaluation did not cover the policy influencing in multilateral organizations. Evaluating policy influencing in multilateral organizations is in itself a complex exercise and would overburden the evaluation at hand. The reason with respect to core contributions is, that in core contribution SDC’s steering influence is fundamentally different than in project contributions and mandates. Thematic evaluations are focusing of the SDC initiated and / or steered projects.
However, what was done following good practice, was to conduct interviews with the identified key stakeholders in these institutions (Helvetas, HEKS, Swisscontact, IFAD) on the topic of MSD in agriculture, in particular also on innovation, methodical approaches, the interaction with SDC and SDC role in concept development.

Support functions which include areas such as how other sectors of SDC activity related to MSD in agriculture and how policy dialogue engaged with and supported MSD in agricultural were looked at, at the country level and reported on in the country visit reports.

**Country notes and case study**

Each country level evaluation led to a country case study report and for each country at least one intervention/project based case study selected from the sample of projects in the country on the basis of the quality of evidence and insight into the evaluation questions.

**Desk study of normative documents and meta evaluation/review documents.** There were two main types of documents reviewed: normative documents such as country and regional and domain-related strategies and earlier evaluations and reviews. At the project level documents included: project identification and formulation; progress and technical reports; project completion reports and reviews and evaluations.

**Interviews with stakeholders.** The people interviewed are shown annex D2 following the structure shown in table B3 below. The structure of the interview in general followed the evaluation matrix with a focus on evidence that informs the selected indicators.

### Table B.3 Interview groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Unit / division</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SDC- headquarters</td>
<td>Core Learning Platform</td>
<td>To deepen understanding of the thematic and domain activities and to follow up where needed on interviews already held during inception phase.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South/ East/ Humanitarian Domain</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Country desks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Networks (E+i; Agriculture and food security)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDC country office personnel</td>
<td>All the field level countries x5</td>
<td>To understand the country context and SDC MSD in agriculture related activities and in particular to obtain information on the sample projects. For visit countries to arrange a programme. To interview across all the evaluation questions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementing Partners</td>
<td>IFAD and others involved in global domain projects</td>
<td>To obtain information on the sample projects and to discuss evidence that can inform relevant indicators under the evaluation questions – this will be done in recognition of the particular sample projects that the implementing partners are involved with and their role.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Selected Multi-B implementing partners</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Selected international implementing NGOs/ research bodies/ consultants</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development partners</td>
<td>Selected donors co-funding Global Programme initiatives or Multi-B projects</td>
<td>To obtain information on the sample projects where the donors are co-funding and in particular to provide an alternative view on the findings of earlier reviews and evaluations and also on-going findings from the evaluations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A ranking of the evidence base was made at sub-question and question level guided by the table below:

- **Strong** - The finding is consistently supported by a range of evidence sources, including documentary sources, quantitative analysis, and qualitative evidence (i.e., triangulation); or the evidence sources, while not comprehensive, are of high quality and reliable to draw a conclusion (e.g., strong quantitative evidence with adequate sample sizes and no major data quality or reliability issues; or a wide range of reliable qualitative sources, across which there is good triangulation).
- **Satisfactory** - There are at least two different sources of evidence with good triangulation, but the coverage of the evidence is not complete.
- **Indicative but not conclusive** - There is only one evidence source of good quality, and no triangulation with other sources of evidence.
- **Weak** - There is no triangulation and/or evidence is limited to a single source.

**Country and project level analysis** - The purpose of the detailed country and project level analysis was to complete the data collection and contribute to answer the evaluation questions. It also served to validate or revise the preliminary hypothesis formulated around the evaluation questions and sub-questions during the desk phase. The country and project level analysis phase are not intended to conduct an in-depth assessment of the implementation of individual SDC supported interventions but to examine the evaluation questions through the lens of selected interventions.

The work at this stage mainly consisted of:

- Semi-structured interviews with in-country stakeholders such as SDC staff and other donor staff; government and non-state actors; and in some cases, end beneficiaries. The team used interview guides on the basis of the preliminary desk findings and information gaps.
- Additional documentation/data collection

Site visits were generally not possible to organise except for Bangladesh where it was possible to meet targeted end beneficiaries.

**Limitations of the evaluation**

The main limitations related to the large number of diverse projects and interventions made over an 8 year period which made it difficult to ensure a representative study. To mitigate this, we undertook a detailed portfolio analysis to ensure that the breadth of the engagement was understood and could serve as a firm basis for more selection. We also expanded the notion of the case studies so that a much wider range of projects are looked at in a cascade from a long list of more than 40 down to a desk analysis on 20 to 25 and a field level analysis of 15. From this broader sample, around 10 case studies were defined where the quality of evidence and forward looking insight is strongest.

The issues underlying the performance of MSD in agriculture engagement are often complex and vary over time and between countries and types of project. Findings are not always convergent and can point in different directions. To mitigate this, we ensured that the quality of evidence was clearly documented so that where divergence was due to evidence weakness this could be considered. We also explored the divergence as this often revealed deeper insights into the circumstances where an approach appears successful and where it does not seem to work. Especially at country level the limitation is also mitigated by ensuring that the context of the engagement is well understood and that our evaluators were familiar with the countries wherever possible.

Another limitation was the availability of data and people for interviews. This waste mitigated because due to Covid-19 a much longer period was available for interviewing people at the
country level meaning that the evaluation team was able to schedule and re-schedule at times when key people were available.

Covid-19 was a major limitation as it meant that the teams could not visit the countries as expected. Instead, and in mitigation much more attention was put on expanding the sample beyond the 5 countries especially on projects that had had recent reviews and evaluations. In this way, the team benefitted from the field work carried out at project level through a much more intensive way that the team itself could have hoped to achieve in the original 5 days allocated per country. In one country, Bangladesh, it was possible to conduct some limited field level checks and meet directly with beneficiaries.

**Summary of evaluation matrix and project level analysis**
Evaluation matrix and project level assessment sheets – the detailed methodology, data source and indicator level analysis is given in the evaluation matrix below together with project level assessment sheets
Evaluation matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions</th>
<th>Indicators / hypothesis to be used in Evaluation</th>
<th>Methods and data sources</th>
<th>Considerations on availability of data / reliability and validity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q1 Relevance</td>
<td>Was the SDC’s MSD approach relevant for responding to the needs of the target group?</td>
<td>1.1 The notion that SDC adopted, and contributed to the evolution of a MSD approach, was evidence-based and well-founded bearing in mind international experience; 1.2 The MSD approach responded to the income and employment challenges and opportunities for target populations, the disadvantaged and poor, also considering gender; 1.3 The MSD approach responded to the resilience challenges and opportunities (in economic, social and environmental terms) of target populations, the disadvantaged and poor, also considering gender; 1.4 The MSD approach responded to the challenges and opportunities in the market system for creation of an enabling environment for pro-poor and inclusive market systems; 1.5 Evidence that the SDC’s strategies and programs demonstrate flexibility and adaptability if/when needed.</td>
<td>Review sample project documents for evidence of context and argument; field visits to target group organisations and communities; discuss desk findings with SDC and implementation staff. Data: Sample project documents, progress reports, reviews, and evaluations; interviews (SDC staff and implementing organisations); interviews with stakeholders at country and field level where possible.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Q2 Coherence | SDC’s operational and institutional MSD approaches were | Review project documents for the sample (project reports, monitoring and evaluation reports); discuss desk findings with SDC, implementation staff and | It is not yet known if the sample projects have monitoring data available. The selection criteria will |

|   |   |   |   |

16 Note that the chosen indicators are not exhaustive in the sense that they will provide the full answer but should been considered indicative in combination with open responses from the interviews.
| Q3 Effectiveness/Impact | Expected results at output and outcome level were achieved (including analysis of contributing factors); Evidence of the impact on the target group, end beneficiaries and market players, e.g., on income, quality of life, gender equality (including analysis of contributing factors); Evidence of systemic changes in functions and rules (including analysis of contributing factors); Evidence of scale up (including analysis of contributing factors); Evidence of unintended outcomes and impacts. | Review sample project documents, results frameworks, progress reports, prior reviews and evaluations to examine results at output and outcome level, impact on target groups, systemic change, evidence of scaling up, and unintended results. Interviews with SDC staff, implementing organisations and stakeholders at country and field level (where possible); discuss desk findings with SDC and implementation staff. Field visits to target group organisations and communities; interviews with partners and target population, including responsible counterparts and private sector representatives in visit countries. Data: project documents, monitoring, review and evaluation reports; interviews with project implementing bodies; target population, SDC embassies and HQ. | It is not yet known if the sample projects have sufficient and high quality monitoring data available, or whether results at output, outcome and impact level are well-documented. The selection criteria across the projects seeks to ensure an acceptable level of representativeness and also allow access to projects that are likely to provide insight. It is not yet known if the sample projects have available documents – there will be a deliberate over-programming of the sample so that those with data can be selected. The selection criteria will ensure an acceptable level of representativeness. |
| Was the SDC’s programs/projects consistent with partner countries’ development priorities, country assistance strategies and Dispatches on Switzerland’s International Cooperation? | consistent with the objectives set out by the Dispatches; Synergies with other approaches and interventions (e.g., TVET, local economic development) were made use of where appropriate; SDC’s strategies and programmes were systematically and sufficiently aligned and complementary to the context and strategies in the partner countries; SDC’s strategies and programmes were systematically and sufficiently aligned and complementary to other donors’ strategic plans. | Review of strategic documents of Swiss development cooperation, of partner countries (for example agriculture national plans, sector plans, local development plans in the visit countries in the sample) and partner organisations. Interviews with implementing staff, visit country representatives, and relevant representatives of the donor community. Focus group meetings with target groups. |seek to ensure an acceptable level of representativeness. |
Q4 Efficiency
Was the market systems approach efficiently managed?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Procedure/Issue</th>
<th>Approach/Methodology</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.1 SDC’s procedures (general and financial in particular) and ways of collaboration are conducive to implementing MSD in partner countries or regions?;</td>
<td>Review project documents, monitoring, review and evaluation reports to examine the appropriateness of the procedures and adequacy of resources and whether the procedures have been noted as problematic or helpful and particularly on the quality of resources and adequacy of selection process (indicator 4.1 and 4.2). Interview both SDC and implementing staff at project level as well as SDC HQ especially the E+I network: Data: project documents, monitoring, review and evaluation reports; interviews with project implementing bodies; SDC embassy and HQ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2 Cost-benefit analyses have been presented and provides evidence for implementing MSD approaches;</td>
<td>Review project document and subsequent monitoring for presentation and updating and quality of evidence on CBA – that is whether it was done (and how well), the value of it (to indicate efficiency and evidence of its credibility. Interview embassy and implementation staff at project and E+I network staff for evidence of the general practice in MSD and quantification approach and expected levels of CBA (indicator 4.2) Data: project documents, monitoring, review and evaluation reports; interviews with project implementing bodies; SDC embassy and HQ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3 SDC and its implementing partners use adequate financial and human resources for effectively implementing MSD programs.</td>
<td>Some of the earlier CBAs are reported by CLP as being quite shallow (also because it was a compulsory requirement)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q5 Sustainability
Have good agricultural practices and market systems development been sustained or likely to be sustained?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Procedure/Issue</th>
<th>Approach/Methodology</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5.1 The interventions were financially and technically sustained/ likely to be sustainable (including analysis of contributing factors);</td>
<td>Review sample project documents, Theories of Change, results chains to examine how well sustainability is addressed in intervention design.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2 The social, environmental/climate sustainability issues were addressed by MSD programs (including analysis of contributing factors);</td>
<td>Review progress reports, prior reviews and evaluations to examine sustainability of results and impact, including analysis of contributing factors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3 The market systems development changes have been sustained /likely to be sustainable</td>
<td>Interviews with SDC staff, implementing organisations and stakeholders at country and field level (where possible); discuss desk findings with SDC and implementation staff.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Field visits to target group organisations and communities; interviews with partners and target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>For most interventions it may be too early to determine their sustainability. Therefore, the likelihood of the intervention being sustained will be examined through a proxy of how well sustainability is addressed in intervention design. The selection criteria will seek to ensure an acceptable level of representativeness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>It is not yet known if the sample projects have available documents – there will be a deliberate over-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(including analysis of contributing factors).

| population, including responsible counterparts and private sector representatives in visit countries.  
| Data: project documents, monitoring, review and evaluation reports; interviews with project implementing bodies; target population, SDC embassies and HQ. |
| programming of the sample so that those with data can be selected. The selection criteria will ensure an acceptable level of representativeness. |
## Assessment grid for evaluations of MSD in agriculture SDC projects/programmes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Aspects based on DAC criteria</th>
<th>Measurement criteria applied for the MSD in agriculture evaluation (reference to indicators in the MSD in agriculture evaluation matrix)</th>
<th>Score (choose only one answer for each question)</th>
<th>Justification compulsory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Assessment of relevance at moment of evaluation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. The extent to which the objectives of the projects/programmes are consistent with the demands and the needs of the target groups incl. a description of the target groups and their specific needs (e.g., gender-, specific, marginalized groups.)</td>
<td>1.2 The MSD approach responded to the income and employment challenges and opportunities for target populations, the disadvantaged and poor, also considering gender; 1.3 The MSD approach responded to the resilience challenges and opportunities (in economic, social and environmental terms) of target populations, the disadvantaged and poor, also considering gender.</td>
<td>Highly satisfactory: Fully consistent and target group-specific  Satisfactory: Largely consistent Unsatisfactory: Only partly consistent Highly unsatisfactory: Marginally or not at all consistent Not assessed / Not applicable</td>
<td>Click here to enter text.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The extent to which the objectives of the projects/programmes are consistent with the demands and the needs of partner country (institutions respectively society) as well as the sector policies and strategies of the partner country.</td>
<td>2.3 SDC’s strategies and programmes were systematically and sufficiently aligned and complementary to the context in partner countries.</td>
<td>Highly satisfactory: Obvious consistency with needs of society and in line with relevant sector policies and strategies Satisfactory: Consistency with needs of society and in line with relevant sector policies and strategies Unsatisfactory: Consistency with needs of society not visible but in line with relevant sector policies and strategies Highly unsatisfactory: Not consistent Not assessed / Not applicable</td>
<td>Click here to enter text.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. The extent to which the design of projects/programmes is adequate to achieve the goal and objectives (articulation of components; level of coordination with all stakeholders and</td>
<td>1.4 The MSD approach responded to the challenges and opportunities for creation of an enabling environment for pro-poor and inclusive market systems.</td>
<td>Highly satisfactory: Fully adequate Satisfactory: Largely adequate Unsatisfactory: Only partly adequate Highly unsatisfactory: Marginally or not at all adequate</td>
<td>Click here to enter text.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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17 This category applies a. if the ToR of the evaluation explicitly exclude the assessment of the criteria and/or of the key aspect(s) or b. if there is no information available to assess the criteria.

18 The policies and strategies should not be in opposition to the needs of the society (applies mainly in governance and human rights).
other projects/programmes; comparative advantage of Swiss cooperation; capacity for adaptive management).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assessment of effectiveness</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>4.</strong> The extent to which the approaches/strategies to the implementation are best suited to achieve the expected results.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1 SDC’s procedures (general and financial in particular) and ways of collaboration are conducive to implementing MSD in partner countries or regions?; 4.3 SDC and its implementing partners use adequate financial and human resources for effectively implementing MSD programs.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>5.</strong> The extent to which the planned objectives at outcome level (as defined in log frame) have been achieved taking into account the causal links between results, i.e. if activities lead to the expected outputs and then to the aimed outcomes.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1 Expected results at output and outcome level were achieved (including analysis of contributing factors).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>6.</strong> The extent to which the projects/programmes contribute to the objectives at impact level (as defined in log frame). Note: this sub-criteria is particularly relevant for ex-post evaluations.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2 Evidence of the impact on the target group, end beneficiaries and market players e.g. on income, quality of life, gender equality (including analysis of contributing factors); 3.3 Evidence of systemic changes in functions and rules (including analysis of contributing factors); 3.4 Evidence of scale up (including analysis of contributing factors).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>7.</strong> The extent to which the outcomes achieved contribute to results related to transversal themes¹⁹.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2 Evidence of the impact on the target group, end beneficiaries and market players e.g. on income, quality of life, gender equality (including analysis of contributing factors); 3.3 Evidence of systemic changes in functions and rules (including analysis of contributing factors); 3.4 Evidence of scale up (including analysis of contributing factors).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹⁹ Link to transversal themes of dispatch 2017-2020 and 2021-2024.
### Assessment of efficiency

#### 8. Cost-effectiveness of project results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>4.2 Cost-benefit analyses has been presented and provides evidence for implementing MSD approaches.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unsatisfactory: Few evidence of contribution</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highly unsatisfactory: No contribution</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not assessed / Not applicable</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 9. If assessable: Cost-benefit ratio of project results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>9. If assessable: Cost-benefit ratio of project results, 20</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unsatisfactory: Poor CBR, based on qualitative justification</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highly unsatisfactory: Poor CER demonstrated</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not assessed / Not applicable</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 10. Projects/Progr. management, monitoring and steering mechanisms are in place and effectively used for the efficient implementation of activities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>4.1 SDC’s procedures (general and financial in particular) and ways of collaboration are conducive to implementing MSD in partner countries or regions?; 4.3 SDC and its implementing partners use adequate financial and human resources for effectively implementing MSD programs.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Highly satisfactory: Highly efficient</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfactory: Efficient</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unsatisfactory: Partly efficient</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highly unsatisfactory: Not efficient</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not assessed / Not applicable</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Assessment of sustainability

#### 11. The extent to which the positive results at outcome level will be sustained

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>5.1 The interventions were financially and technically sustained/ likely to be</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Highly satisfactory: Very likely based on evidence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

20 The extent to which the relation between resources (mainly financial and human resources) and time (e.g. delays compared to planning) required and results achieved is appropriate (Cost-benefit ratio - CBR). Further information: [http://deza-pcmi-lernbuch-3.prod2.lernetz.ch/module-6-en/2-cost-benefit-and-cost-effectiveness-analyses#Fo218](http://deza-pcmi-lernbuch-3.prod2.lernetz.ch/module-6-en/2-cost-benefit-and-cost-effectiveness-analyses#Fo218)
continued beyond the end of the external support. Considering potential risks in the context.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5.2 The social, environmental/climate sustainability issues were addressed by MSD programs (including analysis of contributing factors).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>☐ Satisfactory: Likely based on evidence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ Unsatisfactory: Little likelihood based on evidence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ Highly unsatisfactory: Unlikely based on evidence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ Not assessed / Not applicable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

12. The extent to which partner organisations are capable to carry on activities. Capacity includes technical, financial capacity, human resources.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5.1 The interventions were financially and technically sustained/ likely to be sustainable (including analysis of contributing factors) – specifically concerning capacity of partner organisations/market players.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>☐ Highly satisfactory: Strong capacity (able to further develop without support)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ Satisfactory: Reliable capacity (able to continue at achieved level)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ Unsatisfactory: Little capacity (requires further support)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ Highly unsatisfactory: Still too weak capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ Not assessed / Not applicable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13. The ownership by the partner organisation and the institutional framework (e.g. legislation, administration, politics) is considered conducive for the continuation of the activities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5.3 The market systems development changes have been sustained /likely to be sustainable (including analysis of contributing factors).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>☐ Highly satisfactory: Very likely based on evidence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ Satisfactory: Likely based on evidence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ Unsatisfactory: Little likelihood based on evidence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ Highly unsatisfactory: Unlikely based on evidence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ Not assessed / Not applicable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Additional information (if needed): Click here to enter text.
Project: Click here to enter text.
Assessor: Click here to enter text.
Date: Click here to enter text.
B2 Sample

With reference to the portfolio analysis, the countries with the largest expenditure on MSD in the four domains were selected. For each country, the projects for the sample were selected allowing for as much diversity as possible, for example concerning implementing partner category and sector, as well as a priority for projects with a high share of MSD, and/or with high budgets even when the MSD share was lower, but due to the high budget still of a considerable size. Finally, the selection also sought to have a diversity of early projects and later/still ongoing projects. To ensure the learning aspect, the SDC was asked to provide examples of projects they find particularly insightful. Based on their recommendation three projects were added to the sample.

The summary of the desk and field sample of countries and projects is presented below in table B1, with the proposed visit countries marked in yellow. The long list of projects with the various criteria used in the selection process is presented in table B2 on the next page.

Table B1 Summary of sample projects, showing visit country projects in yellow shading

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Desk #</th>
<th>Field #</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>KATALYST</td>
<td>7F-00521</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SAMRIDDHI (HSI)</td>
<td>7F-03402</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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Additional projects that have been evaluated and provide special insight:

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<td>Kyrgyz</td>
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<td>15-12-13</td>
<td>31-12-14</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>3,500,000</td>
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<td>UN; Large budget; 100% MSD; one of the three project groups in Myanmar</td>
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<td>05-12-14</td>
<td>31-10-17</td>
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<td>01-05-14</td>
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<td>70%</td>
<td>1,792,235</td>
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<td>DOMAIN SC</td>
<td>Myanmar</td>
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<td>01-06-15</td>
<td>28-12-16</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>2,680,389</td>
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<td>Swiss Non-profit</td>
<td>01-08-14</td>
<td>30-11-19</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>3,264,000</td>
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<td>Swiss NGO; high budget for MSD</td>
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<td>01-10-10</td>
<td>31-05-16</td>
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<td>largest budget; private sector</td>
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<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>United Nations Organisations</td>
<td>01-02-17</td>
<td>31-12-16</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>1,050,000</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>UN; highest MSD in S. Sudan</td>
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<td>Agriculture VCD (till 2016)</td>
<td>DOMAIN SC</td>
<td>South Africaan Dev. Comm.(SADC C)</td>
<td>Private Sector</td>
<td>01-10-15</td>
<td>30-09-15</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>2,762,086</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>Largest SADC project; private sector; regional category</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7F-07646</td>
<td>Seeds &amp; Access to Markets Project</td>
<td>Agriculture VCD (till 2016)</td>
<td>DOMAIN SC</td>
<td>South African Dev. Comm.(SADC C)</td>
<td>Private Sector</td>
<td>01-10-15</td>
<td>31-12-19</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>4,459,010</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>as above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7F-03459</td>
<td>Rural Livelihoods Development Program</td>
<td>Agriculture VCD (till 2016)</td>
<td>DOMAIN SC</td>
<td>Tanzania (United Republ. of)</td>
<td>Swiss Non-profit Organisations</td>
<td>01-04-12</td>
<td>31-03-16</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>2,059,868</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>largest project in Tanzania; 50% MSD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7F-07726</td>
<td>Grain Post-Harvest Loss</td>
<td>Trade policy</td>
<td>DOMAIN SC</td>
<td>Tanzania (United Republ. of)</td>
<td>Swiss Non-profit</td>
<td>01-11-17</td>
<td>31-03-20</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>532,500</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>still ongoing; 50% MSD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Number</td>
<td>Project Name</td>
<td>Main code</td>
<td>Domain</td>
<td>country</td>
<td>Partner</td>
<td>project start</td>
<td>project end</td>
<td>% MSD in agriculture coded expenditure</td>
<td>MSD in agriculture coded expenditure (CHF)</td>
<td>Evaluation done</td>
<td>Remarks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7F-07726</td>
<td>Grain Post-Harvest Loss Prevention GPLP</td>
<td>market system</td>
<td>DOMAIN SC</td>
<td>Tanzania (United Republ. of)</td>
<td>Swiss Non-profit Organisations</td>
<td>02-05-14</td>
<td>10-12-16</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>1,586,196</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>second largest proportion of MSD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7F-07219</td>
<td>AFR55 - Politique agricole régionale</td>
<td>Agriculture VCD (till 2016)</td>
<td>DOMAIN SC</td>
<td>West Africa Regional</td>
<td>No Contract Partners</td>
<td>01-11-11</td>
<td>29-12-13</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>810,442</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>Largest West African regional project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7F-07219</td>
<td>AFR55 - Politique agricole régionale</td>
<td>Agriculture VCD (till 2016)</td>
<td>DOMAIN SC</td>
<td>West Africa Regional</td>
<td>Non-Gov.Org.Int ernat./Foreign</td>
<td>01-04-15</td>
<td>31-12-19</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>1,867,956</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>as above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7F-06353</td>
<td>INOVAGRO Private Sector Led Rural Growth</td>
<td>Agriculture VCD (till 2016)</td>
<td>DOMAIN SC</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>Private Sector</td>
<td>01/01/2011</td>
<td>31/12/2013</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>529,986</td>
<td>y</td>
<td>Recommended by CLP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7F-08214</td>
<td>Hortisempre</td>
<td>Agricultural services &amp; market</td>
<td>Domain SC</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>Swiss Non-profit Organisations</td>
<td>02/01/2017</td>
<td>31/12/2020</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>1,026,000</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Recommended by CLP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7F-08391</td>
<td>Great Lakes Agricultural services &amp; market</td>
<td>None of the 3</td>
<td>Domain SC</td>
<td>Great Lakes</td>
<td>Non-Gov.Org.Int ernat./Foreign</td>
<td>01/08/2012</td>
<td>31/08/2016</td>
<td>Zero under the codes</td>
<td>Zero under the codes</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Recommended by CLP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7F-08418.02</td>
<td>SME Development in Ailai/chon Alai</td>
<td>Agricultural services &amp; market</td>
<td>DOMAIN CEE</td>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>Swiss Non-profit Organisations</td>
<td>01/05/2014</td>
<td>31/05/2018</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>952,118</td>
<td>y</td>
<td>Recommended by CLP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex C  Bibliography and people consulted

C1 Bibliography

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5) Economic Empowerment of the Poorest (EEP): Annual Review 2014

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C2 Annotated bibliography

#1 External evaluation of project 7F-08348.01.03 “Market Access for the Rural Poor Through Value Chain Promotion (MARP)” : a mid-term evaluation, 2015 Vietnam

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation questions</th>
<th>Main findings from the evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **1 Relevance**      | • Poor diagnostics and limited market assessments leading to poor choice in value chains and markets channels. (e.g., the cinnamon value chain)  
  “Do they successfully address the specific constraints of the individual value chains in which they operate? And how? As indicated in the report, NGOs are best skilled at addressing up-stream related constraints, bringing in their expertise, methodologies, and tools as global experienced organizations. Their approach to the downstream, private sector interface is more questionable as it is not these NGO’s core area of expertise.”  
  • Partner choice too narrow?  
  “Have the MARP projects identified, selected and worked with partners and target groups that could deliver the outcomes and impact expected? The evaluators observe that effective partnerships linkages have been set up upstream the value chain. Linkages with downstream to facilitate market access have only been established partially and need to be reinforced in order to secure better value capture by the rural poor.” |
| **2 Coherence**      | • Limited attempt to explore synergies, sharing of lessons learn, and in turn scale/replication.  
  “The SDC management team has very limited resource to oversee, lead and drive, and provide strategic guidance to the work of individual NGOs. As a result, progress is only as good as the individual capacity and contribution of each NGO to MARP. It assumes that MARP outputs, outcomes, and ultimate impact stems from the sum of the four NGO projects. Yet the question is raised about maximizing synergies and learning across the different projects, for the overall benefit of MARP and its ultimate beneficiaries. Also, there is no system in place to extract positive gains yielded from |
individual projects in view of having a best practice model that can be disseminated at national/regional level beyond the lifetime of MARP (re. expected outcome 2 of MARP)."

- Limited interaction with other projects, NGOs, and donor organisations.

“MARP and other ODA programme synergies The evaluators observe a lack of understanding across the board (programme and project level) of what other ODA initiatives have or can contribute in terms of synergies to the projects (e.g., FAO, or CBI on lung bamboos). In the absence of a clear mapping of relevant ODA interventions, projects tend to work in isolation and lose the potential benefit of leveraging other funds and technical support to enhance MARP programme impact.”

- Vague links to other Swiss funded initiatives

“More specifically regarding Swiss funded initiatives, close contacts should be established with SECO’s other programmes.”

### 3 Effectiveness, Impact

"In general, all four NGO projects apply similar methodologies and tools. The midterm evaluation confirms that overall, the four project components of MARP conducted by Helvetas, Oxfam, SNV and Vietcraft have delivered according to plan, related to upstream activities in the programme (organizing the supply readiness). Such results already show tangible benefits in terms of cash gains for the poor farmers. Also, most projects have achieved quite remarkable results in terms of organization and productivity improvement up-stream that set a solid base for the sustainability beyond MARP. Quality improvements are less consistent across sectors."

Some hard facts (see Appendix 4 for more details, with abstracts from the 2014 MARP activity report). As of end-2014, MARP had successfully reached 16,734 household beneficiaries in the 8 provinces. This is 2.2% higher than the overall MARP target (16,420). 97% are ethnic minorities from 9 different groups. One third of the beneficiaries are women. The number of poor was estimated at 37% of the total number of households reached. The eight MARP value chains helped improve income of 10,611 Households, which accounts for 65% of the total targeted by the end of MARP. Income increased 20% for hemp and silk, and almost doubled for tea and bamboo.”

“Delivery against “Market Access” is lagging behind. This is a common weakness across the four MARP projects. No solid strategies and plans are in place to secure lasting and value creating market access. None of the project have adopted a market-based value chain approach. That means, identifying opportunities in the market and ways to develop value creating, lasting business propositions. Most of the market linkages established to date are at the interface between farmers and the immediate next private sector “chain linkage”: collectors/local traders, local processors. In general, poor farmer have no visibility, nor understanding where their products are being marketed, at what price, who is out there competing with them, etc. Another critical issue is “Market Dependence”: sole dependence on one market (e.g. China) or very few traders/exporters (e.g., bamboo, tea).

Enhancing the quality for sustainable cooperation (sustainable contracts with the private sector) is key for spices, rattan, and ethnic textiles. Bamboo and tea need to maintain the commitment in the relationship between farmers and processors to improve capacity and aim higher profitability.”

“Most of the outputs delivered to date address upstream supply side related results and show remarkable achievements. Productive capacity improvements at rural poor community level are there and can be measured in terms of incremental financial gains already obtained.”

“What are key gaps between the current status of the project in terms of delivery and results, versus the project’s expected outcomes? The evaluators have flagged the limits of the NGOs' capacity to deliver the market access component part.”

### 4 Efficiency

“The programme adopts a decentralized management approach. It is very cost effective and ensures that the maximum amount of funds be allocated to
implementing partner NGOs. SDC has a small team in place, including a Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) position to measure progress against deliverables and plans."

“How efficient is the management of the project (accountability and cost effectiveness)? These elements are monitored closely through MARP’s the M&E dedicated resource. The evaluators confirm that the project components are for the most part efficiently managed.”

5 Sustainability

“The evaluators were informed that the performance of MARP projects to date towards achieving their outcomes and objectives varied across the portfolio. Sustaining the results was said to be a common key challenge to all projects. Emphasis to date has been placed on the production side rather than developing and sustaining market linkages in downstream value chains. Among others related to strategic market development, business development services and business-enabling environment. Subsequently, all MARP partners had agreed and supported the need for a strategic review of the four projects at mid-term, that would (1) contribute to more efficiently achieve the expected results by mid-2016, and (2) provide direction for the sustainability of such results beyond the programme lifetime.”

Other

• Mixed approaches to MSD with focus on upstream producers and supply, rather than the market system and the demand side. “The evaluators observe that the four projects apply similar traditional value chain approaches. These approaches are not really market driven. They tend to look at optimizing individual elements in the chain, rather than taking a holistic view to optimizing value extraction across all components of the value chain for the benefit of the poor. No analysis have been conducted to date to understand where the value is in each component of the value chain and how poor communities can capture a higher value from the value chain, they are involved in.”
• NGOs (i.e., the implementing organisations) focus on Supply Chain Readiness “More generally, NGOs involved in MARP programme focus on enhancing value at farm level. Limited efforts are made to protect the value created using certification schemes, branding and other intellectual property enhancers. The evaluators observe a general confusion as to the awareness and knowledge, what such tools can do to enhance and protect value: branding is a concept that is misunderstood, the use of certification marks (organic, origin, Rainforest and other schemes) as strategic tools for value protection very poor.”
• A weakness of the market approaches “Is there a clear understanding of the market system and dynamics in which these projects operate? If not, how can a more market driven approach be adopted for the remaining phases of the programme? The evaluators have noted the weakness of the market approaches, across the board, and recommended an ancillary programme to be set up in 2015-2016 to make up for this important success factor.”

#2 Evaluación externa final del programa PYMERURAL Honduras y Nicaragua, April 2015 (pp41)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation questions</th>
<th>Main findings from the evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1 Relevance          | • The project was based in agriculture but combined value chains, M4P and Local economic development together (i1.4)  
|                      | • Many of the recommendations centre around developing lessons learnt and disseminating the success of the approach (it seems that dissemination is a weak point of projects) (i1.1)  
|                      | • One of the recommendations for improvement was the more explicit involvement of youth (i1.2-1.4)  
|                      | • Women were targeted (e.g., through the choice of value chains that included donuts and baking products) and their involvement reported on by the results framework – poverty reduction was one of the stated objectives and was integrated in the M&E system (i.1.2)  |
- The project aimed at influencing rules and functions including the overall legal and regulatory framework – it followed the MSD approach and theory of change (BEAM etc) (i1.4)

**2 Coherence**

- The evaluation argues that it is possible to detect tension between funding a Swiss NGO to carry out the tasks or funding government and/or national organisations to do so – both for ownership and continuity

**3 Effectiveness, Impact**

- There is a list of achievements including impacts on the following webpage of Swisscontact - it has a mountain of evidence overall and per value change – what is not always clear is how it compares to what was planned – the implication of the evaluation is that it is close and exceeds in some respects. [https://www.swisscontact.org/fileadmin/user_upload/HEAD_OFFICE/Documents/Divers/Resultados_pymerural.pdf](https://www.swisscontact.org/fileadmin/user_upload/HEAD_OFFICE/Documents/Divers/Resultados_pymerural.pdf)

Just as an example (there are many) -the increase in sales of vegetables is stated by one local organisation as tripling. (p10 of the above reference).

- The evaluation indicates that in just about all areas the project exceeded the target of the indicators sometimes by 200% which indicate that the results framework was too pessimistic or set too low.

- One of the reasons for both outcome and impact success was the engagement at the local and sub-national level which was found more agile and effective than working only at the central level - the project also engaged with universities which was found useful for promoting innovation (i3.1/2)

- The issue of the trade-off in interests between producers and intermediaries is noted (intermediaries it is argued were gaining when producers were less organised) and led in Honduras to more effort on the producer participation in the project. (3.2)

- Women were targeted and reached over 50% of the diplomas awarded were to women arising from the targeting of women headed businesses (i3.2)

- Another reason was the engagement between the private and public sectors and the facilitation of agreements in commercialisation between private sector organisations and the government regulatory bodies. (i3.3.)

- The evaluation concludes given the context in Honduras and Nicaragua that the project has led to systemic changes (legal framework, cooperation between actors and levels of government, knowledge of actors both public and private – the conclusion is that the project i) connected different actors in the value changes and ii) empowered them with knowledge and demonstration of the win-win approach

**4 Efficiency**

- The project took place over 12 years in several phases – this allowed various approaches to be tested and adjusted. It also allowed the development of a robust M&E system compliant with DCED which is praised by the evaluation (i1.5 &i4.1)

- A highly professional and dedicated approach by the project is noted as is the skill level displayed to carry out the facilitator role – it is also noteworthy that the market and diagnostic studies were of a high quality and swiftly done and singled out as one of the main contributions of the project by local actors(p15) (i4.1)

- The evaluation notes that the complexity of the project made it difficult to judge the efficiency – it was noted that given the facilitating nature of the intervention the overhead/ support costs were high 50-60% of the total project costs. The evaluation noted that the approach of the project was efficient and productive and well managed therefore likely to have used the funds efficiently. Another indicator was that the local co-financing was high (between 30-50%)

- The project worked out a cost benefit ratio of 1:2.45 and cost per FTE job of CHF765 and for every 0.63CHF invested 1 CHF of income was received by the SMEs – the evaluation could not confirm but found the figures plausible.

- The evaluation found the that joining the two projects in two countries led to efficiencies of scale and knowledge transfer

**5 Sustainability**

- There is an indication that much as many results were achieved there was a missing knowledge hub function which was previously held by the project (and perhaps even institutional set up left by the withdrawal of the project organisation and the Swiss NGO) – although local organisations within each value chain were involved e.g. a organisation for quality labelling of fruit and
vegetables product (Funder) were engaged in the project and supported to
develop a labelling system for quality produce especially Cacao (i5.3)
• It seems that evaluation points to sustainability of the committees and
organisations set up across the value chains still need to be tested – the
evaluation concludes that it was not possible to state if the various organisations
in Honduras were likely to continue or would need to be supported by another
international project (p25) – some aspects such as the diagnostics and the
agreements on commercialisation and transfer of technology (e.g. bee keeping,
eco furnaces, irrigation systems) and the huge amount of dissemination and
publications will have good prospects of delivering benefits (over 0.5m
downloads were carried out by the time of the evaluation)– there has also been
a demonstration effect that is of value
• Government cuts in the Honduras agricultural budget in 2004 led to the loss of
key staff in promoting the value chains
• The evaluation notes that environmental aspects were given prominence in the
training provided and guidelines given. Agro-ecological aspects were
considered through a diagnostic observation that the market for organic produce
was not well served –the project thus worked with a company: Alimentos Sanos
Orgánicos de Productores de Lepaterique (ASOPROL), which sells organic
produce to WalMart.(i5.2)

Other

#3 Review of the Rural Economic Development programme for the Southern Regions of
Georgia [RED]: final report, 2014 (pp37)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation questions</th>
<th>Main findings from the evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1 Relevance          | In this case the project focussed on developing demonstration models instead of
                      | focussing on drivers of the value chain - a wider set of actors needed to be
                      | engaged with as well as framework conditions (e.g., access to electricity) and
                      | less reliance on grants that could be replicated (i1.4) |
|                      | The agribusiness finance was not found to follow the MSD principles with a risk
                      | of undermining sound financial practice (i.1.4) |
| 2 Coherence          | The CNFA and NIRAS websites list the concrete outputs and outcomes in terms
                      | of investment crowded in, training, income and productivity increases (they
                      | results are not entirely consistent in presentation but broadly in line) |
|                      | The evaluation (2014) reports that the diary and potato value chains
                      | demonstrate positive outcomes but that the component on agribusiness finance
                      | is not disbursing and has issues on sustainability (i.3.1/3) |
|                      | The review recommends to change the project role from implementor to
                      | facilitator (i.3.3) |
|                      | The M&E system was not robust enough to verify data on results (i.3.1) |
|                      | The model farm approach has tended to assist some farms with substantial
                      | grants and it is not clear if they would have the required demonstration approach
                      | in the absence of the grants (i3.3) |
| 3 Effectiveness, Impact | An improved project management that is highly demanding on facilitation skills
                      | is demanded by the project and the value chain approach (i.4.3) |
|                      | The project tends to set up temporary structures for support and not rely to
                      | permanent local structures (i.4.3) |
| 4 Efficiency         | The review recommends to change the project role from implementor to
                      | facilitator – mainly to ensure that the value chain innovations can be sustained
                      | locally by organisations that have a permanent presence and incentives (i.5.3) |
|                      | A sustainable exit was not planned for as part of the project (i.5.3) |
|                      | It is noted that while not EIAs have been undertaken the project is actively
                      | helping to improve soil quality and reduce erosion (crop rotation, soil
                      | preparation, sprinkler irrigation) and also improved the treatment of effluent from
                      | dairies. (p18) (i5.2) |
| Other                |                                  |

### #4External review mission Livelihood Program Hindukush (LPH)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation questions</th>
<th>Main findings from the evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1 Relevance</strong></td>
<td>On value chains, the NGO service providers do not have the experience to take on the capacity building in production and marketing, although some on-farm value chains are relatively more successful.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2 Coherence</strong></td>
<td>On gender as a cross-cutting theme, the project has successfully intervened in the area of water, education, and social mobilization.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **3 Effectiveness, Impact** | • The evaluation notes that at national level the project was not able to fully coordinate with another Swiss funded project (PROSEDER) and it appears a duplication of efforts between the two projects (p137) (i2.2)  
• The project was well aligned with national policies and approaches (and also contributed to them) but it seems that at the operational level they could in some cases have established new organisations (platforms of producer associations and local government) that were not always possible for the public sector to take over later (i2.3)  
• A statistical analysis was carried out by the evaluation (using control groups) it found that there was a 50-60% increase in income of farmers who participated in the project. The evaluation concluded that whilst there had been increase in income and self-employment there had not been an increase in investment or employment (p16) (i3.1/2)  
• The evaluation concludes that the project has “made a substantial change in the lives of farmers living in the area of intervention” and that it was the marginalised that were targeted (p24) (i3.2)  
• Whilst civil society and government were involved it seems there was an absence of private sector actors focussing on commercial markets – the evaluation states that in none of the 7 platforms did SMEs participate it was mainly producer associations and government bodies such as local government – it states for example that “as private actors and companies were not present in the platforms, commercial actions were limited to market studies on Andean tubers” (p17, 125,128) (i3.3)  
• There is statement that the PIC model is being used by GIZ and other agencies and has also influenced a variety of organisations in the way they promote innovation e.g., University of Chuquesa (i3.3/4) |
There were actions both at local and sub-national/national level which are seen as an important contributor to the success (although there is a critique that each operated independently and were not sufficiently connected which was sub-optimal as meso level decisions could not therefore take micro level reality into account as well) – another ingredient was to bring together different actors (like PYME rural project)\(^{3.3/4}\)

The evaluation states that INAF (Instituto Nacional de Innovacion Agropecuaria y Forestal) adopted some of the project approaches to promoting innovation – by making use of similar platforms between government and producer associations and create local networks – however the extent to which this happened varied between departments (provinces) in some such as Cochabamba the project was seen as duplicating the state functions of promotion...So here we have a dilemma of the project developing platforms to deliver its services and sustain them but not always succeeding to dovetail with the national systems ((i3.4)

The evaluation points to PIC influencing the strategic planning and also financial management of producer associations (also making them more donor and government ready) and the adoption of the PIC “field schools” approach in Tarija as unexpected (i3.5)

Another unexpected effect was the high importance of ensuring flexibility so that the project could react at the right season/timely or risk being irrelevant. (i3.5)

### 4 Efficiency

- The project approach has some clear limitations when it comes to sustainability and scaling – although the project has tried hard to overcome these it has not in all places succeeded.
- The evaluation carried a cost benefit analysis based on a swell described methodology. The result was a cost benefit of 2.7 (NPV benefits of 18.7m USD against costs of 6.9mUSD)

### 5 Sustainability

- The project delivered through 7 value chain platforms; the evaluation puts doubt on whether these can be sustained without continuation of project subsidies for transport – resources mobilisation for these platforms is seen as critical (this is similar to the Pymerural project in Honduras/Nicaragua) (i5.1)
- The financial sustainability of the platforms is seen as the weakest part of the project p137, it appears that 2 of the 7 platforms had independent sources of funding (i5.1)
- The monitoring system and perhaps therefore also the learning was run by the project (the platforms mainly accounted for funds) the absence of private sector actors in in the platforms was also seen as a sustainability issue i5.3

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#6 Mid-term review of SDC Bangladesh project Samriddhi: Phase 1 August 2010 to July 2013 AA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation questions</th>
<th>Main findings from the mid-term review</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Relevance</td>
<td>Samriddhi originally called Phase 3 of LEAF project (start 2004). Component 1 (LEAF) applies the Making markets work for the poor (M4P) approach in twelve value chains. Component 2 (SAAKTI) applies a Human and Institutional Development (HID) approach. Only Component 1 falls under MSD in Agriculture and is reviewed below. Samriddhi is relevant. Rural development and poverty alleviation remain crucial challenges in Bangladesh, despite solid GDP growth and countrywide improvements in productivity and crop diversification. The project works in areas where poverty rates are substantially above national averages. The most promising interventions are in component 1 (LEAF) where an innovative approach to extension was developed through a combination of...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

96
commercially motivated LSPs/SPAs and MSEs\textsuperscript{21}. However, other projects are testing other extension approaches; it remains to be proven that the Samriddhi one is indeed superior.

### 2 Coherence

Synergies with other projects need to be expanded and deepened, in particular with the Katalyst extension activities. So far, an insular view prevails (as is the case in most projects that need to achieve their respective targets).

In relation to the overall SDC domain portfolio, the Samriddhi model, if indeed successfully replicated and upscaled, can ideally complement the other major SDC projects and thus improve the overall impact of the SDC portfolio:

- The M4C project is by definition territorial. If implemented successfully, it will provide sustainable solutions to improving livelihood of the char dwellers. But similar interventions might not be as effective or pertinent for similar value chains in the mainland region.
- Katalyst, that exclusively applies the M4P methodology, usually prioritizes growth over inclusion. Therefore, it does not essentially provide keys to solving systemic constraints related to social power, inclusion and local economy.

### 3 Effectiveness, Impact

Samriddhi has been successful in ensuring inclusive economic development by addressing certain systemic constraints, foremost related to weak private and public sector extension services for reaching the last mile, as well as lack of participation of poor, extreme poor and women in economic development and local decision making.

In most of the value chains in which the project intervened, the relationship between the value chain actors, as well as the performance of public and private sector service providers have improved. Furthermore, it has successfully integrated its core institutions and actors, i.e., the LSPs, SPAs, MSEs and MSE networks, with the market. Samriddhi has also ensured that, throughout the process, its interventions are increasingly market driven rather than project driven.

The project is well on its way to meet most of its targets at impact, outcome, and output levels. By December 2011, achievement was 63% of its direct and 77% of the indirect outreach to its overall target of 1,020,000 clients. The number of groups created, and active service providers are substantial: so far, 3300 MSEs and 116 MSE networks exist, as well as 2450 LSPs and 58 SPAs.

Some analytical questions need to be answered fine-tuning the approaches, in particular in relation to MSEs and MSE networks as well as LSPs and SPAs: Why is growth better with indirect clients; performance contrasts between MSE members and non-members; reasons for LSPs not joining SPAs, etc.).

The project has invested substantial efforts and resources and consequently made good progress in including the extreme poor and poor, also by the inclusion of new value chains. Progress is, however, uneven and concentrates in certain value chains. In relation to gender, progress was better with social inclusion than with economic empowerment.

Challenges remain foremost in economic participation of disadvantaged groups and financing of MSEs. These areas naturally should receive particular attention in the remaining phase period.

### 4 Efficiency

The approach is ambitious, targeting both (1) economic growth through M4P, (2) social inclusion through HID and M4P, (3) governance through HID, and (4) Disaster Risk Reduction (again through HID), leading to dissipation of efforts and focus. A single-focus project on growth might have been more effective and yielded wider and deeper, i.e. more systemic, results.

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\textsuperscript{21} LSP: Local Service Provider; SPA: Service Providers' Association; MSE: Micro and Small Enterprise
The efficiency is good; largely because the head office is 'in the field' and not in Dhaka. Efficiency increases are possible if the project withdraws from value chains where systemic change is unlikely as the demand in the market for products is low (jute, crafts).

The Monitoring and Results Measurement (MRM) system is still being developed with substantial room for improvement and simplification with less indicators.

Untapped potential exists to disseminate the project's success stories among the wider development community in Bangladesh; preferably by participating in core seminars, rather than publications.

5 Sustainability
Sustainability of the institutions that were set up under Samriddhi or its predecessor projects is the core challenge, although the prospect looks brighter under Component 1 where the actors and organisations are driven by their own commercial interest.

An Institutional Analysis in the Prodoc identifies ‘who does – who pays’ and ‘who will do – who will pay’ for the different market functions. It is expected that, as the project matures, ownership of activities in the market systems will be handled more by the relevant market actors rather than the project, eventually leading to a complete exit of the project and withdrawal of support.

Transition of ownership cannot yet be assessed by the level of commitment shown by partners through cost or resource sharing alone. It has to be assessed by the mechanisms put in place by the project for complete withdrawal of support.

Exit: The project should now focus on stronger actors and organisation with a real potential to survive in a post-project situation. It is recommended to graduate the older and long supported LSPs, SPAs, and MSEs into independence, rather than continue identifying the weaker ones and further build their capacities.

Other
The project lacks clear strategic guidance of whether to put growth over inclusion or vice versa.

The number of value chains should be reduced.

#7 External review of the project “Market Opportunities for Livelihood Improvement (MOLI) in Kakheti” review report (pp20) 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation questions</th>
<th>Main findings from the evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1 Relevance          | • The evaluation confirms eh relevance of the project and that “The purpose of the project is to enable the livestock market system to function more inclusively for subsistence and semi-subsistence livestock farmers in Kakheti, resulting in improved incomes, wellbeing and resilience to livelihood related disaster risks.” (i3.2./3)  
• The project clearly aims at implementing the M4P through 3 components (production/ marketing/ governance) (i1.4)  
• The evaluation notes that the project co-financed business partners projects which it states was a deviation from the pure M4P approach – a deliberate effort on devising and using selection criteria is made to avoid distorting effects (i1.4)  
• The selection criteria and principles are well thought out: i) competitive selection based on business plan; ii) collective action goals; iii) framework conditions improvement; iv) project in a facilitating role (i1.4) |
| 2 Coherence          |                                  |
### 3. Effectiveness, Impact
- The government and context changed – favourably – with more emphasis on agriculture and food safety – this helped in creation of outcomes from outputs (i3.1)
- Negative effects in the context also played a part due to a drought and local elections (i3.1)
- Some narrative reflection over the outputs/outcomes are noted in the evaluation report separated into production/marketing/governance- detailed indicators are noted in the annex but not used in the evaluation itself so a variance analysis is not made (i3.1)
- Improving governance suffered from the change in local government (3.1)
- It is noted that Gender is difficult for the project and that they have made some attempts but too early to conclude on success (i3.2)

### 4 Efficiency
- The project is complex with many parties (3 NGOs involved – HEKS/HIS/ABCO) which has led to unclear decision making
- The project has adopted a DCED M&E systems so future reporting should be useful

### 5 Sustainability
- It was too early to speculate on the sustainability in general - The production/marketing result are reported quantitatively but points to general improvements although it is noted that the intentions to link with vet services and offer slaughterhouses for small farmers were optimistic in terms of supply of Vets and demand for slaughterhouses from the farmers (i.5.3)
- There was some interventions on disaster risk reduction and especially drought management which turned out to be needed due to the drought – not clear if it actually helped (that should be known by 2015 its states so it might be recorded in later reports – i5.2

### Other
- This is a review for the first phase 2011-2014; subsequent phases were planned – the project was implemented by HEKS/Helvetas
- This report is very early – the results will be more convincingly documented in later report (hopefully)

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation questions</th>
<th>Main findings from the evaluation</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1 Relevance</strong></td>
<td>The project was found relevant for the target group of relatively poor farmers (I.1.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The approach in the 2nd phase has improved with greater attention to facilitation, disaster risk reduction, and higher value fruit chains which is noted as improving the relevance (i.1.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2 Coherence</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3 Effectiveness, Impact</strong></td>
<td>The design of phase 2 was informed by a thorough feasibility study at the end of phase 1 by a M4P specialist (i.31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4 Efficiency</strong></td>
<td>The phases of projects over longer periods of time tends to lead to improvement in project management and efficiency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Measurement of the economic efficiency was not being undertaken</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The demand on project management skills is very high</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>5 Sustainability</strong></td>
<td>The prospects for sustainability are judged as positive with the factors of: i) the M4P approach which as sustainability inbuilt; ii) high education level of farmers; iii) demand local and international; iv) positive trends in the region (i5.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Scaling is limited by the fact that there is not large land remaining in the region (Meghr) i5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other</strong></td>
<td>The review was done just one year into the operational phase of the project (although there were earlier phases) – so the findings are limited more to the design aspects</td>
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<tr>
<td>Evaluation questions</td>
<td>Main findings from the evaluation</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Relevance</td>
<td>It seems that the project has implemented a M4P approach – although there are still many factors that need attention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Coherence</td>
<td>A comprehensive approach was adopted “Around the main line of facilitating the rise of a self-sustainable veterinary service supply, further crucial aspects for building markets are addressed: milk and meat market channels, input supply, capacity building of farming units, local public service improvement”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Effectiveness, Impact</td>
<td>• “Both reported figures as well as the feedbacks from beneficiaries, facilitators and partners confirm that vet services have become available upon demand when needed in the 40 attended villages”</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>• Eight years ago, practically no milk market existed in Syunik; milk was bartered or self-consumed and animal husbandry not considered an economically feasible activity – now it has increased 25% of which half is commercialised (sold on)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Livestock farmers’ cash income has increased by 22% between 2010 and 2012, benefiting almost 3000 families.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The evaluation notes that gender was mainstreamed (e.g., “The project analysed gender aspects in livestock management, observing that women are more involved in milking, processing and sale of dairy products, and made sure that this was considered in training activities” and “the project continued with a special focus on women: it approached community authorities to identify female-headed households which tend to account for the larger part of vulnerable families”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• A factor of success is mentality change of the farmers from passive receivers of external aid to self-interested actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The evaluation notes: “in the case of this Livestock project, the triggering of a market (i.e., demand)-oriented vet and input service system has been shown to work even in a largely unregulated sector (regulations exist but are not applied)”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The project has been going for 8 years which is one of the factors noted for its success – since it takes time to get the approach to work and to adjust to reality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• A set of outcomes are provided in Annex 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Efficiency</td>
<td>The evaluation notes: “The appearance of consistency also stems from competent implementation by a dedicated team.” – the facilitation and capacity building by the project team are singled out as reasons for the success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The staff of the project were well versed in m4P “In our discussions with project staff in Sisian and Goris, we perceived that the M4P’s facilitation approach has been fully assimilated”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Project management guidance in terms of M4P-compatible implementation has been an important factor for the conceptual consistency of the project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• A CBA has not been undertaken</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Sustainability</td>
<td>Vet services are being offered for a fee which indicates good prospects for financial sustainability - the demand for services is increasing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>It is recommended to extend the project to cover a larger area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>This is one of a series of evaluations done by Innovabridge Markus Reichmuth in 2014 and it appears this project is the most successful.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
#10 InovAgro Project Phase 3 Midterm Review Final Report, 2019

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation questions</th>
<th>Main findings from the evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1 Relevance          | • Inovagro has an excellent reputation among other development actors, private sector partners, and farmer groups – partly due to the project’s performance and partly due to its design – i.e., its relevance to the major challenges of agricultural market development in northern Mozambique.  
 |                      | • Played a vital role in building a more robust network of seed distribution and offtake actors in the region.  
 |                      | • Has represented well the SDC’s interests, adapted smartly over time to maintain its relevance as circumstances in its operating have changed  
 |                      | • Will likely serve as a foundation upon which future successful development efforts will be built  
 |                      | • The decision to work with local commodity traders, when many development actors demonstrate a kneejerk aversion to “middlemen,” was particularly smart and unique and contributes strongly to InovAgro’s relevance. |
| 2 Coherence          | No particular findings |
| 3 Effectiveness, Impact | • In most areas, InovAgro is surpassing annual targets or has already surpassed phase targets and will most likely be able to achieve its objectives by the end of 2020.  
 |                      | • Issues with data quality that make the above a qualified judgement pending a deeper review of the project’s data aggregation and attribution strategies.  
 |                      | • Logframe achievements should be viewed in light of questions regarding the sustainability of impacts and the need to test exit strategies (see sustainability).  
 |                      | • InovAgro’s push to extend market outreach for input access and offtake are its strongest features, although the impacts of individual partners are highly variable.  
 |                      | • MTR has some questions about additionality.  
 |                      | • Compared to other MSD projects in similar contexts (thin markets and large volumes of traditional donor assistance), InovAgro will stand out as likely having achieved significant impact where many others have failed.  
 |                      | • A textbook example of good market systems programming in thin markets. |
| 4 Efficiency         | • Very efficient use of funds, i.e., tangible benefits for a large number of people relative to budget size.  
 |                      | • On course to surpass its phase target. |
| 5 Sustainability     | • Exit strategies are still untested. Projects working with successful partners are often surprised when seemingly beneficial behaviours cease with the withdrawal of project support.  
 |                      | • So, while many of InovAgro’s exit strategies are credible on paper, they need to be purposefully tested in the limited time remaining before the project closes. For this reason, it is difficult to judge the question of the sustainability and replicability.  
 |                      | • The above is not a negative judgement but a call for the project to complete its work by testing its exit strategies – the sooner the better. |
| Other                | Recommendations:  
 |                      | • Test exit strategies for its partnerships (e.g., on inputs access, output marketing, financial access, and private seed inspectors) to prove sustainability. E.g., cease any additional support for some actors to examine whether companies take on the full costs of fielding and expanding services. This is pending but crucial and urgent.  
 |                      | • Knowledge capture and external sharing, e.g., case studies. (Some are already done and included in the list of documents)  
 |                      | • Independent review of data collection and quality, including attribution. |
#11 VEEDA Private Sector Development Project for Serbia: external review, final AA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation questions</th>
<th>Main findings from the evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **1 Relevance**      | • The project goal is “Increased income opportunities and quality jobs, particularly for young people and women”.  
• Based on a strong context analysis and using the M4P framework, the project selected three forest-related market systems and designed interventions.  
• Project has a high relevance nationally, locally, as well as in terms of the Swiss Cooperation Strategy for Serbia.  
• Stakeholders and partners unanimously agreed with this assessment. |
| **2 Coherence**      | • Well aligned with national priorities and with the relevant EU Accession and the Swiss cooperation (SDC and SECO) programmes.  
• The project has coordinated with a Danida Fruit and Berry project to avoid overlaps.  
• Other efforts made by the project, SCO and the Ministry of Agriculture to exploit synergies have not borne fruit, for reasons beyond SCO’s and the project’s control. |
| **3 Effectiveness, Impact** | • Very good research and analysis for intervention design; however, did not include adequate target group specific analysis and no interventions were designed specifically for women and youth.  
• Targets for women are low for a project that aims at benefitting them in particular, and there are no meaningful Women’s Economic Empowerment (WEE) indicators in the logframe or MRM – likely a key reason for the quality and depth of change for women not having been addressed.  
• The project does not monitor participation of and benefits to youth (and there are no targets or forecasts) – despite the project goal.  
• The approach to monitoring and evaluation provides a high degree of probability that impact can be attributed to interventions  
• Overall good (but uneven) progress at the level of interventions and outputs (albeit lower than the target in the logframe).  
• Part (61%) of the impact in jobs is due to direct assistance from the project. This is probably not excessive at this stage, but it does indicate the need for facilitation of more systemic change (without direct support).  
• Strong and effective partnerships, with private as well as public sector market actors at the right level. Especially in the NTFP sector it could benefit from collaboration with actors higher up the value chain with greater leverage to effect systemic change. |
| **4 Efficiency**     | • The project is being very well managed, and the team is committed and competent with a good understanding of the M4P approach (though more capacity building in this and other areas is a priority).  
• The project’s role has been in line with M4P practice.  
• The project is likely to be able to make a good case for M4P in Serbia being an appropriate, viable and inexpensive way of reducing unemployment and poverty through private sector development. |
| **5 Sustainability** | • The results are promising to be sustainable, though it is too early to adequately assess if changes will prove to be sustainable and systemic.  
• The potential for reaching scale is good, especially for some market systems. Scale reached compared to potential is still limited.  
• The project does not have detailed and explicit strategies for reaching scale and ensuring change becomes systemic (which are closely related). |
| **Other**            | Lessons learned:  
• M4P as practiced by VEEDA in Serbia is, or is likely to be, an appropriate, viable and cost-efficient way of reducing unemployment and increasing incomes through private sector development.  
• Partnerships with the public sector can play an important role in M4P in Serbia. |
• An M4P project needs from the onset concrete, detailed and explicit strategies to ensure sustainability, scaling up, and systemic change.
• Gender, or more generally, target group specific analysis of market systems is needed to design interventions that will increase their participation and benefits.

#12 Evaluación de efectos del fondo de innovación del programa de servicios de desarrollo económico rural - PROSEDER (Enero 2012 / Junio 2015) : informe final de consultoría

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation questions</th>
<th>Main findings from the evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Relevance</td>
<td>The project has 25% MSD in agriculture coding - it attempts to create a specialised market for insurance products for poorer farmers in relation to climate change 9 (i1.2/4)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The idea was to pilot attempts to gather enough information on the risks and benefits to allow a future establishment of a system of micro-insurance – this information was intended to lead to a systemic change in the market for insurance products(i1.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The approach calls for a catalytic approach but – in many cases and this is one – there is much that is missing and the project has to become an operator as well – this then becomes a demonstration effect approach.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Coherence</td>
<td>The project was aligned to national policies and strategies but the lack of regulatory norms meant that the project was operating on the margins and weak because of that – it was a project of a pilot nature and ahead of the market and context (i2.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Effectiveness, Impact</td>
<td>The idea was to pilot attempts to gather enough information on the risks and benefits to allow a future establishment of a system of micro-insurance – this information was intended to lead to a systemic change in the market for insurance products(i3.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Three scenarios were designed : transfer from NGO to the state; transfer then to the private sector; transfer then through mutualisation to the farmers</td>
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<td>3 insurance products were registered with the state but only one commercialised by the private sector (Wine sector)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The company that commercialised the insurance felt that it needed to be reformulated to better balance costs and benefits and reflect producer needs – they also noted that more financial literacy was needed</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Nearly 900 farmers were reached with insurance cover for 1 to 3 years – in terms of the indicators there was “partial” success but in reality, the private sector was not attracted in this phase – nevertheless a new phase was started to build and learn on the experience</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Some evidence that the experience would help the government in their regulations for micro-insurance – but work on such norms were not done during the project period</td>
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<td>Training on finance happened but was not systematic – but did serve to increase the demand for the insurance products</td>
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<td></td>
<td>The main issue was that the insurance product was not found interesting enough for the market for insurance – although replication did not happen the evaluation report says there is a potential for it to happen in the future</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Gender was considered in the project (needs of female farmers taken into account)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Dissemination was a weak point</td>
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<td></td>
<td>M&amp;E system is not strong enough</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Efficiency</td>
<td>The project was flexible and adjusted its approach during the implementation period</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The approach was highly complex and, in a context, where many changes in mindset were needed on both supply and demand side – the complexity was underestimated</td>
</tr>
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</table>
- The justification of the project would have to lie with the longer term effects and could not be judged within the project period. (note the final report states a CBA above 1 (roses, milk and peach)
- The cooperation with the state entities was slow and was not prioritised by the state

| 5 Sustainability | Like a lot of projects, the vehicle of change (catalyst) was the project itself and in this case also a local NGO (PROFIN) – but the piloting (and project) of course was using resources (human and financial) and therefore not a test of the future situation when the project would not be there. (i5.3)
- (in the final report of the project it is noted that the sustainability score is 2.4/5 using an EU methodology)

Other
- This is an example of a pilot project that found areas that did not work or needed to be changed

**#13 PASDeR 2012 - 2014 : programme d'appui au secteur du développement rural (Wusua Dabu) : mission d'évaluation interne / externe**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation questions</th>
<th>Main findings from the evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1 Relevance          | - The sectors supported are relevant with the exception of yams (where PASDeR cannot make an innovative contribution).
- Support under the supply chain approach (M4P) is relevant. It includes improving access to inputs and equipment, and technical and management advice. The marketing of agricultural products plays an essential role in mobilizing Family Farmers. Supply chain analysis skills are necessary at the social/professional organisations.
- Access to credit is a key element of the storage credit mechanism (loan by placing as collateral their production likely to increase by value).
- The processing of agricultural products, both plant and animal products, is a relevant activity that supports women in generating income.
- The marketing of processed products requires careful attention to prevent women from becoming discouraged. |
| 2 Coherence          | - Coherence with Benin’s agricultural and rural sector development policies and strategies. i.e. with the Strategic Plan for the Revival of the Agricultural Sector (PSRSA) and its two major objectives: (i) Contribute to growth and food security and (ii) Ensure the competitiveness and access of agricultural production and products to markets.
- In line with around fifteen projects / programs supported by various bilateral and multilateral institutions in support of the agricultural and rural sector, targeting in particular improving productivity and access to the market: Specifically, the European Union and German Cooperation, World Bank, FIDA, ADB, SNV among others. |
| 3 Effectiveness, Impact | Progress towards achieving following intermediate outcomes can be seen:
- (i) At least 30% of peasant family farms that are members of a targeted basic organisation in four communes have easier access to adapted and quality services; and
- (ii) In at least 3 value chains, the productivity of peasant family farms increases by at least 10%.
- In terms of physical achievements (dams, storage warehouses, livestock corridors, etc.) the results obtained are convincing.
- The objective of institutional strengthening will probably not be achieved. They seem dependent of the support structures and not yet sufficiently equipped to fully play their roles. |
| 4 Efficiency         | - The evaluation recommends further efficiency analysis to extract more detailed information on this criterium. At the point of the evaluation, it is considered premature to draw final conclusions on this.
- According to the information provided by the support structure, the management costs of the fund amount to around 40 million FCFA seem to be too high: 40 million FCFA to manage 150 million FCFA. |
The evaluation considers positive how the support is being provided and that partial reimbursement is required from target population, which will extend the duration of the fund.

5 Sustainability

- Organisations’ financial autonomy and sustainability in the medium and long term are not guaranteed due to the lack of funding sources’ diversification.
- Technical assistance and training actions are not sustainable due to the fact that the State is the main actor to take over but state puts all priorities on cotton. Supported value chains and crops have not been prioritised by the agricultural council and only receive attention through externally funded projects.

Other

- Gender’s mainstreaming is partially applied in capacity building activities and the constitution of professional organisations’ representative bodies. Women are part of the activities, even if they are not representative in numbers. The six sectors supported by PASDER do not include those in which women operate (market gardening and soybeans in particular). Thus, very few initiatives to promote these sectors in relation to women's groups have been taken.
- The PMU did not work on building the capacities of actors and identifying needs for gender mainstreaming.
- A mechanism for monitoring the implementation of the gender approach and its effects has not been developed.
- It is important to carry out an in-depth gender study to analyse the situation, identify the challenges, issues, and appropriate strategies as well as the potential stakeholders in this component of the program.

#14 InnovaBridge, External Review of SDC’s Program on Rural Market Development in the South Caucasus 2008 – 2012, 2013 (pp29)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation questions</th>
<th>Main findings from the evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Relevance</td>
<td>The evaluation notes “the M4P approach as proposed by Springfield Centre is complex, not easy to understand, to explain, and to apply.” (i1.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The revaluation notes: “a great advance over earlier VC approaches. M4P encompasses both markets and basic services, proposing a multi-functional approach which takes into consideration both private and public functions” (i1.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The evaluation notes that there are virtually no limits on what obstacles the approach can tackle – the issue is the willingness /capacity of government and private sector to engage (i1.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The M4P approach needs contextualisation and it doesn’t get enough of that in this region – so in these post-soviet countries there are special concerns on “de-capitalisation of agriculture”; “fragmentation of land holdings”; out migration of youth and a lack of entrepreneurial spirit among those that remain and a breakdown of agricultural services and extension systems (i1.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Diaspora are a target group that are not fully met (they have excellent export linkages) (i1.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Coherence</td>
<td>The evaluation notes a need to “complement SECO’s and SDC’s portfolio in Azerbaijan more closely”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>None of the countries have a national agriculture policy that promotes means of reducing poverty -this makes it difficult for M4P to function – it might be ahead of the country (i.2.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A point is made that M4P as generic approach has the possibility to ensure harmonisation between donors so they do not work against each other in trying to address market weakness (i2.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TVET projects in Georgia ran alongside and were helpful in solving a constraint on skills p16 (i.2.2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
|                      | The evaluation notes: “The Cooperation Strategy for the regional programme 2008 – 2012 has tried to provide a consistent strategic framework for disperse contexts with partly conflictive relationships between countries, as well as different portfolios of SDC and SECO. The resulting logframe is an overly ambitious, very high level framework characterizing aims pertaining to
states rather than a donor agency. The future strategy should fit the Swiss intervention’s realm and character more closely. It may not need to go as far as formulating a logframe at regional level but rather provide strategic guidelines.” (i2.1/2)

3 Effectiveness, Impact

- The evaluation suggests that the institutional diagnosis phase was often into strong enough and that more policy dialogue is needed than was typically undertaken to create breakthrough progress (i3.1)
- The evaluation notes: “in the public sector, good governance at all levels is paramount and in the private sector, entrepreneurial capacity is the crucial ingredient.” (i3.3)
- It is noted that externally financed projects have a privileged route towards piloting and allowing experiment which the government would otherwise not tolerate (i3.3)
- The report lists some spill over affects e.g., improved vet services reducing costs and improving quality and demand; farmers accessing credit and continuing to create a demand on the financial systems that then response (p10) other examples of scaling effects are given (i34)
- The report notes that 2 out of 3 projects have had an effect on poverty reduction (Syunik, Alliances SJ but not Racha) (i3.2)
- Involving local authorities in the projects has been beneficial (p10.11) (i3.1)
- System building has different time scales depending on the commodity „shorter” (e.g., bee-keeping) and „longer” (e.g. edible oil extraction from grains), „simple” (e.g. fruit sales) and „more complex” VCs (e.g. milk or meat processing) (i3.3)
- It is noted “it is fair to say that the project contributed noticeably to poverty reduction in the Syunik region and helps turning the tide from the long-term downturn in the agriculture of this region caused by transition” (i3.2)
- The evaluation “did not come across aspects which characterized or were caused by the projects or the programme but were evidently not intended” (i3.5)

4 Efficiency

- The evaluation notes that the approach is relevant but its application is challenging and makes high demands on project leadership – more attention needed to ensure the right staff and training and for SDC in its tendering approach (more emphasis on the skills match) (i4.3)
- M4P as a systemic approach takes time to deploy, at least 6 to 8 years. (i4.3)
- Project management is a strong factor in efficiency of the project – so is ensuring strong partnerships with others including local government (i.41)
- Measurement of economic efficiency has been weak – one project from 2008-2013 had a CBA of 0.8 lower than 1 but still considered positive given that is continuing and has non-monetised benefits (i.4.2)

5 Sustainability

- Sustainability of grants for collectively owned or managed machinery (which was too expensive for any one farmer to own) was an issue (i5.1)
- Sustainability is built into the M4P intervention logic but depends on it working

Other

- The evaluation looks a range of projects in several countries – including some which have later been evaluated/ reviewed and which are in our sample - 2014

#15 Study of SDC Direct/Indirect Beneficiaries in Rural Georgia and Armenia,2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation questions</th>
<th>Main findings from the evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Relevance</td>
<td>The study notes that 64% of the farmers in the target regions in Georgia and 81% of those in Armenia intend to continue farming; given that the project(s) have had significant benefits, it is concluded that the project has been supporting a primary coping strategy for farmers and the rural population. Interestingly, the study concludes that for Georgia, but not Armenia, it is the better educated/resourced individuals that have the commitment to engage in farming and the higher value activities such as dairy farming. This opens up an interesting</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
area of consideration that this MSD in agriculture evaluation could consider, about
the target group and the influence of the MSD in agriculture on rural aspirations
and also rural to urban migration. To what extent does the approach address the
different needs/opportunities for livelihoods and commercialisation of agriculture.

A distinction is drawn between the farmers and the value chain “drivers” where it
would seem the projects are more relevant for or at least more appreciated by the
value chain drivers.

2 Coherence
No particular findings

3 Effectiveness, Impact
- It would appear that in Georgia the interventions were supporting a
  commercialisation of agriculture and attracting talent to both farming and
  higher value chain activities
- Value chain drivers were dependent on establishing networks of producers
  and provided various incentives (pre-payment, advice)
- Contract farming was viewed as an advanced model that needed greater
  trust and a more reliable consumer market.
- Especially in Armenia it was found that a significant constraint was the desire
to operate as independent small holders and not form larger corporations or
enterprises that required trust outside the family
- Informal, verbal agreements were preferred – “contract signing and formal
  imposition of liabilities incited negative attitudes”
- Capacity development and change in market behaviour was easier among
  younger farmers
- An increasing level of income is associated with a desire to remain in
  agriculture and not migrate

4 Efficiency
- The study was a very specific review of the attitudes and value systems of
  the farmers and value chain drivers; it illustrates an investment in lesson
  learning and adaptable management.

5 Sustainability
- The current practices even if not highly efficient were considered sustainable
  – a key factor was reliable production at the small-holder level and
  adherence to raising standards
- Repeat business with the same partners over years was a key factor in
  building up the trust necessary to get the value chain working better

Other
This is an extensive study of beneficiaries, using a control sample, from a range
of SDC projects in Georgia and Armenia employing the MSD in agriculture
approach. It provides solid evidence on the relevance of SDC MSD in agriculture
related interventions under SDC’s South Caucasus Strategy; four regions in
Georgia and two regions in Armenia are covered. These beneficiaries included
are both (1) farmers and (2) value chain drivers, defined as enterprises (e.g.,
cheese processing plant, slaughterhouse, input supplier, dry fruit producer, etc.)
that received a direct benefit from one of the SDC-funded projects

#16 Internal review, increasing market employability, July 2017 Macedonia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation questions</th>
<th>Main findings from the evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1 Relevance          | • Private sector is considered crucial for employment and income (i1.2)
                      | • There is a sense of “pseudo” private sector where the implementing partners
                      | pretend to get involved in the private sector but without any skin in the gam (1.4)
                      | • Farmers dependent on successful harvests are risk adverse and
                      | conservative and rooted in cultural traditions – new approaches such as
                      | working with risk taking farmers are needed (perhaps with underwriting of
                      | losses) (i1.2) |
| 2 Coherence          | • “IME has been designed to be in line with the priorities and policies of the
                      | Government of Macedonia (cf. Prodoc p.5f). IME and its sectors are
                      | furthermore fully in line with the priorities of the Swiss Government for
                      | Macedonia (also the swiss cooperation strategy for Macedonia 2013-16 and
                      | 2017-2020) (i2.1) |
• Employment and income considered crucial areas for the country and for SDC support (i2.3)
• Opportunities for coherence are recognised but not it seems pursued “Opportunities exist also, where other projects with a systemic approach can complement IME’s work. This is the case with the SECO financed Swiss Entrepreneurship Programme (Swiss EP), focusing on supporting the ecosystem for start-ups, and the Swiss Import Promotion Programme (SIPPO), addressing the institutions which promote exports. Also, the new SDC financed project Vocational Skills Development and initiatives for access to finance may provide such an opportunity if prudent labour market measures are inbuilt there and a good coordination with IME can be established. “p16 (i2.2)

3 Effectiveness, Impact

• Organic agriculture sector at one stage was declining but the political support has increased and this has helped as government is providing financial support/ awareness raising for farmers (i3.1)
• Difficult to reach youth in farming as the farms are controlled by the older generation – it seems to be concluded that the goal of involving youth in agriculture is not likely to succeed (they are voting with their feet)(3.2)
• Targets were over optimistic – and especially in the time scale ..it notes that 10-12 years are needed(i 3.1)
• Skills training from non-formal to formal training and education is important (i3.1)
• The room for experimentation is limited as those that participate lose out if it fails (i3.5)
• A DCED pre-audit was done in June 2016 – the M&E system was noted as robust (even to some extent on job creation)

4 Efficiency

• Greater flexibility is required in the planning and log frame to allow response to opportunities (i4.1)
• The project chose a wide spectrum of market systems (9) in total in order to respond to high employment targets set – but the trade-off is complexity and in general it was found to have a negative effect (i4.3)
• Agriculture MSD tends to have a lot of partners (i4.3)
• A lot of investment was made during the inception phase on capacity development of the IME team for MSD (i4.3)

5 Sustainability

• Sustainability is built into the approach – (observation of EBN a strong belief that sometime becomes an untested (even invalid) assumption. (I5.1)
• A main threat is changes in policy, political environment, international markets and where markets are strongly distorted (including from other donors) p17 i5.1

Other

Started with an inception phase 2014 – the review notes that it applies the MSD with the aim of increasing income and employment – food processing and organic agriculture are included as a minor part of a large set of IT/ energy/furniture/tourism sectors

#17 Bai Ala Small business and income creation phase 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation questions</th>
<th>Main findings from the evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Relevance</td>
<td>A secondary relevance was to empower women economically and draw youth into employment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The districts are among the poorest in the region and subject to labour out migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The focus was on production – only cashmere was sold out of the region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Coherence</td>
<td>The project also has regional stability and de-radicalisation / prevention aims or at least effects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Attempts made to work with the Ministry of Finance and also other donors e.g., USAID/ FAO/ IFAD -donors of other projects are involved in the steering board – however for the IFAD project this, although generally good for synergy and harmonisation, was not perfect and subsidy policy of different projects are different (e.g., on fertilizer subsidy) leading to an undermining of the MSD approach</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3 Effectiveness, Impact

- Providing diagnostic studies was a big benefit of the project and the evaluation recommends that more should be disseminated.
- No CBA provided but there is some data but not clear from that what the economic impact is – but it does seem that only 58% of the costs were balanced by income.
- M&E was not sharp enough to measure the impacts or to know if adjustments were needed in the approach (counterfactual was weak).
- Support to women operated business was found to be effective and mentors were set up that continued it seems independent of the project.
- Conflict resolution in long outstanding conflict on grazing rights in Sary-Tash was resolved with contribution by the project.

4 Efficiency

- The project team was found complex but nevertheless it functioned well – a strong demand on project leadership.
- Ambition level was very high and had to be scaled down (e.g., on tractor mechanisation).
- Out migration is a factor that impacts negatively on women.

5 Sustainability

- When the project stops how does the extension advice continue? Hence the need to engage with the VET service.
- The key point is to facilitate rather than be an actor in the process – but by providing subsidies this approach was compromised giving rise to sustainability concerns (subsidy for payment of Angus Aberdeen bulls and transport to OSH).
- Existing associations (water user associations, pasture user committees, rayon associations of private Vets) are all important for the longer term sustainability.

Other

See interview with Richard Chenevard

#18 RLDP M4P approach (Making Market Work for the Poor)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation questions</th>
<th>Main findings from the evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Relevance</td>
<td>During 2008-2011 RLDP engaged in the M4P (Market for Poor) approach. Over 80,000 households benefited from RLDP interventions operated in 5 sectors (cotton, dairy, poultry, rice and sunflower). Women constituted 33% of the direct beneficiaries. The income of the producers increased with a rate of around 10% a year. Across the supported sectors a 41% increase in employment by rural SMEs was achieved. Overall RLDC was on track regarding targets and performance, while less significant results regarding crosscutting issues, namely gender were achieved. Last phase 2012-16 (2015).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2 Coherence

3 Effectiveness, Impact

4 Efficiency

5 Sustainability

Other

#19 External review of livestock development June2019 (pp67)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation questions</th>
<th>Main findings from the evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1 Relevance          | • rationale for both projects are based on addressing rural poverty and weak economic growth and development in rural areas (1.2)  
• A pro-poor focus for the Southern project on new farmers in an expansion phase (1.2)  
• Focussing on farmers and farm level interventions appears more pro-poor than on higher up in the value chain with processors and intermediaries – a trickle up or trickle down approach difference (i.1.2) |

2 Coherence

3 Effectiveness, Impact

4 Efficiency

5 Sustainability

Other
• The value chain in cattle was well chosen as it central to the socio-economic development of the region (1.3)
• Both projects also explicitly adopt and apply a MSD approach – articulated in both projects as M4P (i1.4)

| 2 Coherence | The project has worked with ADA (co-financer) and also GIZ (pasture management) – it has also worked with other donors EU as well as GEF, GIZ, USAID and other s
|            | “The Northern project has also benefitted from recently established Government support activities to low interest agricultural and Processing loans. This has allowed the project to rapidly launch its work with processors and lead farmers”
|            | The Project team has revised the strategy of interventions under “Strengthened capacities of local self-governance bodies to support rural economic development” outcome to address a country-wide community enlargement reform implemented by GoA and donor funded Programs (including “Improvement of the Local Self Governance System” Program funded by SDC), which contributes to mentioned reform (p49 many examples of cooperation with other projects)

| 3 Effectiveness, Impact | The northern project focussed more on lead farmers and processors than the Southern project (interestingly this led to more grant financing in the North to processors and lead farmers) (i3.2)
|                        | The higher formality of the diary market compared to the meat market has led to better M4P results in diary – easier not to become a market player (i3.3)
|                        | M&E data does not allow to see if the poor have benefitted
|                        | Southern project exceeded its impact indicators – particularly impressive is the new number of vet points (from 22 to 49 and with 90% usage by farmers) (i3.1)
|                        | Southern project financial access progress was limited (i3.1)
|                        | Northern project only 3 years – a very short time for a M4P project – very ambitious aims in the time frame allowed (i3.3)
|                        | “Nevertheless, replication has not been a focus for the project and there is a weaker potential for the services to replicate without activities or supporting services that promote replication”. -- “The diversification, growth and replication of benefits and service provision would be enhanced if additional emphasis was placed on developing supporting services that are within the market (for example advisory/training/consulting and possibly export support services for processors and consulting advisory on pasture management) rather than these services being delivered purely under the project.” (i3.4)
|                        | Local governance is important for example in management of grazing rights (i3.3)
|                        | Some gender measures (e.g., softer loans 50% discount for vulnerable female headed households)

| 4 Efficiency | Project team considered highly competent also in their relationships with government and local communities (i.4.3)

| 5 Sustainability | Southern project - Sustainability was assessed at 3 levels 1) Services/benefits created by the project being sustained 2) These services/benefits diversifying and growing and 3) Services replicated by new non-direct project beneficiaries – part 3 is the weakest – for the Northern project the short time frame is a key factor threatening sustainability – see p34 for an analysis

| Other | the focus on milk tends to concentrate risk for the farmers - Downturns in milk prices can have a rapid effect on farmer investment and therefore impact on the project – diversifying incomes is also needed
|       | Impact on rural migration is noted (p32)
### Evaluation questions

**Main findings from the evaluation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation questions</th>
<th>1 Relevance</th>
<th>2 Coherence</th>
<th>3 Effectiveness, Impact</th>
<th>4 Efficiency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Women economic empowerment is one of three components (i1.2)</td>
<td>• The food processing part has worked with bulking facilities established by former projects (i2.3)</td>
<td>• The project is judged likely to achieve its impacts on jobs and income (i3.2)</td>
<td>• High unit costs in the Women economic empowerment component (i4.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• A special component on PSD/SME was made to improve (i) strategic articulation and advocacy skills of SMEs, as well as (ii) their internal organisation.(i1.4)</td>
<td>• “Food Processing is a rather maturing sector in Kosovo, which has received and continues to receive substantial support from projects, as well as from large government subsidy schemes. Consequently, the objective to achieve systemic change is more difficult for a project in a crowded and somewhat distorted market.&quot; I2.4 p11</td>
<td>• Food processing is noted as showing the potential for scale (aggregation and bulking) - especially on contract farming and introduction of industrial varieties (i3.4)</td>
<td>• M&amp;E is weak, targets are not set, and reporting is incomplete (i4.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• No success on linking small producers (only large) (i3.2)</td>
<td>• The work on Women economic empowerment was too scattered to have effect and the right entry points were not found – not enough diagnostic study was done (i3.2)</td>
<td>• Project management is not experienced enough on “private sector and business orientation” (i4.3) &quot;However, there were also occasions where the team demonstrated insufficient knowledge of the sector and some of its players, so it remains unclear if all promising options for partnerships have been exhausted.&quot; p26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• The evaluation suggests that the targets are set too low (i3.1)</td>
<td>• The project is trying through the PSD component to address systemic issues to address power balance between supermarkets and producers (interventions for drafting the Law on Late Payments and the Internal Trade Law)p11, p18 also notes that the real problem is implementation of laws</td>
<td>• PPSE team has shown that it can apply the MSD approach successfully, but there is space for more pro-activeness, flexibility, risk taking and opportunities’ grabbing. (i4.1/3) - The learning cycle from intervention-to-intervention (try – discard – scale up) is still insufficiently rooted in the project.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• The project is trying through the PSD component to address systemic issues to address power balance between supermarkets and producers (interventions for drafting the Law on Late Payments and the Internal Trade Law)p11, p18 also notes that the real problem is implementation of laws</td>
<td>• “While these interventions (new cutting machines and MAP) can certainly be judged as successful in their own right, the envisaged systemic change is faint”. It seems the scaling is based on copying BUT that needs subsidy!! p10</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• A matching grant fund (30% subsidy) was established aimed at innovations – 7 projects within food processing approved (i5.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• “The project also co-financed a cutting machine that allows the company to export products of higher quality” - for the Medicinal and Aromatic Plants.” P10(i5.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Applies the MSD approach (food processing/ tourism)</td>
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**#20 7F-08467.02 External review Promoting Private Sector Employment, PPSE, Kosovo, February 2017 (pp42)**

**#21 7F-08310 Independent review of Risi Albania Phase 1, May 2016, (pp68): Independent review of phase 2 September 2020 (pp64)**
### 3 Effectiveness, Impact
- It is too early to judge (phase 1) – results are going to take time to show systemic change – in phase 2 it improved: “The project’s interventions have overall resulted in, or have good potential for, systemic change (sustainable change at scale)”.
- The project’s goal is that 50 percent of its beneficiaries (new jobs created and youth finding jobs) are women. All signs are that this will be achieved, which is commendable. (phase 1)
- Phase 2 - For each of the impact indicators the target for the share of women is 50%. This has been achieved for new positions and matching (54% and 48% respectively) but not for training (41%). For inclusion of disadvantaged groups, the project is on track to achieve its targets. These positive achievements are due to a good choice of sectors, some GSI overt interventions, a significant measure of mainstreaming, and appointment of a GSI Lead.

### 4 Efficiency
- “A more critical approach to design and reviews, and the more consistent use of business models (developing clear written models that describe the new practice, with expected payment and benefit flows and a cost benefit analysis for all interventions, before potential partners are approached)”
- The project is overall well set up for the remainder of this phase, with capable management and staff and appropriate procedures. Weaknesses include highly insufficient allocation of staff and financial resources to the Monitoring and Results Measurement (MRM) system, which has resulted in the system not yet having been completed.
- The project setup is effective. The team and its management are competent and much appreciated by partners. The Monitoring and Results Measurement system is excellent but could benefit from integration of GSI.

### 5 Sustainability
- High project subsidy (>50%) due to donor competition
- Phase 2 - sustainability still too early to conclude on “In nearly all cases, though, either full sustainability or scale, or both, still have to be realised. This is partly due to the maturity of some interventions and to the pandemic, which has put on hold investment decisions, delayed implementation, and affected tourism in particular.”
- Progress has been good in the agribusiness sector, with interventions to increase access to international markets through certification and value chain development in the fruit and fresh vegetables and the Medicinal and Aromatic Plants (MAPs) subsectors, of which the results are sustainable. Full systemic change could be achieved in Phase 2 or early in Phase 3.

### Other
Aimed at youth employment and “applies the MSD approach” - aims at systemic change in the food processing, tourism, and ICT sectors, + systemic change in the labour market,
The fruit and vegetables component seems to be one of the strongest performers
Lesson learnt:
“It pays to follow good MSD practice: interventions based on research and sector strategies, implemented with appropriate partners, on the basis of business plans, with a level of cost (risk)-sharing below 50% that does not cover operational expenses. Such a solid approach does not have to result in a counterproductive avoidance of risk or innovation.”
## Evaluation questions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation questions</th>
<th>Main findings from the evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Relevance</td>
<td>• Considered highly relevant especially given the high unemployment of youth (at 38.8%) and MM selection of sectors is relevant considering the labour market data</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 2 Coherence          | • Synergies with the main employment projects funded by other donors also remain to be actively explored. This is planned…but presumably not yet done  
• The Embassy has made significant efforts to facilitate more collaboration and synergies between the Economy and Employment Domain, including at a more strategic level. This has been useful in stimulating exchange of information, achieving better mutual understanding and some ad hoc cooperation. More synergies at the strategic level have, however, not been realised. Projects are focussed on their own delivery targets and without cooperation being included among these and accountability mechanism is lacking. |
| 3 Effectiveness, Impact | • A special effort on Gender and Social Inclusion (GESI) – as it was a third outcome (women more excluded from the market than men)...but it was noted that “Gender Equality and Social Inclusion: This was originally intended to be a transversal theme, which would have encouraged mainstreaming without excluding targeted interventions. GESI being put under a separate outcome, and there being sectoral targets for women in the IT sector only, have resulted in a lack of effective mainstreaming.”  
• Progress on achieving systemic change is modest. It has been affected by a late effective start of the project, the Covid-19 crisis, and delays or failures with partners. A few of the interventions’ partners and co-facilitators were not well-placed or had no partners at all, though partnership selection has improved over the past 18 months.  
• System change among IT student education  
• creating in-company childcare services, with IT and BPO firms, depending on successful advocacy for the abolishment of a law that taxes such services. |
| 4 Efficiency         | • MM has attempted to speed up implementation overall by phasing out or pausing interventions with little scope for impact and by making more use of consultants who on a temporary basis support implementation of the partnership agreements.  
• The implementing consortium of Helvetas/Kolektiv functions well, with the partners contributing to their respective areas of expertise.  
• The use of the Monitoring and Results Measurement (MRM) system needs to be improved with regard to monitoring of progress on key indicators and use in Strategic Reviews, which should be held twice instead of once a year. |
| 5 Sustainability      | Too early to tell |
| Other                | Little was done within agriculture (food production) within outcome 1: IT, Business Process Outsourcing (BPO), tourism and food production and processing (FPP) sectors (Outcome 1).  
Two interventions: Establishment of a Participatory Guarantee System (PGS) and knowledge sharing network in organic agriculture; with the PGS Network and Product and marketing innovation in Food Production and Processing (FPP) firms, with two firms. Both interventions have had limited success and MM is discontinuing its support. Attraction of youth to organic farming was not promising enough for the FPP there were benefits from the interventions but no prospects for scale.  
Recommendations include two on coherence:  
• Pilot-test the exploration and realisation of more synergies between Swiss EED projects in a selected locality where all projects are or could be active. |
28. For more synergies between projects, SDC should consider inclusion of indicators and targets in all future log frames or another accountability mechanism, and assignment of responsibility for facilitating and monitoring cooperation to an Embassy staff member.

#23 Final evaluation of the seeds and markets project (Eswatini, Lesotho and Zimbabwe) (pp26)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Evaluation questions</th>
<th>Main findings from the evaluation</th>
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<td>1 Relevance</td>
<td>• In response to experiences on the ground, increased understanding of farmers' priority needs and learning by implementing agencies and SDC, the project evolved during the implementation and intervened through a number of measures recognised as part of Private Sector Development (PSD). The interventions in different phases included those that form part of Inclusive Business Models (IBM) and Social Enterprise (SE). The 3rd phase was about establishing and strengthening Community-Owned Seed and Commodity Enterprises (COEs) and providing a range of services including financing.</td>
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<td>• The project recognised limited prospects of success (in terms of operating independently of donor funding ) by developing partnerships and supporting established market players only. It therefore established COEs that allowed for specialised skills to be deployed in the service of farmers.</td>
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<td>• After establishing COEs, in the second half of phase 3, the project focused on capacity building, developing a whole value chain approach to seed and commodity production, and supporting the supply and demand side to promote sustainability of the COEs. The phase also focused on strengthening COEs governance and systems.</td>
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<td>• The project focused on increasing access to diverse quality seeds and access to markets as well as improved knowledge on good agricultural practices.</td>
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<td>• The project addressed key issues that potentially contributed to the realisation of Sustainable Development Goals 1 (No Poverty) and 2 (No Hunger), including gender.</td>
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<td>• The project also focused on conservation farming that responded to issues of environment and climate change as well as knowledge about food preparation and consumption to respond to issues of childhood stunting, general malnutrition and HIV and AIDS. It also addressed financial literacy.</td>
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<td>• The project was managed flexibly and adaptively, thus allowing for evolution in approach, content and expected results over time. Important changes included.</td>
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<td>• As a result of the flexible and adaptive approach, the project established four companies.</td>
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<td>2 Coherence</td>
<td>• The project, across its phases, delivered the expected outputs (changes in capacities). The outputs led to the expected outcomes (changes in performance).</td>
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<td>• The project contributed to the transformations of the seed sector; contributed to improved market access for SHFs and linkages to outlets they otherwise would not access; The project established 4 companies.</td>
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<td>• At the household level, the project contributed to household wellbeing through direct income gains, cost savings on seed purchases, access to farm input loans, improvements in dietary knowledge and consumption, HIV and AIDS impact mitigation, addressed gender roles and improved financial literacy.</td>
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- Some benefits of the project had a wider reach. Key among these was the production of OPV seed and bio-fortified beans whose reach spread the benefits of the project beyond the participating farmers and contributed to national seed sovereignty (i3.4)

### 4 Efficiency
- The evaluation noted that an adaptive learning approach presented challenge with efficiency analysis - activities may translate to outputs, but the adaptive approach may mean that over time some outputs become outdated or redundant (i4.1)
- It was noted that in larger part the facilitative budgeting approach (above 70% of the budget consisted of different forms of support) did not allow for these costs to be disaggregated and linked to any specific countries and results. Consequently, the true costs were understated. Only administered funds (under 30%) were directly linked to the results. The evaluation noted that the budgeting approach created scope for both redundancies and inefficiencies.
- It was also noted that the contractual arrangements between SDC and various managing agencies carried inherent risks of inefficiency in resource utilisation and offered little if any incentives for efficient cost management. While it may be the case that actual management costs were within what would be considered the norm by other development agencies, the budget formats did not allow for confirmation. (i4.3)
- Unlike the program aspects of the project, the administrative arrangements of Head Quarters, Regional Management Unit (RMU), Field Coordinating Offices (FCO) and long- and short-term consultants were maintained through phases without flexibility and adaptivity in the light of the observed potential for cost-saving (i4.1/3)

### 5 Sustainability
- Some transformations, particularly those at the household level are self-sustaining while those that are systemic require further nurturing for continuity (i5.3)
- Key to sustainability are extents to which the COEs are well-managed, operate profitably and provide tangible benefits for farmers. The companies operate in a space that has not attracted large players (high costs and high risks). Overall, the COEs were found to be works-in-progress that required nurturing and protection from internal and external risks.
- An acceptable balance between smallholder farmers benefiting as producers and owners of the companies on the one hand and while on the other, the enterprises achieving sustainability through implementing strategies that typical private sector firms would adopt is required. Achieving the balance calls for stronger boards and clearer guiding charters for the firms. (i5.3)
### C3 People consulted

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Annex D  Case studies

Case study 1 – Vegetable seeds – Contribution analysis

Project objective – to increase the incomes and livelihoods of small-scale vegetable farmers in Bangladesh by access to and proper usage of higher quality seeds. There are approximately 14 to 17 million farmers in Bangladesh, and 91% of all farmers in Bangladesh are engaged in some form of vegetable production. The Katalyst’s interventions in the vegetable markets reached a (projected) total of 772,785 farmers (“benefit outreach”), which is about 5-6% of the total number of vegetable farmers. The intervention in the seed market was one of several interventions in the vegetable sector. All interventions applied the MSD/M4P approach.

Challenges faced - The three interlinked aspects of low performance in the vegetable market systems were the lack of access, quality, and use of improved agricultural inputs - seeds, fertilisers, and pesticides. These were seen as the symptoms, but the underlying causes of the weak performance of the vegetable market system were that the input supply market systems had many supporting functions that were not operating to their full potential. In the case of higher-quality seeds, the national industry association (BSA) was not adequately skilled to perform the coordination function to advocate on behalf of the seed industry and bring members together to pursue common interests. Lack of access quality and use were largely-attributable to deficiencies in marketing and distribution systems. Seed suppliers did not have information on opportunities and were not taking advantage of selling better seeds to the potential customers in remote areas. They did not see the market potential in poor and remote areas due to high transaction costs nor had the inputs and knowledge needed for the production of quality seeds. On the demand side, farmers who

Contributing factors

- Presence of the seed suppliers and seed distribution systems in the intervention area;
- Information dissemination through local distribution networks and demonstration plots;
- Recognition by seed suppliers of the market potential of serving poor farmers in remote areas;
- Affordable market prices of improved seeds (mini-packs).

Significant change

- Sustainable access to information;
- Sustainable local access and increased use of quality seeds;
- Income increase for small-scale farming families;
- Systemic market change through improved supporting and core functions and development of a new product;
- Scale-up and replication.

SDC influence

- Market research, selection of the intervention areas and origination of the business model;
- Established linkages and lasting partnerships between market players;
- Skilful facilitation avoiding dependence;
- Innovations in seed packaging.

Absence of change

- Expansion (self-replication) in the chars.

Project objectives

- Lack of the awareness of the benefits of using quality seeds;
- Lack of access to improved and affordable seeds;
- Lack of proper usage and marketing practices of the improved seeds;
- Perceived risks on demand and supply side;
- A failure in the transition of market information;
- Lack of capacity and coordination between market players.

did have access to better seed varieties did not see clear benefits from using it. They needed proper usage skills to extract the maximum benefits from the seeds. Lower productivity rates were not only the outcome of improper usage skills but the reduced-quality resulting from inappropriate distribution and storage practices. Lack of use was also a result of the low affordability of quality seeds; they were not marketed in a way that was appropriate for the poor.

**Significant changes or absence of change** - The most transformative change in the sector has been the development and marketing of affordable mini-seed packs. Farmers now have sustainable access to the affordable high-quality seeds and critical information through the established linkages and collaboration between the seed suppliers/producers, retailers, dealers, and mobile seed vendors. Within three agricultural seasons of introduction, almost 0.5 million households had purchased mini-packs, resulting in an additional USD14m of vegetables produced. This resulted in both increases in sales and decreases in purchases of vegetables for consumption which amounted to an average of USD15 per farmer per season. The two partner companies have made mini-packs part of their core business model. 71% of the seeds sold by these companies are now in the form of mini-packs. Beyond the partner firms, there is evidence of uptake of marketing models initiated by Katalyst to access new market segments by other firms in the market. Mini-packs are now the predominant form of seed retail in rural areas of Bangladesh, available from a wide range of seed companies.

It has become ‘normal’ for companies to invest in training small retailers (including in remote locations). Syngenta branched out to set up a rural training centre to train their distributors and retailers. Hundreds of thousands of farmers have benefitted from retailers becoming a more reliable source of knowledge on disease control. The retailer training programme (RTP) model has been replicated across Katalyst sectors and in many other countries, by Katalyst partners, other companies, and other development programmes. Mobile seed vendors (MSVs) have grown significantly and spread organically. There are now an estimated 4,500 operating in Bangladesh, supplying an average of 125 farmers each. That provides a total of 700,000 farmers who now have access to seed who previously did not, and the emulation of formalisation and the delivery of embedded services through MSVs means that more and more of these people have access to improved seeds and skills in how to use them.

Despite the achievements as stated above, there seem to be potential risks for the long-term sustainability of the results. It was noted in the MTR (2016) that marketing costs of one of the seed companies outweigh the benefits, as reported by the company’s director. In addition to that, retailers visited in the char reported low turnover, and the margins made from the sale of new seeds were reported insufficient for covering the costs of promotion activities in the chars. It is thus unlikely that the expansion of the retailer network into areas with poor farmers (self-replication) will happen without further subsidies and support.
Contributing factors - For seed suppliers, a triggering factor was the recognition of the market potential by sourcing higher quality imported seed varieties, inputs such as germplasm and breeder seed and technical knowledge to build their production capacities. A contributing factor for the project were already existing distribution seed systems and by building on these both formal (retailers) and informal (MSVs) networks, the intervention was able to bring about new and improved linkages and channels of the essential information services from seed companies to retailers and MSVs, and from retailers and MSVs on to small-scale farmers. Seed companies invested in the information systems through the RTP, whereas MVSs were linked directly with the companies and incorporated as their dealers and further as sub-dealers. These companies continue to offer training to MSVs and see them as a part of their distribution network to expand into rural areas.

At the farmer level, it was information dissemination through strategically located demonstration plots that increased farmers’ awareness. After the pilot phase, five seed companies organised 400 demonstration plots visited by almost 12,000 farmers. 180 lead farmers were supervised by the newly trained MSVs to develop demonstration plots. These were complemented by 1000 smaller demonstration plots within homesteads which were customised for remote areas and more appropriate to that context. On the innovation side, it was the development and marketing of affordable mini-seed packs that contributed to the increased use among the farmers.

As part of the collaboration between World Vegetable Centre (WVC) and the Bangladesh Agriculture Research Institute (BARI), the project’s financial support to the trainings reduced significantly (from the 60% provided for the first training to 20% for the second training and 0% for the third), as private seed companies realised the need for such training and paid the participation fee.

Influence of SDC support - The SDC project understood how the market system and the supporting system of inputs work and recognized constraints in the sector that were hampering growth and economic development of small-scale farming families, including in the remote areas of Bangladesh and chars. The project presented a new business model and marketing methods in the seed market and at the outset partnered with five seed companies, none of which were the market leaders. These were partnerships of low risk and costs that allowed the project to provide better coverage, reveal competencies of the partners, develop competition among them and set the ground for scale-up. For broadening the impact and setting a stage for a robust change, it was needed to improve the capacities of and collaboration between the actors in seed distribution systems and develop the affordable product for farmers. The project, therefore, established linkages between the seed companies, retailers and MSVs. It also initiated and co-financed the retailer training programme (RTP) run by the seed companies, formalized MSVs and linked them to the seed companies, thereby bridging the marketing and distribution gap to remote areas. Katalyst facilitated two seed companies to access market, develop strategic plan and packaging for promoting vegetable seeds in mini packs. The project facilitated stronger distribution channels in the chars through its partnerships with Lal Teer Seed Ltd, and three other input companies (BRAC Seeds, Metal, and ACI Seeds). In order to further penetrate into remote areas, Katalyst developed new marketing methods (flipcharts and videos). The project’s exit strategy for the seed sector included the collaboration with WVC in setting up a commercial training platform. It further embedded the linkages between WVC, the Bangladesh Society of Seed Technology (BSST) and the Bangladesh Agriculture Research Institute (BARI).
Lessons learnt:

• Adoption of a simple set of principles is more important than the preconception on who needs to do what to address the system constraints or what is the model that needs to be used.
  (Katalyst's principles: analyse the system; determine priority constraints; pilot different ways of addressing these constraints; and monitor and measure whether the constraint has the desired impact on both the system and on the target group)

• It is crucial to understand how the market system and the supporting systems of inputs work.

• Adopting different tactics in deciding on the partners in order to change different supporting functions at different times is vital to success.

• The AAER framework is useful for understanding systemic change that needs to happen. It should not be used for the assessment of whether a product, a service, or a pre-determined behaviour is changing and being replicated.


Parul Begum is a homestead farmer of Char Muladi, Barisal. She has four decimals of land and is the mother of two daughters and two sons. Her husband works at a sawmill factory. One day she was sitting in her front yard, wondering how to make the best use of her land. A member of Lal Teer staff, Hasib, made an unexpected visit to the char and visited Parul’s house. He later, helped her to set up a demonstration plot using the company’s seeds to grow sweet gourd, ladies finger, cucumber and cowpea. Parul was provided with mini-pack costing less than BDT 25 (USD 0.3) of quality vegetable seeds, along with the relevant information about the cultivation techniques for each vegetable. Following these methods, within 40 days of sowing the seed Parul had produced sweet gourd, cowpea, and ladies finger. The cost of investment in the demonstration plot was BDT 1,200 (USD 14), which included seed land preparation, pesticide, and irrigation. She got good yields, and she sold her vegetables at the local market for BDT 500 (USD 6), each month earning a profit of BDT 250 (USD 3). After one long year of hard saving, Parul had BDT 3,000 (USD 36). She then spent BDT 500 (USD 6) on seed and other inputs, and continued homestead vegetable farming in the following season. Parul’s use of quality seeds and modern cultivation techniques meant that her yield has gradually increased. “The whole village respects me, and Lal Teer organises regular community meetings in my yard; about 20-25 women come each time. I am happy to share the benefits of using quality seeds with them and I encourage them to do the same,” Parul says. In 2016, using more of her profits saved from homestead farming, Parul bought a few ducks and chickens. Many women in Parul’s village have been inspired by her example and have started to use quality seed for homestead gardening.
### Case Study 2: Farmed fish in Bangladesh – Contribution analysis

**Project objectives**
To increase the incomes and livelihoods of small-scale fish farmers by cultivating high-value species (HVS).

**Contributing factors**
- Incentivized partners and their positive response to the introduced concept;
- Collaboration between market players beyond the project level support;
- Affordable hatchery management trainings;
- Extension services provided by feed and aqua chemical companies.

**Significant change**
- Behavioural change;
- Sustainable access to knowledge and information;
- Institutionalisation of the new approach to sourcing of high-quality brood stock;
- Improved production patterns of farmers;
- Improved forward marketing linkages.

**Challenges faced**
- Lack of access, quality and use of quality inputs (fingerlings, aqua chemicals, medicine, commercial feed);
- Poor hatchery management;
- Lack of adequate brood stock;
- A failure in marketing of aquaculture information;
- Gaps in the rules governing the market;
- Lack of coordination among private sector actors.

**SDC influence**
- Market diagnosis and selection of the intervention areas - analysis of the market system for pond fish – then focus placed on the fingerling market system as a crucial input to the pond fish market;
- A business model to promote the culture of high-value species;
- Establishment and promotion of an efficient procurement channel for safe fish species;
- Cost-sharing partnerships;
- Collaboration with other donors.

**Absence of change**

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**Project objective** - to increase the incomes and livelihoods of small-scale fish farmers by cultivating high-value species (HVS). In 2014, at the beginning of phase 2 of Katalyst, Bangladesh was the fifth largest producer of fish in the world. In 2009, the fish sector overall accounted for 4.73% of GDP and generated 4.94% of export earnings and was one of the fastest growing sub-sectors of agriculture in the country. Katalyst’s interventions in the fish sector applied the MSD/M4P approach.

**Challenges faced** - Key constraints that prevented small-scale farmers from fully benefitting from high-value fish species were identified in the fingerling market, a supporting market to the principal fish market. It was lack of access, quality and use of fingerlings that were recognized as symptoms of the low performance in the fingerling market system. A limited supply of fingerlings was a consequence of inadequate production practices in the hatcheries leading to higher mortality rates and lower overall size and health of the farmed fish. High demand, on the other side, pushed prices up and beyond the reach of small farmers. Overarching symptom was the lack of use due to the perception of high risks exacerbated by the poor quality of fingerlings but also the low quality in feed and aqua chemical inputs. Underlying causes of such underperformance in the fingerling market system were deficient technical and management practices among hatchery owners and staff. It was found that 45% of surveyed hatchery owners and staff never received technical training related to water quality, brood, feed, disease management etc. In the absence of adequate public extension service and/or industry guidelines the farmers had to rely on local advisers whose advise was based on traditional and insufficient approaches to production.

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Another issue was the lack of adequate brood stock associated with limited number of vertically integrated importers, poor coordination among private sector and low understanding among the farmers of the protocols required to maintain strong brood stock and avoid genetic problems. There were also gaps in the market rules, which needed to be amended and implemented to facilitate the ease of importing brood stock. Finally, farmers were not fully aware of the potential and did not understand the opportunities arising from HVS cultivation. This lack of knowledge and awareness among small-scale farmers was a result of inappropriate aquaculture information marketing function.

**Significant change or absence of change** - 5,800 fish farmers are now using high-value species due to improved links between farmers, hatcheries, and input companies. Input companies, dealers and hatcheries recognized small farmers as significant part of their customer base and provide quality services and inputs to them. With improved linkages between the principal market players, small-scale farmers also got access to information on effective farming techniques, feed management, disease prevention and postharvest management.

It was reported in 2015 that 11,000 small farmers had increased their income by USD 250 on average as a result of the improved farming practices.

The new approach to sourcing of brood stock has been institutionalised by the Department of Fisheries in the form of a policy guideline enabling the hatchery association to import the brood. The hatcheries pay a fee of approximately USD 120 annually to the association which signals the value they perceive in membership. Better brood quality and hatchery management resulted in lower mortality rates.

It is challenging to quantify the impact on poverty of the achieved changes as there are multiple dimensions affecting the overall impact. There are farmers impacted directly and indirectly such as those within the networks of those who were directly impacted by the Katalyst interventions.

**Contributing factors** - BFRF and BFRI had the incentives to support the development and growth of the industry and national reach, as well as experts from the two international institutions in Vietnam and the Philippines, to design and initially deliver training to 45 hatcheries on essential components of hatchery management including brood management, hatching practice, selection of brood, pond-based breeding, hormone mixing and feeding practice. A hatchery management manual was designed and 1,500 copies disseminated. At a later stage, BFRF independently proposed to Katalyst that additional trainings should be developed to extend the outreach, and more importantly there was demand from hatcheries. BFRF conducted a training needs assessment with over 300 hatcheries and following this, designed and promoted an affordable fee-based training programme. Historically such trainings had usually been subsidised by development project and the shift to a fee-based model has contributed to a change of behaviour among private sector hatcheries. A total of 136 hatchery owners, technicians and managers were trained, accounting for 39% of the total number of hatcheries that were breeding HVS across the country.

On the supply side, feed and aqua chemical companies organised demonstration plots and feed companies also started to customise their products to cater to small farmers, with two introducing a low-cost feed suitable for small farmers. Hatcheries, private input companies, and dealers worked together to educate farmers about the profitability of high-value fish species and customised, commercially-profitable culturing techniques for HVS.

In addition, public and private sectors started delivering information services through, among others, television agricultural programmes, rural information centres, customer care helplines and video-integrated training programmes.

**SDC influence** - SDC performed a thorough analysis of the pond fish market to understand what systemic changes were needed to increase the benefits for small-scale farmers. The project took a three-pronged approach: 1) increasing the quality of HVS fingerlings by

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improving the function of brood stock sourcing to hatcheries; 2) improving the management of the hatcheries through a more effective knowledge and skills function; and 3) increase small farmer knowledge of effective and profitable HVS cultivation via better marketing of the benefits of HVS farming by private sector actors in the value chain. To trigger changes in the system, Katalyst entered into cost-sharing partnerships with hatcheries to import high quality brood stock; Bangladesh Fisheries Research Forum (BFRF), a member-based platform for the industry, and Bangladesh Fishery Research Institute (BFRI) to improve the knowledge and skills function in the market; and input companies to establish functional channels for information dissemination in the fingerling market system. In the case of hatcheries, the project paid 85% of the initial and 50% of the second brood stock importation costs. To improve cultivation methodologies, Katalyst on collaboration with technical advisers proposed two innovative and low cost HVS cultivation methodologies. To train the farmers and disseminate cultivation knowledge and practices, the project partnered with smaller feed producers and aqua chemical companies. During phase 3, Katalyst also partnered with World Fish to collectively utilise the existing technical knowhow in order to build the capacity of relevant market actors and consequently improve the input markets for fish sectors. To discuss ways to standardise the new approach to brood stock importing, Katalyst facilitated a meeting between the DoF, hatcheries, BFRF and BFRI. As a result, some colloquial guidelines were transformed into a more formal checklist that the Department of Fisheries (DoF) could use to regulate the import process. The DoF also suggested that a hatchery association needed to coordinate licensing and Katalyst facilitated the formation of the Central Hatchery Association to serve as an apex organisation for regional associations to coordinate buying trips and arrange import paperwork.

**Lessons learnt**

- Multi-actor approach can be used to instil change in a market function.
- Recurrent direct activities (support) can help secure buy-in and make markets if they are part of a realistic systemic vision; with the brood stock import, Katalyst supported individual hatcheries and, although this led to increased profits and built technical capacity, the programme was needed to support them further to repeat this a second time, albeit with reduced input from Katalyst.
- It is not possible to predict exactly how the market, its functions and its rules will or will not react to change. It is therefore crucial to have strong monitoring system to allow for a continued evaluation of the sector so that strategies and approach can be adapted continuously.
- The AAER framework is useful for understanding systemic change that needs to happen. It should not be used for the assessment of whether a product, a service, or a pre-determined behaviour is changing and being replicated.
Mohammad Ali from Radhakanai, Mymensingh, started culturing fish in a pond of seven decimal. This is the main income source for his family of five: his wife, their seven-year old son and Mohammad’s parents. “I had no knowledge of cultivation methods – I just used to culture fish according to my own experience and observations. I tried to learn by doing. Sometimes, the fish died or got some disease, and I could not do anything about it. Some fish grew big, some were small. I never managed to get a fair price for them at the local market. So, life was a bit difficult for me, bearing the expenses of my family,” Mohammad says. “In 2012, the hatchery owner Kader knew I was struggling, so he advised me to get some training on fish cultivation. The first training was on fish culturing methods, provided by Sarnalata hatchery. I learned how to prepare a pond, the optimum number of fish to culture in terms of pond size, and how and what to feed the fish. I realised the mistakes I’d made and applied the new techniques I’d learned straightaway. Hearing about the benefits of culturing high value species, I also bought some quality tilapia fingerlings from the hatchery: now, I culture these alongside the traditional species developed,” Mohammad goes on to say. Mohammad Ali used to spend BDT 8,000 (USD 99) to buy enough fish feed to culture BDT 8,000 (USD 99) of fish, which he can sell in the market for BDT 35,000 (USD 435), making an increase in annual profit of BDT 12,000-15,000 (USD 145-181). However, the training showed him how to make fish feed at home instead of having to buy it. The money he saves as a result – as much as BDT 2,000 (USD 24) – counts towards his profit. With the additional income he has earned during the last three years, Ali says, first he repaired his small house, and later spent some money expanding it. He feels good about the future and plans to lease a pond and continue cultivating fish.
**Case Study 3 - Leveraging Private Sector Investment in Hard to Reach Areas of Bangladesh through Facilitation of a Public Institute: The Example of Nourish Poultry and Hatchery Ltd.**

**Project Brief** – The main thrust of Making Market Work for the Jamuna, Padma and Teesta Chars (2012-2016) and II (2016-2019) was to improve the livelihood options and reduce vulnerability of the farming households in remote char locations by strengthening the market systems. Besides private market actors, Char Development Research Centre (CDRC), a specialised centre of Rural Development Academy (RDA) of Government of Bangladesh, has been the prime public agency and partner of M4C since 2013. As a result of the support of M4C, CDRC has developed a better understanding of the role that the private businesses can play in creating lasting economic development opportunities for the char dwellers and the facilitating role a public agency can play in this process.

**Challenges faced** – The geographic isolation of chars makes accessibility difficult for public and private actors leading to fewer economic activities, higher cost of production and lower output. Majority of the char farmers live on lands without ownership and even if they own land or can rent land for cultivation, they lack the ability to invest in good quality inputs for their productive assets, have little knowledge of how to utilise their assets and limited access to markets for selling their produce at competitive prices. Less than 20% of the farmers within the project areas have been able to live in the same domicile longer than 20 years mainly because of yearly river erosion (Ibid). As a result, additional efforts and further investment from private as well as public sector were required compared to other market development projects to create a functional relationship and strengthen the linkages between the existing market actors and char farmers.

**Contributing factors**
- Char Development Research Centre - CDRC’s willingness to engage with stakeholders through events i.e., Feed-mill meet;
- Regular follow-up and coordination between CDRC and Nourish through M4C’s facilitation;
- Nourish’s interest to expand distributorship in char;
- Access to financial services in the char areas.

**Significant changes**
- Increased income of CHF 20 Million for 124,000 char households;
- CHF 5 Million sales growth of quality agro-inputs in the hard to reach char areas;
- CDRC generated CHF 445,000 investment from private sector;
- Sales of 336 metric ton poultry feed and 96,000 poultry chicks by Nourish.

**SDC influence**
- Major financial and technical support to this project;
- Collaboration with govt. to address challenges in the char context;
- Capacity development of CDRC.

**Challenges (beyond the immediate project scope)**
- Assurance of product quality by relevant public extension services;
- Institutional limitations of CDRC;
- Presence of land disputes and rent seeking.

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24 This case study is based on a case study prepared by M4C team of Swisscontact with review by the evaluation team.
25 Chars are riverine land, susceptible to erosion and soil deposition, which remain disconnected from the mainland either seasonally or throughout the year.
26 Project Document, M4C, Phase III
At the macro level, the public institutes mandated to improve the livelihoods of the poor and extreme poor people were reluctant to collaborate with private sector to create a business enabling environment in the hard to reach context. Since the public sector and most of the donor driven projects have not addressed the infrastructural issues and limited initiatives were taken, the likelihood of autonomous expansion of private agri business network or financial services in chars remained low. For that reason, replication of any successful development models in such context requires working with Government of Bangladesh to increase allocation of resources for chars as the pragmatic scale up strategy. The initial cost of expanding agricultural input by private agro-input companies, establishing a supply chain network by agro processing companies and the financial services by financial institutes in chars is high.

**Significant changes** - During 2012 to 2020, the M4C project reports an increased income of CHF 20 Million for 124,000 char households. There is evidence that at least 35% of the beneficiary households are investing their additional income in accessing better quality education and at least 12% are investing in diversifying their livelihood options. At the market level, exponential sales growth of (up to 430%) of agro inputs and ready feed (CHF 5 million) in the char relevant markets is observed resulting from the emergence of more than 50 additional distributorships and 500 additional retailers targeting this market. CDRC, with project support directly worked with six private companies in microfinance, solar energy, poultry feed and output processing and generated CHF 445,000 investment from private sector in chars. Of these, Nourish Poultry and Hatchery Ltd experienced one of the most successful partnership with CDRC. Nourish participated in a regional stakeholder consultation workshop in 2017 organised by CDRC to identify issues and scopes of support as a private sector and translated the knowledge into a meaningful partnership with this public institute. Because of prudent market facilitation activities, Nourish has already, without direct involvement of the M4C project, set up a new distribution network in Char Tekani, Kazipur, Sirajganj in September 2018 responding to the market potential of char poultry. As of November 2020, the distribution point inside the char successfully contributed to generate additional sales of 336 metric tons of poultry feed and 96,000 poultry chicks with a trend of gradual increase. However, the fact that only 10% of existing native and hybrid chicken market potential of that char area have been catered through this partnership, shows there is a potential scope of expanding the business to capture the rest of the untapped market by Nourish and other competitive market actors.

**Challenges (beyond the immediate project scope)** - The project did not work with the regulatory role of quality agro-input supply with the public extension services such as the Department of Agriculture Extension (DAE) and Department of Livestock Services (DLS) considering this would have required longer time involvement, resources, and coordination with other public agencies. Institutional capacity of CDRC needs further strengthening. Despite showing some success, CDRC is not ready yet to independently take systemic initiatives to attract private businesses in chars based on holistic situation analysis or advocate with relevant authorities to undertake char specific programs. Creating a sustainable pathway out of poverty for char
dwellers would require more institutionalisation and focused investment planning from the government of Bangladesh.

The control of powerful elites over the char lands was an issue beyond the scope of this project. This is further complicated as river erosion renders landlessness and rights to newly formed char lands are plagued with ambiguity due to the absence of updated land records and papers to transfer ownership. Thus, renting or leasing has no proper regulatory process in terms of rehabilitation and land redistribution.

**Contributing factors** – The major contributing factor of such public-private collaboration to implement M4P approach is the public institute’s willingness to engage with private stakeholders through knowledge dissemination and anchoring events. Moreover, regular follow-up and coordination between the private and public actors is also essential. CDRC with the assistance from M4C facilitated the char distributors and Nourish Poultry and Hatchery Ltd. to organize a training for 17 interested char producers on native chicken farm management at RDA Bogura and an exposure visit to farm at a prominent sub-district of Bogura in 2019.

The private sector’s interest and vision to expand business in the thin market is also pivotal. At present, the char areas are generating less than 1% of the district level revenue for Nourish. Despite that, Nourish continued their business in 2020 considering the business opportunity of this untapped market without any external support even within the global pandemic situation.

Access to credit is strengthening the effectiveness of the other changes in the market system. The char distributor of Nourish borrowed microenterprise loan (10% of his investment) from NDP which is facilitated by M4C. As of 2020, NDP offered CHF 3.8 Million seasonal loan product to 11,329 char farmers in Sirajganj. The earlier Char Livelihood Programme (Phased out in 2016) and on-going other projects which improved infrastructure, provided assets for farmers, and helped increase the resilience of housing stock was also a crucial step in changing the underlying economy from based on subsistence and remittances from migrant labour to one where farmers have the potential to be economic actors.

**Influence of SDC support**— From 2012 to 2019 SDC has funded the major portion (CHF 11 Million) of the project and pioneered in realising the opportunity of M4P approach in the char context. For both phases, with the guidance from SDC, M4C exceeded the income and outreach targets. Another important aspect is the collaboration between SDC and Rural Development and Cooperate Division (RDCD), Government of Bangladesh and the recognition of the achievements of the project by both of the parties. This contribution has been highlighted in Bangladesh Economic Review 2017, published by the Ministry of Finance (MoF).

Because of support from SDC, CDRC’s capacity to anchor and attract investment in thin market context is gaining momentum and the centre is gradually institutionalising the market facilitation role. The continuation of support to CDRC for an additional phase forms the basis of SDC’s exit strategy in target chars so that the organisation can champion the development agenda of chars in a more strategic and sustainable manner on its own.

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29 National Development Programme
Lessons learnt:

This elaborated case study developed by the project and others outline several important points including:

1) Working in thin market context needs a longer time horizon, longer-term strategies, and less pressure to reach short-term targets to achieve sustainable large-scale change (Ibid). This is even more relevant if this requires inclusion of public sector institutes.

2) Advocacy role of CDRC with relevant public extension services (DAE, DLS) to enforce and ensure availability of quality products and awareness creation among char farmers would be required.

3) Working in a thin market context such as char requires investing in up-front research to fill the data gap which are likely in thin markets. Such research is a crucial basis for intervention design and implementation; and for establishing partnerships (Ibid).

4) Working in financial inclusion can complement agriculture, livestock, and even more diversified portfolio (e.g., poultry) in terms of addressing inter-related constraints in the market system. This can create relatively quick and lasting impact on targeted population in thin markets.

5) Female members of households can be engaged in diversified income generating activities like ruminant rearing and poultry farming, in addition to subsistence agricultural activities. Char households who are capable of larger production capacity, can be assisted to transfer from subsistence farming to semi-commercial or commercial farming.

Beneficiary story (Source: Interviews and Swisscontact/M4C)

Mohammad Sumon previously worked in a garment’s factory in Gazipur. Suddenly he started suffering from severe backbone pain and his condition started to deteriorate resulting him quit his job. Then he returned in his own char village (Tekani, Sirajganj) to start a business. Previously his parents used to hatch chickens. So, Sumon wanted to re-start the poultry business and received relevant information from Mr. Momin, the char distributor of Nourish, who was trained by Nourish for layer and country chicken rearing. With his guidance Mr. Sumon stated poultry rearing and built 3 sheds for his poultry. As of November 2020, Mr. Sumon sold 1,800 country chicken successfully and is waiting to sell 350 country chicken unsold because of the pandemic situation. He had an additional profit of CHF 585 and will re-invest this income in his business to survive the present economic shock.

Mr. Momen is the poultry feed, chick distributor, medicine seller and poultry farm (Layer) owner based at Char Tekani, Kazipur, Sirajganj. He started as a small poultry seller in 2014 with 30 country chicken and shifted into farming chicken a year later. In 2017, he was introduced with Nourish Poultry and Hatchery Ltd. through CDRC and M4C. CDRC with the assistance from M4C facilitated Mr. Momen and Nourish to organize a training for interested 17 char producers on native chicken farm management at RDA Bogura and an exposure visit to farm at a prominent sub-district of Bogura in 2019. After borrowing microenterprise loan (10% of his investment) from NDP, he started buying feed from Nourish in 2018. Since 2018 till date, he has sold approx. 336 Metric Ton feed of Nourish feed and approx. 96,000 nourish poultry chicks in last 12 months along with disseminating embedded information and technology. Mr. Momen has a layered chicken farm of 900 chickens from which he gets approx. 6000 eggs daily. Despite all his challenges, he is hopeful that he and other poultry farmers can increase their sales and get good prices when the impact of Covid-19 decreases in the adjacent marketplaces.

Poultry farming. Credit: Swisscontact/M4C
### Project objectives

To reduce the poverty situation of men and women involved in rural economic activities by increasing their income, opportunities, and capacities.

### Contributing factors

- Coherence with public policies, the multidimensional poverty’s approach, laws and favourable regulations for productive development, but also with private stakeholders;
- Adapted implementation of MSD approach to Bolivian conditions;
- Promotion of local consumption, food security and food sovereignty to foster nutrition & local demand;
- Networking and facilitation approaches within the project team.

### Challenges faced

- The relationship with the government was not necessarily successful. Public policies’ approach in Bolivia is top down. In order to respond to farmers’ needs a bottom up methodology based on evidence is needed to influence policy;
- Bolivian context suffered of weak institutions and periodic crises. A great degree of adaptation and flexibility is needed in order to take advantage of political momenta;
- The project was affected by the Covid-19 pandemic. Transports and logistics came almost to a total halt causing food scarcity, price increases and delays in food supply chains. Financial institutions have reduced client contacts and thus also granted fewer loans.

### Significant change

- Income increase & employment and self-employment conditions improved for small-scale farming families. Benefit/Cost ratio of about 2.76 1st phase (real) & 1.63 2nd phase (forecast);
- Climate change adaptation measures improved through innovation & technologies;
- Living conditions of women improved through a tailored gender oriented social economical strategy;
- Better linkage and adaptation between products and national & international markets;
- Improved access to innovative productions’ goods and services (productions’ related public services and inputs, technical, information, insurance, financial services).

### Coherence with public policies, the multidimensional poverty’s approach, laws and favourable regulations for productive development, but also with private stakeholders;

### Adapted implementation of MSD approach to Bolivian conditions;

### Promotion of local consumption, food security and food sovereignty to foster nutrition & local demand;

### Networking and facilitation approaches within the project team.

### SDC influence

- MSD principles multidimensional poverty’s approach in conjunction with the project’s facilitating role allowed the development of interventions beyond the economic dimension and led to unexpected results in gender and social aspects;
- The project applied an opportunity approach allowing the scaling up at a national and public policy level. The Ministry of Rural Development valued positively the MSD approach and replicated it based on the project experience but in its fruit and Andean grain programs;
- SDC local management proved to be flexible and adaptive.

### Absence of change

- Competitiveness remains a challenge with respect to imported products (legal & illegal imports);
- Participatory public management is still very limited, due to the centralization and top down approach of the Bolivian public sector but also in a context of extended political crisis;
- COVID 19 impacts hinder the increase in income, and greater access to public goods and services to foster productivity and competitiveness as initially foreseen.

### Case Study 4 - Rural Markets in Bolivia – contribution analysis

**Project objectives** – To reduce the poverty situation of men and women involved in rural economic activities, by increasing their income, opportunities, and capacities to participate in the market, contributing to an increase in the net income of 10,000 Rural Household Production Units\(^30\) (UPF) (approximately 50,000 people) by an average of 30%, mainly in the regions of the Altiplano and inter-Andean valleys. Also, fostering women participation up to 40%.\(^31\) The project was the first one of the SDC in Bolivia to include the market systems development approach\(^32\), which has had two phases, starting in January 2014 up until December 2021.

**Challenges faced** – The relationship with the government was not necessarily successful. Public policies’ approach in Bolivia is top down. In order to respond to farmers’ needs a bottom up methodology based on evidence is needed to influence policy.

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\(^{30}\) Unidades Productivas Familiares UPF in Spanish  
\(^{31}\) SDC (2017) Credit proposal phase 2  
\(^{32}\) SDC (2016) Midterm evaluation.
Bolivian context suffered of weak institutions and periodic crises. A great degree of adaptation and flexibility is needed in order to take advantage of political momentum. The project was affected by the Covid-19 pandemic. Transports and logistics came almost to a total halt causing food scarcity, price increases and delays in food supply chains. Financial institutions have reduced client contacts and thus also granted fewer loans. Further challenges have been the articulation with tourism agencies to promote the gastronomy route, and the fact that the consortium and co-facilitators had to implement the MSD approach, facilitating, and articulating within the agricultural sector in the absence of government leadership.33

**Significant changes or absence of change**

- **Income increase & employment and self-employment conditions improved**: The first phase of the project (2014-17) achieved an increase of around 72% in the net incomes of 13,000 UPF, 32% of them headed by women. 18,000 UPF improved their employment/self-employment conditions, having increased their productivity by 21% thanks to better use of technology and enhanced market links. These numbers show a Benefit/Cost ratio of about 2.6 for the project in its first phase34, and of 1.63 2nd phase (forecast).

- **Climate change adaptation measures improved**: On the second phase 5,174 UFP improved their strategies for climate change adaptation at the intervention territories and 1,430 in other areas, introducing measures and new technologies as: early warning, risk management, insurance, seeds, etc.

- **Living conditions of women improved**: Through reduction of violence, greater participation & equal conditions at family & productive environment, 3,765 women developed capacities and have improved their empowerment at the intervention territories and 995 in other areas.35

- **Better linkage and adaptation between products and national & international markets**: The project fostered production of 868 UPF new or improved products on demand by new national and international markets, implementing short channels, Apps, mobile markets, fairs, intermediaries or/and export companies. 1,243 UFP sold and keep selling their diversified products to these markets. At the national level. the food security and sovereignty approach fostered improved nutrition & local demand.

- **Improved access to tailored productions’ goods and services**: Between January 2018 and December 2019, 16,000 UFP (30% women) have had access to more and improved productions’ goods and services. These goods and services included:
  - Better financial and insurance services, leveraging USD 4,226,254 to promote access to credit and insurance.36 New financial services and products were also developed and implemented (“Pronto Pago”, “Green Credit”, micro insurances, and new mechanisms for the inclusion (“Gestor Financiero Rural”, “Edufina”). Almost 6,000 smallholder (37% women in credit and 41” in insurance);
  - Development and/or dissemination of productions’ inputs to increase yield and productivity, for instance: seeds, insecticides, pheromones, and technologies (mainly soft techs and save time techs) and No Financial Services: New mechanisms for providing technical assistance and information services for smallholder (through universities, enterprises, public entities, and others): More than 16,000 smallholder (31% women);
  - Public management in linkage with producers: New mechanisms to develop skills in local government officials and local leaders through the School for Public Management, the State Autonomy Service and National Irrigation Service. Almost 600 men and women;

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34 SDC (2017) Credit proposal phase 2
35 (F-08634.02.01_C81053330_MInclusivos_Lnf_anual_2019_ASDI_29_03_20.pdf
36 SDC / Swisscontact (2020) Annual report 2019
Innovation in Social Systems: New mechanisms to strengthen prevention and care services for women victims of violence with universities and local governments. 8,938 women.

Despite these achievements the project faces important challenges, concerning: i) Competitiveness with respect to imported products (legal & illegal imports); ii) The participatory public management that is still very limited, due to the centralization and top down approach of the Bolivian public sector but also in a context of extended political crisis; iii) The COVID 19 impacts that hinder the increase in income, and greater access to public goods and services to foster productivity and competitiveness as initially foreseen.

**Contributing factors** – Relying on a consortium and various co-facilitators with the knowledge and experience on the main topics during the initial appraisal stage, was key to the whole process. This facilitated both the work efficiency and access to key stakeholders who were helpful for the updating of the MSD approach. It also helped in digging deep into the root causes of problems in order to prepare concrete and adequate interventions. The interventions were designed to be sustainable and the project mobilized articulations efforts to provide financial services and other activities, creating networks with universities, markets, associations, among others. All partners and target groups were trained on MSD as the core approach for project implementation. It has two major success factors, i) the adaptation of the MSD approach to the Bolivian context, and ii) the capacity to deliver the approach while helping the target groups to innovate in their crops and products. All of it making them both sustainable and scalable, and at the same time increasing their incomes and promoting local consumption.

Finally, yet importantly, working with permanent stakeholders, both public and private; and generating dynamic mechanisms to enhance the goods and services is key to impact with the use of incentives such as capacity building, business planning, funding, amongst others.

**Influence of SDC support** – The SDC had the ability to articulate with many stakeholders who helped in the appraisal stage and the adaptation of the MSD approach to the Bolivian context. Regarding the stakeholders, the SDC had facilitated the governance of the project while overseeing its execution and monitoring. Further MSD principles multidimensional poverty’s approach in conjunction with the project’s facilitating role allowed the development of interventions beyond the economic dimension and led to unexpected results in gender and social aspects. The project applied an opportunity approach allowing the scaling up at a national and public policy level. The Ministry of Rural Development valued positively the MSD approach and replicated it based on the project experience but so far only in its fruit and Andean grain programs because that is where the project was operating. SDC local management proved to be flexible and adaptative, which was a key aspect for the success in influencing.

**Lessons learnt:**

- The feminization of the economic activities at the rural level has to be advocated as the social and economic empowerment of women. The multidimensional poverty approach also allowed working on non-economic issues.
- Both political and institutional changes redefine scaling-up strategies, but changes are permanent and cross-cutting to the project operation. Adequate partnership building is a crucial selection criterium and the most important pre-condition for successful cooperation.
- Implementation and adoption of innovations by private and public sector take time, business models and business as usual need to be adjusted. Public policies can be

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37 7F-08634.01.04_C81044715_inf_MTR_IC_AL_MR_30.09.2016.pdf
38 7F-08634.02.01_C81053330_Minclusivos_Inf_anual_2019_ASDI_29_03_20.pdf
influenced on the basis of proved evidence. The Business model of pilot interventions can create new opportunities allowing new stakeholders/partners to adapt their businesses.

- Incentives are crucial for the implementation of the MSD approach. Sometimes incentives are promoted by the consortium, and sometimes they emerge either from the context, or out of immediate needs of the intervention group. Incentives may also change in a context with weak institutions and periodic crises. Exceptional things have been achieved at one point, with a particular incentive that could not be identified at the outset. It refers to the fact that incentives are not standard, especially when it comes to actors such as universities, it is necessary to "read and understand the actors’ needs" at different stages and act accordingly. The program was well adapted to the Bolivian situation. SDC local management adaptability allowed it, linked to the adaptative management’s approach from Swisscontact, PROFIN and cofacilitators (PROINPA, PLAGBOL and RIMISP). The main features of the adaptive management are: i) Orientation to innovation "open mind"; ii) Results oriented planning & monitoring is everyone’s responsibility and allowed learning, access to good information and assessment of successful or promising interventions and managing the project according to the results, avoiding investment in actions without results; iii) Flexible budgets allow capacity response to changes in context; iv) SDC local management’s trust in the implementer is key to provide flexibility and adaptation’s capacity; v) Operational plans are guidelines to be followed and on-going adapted; vi) Team with multiple leaderships (thematic, functional or others) and with capacity and decision-making power; vii) Extensive networking

Figure 1: Regions that the project operates in Bolivia (Source: IM Project ppt)

![Figure 1](image-url)
In the first and second phases the prioritized chains have been vegetables, fruit, dairy, and tubers (potatoes), in the second phase the chains of Andean grains and legumes were added. The main difference is that in the first phase the areas had more favourable conditions for production and in the second phase the areas are poorer and less favourable for production (mainly because of the climate and access to water).

Beneficiary story. Source: Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation SDC – Inclusive Markets

I Component. Development and Market Access:

3 sustainable information services 10 and 4 technical capacities courses 11. 43 vendors 12 publics (GAM,GAD, State’s Programs and Projects) and private (EIF, 300 referent technical, promotors and producers have been strengthened and have more and better products and/or services adequate to target group’s goals and needs who also word in a sustainable way)

Credit socialization by GFR and BUN’s credit Official. Developed at Challapata municipality to milk producers. Source: Rural Markets from SDC, 2016.
II Component. Desarrollo y Acceso al Mercado Financiero:

6 financial innovations (4 credits and 2 insurance)
4.613 UPF obtained better financing conditions.
1.070 UPF acquired insurance products (viticulture insurance, life insurance/burial insurance and machinery leasing insurance)

III Component. Business Environment:

12 normative, technical, operative, and administrative instruments for productive development and market access. 530 technicians, municipalities’ secretaries, mayors, and council members developed their capacities approving public management specialization modules for productive development.

Results from the introduction of new varieties in La Paz Altiplano.
Source: Inclusive Markets from SDC and SIDA 2019.

Fumigation service through drones and biological supplies.

Public Management Specialization for Productive Development Course Launch Event – EGPP.
Source: Rural Markets from SDC, 2016.
**Case study 5 - Mercados Inclusivos & Covid-19**

<table>
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<th>Project response</th>
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<td>• Increase in labour costs for harvesting and cuts in collection services;</td>
<td>• Creation and improvement of Web solution to support the articulation of actors and institutions to supply food, information, biosafety inputs supply and demand at national, departmental, and local level;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Increase in transportation costs to bring production to marketing channels;</td>
<td>• Innovative e-solutions to guarantee supply of production inputs in collaboration with academia;</td>
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<td>• Reduction in family income due to reduction in demand and sale prices, leading to a reduction in investment capital for future production;</td>
<td>• Articulation with the Financial Services Authority, the Central Bank of Bolivia, and financial entities to develop a tailored strategy to respond to the financial and insurance needs of local actors within the pandemic;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Food shortages and rising prices of basket basic products;</td>
<td>• Purchase and distribution of biosafety equipment and supplies to producers and local governments' technicians in the scope of project activities in collaboration with academia;</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Reduction of access to markets of financial products and services;</td>
<td>• Strengthening of the Municipal Comprehensive Legal Services for care and prevention of gender violence in collaboration with academia;</td>
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<td>• Deterioration of living conditions of women in the productive and domestic spheres because of increased family care tasks and gender-based violence;</td>
<td>• Strengthening of the Municipal management on gender-oriented actions for economic recovery in collaboration with School of Public Management, public actors, and civil society;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Increase of social conflicts affecting territorial governance.</td>
<td>• Cross media and multilingual actions to promote and influence health care in food production &amp; consumption in alliance with the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Outlook**

In the coming months, the project will be further facing Covid-19 related risks (R) and therefore the project will continue with adapted and flexible interventions as those exposed above under consideration of mitigation measures. The goal will be to recover the productive activity, the income under a new and changing context.

- R1. Producers' uncertainty regarding the markets in the midst of the pandemic because it affects the purchase of inputs, the sale of products, the access to financial products and services, and the marketing channels;
- R2. Possible restrictions on mobility paralyze production processes, isolating producers from their markets and making it impossible to transport products to the market;
- R3. Deepening of the rural exodus and the school dropout of children and young people, due to the fall in income, the lack of access to the Internet for educational activities and the lack of agricultural and non-agricultural employment opportunities;
- R4. Anxiety, panic, sadness, and uncertainty among the rural population due to: i) having to continue working and having no other option to protect themselves; ii) the evident precariousness of health centres; iii) the lack of biosafety supplies and measures at workplaces;
- R5. Deepening of precarious living conditions of women in the productive and domestic spheres, increase in child and adolescent care tasks and gender-based violence.

The current phase of the Inclusive Markets project (2017-2021) in Bolivia has the main objective to improve the living conditions and reduce poverty of agricultural producers, craftsmen and women, young people and entrepreneurs in the Andean high plateaus and valleys who are particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate change and food insecurity. The project works on increasing their economic opportunities, capacities, and income with a particular focus on empowering women. It is funded jointly by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) and implemented by a consortium formed by Swisscontact and PROFIN (a Bolivian foundation specialized in financial inclusion and innovation). To achieve sustainability, scale and impact, the project is using a Market Systems Development (MSD)
approach and includes the component “development and access to markets for financial products and services”.

COVID-19 impact

**Increase in personnel costs for harvesting and cuts in collection services.**
To respond to the increase in personnel costs during the harvest of potato, quinoa, broad bean and peach, rural producers without access to machinery used the reciprocity method (help between neighbors of the same community). Dairy products were not collected regularly by the different industries in La Paz.

**Increase in transportation costs to bring production to marketing channels.**
All sectors suffered in the commercialization stage because transportation was affected by restrictions, high ticket fares and lack of fuel. Producers had to travel long distances to reach commercialization points where other peasants gathered to offer their products: there were few buyers (intermediary wholesalers); and demanded quantities were below the usual. Many producers sold their products at low prices to avoid returning with them to their communities. A wide percentage decided to store and transform the product through dehydration (peach, bean) or store it as a seed (quinoa, potato). Vegetables, fruits, and dairy were mostly affected because those are perishable products, so peasants decided to use them as food for their animals. A lot of producers affirm having lost half of their production sales.

**Reduction in family income due to reduction in demand and sale prices, leading to a reduction in investment capital for future production.**
Income reduction is related to a food demand drop from hotels, restaurants, and families, because of the economic stagnation that provoked a cascade effect leading to the cancellation of many contracts with intermediaries and direct channel sales, which had an immediate effect in product prices. Families also lost income from other activities such as construction and transport. Income drop lead to producers not being capable of paying their credits or investing in future production. Transports and logistics came almost to a total halt causing scarcity and delays in food supply chains. This has led to reduced food security and increased fear among the population which ultimately impacted prices for final consumers on the markets.

**Reduction of access to markets of financial products and services.**
Due to social distancing regulations, financial institutions have reduced client contacts and thus also granted fewer loans. However, customers faced liquidity shortages and needed additional cash or were unable to service their debts and interest payments on time.

Deterioration of living conditions of women in the productive and domestic spheres because of increased family care tasks and gender-based violence. Lack of freedom to travel has forced woman to have more coexistence with their aggressors, they have also experienced an overload in terms of care.

In terms of care, schools’ closure has increased the number of hours that women dedicate to take care of the children, in addition to having to support boys and girls in their learning activities. At the same time, COVID-19 patients care has been relegated to woman.
Increase of social conflicts affecting territorial governance. Producers expressed their discontent and disinformation about quarantine measures and social conflicts emerged in various municipalities, because they felt a lack of comprehension and support to continue their productive activities on time, under biosecurity measures, having access to medical attention and the risk of getting the disease provoked anxiety, panic, sadness, and uncertainty among the population.

**Project response**

To respond to the persistent challenges posed by the Covid-19 pandemic, the project has facilitated the cooperation between actors to provide solutions to farmers’ and small enterprises’ needs through the following actions:

**Creation and improvement of online solutions to support the articulation of food, information, biosafety inputs supply and demand at national, departmental, and local level.**

This action is in collaboration with the Ministry of Rural Development and Lands, Ministry of Communication, the Governorates, the municipalities, in alliance with public institutions such as the Productive Development Bank, and civil society organizations such as the Federation of Municipal Associations and many others NGOs. For instance: Mobile Markets (La Paz), Organic vegetable supply markets (Oruro), ECOTIENDAS, etc.

**E-solutions to guarantee supply of production inputs.** Virtual centre for the collection of demand information, articulation with supply and support for joint purchases of dairy cattle feed and cheese production as a pilot in the municipality of Viacha with the Universidad Mayor de San Andres (under the agricultural production and commercialization curriculum).

**Articulation with the Financial Services Authority (ASFI), the Central Bank of Bolivia and financial entities to develop a tailored strategy to respond to the needs within the pandemic.**

The Following actions were implemented: i) An information campaign for the population about the measures taken regarding rescheduling and refinancing of loans; ii) an Online payment system; iii) Extension of the life and accident insurance policy to cover the risk for COVID-19. The following tailored tools were available to farmers allowing them to overcome liquidity shortages in their businesses: i) micro factoring, ii) trainings to local brokers in remote areas.

**Purchase and distribution of biosafety supplies to producers and local governments technicians in the scope of project activities.**

In collaboration with the Bolivian Catholic University “San Pablo” the project supported a group of researchers and Bolivian teachers in the design and delivery of 80 self-inflating bags for air ventilation (MAMBU) to more than 50 municipalities. The project also provided basic supplies (Chinstraps, gloves, alcohol gel, liquid soap, and others) to producers, local governments, and technicians in the scope of project activities.

**Strengthening of the Municipal Comprehensive Legal Services for care and prevention of gender violence**

This action included elaboration of materials related to violence prevention in Spanish and Aymara for dissemination, psychological and legal advice, and attention to rural leaders in
9 municipalities through virtual sessions in collaboration with students of the Universidad Mayor de San Andres (psychology and law careers).

**Strengthening of the Municipal management on gender-oriented actions for economic recovery**

The project provided virtual training through e-platforms in alliance with the State Service of Autonomies to public servants in order to support economic and productive recovery under a gender approach. The project also promoted alliances with State Service of Autonomies, NGOs, and local governments, for the systematization of gender oriented municipal practices.

**Cross media and multilingual actions to promote and influence health care in food production & consumption**

The project produced information pieces for radio, video, print and social networks on biosecurity measures in Aymara, Quechua, and Spanish. Alliances with the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs to address biosafety in food security and to positively influence consumption in order to improve the population immune system.

**Monitoring of needs, impacts and results of project response to facing the pandemic**

Virtual guides and tools have been designed and implemented in order to follow up the upcoming situation. A prospective study is under way to identify the impacts of the emergency on agricultural activities in the project's priority territories and sectors.

**Outlook**

In the coming months, the project will be further facing Covid-19 related risks (R) and therefore the project will continue with adapted and flexible interventions as those exposed above, with consideration to the following mitigation measures (MM). The goal will be to recover the productive activity, the income under a new and changing context.

R.1. Producers' uncertainty regarding the markets in the midst of the pandemic because it affects the purchase of inputs, the sale of products, the access to financial products and services, and the marketing channels. MM1. Deepening and widening of 2.1-2.8 actions to articulate supply and demand of products, diversifying production, improving access to financial products and services, widening commercialization channels, electronic payment methods, actions to promote exports from enterprises with small scale provider programs. All this is done in alliance with public, academia, civil society, and private actors at national, departmental, and local level.

R.2. Possible restrictions on mobility paralyze production processes, isolating producers from their markets and making it impossible to transport products to the markets. MM2. Actions 2.1., 2.4. and 2.7.5. are relevant to mitigate this risk. Enhance local actors' capacities to articulate with others outside the territory in an effective way, using new technologies and with the support of multilevel authorities. Innovating and diversifying harvest, production, and commercialization processes contributes to overcome potential restriction situations.

R.3. Deepening of the rural exodus and the school dropout of children and young people, due to the fall in income, the lack of access to the Internet for educational activities and the lack of agricultural and non-agricultural employment opportunities MM3. It is especially important to promote family agriculture's revaluation and its relevance in food production for the population, to mitigate that risk. All actions of point 2 are relevant, but those that are done in collaboration with institutions to promote a specific support to rural children and youth are especially relevant. 2.5-2.8 In that sense social, cultural, technical, and environmental innovation done along with actors from the academic sector, public and private institutions, to improve production, competitiveness and commercialization conditions are crucial. Development of capacity taking into account priorities such as territorial aspects, promoting intergenerational peers, technological connectivity, and mechanisms to connect rural and urban areas with each other and the global community.

R.4. Anxiety, panic, sadness, and uncertainty among the rural population due to: i) having to continue working and having no other option to protect themselves; ii) the evident
precariousness of health centres; iii) the lack of biosafety supplies and measures at workplaces MM4. Actions 2.4 and 2.7 become essential to mitigate that risk. Deepening and widening of violence prevention and attention services support are also vital.

R.5. Deepening of precarious living conditions of women in the productive and domestic spheres, increase in child and adolescent care tasks and gender-based violence.

MM5. Actions 2.5 and 2.6 become essential to mitigate this risk. Additionally, other actions can be taken such as: i) strengthening actions to make care work visible and co-responsibility, through municipal services and the National Social and Public Co-responsibility of Care Platform; ii) Scaling municipal attention and violence against woman prevention services programs through universities; iii) Diffuse low cost and time saving technologies.
Case Study 6 - Veterinary services in Georgia – contribution analysis

Project objectives

“To make a lasting and positive impact on large numbers of small farmers by improving access and use of veterinary drugs and services”. The project was one of the many interventions carried out by ALCP in the period from 2008 to 2020. ALCP is a multi-phase programme that aims to reduce rural poverty in Southern Georgia by helping livestock farmers to gain better access to markets, information services and public goods with a special focus on women’s economic empowerment. ALCP uses the M4P/MSD approach.

Challenges faced

- Fragmented land holding
- Poor access to credit;
- Collapse of veterinary services
- Poor genetic stock;
- High transport costs in access veterinary drugs and services
- Women facing barriers due to distance to pharmacies;
- Market for providing services to poor, remote farmers is perceived as risky;
- Low animal productivity and continued poverty among rural poor.

Contributing factors

- Better information and raising farmer awareness through marketing and through local pharmacies;
- Access to veterinary drugs and services eased due increase density and mobility of pharmacies;
- Recognition by national input supplier(s) and pharmacies of the market potential of serving poor remote farmers.

Significant change

- Information on drugs and services available improved;
- Sustained behaviour changes in animal health and prevention;
- Local access and increased use of veterinary drugs/services;
- Women access veterinary drugs/services;
- Income increase for poor farmers;
- Systemic market change through sustained, expanding and replicated business model.

SDC influence

- Market intelligence and origination of the business idea;
- Skilful facilitation avoiding dependence;
- Provision of grants to risk share in early stage actions.

Absence of change (in this case beyond the project scope)

- Land holdings fragmented;
- Credit access (although improved);
- Poor genetic stock;
- Average farmer income still low.

Sources: 1) Aarons, A, Bradbury, H, Maestre, M. (June 2016) Transforming access to veterinary services in Georgia. The Alliances Lesser Caucasus Programme. The BEAM Exchange, 2016; 2) Bekkers, H. & Zulfiqar, M. (2020) The story of MSD: achieving sustainable development at scale. 3) Personal communication Helen Bradbury; Roti team (Davit Bostashvili (Director); Eka Narchemashvili - Sales and operational manager; Mikheil Chichakua - livestock department main specialist; Nikoloz Zazashvili - Business Consultant; Nino Nadibaidze, Agro face, 2020); Rural Advisory Services, Pharmacy, Mr Zurab Sadaterashvili.
Challenges faced – In 2011 when the project intervention started, the region was still suffering from the post-soviet collapse of veterinary services with no private or market based alternatives and a fast decline in agricultural production. Land holdings were fragmented, access to credit highly constrained and farming was mainly at a subsistence or semi-substance level farming with most farms having less than 10 milking cows. The genetic stock was depleted and less than 15% of farmers had access to veterinary drugs and services and even less made regular use of them. As a result, animal production was low with underweight animals suffering from disease and high mortality rates. Veterinary services where they were provided were carried out by self-taught vets operating at the farm level with limited access to information and drugs. There were high transport costs to access drugs from a limited number of local pharmacies especially for women who faced cultural barriers to travel to the centres where the pharmacies were located. This situation left farmers unable to respond to the demand for hygiene compliant and quality meat, milk and cheese that was rapidly growing through expanding Georgian supermarket chains and export markets. In summary, the market was not working for small scale farmers due a self-reinforcing cycle of a missing distribution network of veterinary services, low awareness and a cautionary business perspective that was overlooking the potential of a profitable market for veterinary services in rural areas.

Significant changes or absence of change - Today, farmers are better aware of the drugs and services available and this information has led to sustained behaviour change in the priority given to animal health and prevention of disease. This higher priority given to animal health together with easier access to pharmacies and advice has led to increased use of drugs and services and ultimately to higher animal production and farmer income. Women in particular have benefitted as they no longer need to travel long distances and now have direct access to veterinary services. There are some signs that cultural barriers to women taking a lead in livestock production are being slowly broken down. Over the first five years of the project over 440,000 farmers accessed improved veterinary drugs and services leading to a conservatively estimated collective income increase of CHF 11m (2018). Small scale pharmacies have increased sales and outreach and have become more profitable offering a wider range of drugs and services to their clients. A national level input supplier (ROKI) that led the project has grown its business increasing its production volume by 20% and widening the range of drugs available. Through expansion from an initial pilot of five pharmacies the distribution network has grown to 430 pharmacies across Georgia (2020) with a continued expansion and entrance of the two other national level input suppliers. ROKI has expanded its services to address a growing export market to neighbouring countries and a regional system of commercially based animal and veterinary health services is emerging. The domestic production of drugs is now 80% up from 20% when the project started which has led to shorter supply lines and lower prices being offered to the farmers.

The project deliberately did not address some of the external underlying constraints such as the fragmented land holding, access to credit and the genetic stock. An initiative to introduce artificial insemination was considered but not taken up by the business partner. Although credit was not targeted some easing of credit restrictions has occurred through pharmacies offering customer credit through microfinancing institutions.

Contributing factors – At the farmer level, a triggering factor has been the raising of awareness and provision of information through local pharmacies. Coupled with this an increasing density of pharmacies, and especially mobile satellite pharmacies, has served to further enhance demand and respond to it by reducing the distance from the farm, lowering the costs, and enabling women to access a wider range of veterinary drugs and services more easily.

From the supplier perspective, a triggering factor was the recognition of a market potential with relatively poor and remote clients. This recognition combined with the offer of risk sharing from the project broke down the earlier caution of Roki to enter directly into the
market for poor and remote clients. Confidence inspired by market research led to a pilot engagement in marketing and provision of information and later an increasing level of investment in an expanding distribution network. In later stages further investments were made in setting up a laboratory to overcome local bottlenecks in laboratory services. An information portal (Agroface) was also set up to extend information and marketing of services and drugs to end users (more than 700 calls are received each month).

**Influence of SDC support** – The SDC project ALCP was instrumental in recognising a market failure in delivery of veterinary drugs and services to poor and remote farmers. Through a dynamic market research, the project was able to pinpoint and deepen understanding of the causes of the long standing weaknesses in the information environment and distribution network. It was also able to demonstrate a business potential for national level suppliers. Whilst a study could have been left on the shelf like others in the past a more dynamic approach was adopted and an effort was made to engage with potential suppliers to interest them in the business prospects. From these discussions a partner was chosen that undertook their own market analysis and a pilot project with 5 pharmacies was co-financed with the project sharing the risks by initially carrying 65% of the costs with this level reducing to 33% for the last phases.

**Alternative explanations** – It is unlikely that the market weaknesses would have been addressed in the short term without intervention. There is a clear counterfactual in that there was little progress, either within or outside of the regions supported by the project, before 2011 when the project stepped in.

**Lessons learnt:**

The elaborated case studies developed by the project and others outline a number of important points including:

- Work with and mobilise existing market players - internalising the business idea and refraining from involvement in core function areas e.g., drug import
- Share risk but through a declining level of grant as risks/uncertainty reduce – avoiding distortion by considering and being open to all market players
- Add value through market analysis, data processing and dynamic market intelligence
- Market failures for the poor can be addressed through intervention higher up the value chain
- High facilitation and project management skills needed to negotiate, manage relationships, and retain business agility without deviating from core principles.
- Business development services were facilitated successfully due to clear link between service, value, payment – cost is small and technology enabled.

*If you go to someone with a fully pitched idea, maybe they can handle it, but maybe they cannot, especially if they are not really lead firms. And you are asking for a lot of upfront commitment. Whereas if you phase it, start on a level people are happy with, they test it, they see if it works, and then often they come with the ideas you were leading to anyway ... I don’t see it as repeatedly funding the same client in a senseless way – it’s an intelligent drawing along the path." Helen Bradbury, ALCP Team Leader (source 1)*

Owner of the Vet Pharmacy Dato Tatoshvili on Veterinary Service Outputs (SJ): ‘Regular milk suppliers now always pay for the vet service and preventative medicine before due to insecure market, nobody used to pay for the vet service. We are supporting them now by offering low interest rate loans or late payment for vaccination or veterinary medicines and the loans are very well used by the farmers.’ Annual report August 2016, Samtskhe Javakheti.

Female small scale livestock producer- Lia Shavadze on Veterinary Service Outputs (AJ): ‘Before, the Vet pharmacy in the center of Khulo had poor choice and was open about once in a week. Now the new vet pharmacy is open every day, from 9am to 6pm and offers high quality vet medicines at an affordable price, and I can get professional consultation and advice.’ ALCP, Annual report February 2016, Ajara.

Female small scale livestock producer- Khatuna from Tsalka on intervention outcomes: ‘I have 5 cows. Last year one cow became ill, we could not treat it on time, as I couldn’t find a car to go to Tsalka and the cow died. This year a vet pharmacy was opened in our village. I often visit it and now take measures in advance.’ ALCP, Annual report August 2014, Kvemo Kartli.

Zurab Sadatiershvili, Owner of Rural Advisory Services Pharmacies: ‘I used to go to Tbilisi with my own car to get the supplies – Roki did not have a stockpile so I had to stockpile in bulk and this also caused a problem with expiry dates – also a waste in time use. Now it is much better and I have been able to expand from 2 to 6 pharmacies.’ Interview September 2020.
Case Study 7 - Feed market in Georgia – contribution analysis

Project objectives

To increase the incomes and livelihoods of small-scale farming families by better access to improved livestock feed.

Challenges faced

- Low productivity of the livestock sector due to inappropriate feeding practices;
- Lack of information on improved feeding practices and prejudices;
- Low availability of improved livestock feed;
- Farmers’ purchasing power low;
- Feed mills’ scope of services narrowed;
- Insufficient business linkages between feed mills and input supplier(s).

Contributing factors

- Information dissemination through local media and feed mills;
- Affordable market prices of improved feed;
- Presence of large, medium, and small-scale feed producers on the market;
- Recognition by large (national) feed suppliers of the market potential of serving small-scale farmers;
- Accessibility of improved feed through the geographical concentration of feed distributors in all district centres and large villages.

Significant change

- Information on livestock feed improved;
- Sustainable local access and increased use of improved livestock feed;
- Income increase for small-scale farming families;
- Systemic market change through improved supporting and core functions.

SDC influence

- Market diagnosis and selection of the intervention area;
- Education and awareness raising;
- Focus on the intervention and attaining the results rather than on direct business development support to SMEs;
- Skilful facilitation avoiding dependence;
- Diversification of the services of Kakheti based feed mills;
- Establishment of lasting partnerships between market players.

Absence of change

- Users still choose lower prices over quality;
- Farmers’ awareness increased but remains low;
- Farmers’ understanding of the importance of the use of improved feed increased but still remains low.

Project objectives – to increase the incomes and improve the livelihoods of small-scale farming families in Kakheti region of Georgia by better access to improved livestock feed. Kakheti is one of the largest regions in the country with widespread small-scale cattle and pig rearing. It is estimated that 85% of farming families own at least one cow and that the majority (55%) are subsistence-oriented livestock producers. The project intervention targeted those that own less than ten cows and/or 10 pigs. This was one of several interventions under the Market Opportunities for Livelihood and Improvement project (MOLI) which started in November 2011 and ended in November 2018. The project intervention applied the MSD approach.

Challenges faced – The baseline study from 2012 showed that less than 20% of farmers had access to concentrated feed enriched with vitamins, grain-based feed, animal feed vitamins and high protein feed. Absence of information and insufficient access to improved

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feed resulted in lower production volumes and under-nutrition of cattle. Only 15% of feed mills were selling their own prepared animal feed products whereas the remaining 85% were providing only milling services to farmers who brought their own ingredients. One of the reasons for this narrowed scope of feed mills’ services was insufficient business linkages between feed mills and the input suppliers that provide the necessary ingredients and technical knowledge regarding improved feeding recipes and ingredients.

**Significant changes or absence of change** – Today, 36,000 of farmers, or almost 47% of all rural households in Kakheti region have access to improved feed. The sale of improved feed increased from 32 tons in 2012 up to 2300 tons in 2017, an increase of almost 70 times in six years. The productivity of fattened bull and pig for sale increased by 30 and 100% respectively (against a project target of 20%). 7,000 small-scale farmers received GEL 4,400,000 as net additional income through feeding their livestock with combined feed. Farmers are better informed of the advantages of using combined feed and more easily able to access it due to better market linkages between national and regional suppliers and locally based feed mills. A systemic market change occurred and new practices have been adopted and maintained at regional but also expanded and supported by market players at national level. The lasting change has been catalysed through partnerships between regional and national suppliers and local media.

MOLI helped the national suppliers who were involved in the project, like INVET to become more popular and widespread in Kakheti but it did not end up in monopolising the market. Vice versa, a number of small feed mills were created in Kakheti, and the idea of concentrated feed got penetrated in small villages and among small-scale farmers. Besides, large feed producers like AgroComb have evolved. Currently there are AgroComb, Nutrimax, INVET, ROKI and other companies which more or less are competitors and at the same time with different packages of services and products to the farmers. Although positive change has occurred a study commissioned by the SDC in 2017 revealed that 67% of farmers still choose low price over quality in animal nutrition products. Despite an increase in the awareness that intervention has achieved, there is still a persistent lack of knowledge on improved feed among users. The same study showed that farmers use improved feed only when there is no other food, i.e., sales of cattle feed are almost zero from May to September demonstrating a still low understanding of the importance of the use of improved feed among some farmers.

**Contributing factors** – At the supplier level, there were already large, medium, and small-scale feed producers represented across all district centres and large villages. By building on this network the intervention was able to bring about improved linkages between the farmers, the feed producers and national feed suppliers mainly through market research that demonstrated the market potential through provisioning feed mills with the needed inputs to ensure the availability and sustainable access to improved feed by the mills and farmers. Moreover, feed mills are now able to purchase inputs at wholesale prices from national suppliers, making the improved feed products more affordable to farmers. The market linkages were first improved in 2012-13 when the intervention supported two relatively big village-based feed mills and facilitated the establishment of linkages with a national level inputs supplier. At the end of November 2018 there were 4 national and 4 regional feed producers in Kakheti with a significantly increased the volume of produce serving a larger number of small-scale family farmers with combined feed. This permanent increase of geographical outreach in Kakheti area, as well as an increasing trend of local feed production and sales of improved feed in general, ensured a sustainable provision of improved feed to small scale farmers dealing with livestock.

As well as the availability of better feed, a triggering factor for farmers has been the awareness raising and dissemination of product information, which has led to improved feeding practices. Direct linkages with the national suppliers such as INVET, ensured
sustained coverage and availability of information provided to feed mills through which farmers get direct consultations. The information environment has improved through the establishment of the Association of Georgian Agricultural Journalists (AGAJ) in 2017. Through proper facilitation and networking, combined with well thought and implemented capacity building activities by using various approaches (workshops, study tours, experience exchange), the Association become a member of the International Foundation of Agricultural Journalists (IFAJ) 6 months after its creation.

The study from 2017 showed that some users thought that the concentrated feed harms the quality of the product. This could explain why some farmer still resist the use of improved feed. It is possible that had the farmers’ perceptions of and attitudes towards concentrated feed been studied prior to the intervention, the results could have been even more impressive. The interpretation of the perceptions would potentially have better informed the intervention activities, as well as deepen the understanding of change or absence of change in behaviour.

Influence of SDC support – The SDC project recognized constraints in the market system that are limiting production growth and are hampering economic development of small-scale farmer families. The project supported the development of strategy to diversify the services of Kakheti based feed mills and established sound and lasting partnerships between local media, regional feed mills and a nation-wide operating feed-suppliers and demonstrated business potential of SMEs (e.g., feed mills and bull fattening farmers through slaughterhouses and milk supplier farmers through dairies) through intensification of cooperation with small-scale farming families. The SDC project was instrumental in catalysing a process where the feed mills were transformed from being a single service provider to becoming a comprehensive feed business. The project management did not face substantial challenges during the implementation as they focused on the direct intervention activities and results rather than on direct business development of SMEs. Noteworthy, the project management did not experience any change in human resources during the intervention period.

Lessons learnt

- Access to good information is an elementary issue for planning, implementing, and monitoring a development project
- The importance of partner selection, and the ability to anticipate and allow changes in their business operation is the crucial selection criteria and most important pre-conditions for successful cooperation
- Timely and effective communication to all stakeholders is needed, as well as better coordination of activities internally and externally
- Both the traditional and social media channels are important for larger coverage of project intervention
- Set clear goals, learn from other cases, and think how and to what extent successful stories can be applied in a given context

A member of the Association of Georgian Agricultural Journalists Nestan Mermanishvili on partner selection: “It is important who you start to partner with. The one is relevant which expresses an incentive and has a respective way of understanding of market system development.”

Director of Agro Solutions consulting company Irakli Chikava on awareness raising: “We love to talk about the success of this project. MOLI was successful in education and awareness-raising. Not many development projects in Georgia are successful. It was essential to build trust between the project and farmers. Raising awareness and providing information via local media would not be enough without the built trust and word of mouth.”
Director of Agro Solutions consulting company Irakli Chikava on project design: The project was designed properly and the thorough approach considered all actors and segments of the value chain.”

**Figure 1: The region that the project operates in**, Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Administrative_Divisions_of_Georgia_(country)_-_en.svg

**Beneficiary story.** Source: Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation SDC – Moli project PPT

"My name is Natela Mamucharashvili, I am 62 years old, married and I have 2 children already living outside my house. I live together with my husband in the village Matani in the Kakheti region. Just like my other neighbours, I own four pigs for fattening. While using improved feed it usually takes 5.5 months for them to reach 120 kg. live weight (90 kg. meat) as an optimal weight for selling the pig, meaning that two fattening cycles can be made per year. It is worth mentioning that with the use of traditional feed for fattening, it takes 11 months to reach the same weight, which allows for only one fattening cycle per year. Despite the fact that the cost of 1 Kg of improved feed is higher compared to the cost of the traditional feed, the overall annual cost of feeding one pig is equal. The reason is only the difference in feeding durations. Since with improved feed I can make two fattening cycles of pigs per year, my income per pig is twice more than the income of my neighbours, who use traditional feed for pig fattening and while I, as majority of my neighbours, keep 4 pigs for fattening per cycle, my net annual profit is GEL 4,000, which is 100% more compared to "traditional feed"."
**Case study 8 - Mali – Youth**

### Project objectives

Public sector actors and organisations’ networks support the implementation of agricultural land policy and the development of rural youth entrepreneurship in agriculture.

### Challenges faced

- Lack of opportunities to get jobs and training;
- Need for material resources (professional kits) to become credible professionals;
- Need for financial means (micro-credit, mobilisation of family resources) to start their (self) entrepreneurial activities;
- Lack of information and support for establishing business relationships within market systems;
- Need for structural and institutional means (infrastructure, access to energy, working conditions and salaries, etc.) to participate in the good governance of their sector and market system.

### Contributing factors

- MSD approach has facilitated relations between actors around transactions, focusing on the empowerment and autonomy of the partners;
- The nature of partnerships and collaboration have been based on the analysis of production systems and markets;
- The project contributed to develop advocacy approaches to promote regional development and decentralisation.

### Significant change

- Networking and access to information;
- Young people are better represented;
- Mediation between supply and demand (and creation) of employment for 708 young people within local economy allowed to integrate them as professionals; Farmers’ organisations were dynamic actors within these actions as endogenous vocational training providers for a total of 405 young people;
- Young family members with well-defined responsibilities within 50 local families, 15 local businesses and towns’ administrative authorities and structures;
- Creation of 50 new innovative businesses run by 75 young people.

### SDC influence

- SDC co-financing with the federation of farmers’ organisations to provide training for young people represents a paradigm shift in a country used to receive without own contribution;
- Helvetas facilitator’s and coach role is the new way to foster permanent connections between actors and triggering a market system into which young people can actively fit.

### Outlook

- In-depth vocational training needs to be adapted to rural needs in dialogue with education authorities at national and local levels;
- Young oriented social services in the targeted towns need to be provided in collaboration with the local government and families;
- New public private partnerships, technical innovative approaches may motivate young people to work in Agri businesses and at the same time, increase productivity and competitiveness;
- Further strategies to improve market access of rural products and for the development of systemic investments through the public private partnerships are needed.

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**Project objectives** – To improve in a sustainable way the food security, the nutrition, and the income of family farms and agriculture enterprises in Sikasso, Mopti and Tombouctou. The project has also foreseen as expected outcome that public sector actors and organisations’ networks support the implementation of agricultural land policy and the development of rural youth entrepreneurship in agriculture.

**Challenges faced** – Several serious problems confront young people in targeted rural areas to get inserted into formal professional education or employment: among the identified problems were:

- Lack of opportunities to get jobs and training;
- Need for material resources (professional kits) to become credible professionals;
- Need for financial means (micro-credit, mobilisation of family resources) to start their (self) entrepreneurial activities;
- Lack of information and support for establishing business relationships within market systems;
• Need for structural and institutional means (infrastructure, access to energy, working conditions and salaries, etc.) to participate in the good governance of their sector and market system.

As a result of this situation, young people often decide to migrate to cities leaving their towns and families. In the cities they often accept to be involved in disqualified low-income generating activities.

**Significant changes or absence of change** – This challenging situation has been analysed by the project and therefore specific actions and measures have been proposed to improve youth living conditions and opportunities. The project set up a systemic approach to closing information gaps, introducing a youth sensitive approach, and increasing employment opportunities.

**Networking and access to information:** The project promoted the creation of young led networks and organizations that provided among others: information; matching services; start-up support within opportunity groups. For instance, a database on agricultural information has been set up providing information on the quantity of cereal stock in stores, the price of cereals on the market, the price of agricultural inputs, the date of sowing, etc.

**Young people are better represented:** young people are represented in platforms, events, business, political dialogues, advocacy meetings, conflict resolution initiatives, especially on land, in order to defend their interests and assert their viability, credibility, professionalism and relevance in the local economy. The project has provided support for through local radios’ campaigns in towns that fostered for instance the application of traditional land transfer among municipal and administrative authorities. As a result of project actions young people have increased their access to land for vegetable production, corn, and fish farming.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name: Amagana GUINDO</th>
<th>Town: Koro</th>
<th>Région: Mopti</th>
<th>Activity: Fish farmer and market gardener</th>
</tr>
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</table>
| "I was unemployed after my studies in public health, I started fish farming through a small basin at home. After two years of trial and error without much success, I was selected by the OPF4 program to follow the 10-day training in fish farming. At the end of the training, I also started the activity of market gardening. In terms of employment, I told myself that by expanding my business with own investments, I could still create jobs for other young people at the local level. Today I employ more than 5 young people for the manufacture of fish feed and market gardening. Currently I am a reference in the area. The OPF4 project uses my site to carry out practical training for young fish farmers and market gardeners. In short, my motivation for fish farming and market gardening can be summed up in three areas: Enable the employability of young people, essential for sustainable development. Effectively fight against malnutrition through the availability of local foods with high nutritional values Contribute to food self-sufficiency. To this end, these fish farming and market gardening activities are for me a real springboard allowing me to strengthen my capacity, to train myself more and to be better equipped in this field to serve even other young people."

Credit: Helvetas
Short term training: Six (6) OPF Farmers organisations were dynamic actors within these actions as endogenous vocational training providers for a total of 405 young people. 110 young people have been also trained in the technical aspects and management of SMEs in Agri-businesses.

Young people as dynamic income generating family and town members: the project promoted actions to provide young family members with well-defined responsibilities within 50 local families, 15 local businesses and towns’ administrative authorities and structures. Families and local businesses encouraged them with financial support, access to land to undertake income generating and commercial activities. Some young people manufactured own products, other engaged themselves in the production of corn in the region of Sikasso and in market gardening in the region of Mopti.

Mediation between supply and demand (and creation) of employment for young people within local economy allowed to integrate them as: 768 new seasonal regular rural jobs have been created. Examples of demanded and created jobs are:

- Young veterinary assistants disseminating information on veterinary products, and offering paid care services to family farms;
- Young warehouse workers in collaboration with distribution companies, which offer information and advice services on inputs (fertilizers, phytosanitary products, etc.);
- Young storekeepers to aggregate the harvests of agricultural products from farmers’ organizations members, to ensure group marketing;
- Young workers into local product processing units managed by farmers’ organizations.

Name: Saliabé Gilbert Diarra  
Town: Dabera - Mandidakuy-; Tominian  
Activity: Service provider

“I am a member of FUAPAD, as I did not go to school so the main activity that I carried out was agriculture with little means, but in 2017 I was literate for 45 days in the local language to know how to read and calculate. Then I had a practical training on the operation of post-harvest equipment through FUAPAD through the OPF4 project.

To be able to set up as a post-harvest service provider, I signed a collaboration agreement with FUAPAD to access post-harvest equipment (threshers and huskers). According to the collaboration agreement, I must reimburse the costs of post-harvest equipment in 4 years. Upon receipt of the 1st sheller and thresher in 2018, I received explanations given for the proper functioning, therefore I started the husking of fonio. Since February 2019 I provide fonio shelling to FUAPAD without having received any training, I perform my services without problems while providing small interviews. Currently I have been able to reimburse a good part of the costs of the equipment that I had leased with FUAPAD.

Before I did not have enough income to support the family, but since I started this activity my life has changed in the positive direction:

I bought a cart with 02 wheels, a ploughing ox without forgetting the education of children. I have an income of 35,000 FCFA / week depending on the volume of the service. I also increased my production, which is a source of income because fonio is really appreciated by consumers. Because with the performance of the threshers I no longer have to worry about threshing and shelling.

I feel proud of the service I provide. In perspective, the impressions I have gathered from family farms are that some farmers are ready to increase their fonio areas by 1 or 2 hectares. Before the arrival of the thresher the cultivated fields were around 0.25 ha - 0.50 ha. About 150 family farms are proposing to increase their cultivated areas from 0.5 to 2 ha each. I intend to renew my equipment after having reimbursed to FUAPAD. This will allow me to employ other 6 young people on a part-time basis.”
Creation of new innovative businesses run by young people: around 50 Agri businesses involving 75 young people using among others new and adapted techniques for climate change. At least 200 young people (entrepreneurs) have established a credit or "leasing" contract with companies or microfinance institutes. Around 100 young entrepreneurs have secured their site.

Contributing factors – The last phase of the project has been designed under the market systems development approach, facilitating relations between actors around transactions related to services and agricultural products. The project also focused on the empowerment of partners: getting the most appropriate actors to properly play their role while moving on a path of autonomy. Also, the nature of partnership and collaboration have been based on the analysis of production systems and markets. Public actors ensuring the rules and standards; or even companies, investors or the media which could offer quality services to the rural world and thus impact on small producers. The project has also contributed to develop advocacy approaches that have allowed working with certain national and local decision-makers to promote regional development and decentralisation.

Influence of SDC support – The commitment of the Swiss cooperation, as the project's financial backer, to support a strategy for rural youth. Thanks to the co-financing of the training costs for young people by the Swiss cooperation and the federation of farmers' organisations relevant results have been obtained. Also, the market system development expertise provided by Helvetas have influenced the local processes. Helvetas played a facilitator and coach role allowing collaboration between young people and other market players (service providers, farmers' organisations, economic operators, families etc.). This new way to connect to each other has triggered a market system into which young people can actively fit.

Lessons learnt – Main lessons learnt refer to the employability of young people:

- It could be demonstrated that rural young people having access to rural related vocational training (agriculture or services related to), can be more easily integrated in professional activities and / or can create their own employment opportunities.
- The implementation of the market system development approach in favour of rural youth fosters collaborative work and motivation of the private sector in the agroindustry and agricultural inputs' producers. Collaboration includes among others: co-financing specific training for young people, information, marketing, and distribution services.
- The sustainability of employment and self-employment created by and for young people depend on the profitability of the initiated income generating activity (service provided or the product put on the market). Therefore, the importance of the market system development approach and the collaboration between market actors.
- Confidence is an important element in business development because some economic operators have taken risks within the collaboration with young people; some provided inputs (livestock feed) without prior payment. The fact to provide products in advance contributed to the creation of employment for young people as storekeepers.
- The partnerships between the farmers’ organisations federation and the economic operators are successful examples in the massive employment of young people. In particular: The Modern Mills of Mali (M3), Agro-platform, Toguna-Agro-industry, and veterinary pharmacies.
- The development of systemic investments in the agricultural sector offers employment opportunities to young people.
"I have received several trainings through the AOPP R Gao including, among others. The training of young endogenous veterinary assistants in animal health and treatment techniques. At the end of this training, the AOPP R Gao provided me with material and equipment such as the pliers to castrate animals and some veterinary products (vitamins, deworming, antibiotics, etc.) for my first installation. Then the AOPPR-Gao put me in touch with a veterinary pharmacy. I work with the technical services of the state and the veterinary pharmacy, which also gives me advice. I buy all veterinary products from the veterinary pharmacy I collaborate with. Since my installation for animal care services, I can treat an average of 50 small ruminants and 40 large ruminants per month. I cover three villages in my commune and the demand for service in the villages is great. I provide these services to 300 family farms. I have an average monthly income of 200,000 FCFA. This job gives me full time employment and improves my living conditions and that of my family.

In prospect, I intend to open in my commune a depot of veterinary products of basic necessities (vitamin, deworming, antibiotic, etc.) in collaboration with the veterinary pharmacy of the city of Gao. I would like to thank the AOPP Gao and all its partners, in particular HELVETAS Mali and Swiss cooperation, and I encourage them to work in supporting rural young people because for me it is a means of job creation, the fight against poverty and stabilization of young people."

To ensure the employability of young people, it is therefore necessary to:

- Improve the supply of labour by better adapting training to needs of economic operators;
- Increase labour demand in urban and rural areas through private sector development;
- Promote employment at the local level, considering the specificities at the regional level.

**Outlook**

Working with young people and keeping in track of the achieved results also require to face important challenges in the future. In-depth vocational training needs to be adapted to rural needs in dialogue with education authorities at national and local level. Young oriented social services in the targeted towns need to be provided in collaboration with the local government and families. Innovative strategies for sustainability of the "professionalization" function and even "integration" of young people in Agri businesses are needed to interconnect them within the market systems. New public private partnerships, technical innovative approaches may motivate young people to work in Agri businesses and at the same time, increase productivity and competitiveness. Further strategies to improve market access of rural products and for the development of systemic investments through the public private partnerships are needed.
MSD approach adaptation 1: Cashew market

Within the OPF4 project, a systemic investment and vision has allowed sustainable changes in the lives of people within the cashew market. Cashew growers had trouble selling their nuts due to poor quality. Traders lacked liquidity to buy the nuts on time. Further, there was a lack of trust between producers and promoters. The OPF4 project through the Regional Council facilitated a business dialogue with following decisions as result: (i) train young advisers to offer agricultural advisory services to cashew producers to increase production and improve organic quality; (ii) modernise the selection process to improve the quality of the nuts; (iii) promote access to bank loans for producers and traders. The establishment of this system allowed the trained youth to offer local advice to 6,000 cashew producers. The advisory service allowed member producers to increase the volume and sale price in 2019, and therefore their income. The improvement in the selection process allowed: to improve quality, increase production volume, create 300 additional jobs (> 80% women). The business linkage with the bank allowed access to credit for all actors in 2019. Small producers now have better access to the market, their income increased, and trust among market players has been restored.

MSD approach adaptation 2: FUAPAD (Fédération des Unions des Associations des Producteurs pour une Agriculture Durable)

Added to low productivity, post-harvest loss of corn, millet, sorghum, fonio, rice, shallot and cashew continues to be high. Low competitiveness of their marketable surplus led to extra challenges to access the lucrative markets for farmers. This situation replicated for all crops. Its production did not satisfy the demand in quality and quantity. To face those challenges, the OPF4 project promoted an increase of stored and/or processed agricultural products. This would increase production competitiveness and transform farmers into preferred “processors and merchants”. Therefore, since 2018, the project has researched on adaptation to innovative post-harvest and processing teams. The project identified and developed agricultural equipment services as a business model that facilitated the access to agricultural and market equipment, and eased association between farmer’s coordination organisations and local artisans. Those structured relations between peasant organisations and artisans were the starting point of the project because it simplified action-investigation about post-harvest teams and agricultural products processing. They also encourage fabricants and technology merchants to invest in the fabrication and sell of processing and post-harvest teams. A tripartite agreement was signed between FUAPAD, the youth and artisans, to facilitate access of young people to equipment and reimbursement of post-harvest equipment costs. Agricultural mechanization services developed by the program are sustainable because they combine human, animal, solar and motor efforts. Job positions created through a paid agricultural mechanisation services offer (thresher and peeled) will continue to be sustainable even after demand increases because of work limitations, crops loss, and hard work for men and women.
Project objective - To improve income and livelihood security of small-scale fishing families in the Gulf of Mottama, Myanmar, by combating illegal fishing. The Gulf of Mottama in the South-east of Myanmar is one of the most important intertidal mudflats in the world. It is highly productive but severely overfished, resulting in a reduction of catch by at least 60% over the last decade. The intervention targeted vulnerable women and men. This was one of interventions under the Gulf of Mottama project that aims to conserve and improve the governance of Gulf’s coastal natural resources to benefit communities that depend on them.

Challenges faced - A major problem for the local fishers in the Gulf of Mottama has been illegal fishing with long, fine-mesh stake nets. These nets have been identified as a cause of local fisheries stocks declining, as they indiscriminately catch juvenile fishes. However, previously there were not enough coordination or resources to combat this illegal fishing – thought to be run by businessmen in the town of Kyaikhto.

Significant changes or absence of change - There has been a substantial decrease in the illegal fishing of the small mesh (nets that were catching large quantities of juvenile fish). This decrease in illegal fishing is due to the project-initiated partnership between DoF and FDA that has resulted in joint patrolling for illegal nets and their subsequent burning. A summary of four years fishery data collection (2016-2019) ascribes the increase in the fisheries catch to the decrease in this illegal fishing. Under the new fisheries law, the local fishermen have the right to organize and manage co-management zones, including patrolling for illegal fishing. However, for patrols to have enforcement power, government departments must also be involved.

The major success of this joint activity is a better understanding and trust between local fisher families and government department officials. Therefore, the local fishers are willing to work with government officials and the department officials are more likely to work directly with the fishing communities on other issues as well.

However, as a result of discussions with the private fishing company, concerns are raised regarding the potential for illegal fishing activities in the GoM to be reliant on slave or forced labour. The governance structure needs to ensure that this threat is addressed and any such activity dealt with appropriately. Moreover, there is a genuine concern that there will be limited funds available for future monitoring, patrolling (and specifically Spatial Monitoring and Reporting Tool (SMART) patrolling) or assessment of conservation-related efforts. The donor-dependency on this element will remain even if the governance structure is robust and livelihoods are being enhanced. Considerable thought needs to be given to developing a sustainable financing mechanism to underwrite future ecological and conservation work. Without this, there will be limited data or evidence to assess the ultimate impact or sustainability of the project.

In addition, there is a risk that these efforts will fail to achieve their maximum impact, not through any inherent failing of the project, but due to a lack of infrastructure needed to link villagers to markets, namely adequate roads.

**Contributing factors** - Through the efforts of local fishers, government departments from Mon State and Bago region patrolling and enforcement efforts are more coordinated and effective. These efforts are linked to more broad work to strengthen fisheries management in the Gulf of Mottama. During the first joint trip in Mon State, the patrolling team observed illegal fishing nets along the mudflats in Bilin area. They informed the fishers operating these nets that this kind of fishing was illegal and detrimental for the fish stock for all the fishermen in the GoM area. In response, some illegal fishing activity moved instead to Bago Region. To deal with this, the FDAs and DoF decided to prepare a joint patrol between Mon State and Bago Region. This patrol was organized at the beginning of the fishing season, and involved active participation from over 30 local fishermen, four DoF officers, four General Administration Department officers and six police officers. This time, the patrol team found over six kilometres of the illegal fishing nets along the mudflat areas, with two boats used for this illegal fishing. Government officials from both Bago and Mon decided to destroy all the nets to prevent further fishing with these nets in the GoM area, and to demonstrate a commitment to enforcement. The total value of the fishing nets was more than US$ 50,000. The state and regional government ministers and DoF director made a media interview and gave official news to public that they will organize more similar actions if other illegal fishing is found along the GoM coast. The local and government official media published this news in both newspaper, journal, TV channels and other social media. Because of this surprise joint patrolling action, most illegal fishing businesses now do not dare to use these illegal nets in the GoM area, because they know if they are caught the nets will be burned and the loss is too high for them. Continued patrols will be needed to maintain effective enforcement; these are planned.

**Influence of SDC support** - The SDC project recognized issues that are limiting income and livelihoods security of small-scale fishing families and are hampering sustainable management of the Gulf's fisheries. The project therefore facilitated the review and revision of the local fishery laws of Mon state and Bago region, working with State and Regional Governments, Department of Fisheries, General Administration Department, and Fishery Development Associations made up of representatives from local fishers. With GoMP assistance, the FDAs prepared action plans, including patrolling against illegal fishing. At first, these plans were not approved upon submission to the DoF due to the lack of familiarity
with the new fisheries law and the lack of available resources from the DoF to cover patrol costs. GoMP has contributed funding for boats and partially funded the patrols. The project’s team facilitated a joint meeting and a capacity building training on the SMART patrolling technique in the GoM area. After this, the FDAs together with the DoF developed a patrolling plan with all relevant departments involved and a budget estimate. This paved the way for successful collaboration.

**Selected quotes from the MSC study (2020)**

**On increased resources:** “There is significantly increased amount of fish after the project. Before, the amount was decreasing due to the overharvesting by the people from other villages/regions.”

**On decreased illegal fishing:** “Because of the seizure of the illegal fishing nets, the awareness programmes and the maritime patrol, there is almost none of the illegal fishing nets.”

**On improved livelihood:** “My livelihood is better and I can run another business. I am now doing pig farming too and also contribute to the collective fish farming. My livelihood becomes better. As I am a fishery worker, it is really good for my family in the future because of the increased amount of fish.”

**On increased knowledge awareness:**
“Because of the awareness programmes, there is more public participation on not using 1-inch fishing nets. As a result, we can conserve the birds as well. (before, e.g., we used to set a trap on the beach for birds with the caught but unwanted fish).”

“Although we used to raise wild fish, we are running systematically now. We also understand fisheries laws and more about the fishing nets. We are also aware of fish extinction and how to take care of it.”
Case study 10 – SDC approach to Women’s Economic Empowerment (WEE) 42

Approach
- Gender Mainstreaming - Projects explicitly integrating women’s economic empowerment into all aspects of the project cycle;
- Women targeted – Interventions specifically targeting women and stating WEE as the key objective;
- Combined approach – Projects applying a Gender Mainstreaming approach in one value chain, yet specifically select another value chain for a Women Targeted intervention.

Implementation strategies
- Early articulation and implementation of a more comprehensive strategy often based on WEE analyses;
- Attention to gender issues late in the process as a result of the learning by the project, internal and/or external initiation by SDC and other donors;
- Co-funding of gender-related interventions with other donors;
- Targeting and building capacities in women-driven types of work.

Results
- Increased income brought about by building the capacities of women in women-driven types of work (e.g., in post-harvest activities);
- Women engagement in markets (e.g., contract farming, handicraft production) brought about by increased decision-making authority at the household level brought about by capacity building and income;
- Increased access to finance through innovative microfinance, insurance, and micro insurance products as well as training;
- Increased employment, in particular in women-driven sectors;
- Improved financial literacy with the use of information technology.

Approach and implementation strategies - The SDC approach to increasing women’s participation in agricultural market systems has been three-fold: Adopting an explicit Women Economic Empowerment (WEE) approach with gender issues integrated in the entire project life cycle from the market systems analyses including the core market, the support functions, rules and regulations to the result chains including direct interventions targeted at underlying constraints to women’s equal participation in market systems; targeting women specifically at selected interventions and also by focusing on women-driven value chains; and combining these two.

In Bangladesh, the Katalyst project [7F-00521.04] addressed WEE on the one hand by integrating women into its core sectors (maize, fish, vegetable) and providing intensive support to women to get involved in these sectors. On the other, it targeted selected value chains (silk, bamboo, compost, prawn) to increase women visibility to relevant market players. The M4C project [7F-07952.02] likewise used the combined approach, from the outset establishing WEE as the key objective, and as part of the market research, examined gender roles and responsibilities in market sub-sectors(core market system), gender-based access and control over resources and services (supporting functions) and gender-friendly policies, social/community acceptance of women in various jobs, and women’s decision-making abilities and time use (rules/regulations). The project then developed specific theories of change for economically empowering women that linked the types of work women do, to their level of empowerment.

In Bolivia there was a strong focus on gender especially in the case of Mercados Inclusivos [7F-08634.02.01] that applied and contributed to the WEE approach. Some of the relevant action points in the case of Mercados Inclusivos include: The identification, development

and dissemination of time-saving technologies related to key practices for women; raising awareness on the co-responsibility of care through companies and other project partners; applied research to identify the key elements to address the issue of machismo in rural areas; and mainstreaming gender targets so that the system actors themselves were the ones incorporating gender issues into their work. In Mali, all projects were designed with an inclusive gender approach. In fact, together with the poor and disadvantaged, including young, women were the main target population. Particular attention was given to women in rural areas under a Conflict Sensitive Project Management approach developed by Helvetas.

**Although gender issues were generally considered at design stage, attention to gender issues was not always implemented as intended at least in the initial phases.**

In Bangladesh, also the Katalyst project [7F-00521.04] initially inadvertently focussed on interventions that mostly benefitted men. Many of the most economically promising value chains such as fish and maize were male dominated and whilst highly worth pursuing would be unlikely to empower women directly. Learning from this experience, the projects in later phases recognising women as economic actors, adopted a strong gender targeting of interventions in value chains that could benefit women including composting, small livestock (ducks and goats) as well as fruit and vegetable growing. This led to greater involvement and empowerment of women. Examples include a focus on the potential of marketing compost which was an area dominated by women and the raising of small ruminants. In later years, the project used a Women Economic Empowerment Index to assess the potential for women empowerment in each intervention area.

**Even in projects and value chains, where women were significant actors, as small holders, workers, and traders, attention to women economic empowerment came late into focus.** In projects such as the Great Lakes Region Catalyst -2 [7F- 08391]; Generating Rubber Opportunities in Myanmar [7F-08844.02]; and InovAgro [7F-06353.03] in Mozambique there was a time-lag between the start of the project and actions to address gender inequality. This lag appears to be based on a notion not to overburden the market actors whom the project worked with, failing to realise that the market failure pertains to women being left out, and that women are themselves important economic actors and by not including women a significant potential for growing markets was missed out on.

**Results -** Women benefitted from the MSD approach but to varying extents. Despite many projects having as an equal number of men and female beneficiaries, often more men benefits. An example is Katalyst where only 0.4m out of a total of 4.75m beneficiaries were women. The results were better in projects that had considered gender issues at the very start and used the combined approach including direct interventions. One example is M4C that increased access to opportunities and resources and decision-making authority at the household level of 75% of women surveyed for the study on WEE in 2014. Changing household dynamics, in the sense that other HH members contribute to the HH activities normally associated with women, have left women with more time for engaging in other activities, e.g., handicraft production, seeds treatment or contract farming. In Georgia, the ALCP project [7F-06629.03] promoted the Women’s room concept (childcare) that has been replicated in rest of Georgia but also Armenia. The project also initiated the National Women's Business Forum and arranged an exit strategy in 2019 that left the forum continuing to function. The Proseder project [7F-06552.02] in Bolivia improved financial literacy of 20,000 women by using information technology thus allowing women to exercise their rights and become more economically independent. In the case of Samriddhi [7F-03402.03], 55% of the direct outreach were women (372,571) of which 14% (54,000)
were employed in women-driven value chains - from 8,000 (baseline) to more than 62,000 (by end of the project).

The experiences from M4C, ALCP, Proseder and Samriddhi suggest that articulating how both women and men will benefit, setting goals and indicators for follow-up, treating women as economic actors with equal rights, targeting women-driven value chains, addressing factors that leave women out of the market by specific interventions, also if they only related to cultural stigma, can lead to better results also for women.

Beneficiary story: Changemaker

**Source:** Prof. Mohammad Jakariya (Fieldwork of the SDC-MSD Evaluation, December 2020).

Sobia Begum, 40, is a farmer who has immensely benefitted by M4C and influenced others to change their agriculture practices. She applied the learnt cultivation techniques not only in hers but the neighbouring villages that were not part of the M4C interventions. Before the project, she was a regular housewife never involved in the decision-making process. In 2013, Sobia accepted an invitation to collaborate with M4C and participated in their training. Her husband and other villagers were rather sceptic due to the fear of crop damage. She allocated 1 acre of land to the project with the thought that even if it fails it is only 1 out of 11 acres of land that she cultivates. She received instructions and advice on cultivation techniques as well as improved fertilizers and seeds and how to use them.

Post-harvesting calculations showed the increase of 28 mon of maize in 1 acre of land and marked a turning point in Sobia’s way of doing agriculture. Other farmers realized the potential, especially in the light of lower production costs if following the improved cultivation practices. Sobia’s involvement in the project has significantly improved her situation through increased income. She now owns a house, two cows, and sends her children to school. The seasonal loan for both men and women has been an important financial back-up for Sobia.

She can take a loan during the cultivation period and return it when obtaining the profit from crop sales. After re-paying the loan, yet there is money left for the family to cover unexpected expense. For example, last year she took a 25,000 BDT of the seasonal loan adding to it around 7,000 BDT of what she has saved to cultivate maize on 4 acres of land. The total cost of the entire production cycle was 32,000. She produced 150 mon of maize, and after selling it to the market earned around 90,000 BDT with the profit of 58,000 after re-paying the loan.

Sobia is empowered; now she goes out to the field and cultivates crops alongside her husband, negotiate with the traders herself, understand the quality of input materials best used for her crops, fights back if provided with second-hand materials, and can contribute with her views to group discussion or decision making as she now holds knowledge about cultivation and harvesting crops.

Despite the positive changes in the agricultural sector, Sobia and other farmers are concerned about the lack of health facilities in the area. The fear of health issues is constant and the farmers hope for the accessible and affordable healthcare facilities in the future.
Mini-case studies

1. Trichoderma - fungi for improved composting
Trichoderma is fungi with the ability to accelerate the process of composting. It can make high-quality organic manure in a short period. The fungi’s characteristic has been the groundbreaking discovery for the Rural Development Academy (RDA) and the CDRC. They are now aware of the potential of Trichoderma if properly evaluated and used and are working to popularize the use of Trichoderma in all Districts. It is in fact the CDRC that sells the fungi to the farmers making the profit aimed for investments in other development activities.

Mr. Salekum Rahman, former local village doctor, took part in the Katalyst project and spread the word about the benefits of using Trichoderma among the dwellers of secluded areas. He convinced them through backyard meetings that although chemical fertilizers are cheap, the long-term consequences are dire. On the other hand, even the organic fertilizer made by him is somewhat more expensive, the result is an excellent and sustainable approach for the farmer’s crop.
In Salekur’s words, Trichoderma compost’s main ingredients is cow dung, water hyacinths, tea leaves, and household vegetable leftovers collected locally. It takes about 4 to 5 weeks from the initial day to make the final products for him. According to him, his annual income increase is now 5 to 6 lakhs BDT with a total investment of 2 lakhs BDT only. His total amount of organic manure produced is about 8 to 10 tons per year. He showed a concern that if his fertilizers were approved to be packaged and commercially produced, the business would have accelerated. However, there is a long process to reach that stage as he needs a license to be legally in the market. Hence, he shared that if through Katalyst there was an opportunity for him to get the license that would have been good for his business.

Despite the benefits of the fungi as stated above, there are considerable limitations that must be taken into account:

1) Insufficiency of raw material for making fertilizer.
2) It is not easy to find workers for such work.
3) Since the government has not yet approved it, it is not suitable for large scale production.
4) It is impossible to meet the production capacity and demand on a large scale as it depends on organic raw materials.
5) The production process is traditional and outdated and with modernized production there is a risk of higher and out-of-reach prices for the farmers.
2. Pulled back from the road to benefits

One of the stakeholders of Katalyst was Asaduzzaman who is a maize seed distributor and businessman. He has been with the project since 2009. He played three significant roles during the project period. At the initial stage, he worked as a medium for the project to link them with the farmers residing in the Chars, accompany them to the Char areas and organize different training programs with the farmers there. Secondly, he was being linked with the farmer’s group at the Char area and allowed to create a market chain in the hard-to-reach areas where he became a primary seed/ input distributor/supplier. Thirdly, he acted as a key grantor and contractor under Agrahani Bank to distribute loans to the farmer groups in the Char areas.

The project’s aim was to promote the cultivation of highly profitable maize on the Chars, and for that Mr. Assaduzzaman helped the project team with organizing and conducting training with the char farmers. The focus was on disseminating knowledge on all production steps from seedlings to harvesting. Demo plots were set-up to demonstrate the difference in cultivation approaches. It resulted with the shift from cheaper to more profitable crops such as maize, chilies, jute and wheat. In the case of maize, the farmers now produce 40-50 mon (1600-2000 kg) in one acre of land. Before the project interventions, it was only 7-8 mon (280-320 kg). This increase in the product volume has also positively impacted their livelihood and lifestyle status. Along with the training to the farmers, the project established farmer groups each including a team leader, and developed a chain of network between the group, group leader, and traders/distributors. Stock points were created for the farmers and distributors to exchange goods thus lowering the costs and saving time for all. This network allowed Assaduzzaman to expand his business and sell 30-40 tons of goods monthly. Often the farmers took advice from him concerning the quality of seeds which played a role in building trust and further expanding his business. However, the stock points are only beneficial in wet seasons when transportation costs for the farmers are lower. In dry seasons, the farmer has to spend 30-40 BDT extra just for the transportation of 1 mon (40 kg) of maize.

Later, Assaduzzaman was responsible for distributing loans to the farmers through Agrahani Bank. Katalyst created a network between the farmers, group leaders, and him as a grantor. A memorandum of understanding (MOU) was signed among them and with the bank. There were around 250 – 300 farmers under Assaduzzaman’s supervision who received the loan agreeing to pay it back after selling their crops. It was also agreed that Mr. Assaduzzaman takes the liabilities of those who do not re-pay their debts. The arrangement turned out flawed from several sides. First, not all farmers managed to sell sufficient crop volume to the mainland. Due to river erosion some farmers suffered from significant loss and could not sell the crops for a longer period which placed him in an unfavorable position. He is still trying to get two farmers to return the borrowed money. In his opinion, the risk for him was even higher because the farmers who get the loan were allowed to purchase inputs from other retailers. Such uncertainty has considerably decreased his visits to the Chars and sales in the stock points after the project stopped. In his opinion, it would have been better if the loan were given to them instead (the businessmen) and purposely used for purchasing extra materials that the farmers could buy from them only. In such a case, he would have to take the liability only for his loss. He also pointed out the issue of being responsible for the loans of too many farmers. For him it would have been easier to take the risk of 1 or 2 farmers. It appeared quite difficult to monitor and manage the risk factors for more than 100 farmers.

As much as he has been benefitted from the project practice, it has also brought some constraints along the path, which pulled him back from the road to benefits and following the practice after the project ended.
3. Trust

Mohammad Ali is a veterinarian who practices veterinary medicine by treating cow diseases, and injuries in his village, Char Pepulia since a very early age. He was the only vet to whom people of the Char used to bring their cows when ill. However, with time he lost many of the customers as they lost trust in his advice and medicines. He observed through his cases that the local people used to pet the cows for 1 year before selling and did not feed and treat them with adequate medicines and vitamins nor had they a proper shed for their shelter. This often led to heart attack or cows being too weak to be sold for a high market price. It changed with M4C interventions and collaborations between the veterinary services and the project. Mr. Ali took part in the training sessions organized by M4C where he was introduced to improved medicines and other input suppliers from whom he is now able to purchase better medicines in an efficient manner, i.e., lowering the costs and saving his time. Before the project, he used to travel to the Fulchori market to buy the medicines but now he makes orders via phone and visits when the order is ready.

After the training and demonstration processes through M4C, the local people realized the benefits of treating their cows with improved medicines and proper vaccines to maintain the health of these animals. Thus, the demand for such products increased and Mr. Ali’s monthly income tripled. Such change indicates the increased understanding of the benefits of using better vet practices. With the improved vet practices, the farmers are able to sell more cows and substantially increase their yearly income. Before the project they would sell one cow a year for around 5,000 BDT whereas now they can sell off to the market one cow after 3 or 6 months.

The number of cows in the village increased. Along with Ali, there are three to four people who started their veterinarian business by noticing the profit. The conflict arises only when the advice on medicines contradicts with others while giving local people suggestions. However, it does not appear a major issue as they fix it through discussion and come to a conclusion for the better of all.
4. Profitable switch

Abdul Mominal has been in the maize business for a longer period and was facing constraints. Due to the transportation issues in the Chars, it was difficult for him to transport his goods to the market in the Fulchori Bazar. He then switched to chilies where the profit was higher. The profit he used to obtain from selling 100 mon of maize, Abdul now gets from only 20 to 25 mon of chillies. Although the quality of the chillies he would purchase was high, they would degrade quickly due to the poor post-harvesting practices. The project therefore established linkages between the local traders and introduced the alternatives for drying.

Before the project, Abdul could notice the lack of quality and would always reject to buy such chillies but now he possesses the knowledge on improved practices which he is transferring on to the farmers. With the better pre- and post-harvesting practices, Abdul has noticed the change in the quality and production volumes when he travelled a long distance and got 150 – 250 instead of 20 – 25 mon of chillies. In his opinion, not only the quantity increased, but the quality improved too. Abdul previously used to earn around 1000 – 2000 BDT weekly, whereas now, the earnings are from 4,000 to 6,000 BDT a week. Although chilly is a seasonal crop, he does not face any financial gap. Even the amount of production is low during the off-season, now Abdul supports his family with the savings from the profit earned during the chilly season. However, there is still insecurity in the family regarding the lack of an adequate healthcare system. A considerable portion of the income goes for buying the medicines.

Abdul also expressed concerns regarding inadequate transport practices. Dry chillies can easily break if not properly transported to the market. Only in this year he has lost 50,000 BDT as the carrier through which he sends the chilies to the Fulchori market was so tightly packed that it damaged about 120 – 130 mon of chilies. Hence, 40% of the local traders still go to the city market to ensure their product are in good condition when marketed. To minimize the loss, the chili traders conduct a business jointly with 5 – 6 partners.

Magic Nets!

In the past, the local farmers used to dry their crops directly on the soil, which used to degrade the quality of the crops drastically. The locals being unaware of the reason behind the degradation, they used to sell these in lower prices to the market and sometimes could not sell at all. However, when M4C suggested to use polythene of nets on the soil and placing the crops on the polythene and not the soil directly, they could see a change in the quality of the crops and now could sell in good prices to the market. This method was mostly highlighted during the field visit by the farmers as a significant change for them.

Credit: Prof. Mohammad Jakariya
A focus group discussion was conducted with the retailers and traders from companies like Auto Crops and Buyer Crops who partnered with the M4C project in 2013. Before 2013, the traders from certain companies used to visit the Fulchori Bazar to distribute their products to the retailers. During that time, the char farmers were coming to the Fulchori Bazar and buying inputs from the retailers. They did not have any idea about the existence of the companies. The farmers could not even differentiate between good and bad quality seeds or fertilizers. Not only farmers were unaware but the traders themselves were clueless about such information. But upon the introduction to the Char market through M4C, the profit of the companies and retailers more than doubled. The first issue faced by the traders was to convince the farmers to buy better quality inputs for a somewhat higher price. They used to buy 1kg of seeds for 200-300 BDT and now the same quantity but of improved seeds costs 500 BDT or more. In the beginning, the farmers were reluctant to switch to the new seeds but their attitude changed through the demonstration plots organized by M4C. They could see the increase of 5 to 7 mon in the product quantity. Thus, the sales of better seeds in the Chars increased. However, this was only during the project time when the companies were under contractual agreements with M4C. After the project, they are reluctant to visit the Chars mainly because their profit targets can be met in the mainland. Such visits are also time-consuming.

In addition to the above, the local storage system established during the project was not sufficient to store the maize bought in bulk and not sold immediately. Such maize can reach even higher price at a later point if properly stored. The traders and retailers hope the M4C project will address this issue in the next phase.
Annex E Linkage between findings, conclusions, and recommendations

### Strategic relevance

The MSD approach has evolved and is continuing to evolve (i.1.1)
- Although greater clarity and an increasing body of experience is being gained, there are still conceptual inconsistencies in the approach and in how MSD is applied in practice (i.1.1)
- Although the international body of evidence on MSD and its impact on poverty and system change is developing, there are still gaps (i.2.1/2)
- The SDC MSD-related projects close to their targets and were largely (but not entirely) responsive to the challenges faced by the target population (disadvantaged and poor), also considering gender (i.2.7/8)
- The SDC MSD-related projects were adapted to highly differing economic situations (i.4.1)
- The focus and evidence base are stronger at the intervention level than at the project level and enabling environment where the importance of the political and macro-economy needed to be overlooked (i.4.4)

### Coherence

There were projects consistent with and supportive of SDC global objectives and strategies although sometimes weak in some of the transversal themes (i.2.1)
- The project role of identifying and stimulating change in the markets was rarely owned, and only in one/few instances permanent bodies, including farmers associations, government, and universities
- There was an increasing level of attention given to sustainability by linking more and anchoring interventions in more permanent bodies within the system (i.3.3)

### Effectiveness

Generally, projects realised their targets or were likely to reach targets. However, the impact on poverty reduction was mixed (i.3.1)
- The projects were reached but there was limited evidence on the SDC country strategy and projects (i.3.2)
- Although MSD was usually in line with government policy and strategy, most projects did not have a strong engagement with government actors (i.3.2.3)
- A number of external evaluators and internal project reflections pointed to the importance and benefit of involving government more – especially local government (i.2.7/8)
- Advocacy for policy change was recognized as weak in earlier phases of the cooperation but has tended to improve with more attention given to policy in later years (i.3.3)

### Efficiency

The project role of identifying and stimulating change in the markets was rarely owned, and only in one/few instances permanent bodies, including farmers associations, government, and universities
- There was an increasing level of attention given to sustainability by linking more and anchoring interventions in more permanent bodies within the system (i.3.3)
- The SDC multi-phased approach provided continuity over many years and was important for creating cumulative results and wider systems changes was difficult to assess (i.3.5)

### Sustainability

Sustainability is a key concept in the MSD approach – but with few post-evaluations available, the assessment was difficult, and learning constrained. The bar for sustainability in the MSD approach is often underestimated (i.4.1/2)
- Cost-benefit analysis has been done to varying degrees but was insufficiently standardised (i.4.2)
- Overall, across an assessment of 16 projects, it can be concluded that the approaches and strategies applied were well suited and efficient with some exceptions (i.4.4)
- Although difficult to measure, there is evidence that the MSD approach built social capital and empowerment which have contributed to the prospects of sustainability (i.2.2)
- Attention to environmental sustainability and climate impacts was evident in some projects but not in all, and in some cases with negative implications (i.2.2)

### Conclusions

1. Conclusion 1: MSD is well served by an active community of practice. SDC took a proactive role in contributing to MSD both globally and through implementation at the project level (i.1.2)
2. MSD in agriculture has evolved as an approach and where finally applied has proven its relevance for scaling markets work better for the poor, in many but not all contexts (i.2.1/3)
3. The approach evolved to better respond to the MSD – inclusiveness, gender equality and climate (i.3.1)
4. There have been good results on additional income and nutritious value per person – usually with excess of targets. However, the contribution to poverty per household is often thinly spread (i.4.4)
5. Notable results have been reported in creating systems change at the intervention level, especially in distribution channels and enabling of services. However, the wider market impact and sustainability of such changes was difficult to assess (i.5.1)
6. The interventions were often narrow and incomplete from the stakeholder point of view and the risks from the wider political economy and market factors where not always translated at the project level (i.5.3)
7. Projects working above farms is challenging to advocate for change in policies, rules, and regulations, where there was a lack of MSD making use of the projects and information base to enhance policy dialogues, results were promising (i.5.6)
8. The project role of identifying and stimulating change in the markets was rarely owned, and only in one/few instances permanent bodies, including farmers, government, and universities
9. The rigor of reporting varied considerably, understanding, measuring, and reporting on wider systems changes was difficult (i.6.1)
10. MSD was complex and demanding on project teams, the SDCs and co-financing processes
### Conclusions

1. Conclusions on MSD practices are well served by an active community of practice. SDC took a proactive role in ensuring MSD is well served by an active community of practice through implementation at the project level.

2. MSD in agriculture has evolved as an approach and was designed as a holistic approach for making markets work better for the poor, in many but not all contexts.

3. The approach evolved to better respond to the SDGs - inclusiveness, gender equality and climate.

4. There have been good results on additional income and outreach to target population - usually well in excess of targets. However, the reduction in poverty per household is often thinly spread.

5. Notable results have been reported in creating system change at the intervention level especially in distribution channels and embedding of services. However, the wider market impact and sustainability of such changes was difficult to assess.

6. The interventions were often narrow and inconsistent from the stakeholder point of view and the risks from the wider political economy and external factors where not always translated at the project level.

7. Projects working alone found it challenging to advocate for change in policies, rules, and regulations. There was evidence of the MSD making use of the projects and information base to enhance policy dialogue, results were promising.

8. The project role of identifying and stimulating change in the markets was rarely owned by and only sometimes anchored in permanent organizations - leaving learning gaps and threatening sustainability.

9. The risk of reporting varied considerably. Understanding, measuring, and reporting on wider systems changes was difficult.

10. MSD is complex and demanding on project teams, the SCOs and in procurement processes.

### Recommendations

1. Clarify the role of MSD in Swiss development cooperation in the future.

2. Continue to support the developments of the approach to better respond to the SDGs through enhancing inclusiveness, gender equality, and climate resilience.

3. Continue the engagement of the E+I and A+FS networks with in SDC (SDC headquarters).

4. Develop policy and reform advocacy agenda and strategy for enhancing MSD in agriculture, making use of project-based information and evidence (SCO, project implementing agents).

5. Introduce evidence of system change in the results frameworks with greater detail provided using the more detailed intervention level results (SCO, implementing agents).

6. Develop policy and reform agenda and strategy for enhancing MSD in agriculture, making use of project-based information and evidence (SCO, project implementing agents).

7. Enhance as part of the design and ongoing adjustment of projects the exercise of mapping of relevant national and other support efforts to draw the boundaries of the MSD intervention (SDOs).

8. Integrate actions on policy change and support to reforms into the results frameworks (SCO).

9. Increase the degree to which MSD in agricultural efforts are co-funded and part of larger projects (SCO).

10. Work more explicitly with partners that are able to influence and effect market related policy change and reforms (SCO, project implementing agents).

11. Develop policy and reform advocacy agenda and strategy for enhancing MSD in agriculture, making use of project-based information and evidence (SCO, project implementing agents).

12. Integrate actions on policy change and support to reforms into the results frameworks (SCO).

13. Develop an economy level, together with the relevant national entities and other development partners, options, and strategies for ensuring the mainstreaming of MSD in agriculture approaches (SCO, national entities and other development partners).

14. Enhance the exit strategies at the project and intervention level to include the capacity to respond, adapt and replicate the market intervention introduced (SCO, implementing agents, national entities).

15. Continue the engagement of the E+I and A+FS networks with in SDC (SDC headquarters).

16. Increase the adoption of DCED audits [SCO, implementing entities].

17. Continue and enhance mid-term reviews, potentially involving relevant national bodies for enhanced learning (SCO).

18. Continue to rollout internal training and participation of SCO staff through the community of practice and think tank processes (SCO).

19. Engage in a dialogue with government and other development partners to develop and exploit synergies (SCO).

20. Consider which countries to provide significant support to MSD in agriculture as part of the medium-term cooperation strategies being developed.

### Operational measures

- Decide the focus of SDC support for MSD in agriculture building on the achievements so far to support the development of sustainable food systems.

- Continue to engage with the community of practice think tanks as well as implementers to promote experience exchange and research on how MSD can most effectively, identify entry points, target, and contribute to market development and the SDGs through attention to inclusiveness, gender, environment and climate resilience (SDC headquarters, community of practice think tanks, MSD project implementers).

- Incorporate inclusiveness, gender, environment and climate resilience into the objectives and result frameworks and reporting of new MSD projects or projects moving into new phases (SDC headquarters and SCOs).

- Work more explicitly with partners that are able to influence and effect market related policy change and reforms (SDC, project implementing agents).

- Develop policy and reform advocacy agenda and strategy for enhancing MSD in agriculture, making use of project-based information and evidence (SDC, project implementing agents).

- Integrate actions on policy change and support to reforms into the results frameworks (SDC).

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- Increase the degree to which MSD in agricultural efforts are co-funded and part of larger projects (SDC).
## Annex F Project assessment sheets

### 7F-00521.01-04 – Katalyst/Bangladesh

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Aspects based on DAC criteria</th>
<th>Measurement criteria applied for the AMSD evaluation (reference to indicators in the AMSD evaluation matrix)</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Justification - compulsory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assessment of relevance at moment of evaluation</td>
<td>1. The extent to which the objectives of the projects/programmes are consistent with the demands and the needs of the target groups incl. a description of the target groups and their specific needs (e.g., gender-specific, marginalized groups). 1.2 The MSD approach responded to the income and employment challenges and opportunities for target populations, the disadvantaged and poor, also considering gender. 1.3 The MSD approach responded to the resilience challenges and opportunities (in economic, social, and environmental terms) of target populations, the disadvantaged and poor, also considering gender.</td>
<td>☐ HS ☑ S ☐ US ☐ HUS ☐ N/A</td>
<td>The overall goal of the project was to contribute to sustainable poverty reduction by increased income of poor man and women. WEE was addressed on one hand by integrating women into its core sectors (maize, fish, vegetable) and providing intensive support to women to get involved in these sectors. On the other, it targeted selected value chains (silk, bamboo, compost, prawn) to increase women visibility to relevant market players (MTR, 2016, p19). Katalyst did not set employment targets as it was expected that sustainable systemic changes would create long-term sustainable income and employment for farmers and other value chain actors (EPROR, p5). Weak attention was given to the adaptation to environmental shocks and stresses such as floods. - particularly important in the context of Bangladesh.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The extent to which the objectives of the projects/programmes are consistent with the demands and the needs of partner country (institutions respectively society) as well as the sector policies and</td>
<td>2.2 SDC’s strategies and programmes were systematically and sufficiently aligned and complementary to the context in partner countries.</td>
<td>☐ HS ☑ S ☐ US ☐ HUS ☐ N/A</td>
<td>Government of Bangladesh was a key player and partner of Katalyst’s efforts to reduce rural poverty. The project worked at addressing cooperation of private actors with GoB agricultural extension programmes and jointly with the Department of Agricultural Extension developed Agricultural Extension Manual (CPs, Katalyst website). In phase 3, Katalyst remained highly coherent with the GoB priorities spelled out in its Five-Year Plan 2011-2015; as well as in its Food Security Country Investment Plan (CIP, 2011). (CP4, p3)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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43 HS: Fully consistent and target group-specific; S: Largely consistent; US: Only partly consistent; HUS: Marginally or not at all consistent.  
44 N/A applied to all questions, a. if the ToR of the evaluation explicitly exclude the assessment of the criteria and/or of the key aspect(s) or b. if there is no information available to assess the criteria.  
45 HS: Obvious consistency with needs of society and in line with relevant sector policies and strategies; S: Consistency ... do.; US: Consistency with needs of society not visible but in line with relevant sector policies and strategies; HUS: Not consistent.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3. The extent to which the design of projects/programmes is adequate to achieve the goal and objectives (articulation of components; level of coordination with all stakeholders and other projects/programmes; comparative advantage of Swiss cooperation; capacity for adaptive management).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.4 The MSD approach responded to the challenges and opportunities for creation of an enabling environment for pro-poor and inclusive market systems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ HS[^45]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katalyst performed a thorough analysis of the three core sectors of interventions - maize, fish, vegetable, to understand what systemic changes were needed to increase the benefits for small-scale farmers, and then to choose adequate partners. As many other MSD projects, Katalyst aimed to improve the enabling environment at various instances but with minor success on policy and regulation levels.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4. The extent to which the approaches/strategies to the implementation are best suited to achieve the expected results.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.1 SDC’s procedures (general and financial in particular) and ways of collaboration are conducive to implementing MSD in partner countries or regions?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ HS[^47]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competitive salaries attracted top business administration graduates; higher budget share has come to be accepted practice in MSD projects. Working with the central government was challenging for Katalyst due to the nature of its facilitative approach to development as opposed to the ‘conventional’ approach usually adopted by governments. Collaboration with local government was successful and the PPP concept introduced by Katalyst replicated and applied elsewhere. (Tarnutzer, 2017, p17)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5. The extent to which the planned objectives at outcome level (as defined in log frame) have been achieved taking into account the causal links between results, i.e., if activities lead to the expected outcomes.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.1 Expected results at output and outcome level were achieved (including analysis of contributing factors).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☒ HS[^48]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome targets exceeded – the project achieved 102% of the income and 101% of the benefit log frame targets respectively - outcome 1&amp;2, higher degree of systemic change (outcome 3) achieved in 4 sectors – 200% of the log-frame target (Country note supportive analysis)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[^45]: HS: Fully adequate; S: Largely adequate; US: Only partly adequate; HUS: Marginally or not at all adequate.
[^47]: HS: Fully suited; S: Suited; US: Partly suited; HUS: Not suited.
[^48]: HS: Fully achieved or overachieved; S: Most important outcomes are largely achieved; US: Only least important outcomes are achieved; HUS: Marginally achieved.
6. The extent to which the projects/programmes contribute to the objectives at impact level (as defined in log frame). Note: this sub-criteria is particularly relevant for ex-post evaluations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3.2 Evidence of the impact on the target group, end beneficiaries and market players e.g., on income, quality of life, gender equality (including analysis of contributing factors).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>□ HS⁴⁹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✗ S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□ US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□ HUS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□ N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Impact on poverty reduction is mixed. An average income increase, as presented below, seem not sufficient for lifting people out of poverty. But within the group of beneficiary farmers presumably there are some that gained greater income depending on which interventions that were involved in and how well they have been able to expand production and income since the intervention

- Over all phases USD 729m for 4.75m beneficiaries over 17 years – gives less than USD 10/beneficiary/year or USD 0.02/beneficiary/day
- In phase 3, (5 years) Katalyst generated an additional net nominal income for 1.65 million farmers and micro, small and medium entrepreneurs in a sum of USD 294 million (102% of the target) or 0.09 USD per farmer per day

Higher level of systemic change in four sectors (Vegetables, Maize, Farmed Fish, and Local Agri-business Network or LAN, and these were validated through specific Springfield Centre and SenseMaker studies. (Phase 3CP, p15)

Scale up noted in vegetable sector (mini seed packs). Mobile seed vendors (MSVs) have grown significantly and spread organically (seed case study).

Replication of PPP model (Epror, 2018)

7. The extent to which the outcomes achieved contribute to results related to transversal themes⁵⁰. (Please add a line for each relevant transversal theme.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3.2 Evidence of the impact on the target group, end beneficiaries and market players e.g., on income, quality of life, gender equality (including analysis of contributing factors).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>□ HS⁵¹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✗ S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□ US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□ HUS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□ N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Gender - Cumulative total women beneficiaries less than 0.4m out of total beneficiaries of 4.75m (EPROR, September 2018)

Environment - Integrated pest management introduced but no evidence of expansion beyond the project areas (seed case study); Policy recommendation allowing for the commercial marketing of IPM products was accepted (seed case study)

Assessment of efficiency

| □ HS⁵² |

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⁵⁰ Link to transversal themes of dispatch 2017-2020 and 2021-2024.


⁵² HS: Positive CER based on a cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA); S: Positive CER, based on qualitative justification; US: Poor CER, based on qualitative justification; HUS: Poor CER demonstrated.
8. Cost-effectiveness of project results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4.2 Cost-benefit analyses has been presented and provides evidence for implementing MSD approaches.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>□ S   □ US   □ HUS   □ N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost benefit ratio of Katalyst was 6.6 (phase 2) rising to 10.48 phase 3 (EPROP, 2018)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9. If assessable: Cost-benefit ratio of project results.\(^{53}\)

| ☒ HS\(^{54}\) □ S   □ US   □ HUS   □ N/A |
| As above |

10. Projects/Progr. management, monitoring, and steering mechanisms are in place and effectively used for the efficient implementation of activities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4.1 SDC’s procedures (general and financial in particular) and ways of collaboration are conducive to implementing MSD in partner countries or regions? 4.3 SDC and its implementing partners use adequate financial and human resources for effectively implementing MSD programs.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>☒ HS(^{55}) □ S   □ US   □ HUS   □ N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katalyst was the first ever DCED-certified MRM system, and became one of the core contributors to what is today the globally accepted MRM Standard of DCED (MTR, 2016, p46) The program scored 468/500 points for the MUST control points and 108/120 for the RECOMMENDED control points, and was described as having a Strong results measurement system with strong additional features (DCED audit, 2016)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Assessment of sustainability

| 11. The extent to which the positive results at outcome level will be continued beyond the end of the external support. Considering potential risks in the context. |
| 5.1 The interventions were financially and technically sustained/ likely to be sustainable (including analysis of contributing factors) 5.2 The social, environmental/climate sustainability issues were addressed by MSD programs (including analysis of contributing factors). |
| □ HS\(^{56}\) □ S   □ US   □ HUS   □ N/A |
| Many of the achievements seem to be sustainable but there are threats to some.  
  - Mini seed packs – an innovation in vegetable sector is well-received and their use has expanded. The training model replicated (input companies – retailers - dealers), and distribution channels have grown organically (e.g., mobile seed vendors).  
  - In the fish sector, the new approach to brood stock importing was standardised and regulated by the Department of Agriculture (DoA) but through collective action between DoA, hatcheries (represented by the Central Hatchery Association) and national research organizations to ensure ownership of the model. But one question remains - Will there be fish brood imported from abroad or brood banks will be established in Bangladesh? |

\(^{53}\) The extent to which the relation between resources (mainly financial and human resources) and time (e.g. delays compared to planning) required and results achieved is appropriate (Cost-benefit ratio - CBR). Further information: [http://deza-pcmi-lernbuch-3.prod2.lemetz.ch/module-6-en/2-cost-benefit-and-cost-effectiveness-analyses#Fo218](http://deza-pcmi-lernbuch-3.prod2.lemetz.ch/module-6-en/2-cost-benefit-and-cost-effectiveness-analyses#Fo218)  
\(^{54}\) HS: Positive CBR based on a cost-benefit analysis (CBA); S: Positive CBR, based on qualitative justification; US: Poor CBR, based on qualitative justification; HUS: Bad CBR demonstrated.  
\(^{55}\) HS: Highly efficient; S: Efficient; US: Partly efficient; HUS: Not efficient.  
\(^{56}\) HS: Very likely based on evidence; S: Likely based on evidence; US: Little likelihood based on evidence; HUS: Unlikely based on evidence.
Public-private partnership model (LAN) at the local levels is at risk of government staff changes and the lack of formalised support mechanisms at the central level. (MTR, 2016, p26)

Environment - Integrated pest management introduced but no evidence of expansion beyond the project areas (seed case study); Policy recommendation allowing for the commercial marketing of IPM products was accepted (seed case study)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>12. The extent to which partner organisations are capable to carry on activities. Capacity includes technical, financial capacity, human resources.</th>
<th>5.1 The interventions were financially and technically sustained/likely to be sustainable (including analysis of contributing factors) – specifically concerning capacity of partner organisations/market players.</th>
<th>See above</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>☐ HS&lt;sup&gt;57&lt;/sup&gt; ☑ S</td>
<td>☐ US ☐ HUS ☐ N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. The ownership by the partner organisation and the institutional framework (e.g., legislation, administration, politics) is considered conducive for the continuation of the activities.</td>
<td>5.3 The market systems development changes have been sustained/likely to be sustainable (including analysis of contributing factors).</td>
<td>See above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>☐ HS&lt;sup&gt;58&lt;/sup&gt; ☑ S</td>
<td>☐ US ☐ HUS ☐ N/A</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Additional information (if needed): Click here to enter text.

Project: 7F-00521.01-04 - Katalyst
Assessor: Ivan Naletilic
Date: 11.12.2020

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<sup>57</sup> HS: Strong capacity (able to further develop without support); S: Reliable capacity (able to continue at achieved level); US: Little capacity (requires further support); HUS: Still too weak capacity.

<sup>58</sup> HS: Very likely based on evidence; S: Likely based on evidence; US: Little likelihood based on evidence; HUS: Unlikely based on evidence.
### Key Aspects based on DAC criteria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measurement criteria applied for the AMSD evaluation (reference to indicators in the AMSD evaluation matrix)</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Justification - compulsory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assessment of relevance at moment of evaluation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. The extent to which the objectives of the projects/programmes are consistent with the demands and the needs of the target groups incl. a description of the target groups and their specific needs (e.g. gender, specific, marginalized groups).</td>
<td>☐ HS</td>
<td>M4C targeted 2m extreme poor and vulnerable living on small and hard to reach river islands – chars. (CP1/2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>☒ S</td>
<td>WEE has been a key objective from the very start (Markel, 2014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>☐ US</td>
<td>Environment – high-quality inputs were tested by the government before entering the market and had positive impacts on farm-safety and soil conditions (MTR, 2015, p32).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>☒ HUS</td>
<td>Disaster risk reduction part of sector strategies (M4C sector strategies)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>☐ N/A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The extent to which the objectives of the projects/programmes are consistent with the needs of partner country (institutions respectively society) as well as the sector policies and strategies of the partner country.</td>
<td>☐ HS</td>
<td>M4C is implemented in collaboration with the Chars Research and Development Centre (CRDC) which operates under Rural Development Agency (RDA), a specialized national rural development institution affiliated with the Ministry of Local Government, Rural Development and Cooperatives, and the project’s implementation unit is set-up within the CRDC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>☒ S</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>☐ US</td>
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<td>☐ HUS</td>
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<td>☐ N/A</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. The extent to which the design of</td>
<td>☐ HS</td>
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<td></td>
<td>☒ S</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>☐ HUS</td>
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<td></td>
<td>☐ N/A</td>
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</tr>
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</table>

59 HS: Fully consistent and target group-specific; S: Largely consistent; US: Only partly consistent; HUS: Marginally or not at all consistent.

60 N/A applied to all questions, a. if the ToR of the evaluation explicitly exclude the assessment of the criteria and/or of the key aspect(s) or b. if there is no information available to assess the criteria.

61 HS: Obvious consistency with needs of society and in line with relevant sector policies and strategies; S: Consistency . do.; US: Consistency with needs of society not visible but in line with relevant sector policies and strategies; HUS: Not consistent.

62 HS: Fully adequate; S: Largely adequate; US: Only partly adequate; HUS: Marginally or not at all adequate.
projects/programmes is adequate to achieve the goal and objectives (articulation of components; level of coordination with all stakeholders and other projects/programmes; comparative advantage of Swiss cooperation; capacity for adaptive management).

| and opportunities for creation of an enabling environment for pro-poor and inclusive market systems. | ☐ US  
| ☐ HUS  
| ☐ N/A |

The project responded to the challenges faced by farmers on the chars – high to reach river islands, and worked to improved distribution networks for high-quality inputs, knowledge and market information.

The project is linked to the DFID-funded Chars Livelihood asset transfer Programme (CLP), which did not work on the market but provided a core economic package of productive assets for the farmers – e.g., livestock, rickshaws, sewing machines.

The project cooperates with autonomous government organization and with the Microcredit Regulatory Authority (National Development Programme) to remove regulatory constraints and provide incentives for the Micro-finance institutions to offer the loans.

### Assessment of effectiveness

| 4. The extent to which the approaches/strategies to the implementation are best suited to achieve the expected results. | 4.1 SDC’s procedures (general and financial in particular) and ways of collaboration are conducive to implementing MSD in partner countries or regions?  
4.3 SDC and its implementing partners use adequate financial and human resources for effectively implementing MSD programs. | ☐ HS  
| ☐ S  
| ☐ US  
| ☐ HUS  
| ☐ N/A |

High level of staff competence and impressive capacity building efforts reported in MTR (2015), but insufficient financial resources in phase 2 to allow for the continuation of a flexible approach (thin markets paper, p28)

Decentralised project set-up allowed for efficient and effective project management (e.g., timely intervention review meetings) (MTR, 2015,p4)

The partnership cost sharing went from 70/30 to 30/70 over a period of 4 years. The main subsidy was in salaries, transport, and promotional costs (interview)

| 5. The extent to which the planned objectives at outcome level (as defined in log frame) have been achieved taking into account the causal links between results, i.e. if activities lead to the expected outputs and then to the aimed outcomes. | 3.1 Expected results at output and outcome level were achieved (including analysis of contributing factors). | ☒ HS  
| ☒ S  
| ☐ US  
| ☐ HUS  
| ☐ N/A |

Outcome targets exceeded:
- 39,300 HH use better services – 131% of the target. Usage/benefit ratio 67% - 84% of the target (Supportive analysis)
- 400 service providers adapt and/or expand services to char HH – 260% of the target (Supportive analysis)
- 2 micro-finance institutes have expanded micro-finance services to char territory, 1 national feed-mill company have established purchase centre in the char region, 1 poultry chick feed company is procuring inputs from char - 133% of the target (Supportive analysis)

| 6. The extent to which the target group, end | 3.2 Evidence of the impact on the target group, end | ☐ HS  
| ☐ S |

Impact on poverty reduction is mixed. An average income increase, as presented below, seem not sufficient for lifting people out of poverty. But within the group of people who benefited...

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63 HS: Fully suited; S: Suited; US: Partly suited; HUS: Not suited.
64 HS: Fully achieved or overachieved; S: Most important outcomes are largely achieved; US: Only least important outcomes are achieved; HUS: Marginally achieved.
projects/programmes contribute to the objectives at impact level (as defined in logframe). Note: this sub-criteria is particularly relevant for ex-post evaluations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>7. The extent to which the outcomes achieved contribute to results related to transversal themes. (Please add a line for each relevant transversal theme.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.2 Evidence of the impact on the target group, end beneficiaries and market players e.g. on income, quality of life, gender equality (including analysis of contributing factors).</td>
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<p>| | | | | |</p>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>US</td>
<td>HUS</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

beneficiaries and market players e.g., on income, quality of life, gender equality (including analysis of contributing factors).

3.3 Evidence of systemic changes in functions and rules (including analysis of contributing factors).

3.4 Evidence of scale up (including analysis of contributing factors).

3.2 Evidence of the impact on the target group, end beneficiaries and market players e.g. on income, quality of life, gender equality (including analysis of contributing factors).

74% of women working on the family farm indicated in the M4C’s WEE assessment (2014) that household income had increased because of their improved capacity particularly in post-harvest handling. But it remains unclear how impactful that increase is – see above.

Attention to environment and climate has been weak.

Systemic change occurred:

- 5 leading agro-input companies and 3 microfinance providers expanding business on chars and created around 1'500 service providers offering 63 types of services.
- Farmers now have better access to inputs, markets and knowledge and information. Productivity, quality, volume, and diversity of their produce have improved. Farmers are copying each other’s improved practices (thin markets, p12).

Replication noted in that the 5 original companies led to 20 others expanding their business and 10 new distributors from non-partner companies e.g. 4 non-partner agro-vet companies have employed distributors in the area (poultry feed + vet drugs).

From May 2013 to December 2019 the project has benefitted 124,000 HH with an additional income of ~20m chf or chf 2/hh/month over the period or 0,06 chf/hh/day.

The project is reported as leading to a benefit of chf 7.7 million for 32,000 HH (158,220 people) by end of 2021 leading to an income increase of chf 240/hh over 58 months or chf 51/hh/year or about 0,02 chf/p/day (EPR,2020)

Attention to environment and climate has been weak.

Assessment of efficiency

66 Link to transversal themes of dispatch 2017-2020 and 2021-2024.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>8. Cost-effectiveness of project results</th>
<th>4.2 Cost-benefit analyses has been presented and provides evidence for implementing MSD approaches.</th>
<th>□ HS[^{68}] □ S □ US □ HUS □ N/A</th>
<th>No CBA was made</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9. If assessable: Cost-benefit ratio of project results[^{69}]</td>
<td>4.1 SDC’s procedures (general and financial in particular) and ways of collaboration are conducive to implementing MSD in partner countries or regions? 4.3 SDC and its implementing partners use adequate financial and human resources for effectively implementing MSD programs.</td>
<td>□ HS[^{70}] □ S □ US □ HUS □ N/A</td>
<td>No CBA was made</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Projects/Progr. management, monitoring, and steering mechanisms are in place and effectively used for the efficient implementation of activities.</td>
<td>MRM in the words of the MTR review “The MRM is impressive. It includes a number of new and innovative monitoring tools, which are often one of the weaknesses in MRM. In addition to the MRM the project keeps records of a wide range of other data, e.g., its coverage of villages, CLP beneficiaries, and PPI scores. We had the impression that for nearly every question we asked an excel sheet could be pulled out with the answers.” High level of staff competence and impressive capacity building efforts reported in MTR (2015), but insufficient financial resources in phase 2 to allow for the continuation of a flexible approach (thin markets paper, p28) Decentralised project set-up allowed for efficient and effective project management (e.g., timely intervention review meetings) (MTR, 2015, p4) The partnership cost sharing went from 70/30 to 30/70 over a period of 4 years. The main subsidy was in salaries, transport, and promotional costs (interview).</td>
<td>□ HS[^{71}] □ S □ US □ N/A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Assessment of sustainability**

| 11. The extent to which the positive results at outcome level will be continued beyond the end of the external support. Considering | 5.1 The interventions were financially and technically sustained/ likely to be sustainable (including analysis of contributing factors) 5.2 The social, environmental/climate | □ HS\[^{72}\] □ S □ US □ HUS □ N/A | MTR (2015) reported good indications of sustainability of the service/input/forward marketing changes but significant risks too, with a remark that it was generally too early to assess the sustainability  
- Increased coverage of lead firms and sales of lead firms, retailers, and dealers  
- Increased demand for services and finance; loan performance good  
- Increased and expanded contract farming |

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\[^{68}\] HS: Positive CER based on a cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA); S: Positive CER, based on qualitative justification; US: Poor CER, based on qualitative justification; HUS: Poor CER demonstrated.

\[^{69}\] The extent to which the relation between resources (mainly financial and human resources) and time (e.g., delays compared to planning) required and results achieved is appropriate (Cost-benefit ratio - CBR). Further information: [http://deza-peci-lernbuch-3.prod2.neretz.ch/module-6-en/2-cost-benefit-and-cost-effectiveness-analyses#Fo218](http://deza-peci-lernbuch-3.prod2.neretz.ch/module-6-en/2-cost-benefit-and-cost-effectiveness-analyses#Fo218)

\[^{70}\] HS: Positive CBR based on a cost-benefit analysis (CBA); S: Positive CBR, based on qualitative justification; US: Poor CBR, based on qualitative justification; HUS: Bad CBR demonstrated.

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\[^{72}\] HS: Very likely based on evidence; S: Likely based on evidence; US: Little likelihood based on evidence; HUS: Unlikely based on evidence.
potential risks in the context.
sustainability issues were addressed by MSD programs (including analysis of contributing factors).

<table>
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<th>12. The extent to which partner organisations are capable to carry on activities. Capacity includes technical, financial capacity, human resources.</th>
<th>5.1 The interventions were financially and technically sustained/ likely to be sustainable (including analysis of contributing factors) – specifically concerning capacity of partner organisations/market players.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>☐ HS</td>
<td>☒ S</td>
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<tr>
<td>☑ LS</td>
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<tr>
<td>☐ HUS</td>
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</table>

See above

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<tr>
<th>13. The ownership by the partner organisation and the institutional framework (e.g. legislation, administration, politics) is considered conducive for the continuation of the activities.</th>
<th>5.3 The market systems development changes have been sustained /likely to be sustainable (including analysis of contributing factors).</th>
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The project works in close collaboration with CRDC – an autonomous government organization and is building their institutional capacity from within so that they can gradually take over the facilitation.

Additional information (if needed): Click here to enter text.
Project: 7F-07952.01-02 M4C Market works for Chars
Assessor: Ivan Naletilic
Date: 11.12.2020

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73 HS: Strong capacity (able to further develop without support); S: Reliable capacity (able to continue at achieved level); US: Little capacity (requires further support); HUS: Still too weak capacity.

74 HS: Very likely based on evidence; S: Likely based on evidence; US: Little likelihood based on evidence; HUS: Unlikely based on evidence.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Aspects based on DAC criteria</th>
<th>Measurement criteria applied for the AMSD evaluation (reference to indicators in the AMSD evaluation matrix)</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Justification - compulsory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assessment of relevance at moment of evaluation</td>
<td>1. The extent to which the objectives of the projects/programmes are consistent with the demands and the needs of the target groups incl. a description of the target groups and their specific needs (e.g., gender-specific, marginalized groups).</td>
<td>☒ HS75 ☐ S ☐ US ☐ HUS ☐ N/A76</td>
<td>Samriddhi worked in areas where poverty rates are substantially above the national averages with an outreach of 1m HH of which 66% are poor (MTR, 2013, p22; CP3, p5), also focusing on the value chains traditionally driven by women (CP3, p4) Samriddhi responded to employment and income opportunities through improving the production, productivity, and business capacity of MSEs or producer groups and their networks (CP3, p3), adopted the human and institutional development model for improving social capital, and developed and mainstreamed community-based DDR plans in Community (Ward) platforms. (EPROR, 2017, p5/7)</td>
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<td>2. The extent to which the objectives of the projects/programmes are consistent with the demands and the needs of partner country (institutions respectively society) as well as the sector policies and strategies of the partner country.</td>
<td>☐ HS77 ☒ S ☐ US ☐ HUS ☐ N/A</td>
<td>Samriddhi’s objectives were in line with the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) of the Government of Bangladesh. (EPROR, 2017, p6) Pro-poor growth and accelerated agricultural development through local service, high-value products, non-cereal value chains, enhanced access to markets for small enterprises are key elements of the revised ‘National Strategy for Accelerated Poverty Reduction 2009-2011’ (PRS-II) of the Government of Bangladesh (i2.3, Credit Proposal 2010, p2)</td>
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</table>

75 HS: Fully consistent and target group-specific; S: Largely consistent; US: Only partly consistent; HUS: Marginally or not at all consistent.
76 N/A applied to all questions, a. if the ToR of the evaluation explicitly exclude the assessment of the criteria and/or of the key aspect(s) or b. if there is no information available to assess the criteria.
77 HS: Obvious consistency with needs of society and in line with relevant sector policies and strategies; S: Consistency .. do.; US: Consistency with needs of society not visible but in line with relevant sector policies and strategies; HUS: Not consistent.
3. The extent to which the design of projects/programmes is adequate to achieve the goal and objectives (articulation of components; level of coordination with all stakeholders and other projects/programmes; comparative advantage of Swiss cooperation; capacity for adaptive management).

1.4 The MSD approach responded to the challenges and opportunities for creation of an enabling environment for pro-poor and inclusive market systems.

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<td></td>
<td>Samriddhi’s two-pronged model showed good results. It aimed at improving agricultural market systems and building social capital. The HID model of the project built the capacities of Ward platforms for better participation of local communities in local governance. The project in addition aimed at 2 government agencies to adopt the project’s model of work but with no success mainly due to lack of explicit focus on advocacy from the start of the project and lack of practical experience of the staff in dealing with public sector agencies. (Helvetas, 2014, Value chain development for inclusive and sustainable market systems in Bangladesh – the experience so Samriddhi)</td>
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Assessment of effectiveness

4. The extent to which the approaches/strategies to the implementation are best suited to achieve the expected results.

4.1 SDC’s procedures (general and financial in particular) and ways of collaboration are conducive to implementing MSD in partner countries or regions?

4.3 SDC and its implementing partners use adequate financial and human resources for effectively implementing MSD programs.

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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The team was well qualified. Various team members were part of the LEAF and SAAKTI projects for many years. (MTR, 2010) Implementing local NGOs showed good technical capacities and had the required institutional relationships and local networks to play their role effectively. (MTR, 2010) The private sector partners were committed and shared 38% of the financing needs in 2011, and with the help of the project formed sustainable business relationships with service providers and associations. (MTR, 2010)</td>
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4.2 The extent to which the planned objectives at output level (as defined in logframe) have been achieved taking into account the causal links between results, i.e. if activities lead to the expected outputs and then to the aimed outcomes.

3.1 Expected results at output and outcome level were achieved (including analysis of contributing factors).

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<td>Targets at the outcome level were for the most part met (Country note supportive analysis) No analysis on contributing factors was made</td>
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Note: for mid-term/end-of-phase evaluations: likelihood of achievement/contribution

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78 HS: Fully adequate; S: Largely adequate; US: Only partly adequate; HUS: Marginally or not at all adequate.

79 HS: Fully suited; S: Suited; US: Partly suited; HUS: Not suited.

80 HS: Fully achieved or overachieved; S: Most important outcomes are largely achieved; US: Only least important outcomes are achieved; HUS: Marginally achieved.

180
6. The extent to which the projects/programmes contribute to the objectives at impact level (as defined in logframe). Note: this sub-criteria is particularly relevant for ex-post evaluations.

| 3.2 Evidence of the impact on the target group, end beneficiaries and market players e.g. on income, quality of life, gender equality (including analysis of contributing factors). | □ HS  
☐ S  
☐ US  
☒ HUS  
☐ N/A | A total outreach was 104% of the impact target. Women represent 55% of total direct producers while poor and extreme poor represent 66% of direct producers. (Country note supportive analysis) Employment created for more than 30,000 full-time employees, Annual income per producer increased to 41% of baseline, increased income for women, poor and extreme poor by 62%, 32% and 73% respectively (EPROR, 2017, p3) Samriddhi achieved systemic changes in functions but not rules, and the project’s approach to collective action – Collection centres, has been replicated by a number of projects and donors (Country note) |

7. The extent to which the outcomes achieved contribute to results related to transversal themes. (Please add a line for each relevant transversal theme.)

| 3.2 Evidence of the impact on the target group, end beneficiaries and market players e.g. on income, quality of life, gender equality (including analysis of contributing factors). | □ HS  
☐ S  
☒ US  
☒ HUS  
☐ N/A | 3.2 see above – WEE addressed; annual income increase for women 62% of baseline Environment was not a strong feature and attention to it weak in reporting Social dimension addressed through the human and institutional development approach |

Assessment of efficiency

| 8. Cost-effectiveness of project results | □ HS  
☐ S  
☐ US  
☒ HUS  
☐ N/A | No CBA was made |

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81 HS: Strong evidence of contribution; S: Evidence of contribution; US: Few evidence of contribution; HUS: No contribution.
82 Link to transversal themes of dispatch 2017-2020 and 2021-2024.
83 HS: Strong evidence of contribution; S: Evidence of contribution; US: Few evidence of contribution; HUS: No contribution.
84 HS: Positive CER based on a cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA); S: Positive CER, based on qualitative justification; US: Poor CER, based on qualitative justification; HUS: Poor CER demonstrated.
9. If assessable: Cost-benefit ratio of project results.\(^{85}\)

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<th>HS(^{86})</th>
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<th>N/A</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cost-benefit ratio of project results.</td>
<td>No CBA was made</td>
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10. Projects/Progr. management, monitoring and steering mechanisms are in place and effectively used for the efficient implementation of activities.

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<th>HS(^{87})</th>
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<th>N/A</th>
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</thead>
</table>
| 4.1 SDC’s procedures (general and financial in particular) and ways of collaboration are conducive to implementing MSD in partner countries or regions? | The MRM operated by Samriddhi was being developed throughout the project implementation and there was room for simplification and improvement (Mid-term review, 2012 p23). Strengthen MRM system through learning by doing but also iterative, intensive process and time-consuming process. (Helvetas (2014). Experience with the DCED Standard for Results Measurement: The Case of Samriddhi in Bangladesh)
| 4.3 SDC and its implementing partners use adequate financial and human resources for effectively implementing MSD programs. | The team was well qualified. Various team members were part of the LEAF and SAAKTI projects for many years. (MTR, 2010)
|          | HS          | S | US | HUS | N/A |

Assessment of sustainability

11. The extent to which the positive results at outcome level will be continued beyond the end of the external support. Considering potential risks in the context.

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<th>HS(^{88})</th>
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<th>N/A</th>
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</table>
| The interventions were financially and technically sustained/ likely to be sustainable (including analysis of contributing factors) | Cost-sharing mechanisms with private sector actors were established as part of the exit strategy at the very outset. (Helvetas, Capitalisation of Samriddhi experience on private rural service providers system August 2013, p4) The private sector partners were committed and shared 38% of the financing needs in 2011, and with the help of the project formed sustainable business relationships with service providers and associations. These collaborations were regarded as increasingly independent of project initiatives. (MTR, 2010)
| The social, environmental/climate sustainability issues were addressed by MSD programs (including analysis of contributing factors). | Environment was not a strong feature and attention to it weak in reporting
|          | HS          | S | US | HUS | N/A |

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\(^{85}\) The extent to which the relation between resources (mainly financial and human resources) and time (e.g. delays compared to planning) required and results achieved is appropriate (Cost-benefit ratio - CBR). Further information: [http://deza-pcmi-lernbuch-3.prod2.lemetz.ch/module-6-en/2-cost-benefit-and-cost-effectiveness-analyses#Fo218](http://deza-pcmi-lernbuch-3.prod2.lemetz.ch/module-6-en/2-cost-benefit-and-cost-effectiveness-analyses#Fo218)

\(^{86}\) HS: Positive CBR based on a cost-benefit analysis (CBA); S: Positive CBR, based on qualitative justification; US: Poor CBR, based on qualitative justification; HUS: Bad CBR demonstrated.

\(^{87}\) HS: Highly efficient; S: Efficient; US: Partly efficient; HUS: Not efficient.

\(^{88}\) HS: Very likely based on evidence; S: Likely based on evidence; US: Little likelihood based on evidence; HUS: Unlikely based on evidence.
12. The extent to which partner organisations are capable to carry on activities. Capacity includes technical, financial capacity, human resources.

5.1 The interventions were financially and technically sustained/likely to be sustainable (including analysis of contributing factors) – specifically concerning capacity of partner organisations/market players.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partner Organisation</th>
<th>HS</th>
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<th>US</th>
<th>HUS</th>
<th>N/A</th>
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<tr>
<td>Samriddhi</td>
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See above

13. The ownership by the partner organisation and the institutional framework (e.g. legislation, administration, politics) is considered conducive for the continuation of the activities.

5.3 The market systems development changes have been sustained/likely to be sustainable (including analysis of contributing factors).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partner Organisation</th>
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<tr>
<td>Samriddhi</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Samriddhi achieved sustainable and inclusive systemic changes and its model was institutionalised by wider level actors.

- Increased number of producers’ groups and MSEs from 1600 in baseline to 6048 in 2015 based on developed linkages of more than one million producers with buyers/traders, input suppliers and processors within and outside the project area through the facilitation by Local Service Providers (LSPs) and Service Provider Associations (SPAs) (Epron, 2015, p12)
- The number of SPA members increased, as the LSP’s income sources expanded and became more diversified – indicating a sustainable mechanism in service provision
- The expansion of markets resulted in increasing number of market infrastructures (177 collection centres) which contributed to remarkably lowering the transaction costs. (Epron, 2015, p12)

Additional information (if needed): Click here to enter text.

Project: 7F-03402.01-03 Samriddhi
Assessor: Ivan Naletilic
Date: 11.12.2020

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89 HS: Strong capacity (able to further develop without support); S: Reliable capacity (able to continue at achieved level); US: Little capacity (requires further support); HUS: Still too weak capacity.

90 HS: Very likely based on evidence; S: Likely based on evidence; US: Little likelihood based on evidence; HUS: Unlikely based on evidence.
### Key Aspects based on DAC criteria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measurement criteria applied for the AMSD evaluation (reference to indicators in the AMSD evaluation matrix)</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Justification - compulsory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Assessment of relevance at moment of evaluation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. The extent to which the objectives of the projects/programmes are consistent with the demands and the needs of the target groups incl. a description of the target groups and their specific needs (e.g. gender-specific, marginalized groups).</td>
<td>☒ HS91 ☐ S ☐ US ☐ HUS ☐ N/A92</td>
<td>The project targeted the poorest regions but also the most marginalised groups. The project proved to be relevant for benefitting not just farmers’ families that increased their income, but specifically a large number of rural women involved in productive activities that improved their living conditions beyond their income. Women also improved their social and family standing. Resilience was also targeted in terms of improving food safety and sovereignty promoting local consumption, linking national and international markets with productive activities. The project achieved great systemic changes regarding climate change adaptation measures and technologies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The extent to which the objectives of the projects/programmes are consistent with the demands and the needs of partner country (institutions respectively society) as well as the sector policies and strategies of the partner country.</td>
<td>☐ HS93 ☐ S ☐ US ☐ HUS ☐ N/A</td>
<td>The project was well-aligned and supportive of the Bolivian Agricultural Development strategy. It also worked closely with national and local institutions. Nevertheless in Bolivia a bottom up approach requires great efforts to influence policy at national level. National policies are top down oriented and institutional crisis in Bolivia did not contribute considerably to make dialogue channels easier. The project still faces important challenges at institutional, social and sanitary level. The project was indeed complementary to the context but the national and local policies remain short to face these upcoming situations to respond to local populations. In this context SDC strategies require greater efforts to palliate these upcoming situations, SDC and implementing partners are requested to be highly flexible and demand oriented.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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91 HS: Fully consistent and target group-specific; S: Largely consistent; US: Only partly consistent; HUS: Marginally or not at all consistent.

92 N/A applied to all questions, a. if the ToR of the evaluation explicitly exclude the assessment of the criteria and/or of the key aspect(s) or b. if there is no information available to assess the criteria.

93 HS: Obvious consistency with needs of society and in line with relevant sector policies and strategies; S: Consistency .. do.; US: Consistency with needs of society not visible but in line with relevant sector policies and strategies; HUS: Not consistent.
3. The extent to which the design of projects/programmes is adequate to achieve the goal and objectives (articulation of components; level of coordination with all stakeholders and other projects/programmes; comparative advantage of Swiss cooperation; capacity for adaptive management).

1.4 The MSD approach responded to the challenges and opportunities for creation of an enabling environment for pro-poor and inclusive market systems.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assessment of effectiveness</th>
<th>Note: for mid-term/end-of-phase evaluations: likelihood of achievement/contribution</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4. The extent to which the approaches/strategies to the implementation are best suited to achieve the expected results.</td>
<td>4.1 SDC’s procedures (general and financial in particular) and ways of collaboration are conducive to implementing MSD in partner countries or regions? 4.3 SDC and its implementing partners use adequate financial and human resources for effectively implementing MSD programs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. The extent to which the planned objectives at outcome level (as defined in logframe) have been achieved taking into account the causal links between results, i.e. if activities lead to the expected outputs and then to the aimed outcomes.</td>
<td>3.1 Expected results at output and outcome level were achieved (including analysis of contributing factors).</td>
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</table>

The project is considered a flagship in Bolivia and in the MSD community of practice. MSD approach responded to the challenges and opportunities to enabling a pro poor and inclusive market system in the interventions areas. The MSD approach was adapted to the Bolivian and local context, to the local offer, their products were adapted under an innovative approach to the local, national and international market demands and opportunities. At the same time crosscutting issues contributed to inclusion like the intensive gender and climate change approach. In both cases innovation was present: social and technological innovation.

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<td>95</td>
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<td>96</td>
<td>HS</td>
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94 HS: Fully adequate; S: Largely adequate; US: Only partly adequate; HUS: Marginally or not at all adequate.
95 HS: Fully suited; S: Suited; US: Partly suited; HUS: Not suited.
96 HS: Fully achieved or overachieved; S: Most important outcomes are largely achieved; US: Only least important outcomes are achieved; HUS: Marginally achieved.
6. The extent to which the projects/programmes contribute to the objectives at impact level (as defined in logframe). Note: this sub-criteria is particularly relevant for ex-post evaluations.

- 3.2 Evidence of the impact on the target group, end beneficiaries and market players e.g. on income, quality of life, gender equality (including analysis of contributing factors).
- 3.3 Evidence of systemic changes in functions and rules (including analysis of contributing factors).
- 3.4 Evidence of scale up (including analysis of contributing factors).

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The were evidence based notable impacts on both: target groups and systemic changes: income increase, employment and self-employment improvement, living conditions’ improvement for rural women, climate change resilience increased, greater linkage between markets and production processes, financial and technical goods and services’ improvements, etc.

The scaling up of MSD approach best practices was possible. Most relevant contributing factors for achieving the systemic changes and the scaling up were: i) coherence with public policies, the multidimensional poverty’s approach, laws and favourable regulations for productive development, but also with private stakeholders; ii) Adapted implementation of MSD approach to Bolivian conditions; iii) Promotion of local consumption, food security and food sovereignty to foster nutrition & local demand; iv) Networking and facilitation approaches within the project team.

7. The extent to which the outcomes achieved contribute to results related to transversal themes. (Please add a line for each relevant transversal theme.)

- 3.2 Evidence of the impact on the target group, end beneficiaries and market players e.g. on income, quality of life, gender equality (including analysis of contributing factors).
- 5.2 The social, environmental/climate sustainability issues were addressed by MSD programs (including analysis of contributing factors).

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Climate change adaptation and gender and economic empowerment of women were strong points of the project.

- **Climate change adaptation measures improved**: 5,174 UFP improved their strategies for climate change adaptation at the intervention territories and 1,430 in other areas, introducing measures and new technologies as: early warning, risk management, insurance, seeds, etc.
- **Living conditions of women improved**: Through reduction of violence, greater participation & equal conditions at family & productive environment, 3,765 women developed capacities and have improved their empowerment.

### Assessment of efficiency

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>8. Cost-effectiveness of project results</th>
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<tr>
<td>4.2 Cost-benefit analyses has been presented and provides evidence for implementing MSD approaches.</td>
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The results’ and impact assessment and project reporting indicate a high degree of cost effectiveness for indicators on income and employment. The second phase showed high effectiveness on crosscutting strategies as climate change adaption and women empowerment.

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98 Link to transversal themes of dispatch 2017-2020 and 2021-2024.
100 [F-08634.02.01_C81053330_MInclusivos_Inf_anual_2019_ASDI_29_03_20.pdf](F-08634.02.01_C81053330_MInclusivos_Inf_anual_2019_ASDI_29_03_20.pdf)
101 HS: Positive CER, based on qualitative justification; US: Poor CER, based on qualitative justification; HUS: Poor CER demonstrated.
9. If assessable: Cost-benefit ratio of project results.\(^{102}\)

- ☒ HS
- ☐ S
- ☐ US
- ☐ HUS
- ☐ N/A

The project proved a Benefit/Cost ratio of about 2.6 for the project in its first phase\(^ {104}\), and of 1.63 2nd phase (forecast).

10. Projects/Progr. management, monitoring, and steering mechanisms are in place and effectively used for the efficient implementation of activities.

- ☒ HS\(^ {105}\)
- ☐ S
- ☐ US
- ☐ HUS
- ☐ N/A

4.1 SDC’s procedures (general and financial in particular) and ways of collaboration are conducive to implementing MSD in partner countries or regions?

4.3 SDC and its implementing partners use adequate financial and human resources for effectively implementing MSD programs.

The program was exceptionally well adapted to the Bolivian situation. SDC local management adaptability allowed it, linked to the adaptive management’s approach from Swisscontact, PROFIN and cofacilitators (PROINPA, PLAGBOL and RIMISP). The main features of the adaptive management are: i) Orientation to innovation “open mind”; ii) Results oriented planning & monitoring is everyone's responsibility and allowed learning, access to good information and assessment of successful or promising interventions and managing the project according to the results, avoiding investment in actions without results; iii) Flexible budgets allow capacity response to changes in context; iv) SDC local management’s trust in the implementer is key to provide flexibility and adaptation’s capacity; v) Operational plans are guidelines to be followed and on-going adapted; vi) Team with multiple leaderships (thematic, functional or others) and with capacity and decision-making power; vii) Extensive networking.

Assessment of sustainability

11. The extent to which the positive results at outcome level will be continued beyond the

- ☒ HS\(^ {106}\)
- ☐ S
- ☐ US
- ☐ HUS
- ☐ N/A

There are many elements of the project intervention that are likely to be sustained in particular:

- o New biological inputs and technologies for sustainable agriculture.

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\(^{102}\) The extent to which the relation between resources (mainly financial and human resources) and time (e.g. delays compared to planning) required and results achieved is appropriate (Cost-benefit ratio - CBR). Further information: [http://deza-pcmi-lernbuch-3.prod2.lernetz.ch/module-6-en/2-cost-benefit-and-cost-effectiveness-analyses#Fo218](http://deza-pcmi-lernbuch-3.prod2.lernetz.ch/module-6-en/2-cost-benefit-and-cost-effectiveness-analyses#Fo218)

\(^{103}\) HS: Positive CBR based on a cost-benefit analysis (CBA); S: Positive CBR, based on qualitative justification; US: Poor CBR, based on qualitative justification; HUS: Bad CBR demonstrated.

\(^{104}\) SDC (2017) Credit proposal phase 2

\(^{105}\) HS: Highly efficient; S: Efficient; US: Partly efficient; HUS: Not efficient.

\(^{106}\) HS: Very likely based on evidence; S: Likely based on evidence; US: Little likelihood based on evidence; HUS: Unlikely based on evidence.
### 5.2 The social, environmental/climate sustainability issues were addressed by MSD programs (including analysis of contributing factors).

- The tailored financial (“Pronto Pago”, “Green Credit”, micro insurances, and new mechanisms for the inclusion (“Gestor Financiero Rural”, “Edufina”);
- The technical services (technical assistance and information). The food safety measures that promotes local consumption even more important on a pandemic COVID situation worldwide.
- The gender oriented social activities. strengthened prevention and care services for women victims of violence with universities and local governments.

Contributing factors for achieving the systemic changes and the scaling up were: i) coherence with public policies, the multidimensional poverty’s approach, favourable public programmes for productive development, but also with private stakeholders; ii) Adapted implementation of MSD approach to Bolivian conditions; iii) Promotion of local consumption, food security and food sovereignty to foster nutrition & local demand; iv) Networking and facilitation approaches within the project team.

These factors remain key factors to keep the project on track but further efforts and strategies at both levels are requested: SDC level and implementing partner’s level.

### 12. The extent to which partner organisations are capable to carry on activities. Capacity includes technical, financial capacity, human resources.

5.1 The interventions were financially and technically sustained/ likely to be sustainable (including analysis of contributing factors) – specifically concerning capacity of partner organisations/market players.

5.3 The market systems development changes have been sustained /likely to be sustainable (including analysis of contributing factors).

### 13. The ownership by the partner organisation and the institutional framework (e.g. legislation, administration, politics) is considered conducive for the continuation of the activities.

- **Income increase & employment and self-employment conditions improved:** For new forms of relationship (named mechanisms) between actors in the market systems that allow smallholder access to productivity factors, mainly knowledge and technologies.
- **Climate change adaptation measures improved:** Through the focus on practices and innovative inputs that decrease the crop losses, some functions on the market system has been enhanced, for instance: Technical assistance services, micro insurance, biological inputs, etc.)

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107 HS: Strong capacity (able to further develop without support); S: Reliable capacity (able to continue at achieved level); US: Little capacity (requires further support); HUS: Still too weak capacity.

108 HS: Very likely based on evidence; S: Likely based on evidence; US: Little likelihood based on evidence; HUS: Unlikely based on evidence.
Living conditions of women improved: For the above issues and also for addressing conditions for empowerment: fight against violence, responsibility for care and participation in the public and private sphere.

Better linkage and adaptation between products and national & international markets

Improved access to tailored productions’ goods and services: By addressing different markets (public and private), appropriate to the characteristics of different groups of smallholder, SMEs and buyers, for example: eco-shops, supermarkets, mobile markets, etc.
### Key Aspects based on DAC criteria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measurement criteria applied for the AMSD evaluation (reference to indicators in the AMSD evaluation matrix)</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Justification - compulsory</th>
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<td>(please write a short explanation with the main points and refer to the chapter(s) where the information that justify your assessment can be found) + in brackets add the strength of evidence /S/US</td>
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</table>

### Assessment of relevance at moment of evaluation

| 1. The extent to which the objectives of the projects/programmes are consistent with the demands and the needs of the target groups incl. a description of the target groups and their specific needs (e.g. gender-specific, marginalized groups.) | 1.2 The MSD approach responded to the income and employment challenges and opportunities for target populations, the disadvantaged and poor, also considering gender. | ☐ HS109 ☒ S ☒ US ☒ HUS |
| | | The project contributed to poverty reduction targeting on small and medium size farms. The project mainly focused on institutional building and producer level innovations e.g. use of improved seeds. According to the program evaluation the project “made a substantial change in the lives of famers living in the area of intervention” and that it was the marginalised that were targeted. Initial approach was a bottom-up, multi-stakeholder (institutional) approach. In phase 3 the M4P approach was introduced. This was a hybrid project. The MSD approach was naturally implemented within the program actions. About 40 seeds’ varieties were promoted by the INIAF following market’s needs. Marked was important and guided the project work as a common thread. |

| 2. The extent to which the objectives of the projects/programmes are consistent with the demands and the needs of partner country (institutions respectively society) as well as the sector policies and strategies of the partner country. | 2.2 SDC’s strategies and programmes were systematically and sufficiently aligned and complementary to the context in partner countries. | ☐ HS109 ☒ S ☒ US ☒ HUS ☒ N/A110 |
| | | The project was well aligned with national policies and approaches (and also contributed to them) but it seems that at the operational level at least in earlier phases they could in some cases have established new organisations (platforms of producer associations and local government) that were not always possible for the public sector to take over later. The project was anchored in the Bolivian institutions, avoiding doubling efforts. The role of the institutions was respected, contributing to the development of INIAF capacities. Working with other donors in phase 4 was an element in ensuring critical mass and coherence in changing the system – different donor projects trying to make different system changes was avoided in phase 4 by merging the projects. |

109 HS: Fully consistent and target group-specific; S: Largely consistent; US: Only partly consistent; HUS: Marginally or not at all consistent.
110 N/A applied to all questions, a. if the ToR of the evaluation explicitly exclude the assessment of the criteria and/or of the key aspect(s) or b. if there is no information available to assess the criteria.
111 HS: Obvious consistency with needs of society and in line with relevant sector policies and strategies; S: Consistency .. do.; US: Consistency with needs of society not visible but in line with relevant sector policies and strategies; HUS: Not consistent.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>3. The extent to which the design of projects/programmes is adequate to achieve the goal and objectives (articulation of components; level of coordination with all stakeholders and other projects/programmes; comparative advantage of Swiss cooperation; capacity for adaptive management).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>□ HS</td>
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<tr>
<td>Initial approach was a bottom-up, multi-stakeholder (institutional) approach. In phase 3 the M4P approach was introduced. This was a hybrid project. The MSD approach was naturally implemented within the program actions. About 40 seeds’ varieties were promoted by the INIAF following market’s needs. Market was important and guided the project work as a common thread.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

### Assessment of effectiveness

4. The extent to which the approaches/strategies to the implementation are best suited to achieve the expected results.

| 4.1 SDC’s procedures (general and financial in particular) and ways of collaboration are conducive to implementing MSD in partner countries or regions? | □ HS | □ S | □ US | □ HUS | □ N/A |
| 4.3 SDC and its implementing partners use adequate financial and human resources for effectively implementing MSD programs. |
| As a hybrid project there is not sufficient evidence to answer adequately to these indicators. The project approach was adopted for the first 3 phases with a handover to the relevant national agency in the last phase. Some advantages were: high quality, unimpeded by bureaucracy and politics. Some disadvantages: risk of not internalising/low ownership, financial sustainability. Working with other donors has led to levering of funds (with SDC only funding 8%) and also an economy of scale on project administration and reporting and M&E. |

5. The extent to which the planned objectives at outcome level (as defined in logframe) have been achieved taking into account the causal links between results, i.e. if activities lead to the expected outputs and then to the aimed outcomes).

| 3.1 Expected results at output and outcome level were achieved (including analysis of contributing factors). |
| □ HS | □ S | □ US | □ HUS | □ N/A |
| Expected results, outcomes and outputs were achieved. The project had strong influence in public policies and capacity building. There was significant increase in income of targeted famers confirmed by several different analysis and evaluations. On average, producers who have adopted project-generated innovations have benefited from significant increases in net revenue from their agricultural enterprises. According to project evaluation the project has “made a substantial change in the lives of marginalised famers living in the area of intervention”. Whilst there had been increase in income (50-60%) and self-employment there had not been an increase in investment or employment. |

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112 HS: Fully adequate; S: Largely adequate; US: Only partly adequate; HUS: Marginally or not at all adequate.
113 HS: Fully suited; S: Suited; US: Partly suited; HUS: Not suited.
114 HS: Fully achieved or overachieved; S: Most important outcomes are largely achieved; US: Only least important outcomes are achieved; HUS: Marginally achieved.
6. The extent to which the projects/programmes contribute to the objectives at impact level (as defined in logframe). Note: this sub-criteria is particularly relevant for ex-post evaluations.

| 3.2 Evidence of the impact on the target group, end beneficiaries and market players e.g. on income, quality of life, gender equality (including analysis of contributing factors). | □ HS\textsuperscript{115} ☒ S ☒ US ☒ HUS ☒ N/A | Initially in the first phases there was a disconnect with making systemic change as the project was outside the national systems but this was changed in the last phase of the project (the evaluation recommended to transfer the model from the project to INIAF the national body in charge). In phase 4 the project was located within a permanent body that had the mandate for agricultural innovation (INIAF) and joined a wider World Bank effort but success was partial because of institutional shortcomings in the public sector and difficulty in finding a long term solution to financing the activities which were essentially of an agricultural extension nature – neither the user or the state could pay. BM, Danida, SDC strengthened INIAF in their action at the national level... all this improved the response to producers who are final beneficiaries. Evaluation of effect indicators in technological innovations. Changes in technologies used by producers and their impact on productive performance were evidenced. The change that was aimed for (i.e. to change from a vertical promotion of innovation to a horizontal, participative and user focused one) ended up being a process that took a long time (and is not yet consolidated). |
| 3.3 Evidence of systemic changes in functions and rules (including analysis of contributing factors). | ☒ HS\textsuperscript{115} ☒ S ☒ US ☒ HUS ☒ N/A | |
| 3.4 Evidence of scale up (including analysis of contributing factors). | ☒ HS\textsuperscript{117} ☒ S ☒ US ☒ HUS ☒ N/A | It was difficult to create scale through the project approach during the first phases, the later approach of anchoring the project in INIAF had greater prospects of scale but suffered from other constraints: i) the otherwise positive merger of the project with others tended to dilute the emphasis on gender; and ii) the intended change in system (from vertical to horizontal promotion of innovation) entailed a loss of control by the national body. |

7. The extent to which the outcomes achieved contribute to results related to transversal themes\textsuperscript{116}. (Please add a line for each relevant transversal theme.)

| 3.2 Evidence of the impact on the target group, end beneficiaries and market players e.g. on income, quality of life, gender equality (including analysis of contributing factors). | □ HS\textsuperscript{115} ☒ S ☒ US ☒ HUS ☒ N/A | |
| 5.2 The social, environmental/climate sustainability issues were addressed by MSD programs (including analysis of contributing factors). | ☒ HS\textsuperscript{117} ☒ S ☒ US ☒ HUS ☒ N/A | |

Assessment of efficiency

8. Cost-effectiveness of project results

| 4.2 Cost-benefit analyses has been presented and provides evidence for implementing MSD approaches. | □ HS\textsuperscript{118} | As an hybrid project the evidence for implementation of MSD approach is not sufficiently provided. Nevertheless, the cost benefit analysis has been independently analysed and shows positive results. The benefit cost ratio is 1.73 |

\textsuperscript{115} HS: Strong evidence of contribution; S: Evidence of contribution; US: Few evidence of contribution; HUS: No contribution.

\textsuperscript{116} Link to transversal themes of dispatch 2017-2020 and 2021-2024.

\textsuperscript{117} HS: Strong evidence of contribution; S: Evidence of contribution; US: Few evidence of contribution; HUS: No contribution.

\textsuperscript{118} HS: Positive CER based on a cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA); S: Positive CER, based on qualitative justification; US: Poor CER, based on qualitative justification; HUS: Poor CER demonstrated.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Assessment of sustainability</th>
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<tr>
<td>11. The extent to which the positive results at outcome level will be continued beyond the end of the external support. Considering</td>
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<tr>
<td>5.1 The interventions were financially and technically sustained/ likely to be sustainable (including analysis of contributing factors).</td>
<td>☒ HS</td>
<td>☐ S ☐ US ☐ HUS ☐ N/A</td>
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<tr>
<td>5.2 The social, environmental/climate</td>
<td>☒ HS</td>
<td>☐ S ☐ US ☐ HUS ☐ N/A</td>
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<td>See next assessment question. For 5.2 there is no evidence.</td>
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119 The extent to which the relation between resources (mainly financial and human resources) and time (e.g. delays compared to planning) required and results achieved is appropriate (Cost-benefit ratio - CBR). Further information: [http://deza-pcmi-lermbuch-3.prod2.lemetz.ch/module-6-en/2-cost-benefit-and-cost-effectiveness-analyses#Fo218](http://deza-pcmi-lermbuch-3.prod2.lemetz.ch/module-6-en/2-cost-benefit-and-cost-effectiveness-analyses#Fo218)

120 HS: Positive CBR based on a cost-benefit analysis (CBA); S: Positive CBR, based on qualitative justification; US: Poor CBR, based on qualitative justification; HUS: Bad CBR demonstrated.

121 HS: Highly efficient; S: Efficient; US: Partly efficient; HUS: Not efficient.

122 HS: Very likely based on evidence; S: Likely based on evidence; US: Little likelihood based on evidence; HUS: Unlikely based on evidence.
12. The extent to which partner organisations are capable to carry on activities. Capacity includes technical, financial capacity, human resources.

5.1 The interventions were financially and technically sustained/ likely to be sustainable (including analysis of contributing factors) – specifically concerning capacity of partner organisations/market players.

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☐ HS | ☒ S | ☐ US | ☐ HUS | ☐ N/A

Sustainability and an exit strategy was considered at the start and there was a growing concern on sustainability over the phases with significant adjustments to align it with a changing government set-up to obtain institutional embedding.

- From the beginning, the sustainability was a relevant concern. It has always considered the exit strategy, making each actor play their own role ... It has sought to consolidate a process of co-learning with INIAF.
- The concern regarding the sustainability required also a strategy based on: i) a bottom up approach, ii) an advocacy action line to influence with evidence in the public sphere, iii) development of institutional and people capacities; iv) use of technologies solutions to be intended to remain but also to be improved on the field. That achievement would be worth visiting and be evaluated ex post: It has been able to implement and develop further the processes to support exports of beans from the Santa Cruz region. - The Vallecito - Gabriel René Moreno Santa Cruz University (agronomy faculty /research institute - Víctor Choque (contact)). (i3.3 interviews BO5).
- “During the final year of implementation, INIAF management, with support from COSUDE and Danida, prepared a strategic plan for INIAF’s further development following the closing of the project. Covering the period 2017-2020, the strategic plan presents a vision for INIAF that is aligned with the Government’s development policies and programs, taking into account INIAF’s capacities and organizational structure, and building on lessons learned under PISA. The strategic plan, which proposes a series of reforms designed to better position INIAF to fulfill its mission over the longer-term, was adjusted during the first semester of 2017 to better align it with the sectoral development plan approved by the Minister of Rural Development and Lands in June 2017. These developments that took place following the final supervision mission have significantly improved sustainability prospects for the project’s achievements. Having prepared a clear strategy that is well aligned with sectoral policies and fully backed by the line ministry, INIAF is now much better positioned to secure funding in upcoming budget cycles (i5.1/3 World bank (2017, interview BO3)
- Institutional sustainability was enhanced by locating the tasks in a permanent government body however this body (INIAF) had challenges to raise funding for

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123 HS: Strong capacity (able to further develop without support); S: Reliable capacity (able to continue at achieved level); US: Little capacity (requires further support); HUS: Still too weak capacity.
| 13. The ownership by the partner organisation and the institutional framework (e.g. legislation, administration, politics) is considered conducive for the continuation of the activities. | 5.3 The market systems development changes have been sustained /likely to be sustainable (including analysis of contributing factors). | ☐ HS\(^{124}\) ☐ S ☒ US ☐ HUS ☐ N/A | The 7 producer platforms at the start did not include private sector organisations (just producer associations and local government. 6 of the established platforms partially stopped once project funding ceased. Just 1 continued as a marketing committee (peach one). The project was constituted as a manager, not as an executor. National institutions have an instability problem due to changes in government and party. That is why the “manager approach” is important to overcome those bottlenecks. There was a downturn in institutional terms and it is due to institutional changes. Lesson learned: it requires a permanent managing entity to make the link between actors. |

Additional information (if needed): Click here to enter text.

Project: Continuous training program - PIC COSUDE -7F-01051.03
Assessor: Eric Buhl Nielsen and Lida Patricia Rodríguez Ballesteros
Date: 08 10 2020

\(^{124}\) HS: Very likely based on evidence; S: Likely based on evidence; US: Little likelihood based on evidence; HUS: Unlikely based on evidence.
## 1. The extent to which the objectives of the projects/programmes are consistent with the demands and the needs of the target groups incl. a description of the target groups and their specific needs (e.g. gender-specific, marginalized groups).

- **1.2** The MSD approach responded to the income and employment challenges and opportunities for target populations, the disadvantaged and poor, also considering gender.
- **1.3** The MSD approach responded to the resilience challenges and opportunities (in economic, social and environmental terms) of target populations, the disadvantaged and poor, also considering gender.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measurement criteria applied for the AMSD evaluation (reference to indicators in the AMSD evaluation matrix)</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Justification - compulsory</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>☐ HS125</td>
<td>The project contributed to poverty reduction and targeting poor farmers – especially in terms of financial literacy of smaller holders who had not yet had access or only limited access to finance. The project aimed at establishing an insurance market and incorporated elements of MSD - The idea was to pilot attempts to gather enough information on the risks and benefits to allow a future establishment of a system of micro-insurance – this information was intended to lead to a systemic change in the market for insurance products. The concept was good and highly relevant but it underestimated the institutional difficulties and information challenges and overestimated the profitability of the insurance market and therefore also the interest of the private sector to engage with it. The second phase made significant adjustments which have the potential to making a system change through the piloting of agricultural insurance for Soya.</td>
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<td>☒ S</td>
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## 2. The extent to which the objectives of the projects/programmes are consistent with the demands and the needs of partner country (institutions respectively society) as well as the sector policies and strategies of the partner country.

- **2.2** SDC’s strategies and programmes were systematically and sufficiently aligned and complementary to the context in partner countries.

<table>
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<tr>
<td>☐ HS127</td>
<td>The project was broadly aligned to national policies and strategies but the lack of regulatory norms during the period of the first phase meant that the project was operating on the margins and weak because of that – it was a project of a pilot nature and ahead of the market and context. The second phase was able to benefit from changes in the government regulatory environment which to some extent improved the prospects for change.</td>
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<td>✗ S</td>
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125 HS: Fully consistent and target group-specific; S: Largely consistent; US: Only partly consistent; HUS: Marginally or not at all consistent.  
126 N/A applied to all questions, a. if the ToR of the evaluation explicitly exclude the assessment of the criteria and/or of the key aspect(s) or b. if there is no information available to assess the criteria.  
127 HS: Obvious consistency with needs of society and in line with relevant sector policies and strategies; S: Consistency .. do.; US: Consistency with needs of society not visible but in line with relevant sector policies and strategies; HUS: Not consistent.
3. The extent to which the design of projects/programmes is adequate to achieve the goal and objectives (articulation of components; level of coordination with all stakeholders and other projects/programmes; comparative advantage of Swiss cooperation; capacity for adaptive management).

1.4 The MSD approach responded to the challenges and opportunities for creation of an enabling environment for pro-poor and inclusive market systems.

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The project responded to needs but at least in its first phase was ahead of the national strategies and approaches, which favoured a state led solution to providing agricultural insurance for the poor. This was one of the contributory factors to the difficulties faced by the first phase. One could argue that the feasibility study phase was not carried out in enough depth. The second phase was able to adjust and adapt.

4. The extent to which the approaches/strategies to the implementation are best suited to achieve the expected results.

4.1 SDC’s procedures (general and financial in particular) and ways of collaboration are conducive to implementing MSD in partner countries or regions?

4.3 SDC and its implementing partners use adequate financial and human resources for effectively implementing MSD programs.

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As noted earlier, initially the project was over optimistic in its design in terms of the institutional and commercial environment. The first phase was not able, as recorded by the mid-term review, to reach its objectives. The second phase made adjustments, which indicate the adaptability of the project implementing bodies and also the SCO in La Paz. However, the time frame to create the changes envisaged is much longer than allowed for in the project design.

5. The extent to which the planned objectives at outcome level (as defined in logframe) have been achieved taking into account the causal links between results, i.e. if activities lead to the expected outputs and then to the aimed outcomes).

3.1 Expected results at output and outcome level were achieved (including analysis of contributing factors).

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The second phase was able to persuade 5 insurance companies to design insurance products that responded to the needs of the poorer population. The full roll out of these products has not yet taken place. The project also initiated an articulation between 8 insurance companies and the Bolivian association of insurers to exchange information on micro-insurance aimed at poor customers. In total 12,800 people were provided with insurance services (against a target of 10,000). Financial education was carried out including awareness raising of 900,000 people and more direct training of 25,000. Associations, NGOs and other groups (in total 10) were trained in insurance topics enabling them to replicate the knowledge to their members.

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128 HS: Fully adequate; S: Largely adequate; US: Only partly adequate; HUS: Marginally or not at all adequate.
129 HS: Fully suited; S: Suited; US: Partly suited; HUS: Not suited.
130 HS: Fully achieved or overachieved; S: Most important outcomes are largely achieved; US: Only least important outcomes are achieved; HUS: Marginally achieved.
A pilot model for commercial insurance was developed for Soya in Santa Cruz (linked to climate change effects) for some 730 producers. The results of the pilot are being analysed and will be used to develop the model.

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<tr>
<th>6. The extent to which the projects/programmes contribute to the objectives at impact level (as defined in logframe). Note: this sub-criteria is particularly relevant for ex-post evaluations.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.2 Evidence of the impact on the target group, end beneficiaries and market players e.g. on income, quality of life, gender equality (including analysis of contributing factors).</td>
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<td>The impact is still unknown as much of the project is still in pilot phase. It would be fair to say that the financial literacy has had and is likely to have an impact in the future and especially for women who were previously marginalised in accessing loans and financial products. Some systemic change related to the insurance market recognising the potential of offering insurance services to small farmers have been initiated and there appears to be grounds for believing that they will be pursued and eventually reached but it does not yet appear to have reached a tipping point and scaling up has not yet occurred. The project experience has been passed on the Mercados Inclusivos project (and probably others) who are also engaging in promoting financial and insurance related services.</td>
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<tr>
<th>7. The extent to which the outcomes achieved contribute to results related to transversal themes.*&lt;sup&gt;132&lt;/sup&gt; (Please add a line for each relevant transversal theme.)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.2 Evidence of the impact on the target group, end beneficiaries and market players e.g. on income, quality of life, gender equality (including analysis of contributing factors).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gender - Women were targeted and have benefitted from the financial literacy – it is claimed that this has led to wider benefits in terms of their exercise of rights and especially against violence. The targets of 30% women beneficiaries has in general been met (e.g. 31% of those insured are women farmers). Environment - As the insurance products were partially designed to reduced climate change related risks (especially for drought and flood) there has been an effective in increasing resilience (of the farmers affected in the 2018/19 season the average indemnity was CHF 34 against a premium of CHF 10). It should be noted that the premiums were subsidised by the project (although in part through a revolving fund).</td>
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Assessment of efficiency

| 8. Cost-effectiveness of project results |
| 4.2 Cost-benefit analyses has been presented and provides evidence for implementing MSD approaches. |
| ☐ HS | ☒ S | ☒ US | ☒ HUS | ☒ N/A |
| A cost effectiveness analysis has not been presented and it would be difficult at this early stage to do so also because the intervention is complex and to get it started considerable subsidy was needed. |

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*<sup>131</sup> HS: Strong evidence of contribution; S: Evidence of contribution; US: Few evidence of contribution; HUS: No contribution.
*<sup>132</sup> Link to transversal themes of dispatch 2017-2020 and 2021-2024.
*<sup>133</sup> HS: Strong evidence of contribution; S: Evidence of contribution; US: Few evidence of contribution; HUS: No contribution.
*<sup>134</sup> HS: Positive CER based on a cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA); S: Positive CER, based on qualitative justification; US: Poor CER, based on qualitative justification; HUS: Poor CER demonstrated.
<p>| | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9. If assessable: Cost-benefit ratio of project results.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Not carried out</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>☐ S</td>
<td>☒ US</td>
<td>☐ HUS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Projects/Progr. management, monitoring and steering mechanisms are in place and effectively used for the efficient implementation of activities.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The implementation efficiency measured as expenditure rate was high in the second phase (over 95%). The adaptability was high as shown by the changes in approach and the lessons learnt between the first and second phase.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>☐ HS</td>
<td>☐ S</td>
<td>☒ US</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Assessment of sustainability

<p>| | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11. The extent to which the positive results at outcome level will be continued beyond the end of the external support. Considering potential risks in the context.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1 The interventions were financially and technically sustained/ likely to be sustainable (including analysis of contributing factors).</td>
<td>☐ HS</td>
<td>☒ S</td>
<td>☒ US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2 The social, environmental/climate sustainability issues were addressed by MSD programs (including analysis of contributing factors).</td>
<td>It is too early to tell if the changes and innovations that have taken place will be sustained once the project stops. It should be noted that the premiums were subsidised by the project although in part through a revolving fund which opens up a pathway for sustainability. As noted by the final report (April 2020) a commercial market for agricultural insurance for small holders requires an economy of scale that is only likely to be reached if the insurance services offered are broader and include for example health. As also noted one of the major obstacles for the operation of a commercial market for agricultural insurance is the lack of trust and/or familiarity of the small holders. This was in part addressed by financial education but is a process that is likely to take longer to achieve a change. The project contributes through a pilot</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>☐ HS</td>
<td>☒ S</td>
<td>☒ US</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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135 The extent to which the relation between resources (mainly financial and human resources) and time (e.g. delays compared to planning) required and results achieved is appropriate (Cost-benefit ratio - CBR). Further information: [http://deza-pcmi-lernbuch-3.prod2.lernetz.ch/module-6-en/2-cost-benefit-and-cost-effectiveness-analyses#Fo218](http://deza-pcmi-lernbuch-3.prod2.lernetz.ch/module-6-en/2-cost-benefit-and-cost-effectiveness-analyses#Fo218)
136 HS: Positive CBR based on a cost-benefit analysis (CBA); S: Positive CBR, based on qualitative justification; US: Poor CBR, based on qualitative justification; HUS: Bad CBR demonstrated.
137 HS: Highly efficient; S: Efficient; US: Partly efficient; HUS: Not efficient.
138 HS: Very likely based on evidence; S: Likely based on evidence; US: Little likelihood based on evidence; HUS: Unlikely based on evidence.
12. The extent to which partner organisations are capable to carry on activities. Capacity includes technical, financial capacity, human resources.  
5.1 The interventions were financially and technically sustained/ likely to be sustainable (including analysis of contributing factors) – specifically concerning capacity of partner organisations/market players.  
☐ HS  
☒ S  
☐ US  
☐ HUS  
☐ N/A  
Capacity was deliberately built among the commercial sector and the association of Bolivian insurers and also among associations and NGOs who have as their constituency many small holder farmers. It is too early to tell if this will be enough but certainly the right approach was adopted in trying to locate future tasks with permanent organisations. 
It is not clear how the pilot can be continued without any subsidy to the premiums or the other interventions of the project.

13. The ownership by the partner organisation and the institutional framework (e.g. legislation, administration, politics) is considered conducive for the continuation of the activities.  
5.3 The market systems development changes have been sustained /likely to be sustainable (including analysis of contributing factors).  
☐ HS  
☐ S  
☒ US  
☐ HUS  
☐ N/A  
There have been some changes in the institutional environment between phase 1 and phase 2 (not necessarily driven or contributed to by the project) which have improved the prospects for success and sustainability e.g. 
- The creation of public insurance agencies has monopolised certain areas of insurance which obliged the commercial operators to seek new niches (including agricultural insurance for small farmers which the project promotes) 
- The requirement for all providers of financial services to offer financial education has given impetus to the project support for financial literacy 
- As agricultural insurance was stipulated as a non-conventional insurance product, there are opportunities to develop a commercial market.

Additional information (if needed): Click here to enter text.
Project: Continuous training program - Proser - 7F - 06552.01 and 02  
Assessor: Eric Buhl Nielsen and Lida Patricia Rodriguez Ballesteros 
Date: 19 10 2020

139 HS: Strong capacity (able to further develop without support); S: Reliable capacity (able to continue at achieved level); US: Little capacity (requires further support); HUS: Still too weak capacity.  
140 HS: Very likely based on evidence; S: Likely based on evidence; US: Little likelihood based on evidence; HUS: Unlikely based on evidence.
### Key Aspects based on DAC criteria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Aspects of the project evaluation (reference to indicators in the AMSD evaluation matrix)</th>
<th>Measurement criteria applied for the AMSD evaluation</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Justification - compulsory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. The extent to which the objectives of the projects/programmes are consistent with the demands and the needs of the target groups incl. specific needs (e.g. gender-specific, marginalized groups).</td>
<td>1.2 The MSD approach responded to the income and employment challenges and opportunities for target populations, the disadvantaged and poor, also considering gender.</td>
<td>☐ HS(^{141}) ☒ S ☐ US ☐ HUS ☐ N/A(^{142})</td>
<td>The project was aimed at subsistence and semi-subistence farmers (usually involving fewer than 5 cows and less than 2ha of land and not employing significant farm labour) in this respect it was one of the most pro-poor targeted projects in MSD in the country. Resilience was targeted in terms of improving food safety in small diaries and cooperating with government efforts at controlling animal disease - this ensured compliance with regulations as well as providing a strong basis for maintaining income levels. Gender was considered but as strongly as some of the other MSD projects in Georgia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The extent to which the objectives of the projects/programmes are consistent with the demands and the needs of partner country (institutions respectively society) as well as the sector policies and strategies of the partner country.</td>
<td>2.2 SDC’s strategies and programmes were systematically and sufficiently aligned and complementary to the context in partner countries.</td>
<td>☐ HS(^{143}) ☒ S ☐ US ☐ HUS ☐ N/A</td>
<td>The project was well-aligned and supportive of the Georgia Agricultural Development strategy (2015-2020). It also worked closely with national agencies on food safety and disease control.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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\(^{141}\) HS: Fully consistent and target group-specific; S: Largely consistent; US: Only partly consistent; HUS: Marginally or not at all consistent.  
\(^{142}\) N/A applied to all questions, a. if the ToR of the evaluation explicitly exclude the assessment of the criteria and/or of the key aspect(s) or b. if there is no information available to assess the criteria.  
\(^{143}\) HS: Obvious consistency with needs of society and in line with relevant sector policies and strategies; S: Consistency . . do.; US: Consistency with needs of society not visible but in line with relevant sector policies and strategies; HUS: Not consistent.
### 3. The extent to which the design of projects/programmes is adequate to achieve the goal and objectives (articulation of components; level of coordination with all stakeholders and other projects/programmes; comparative advantage of Swiss cooperation; capacity for adaptive management).

- **1.4 The MSD approach responded to the challenges and opportunities for creation of an enabling environment for pro-poor and inclusive market systems.**
  - HS: Fully adequate; S: Largely adequate; US: Only partly adequate; HUS: Marginally or not at all adequate.
  - The project responded to the challenges in processing milk and in producing meat and milk and in particular through interventions in the feed mill value chain where an enabling environment was created for greater use of high quality feed that increased the incomes of poor families and also women headed households benefitted.
  - The project promoted the provision of embedded services by especially dairies which increased the access of poor farmers to credit, inputs and advice.

### Assessment of effectiveness

#### 4. The extent to which the approaches/strategies to the implementation are best suited to achieve the expected results.

- **4.1 SDC’s procedures (general and financial in particular) and ways of collaboration are conducive to implementing MSD in partner countries or regions?**
  - HS: Fully suited; S: Suited; US: Partly suited; HUS: Not suited.
  - The project was carried out over 7 years in two phases which learnt from each other. In the view of the project manager the project withdrew at the right time (some activities carried on by another project that expanded into the same area).

- **4.3 SDC and its implementing partners use adequate financial and human resources for effectively implementing MSD programs.**
  - HS: Fully achieved or overachieved; S: Most important outcomes are largely achieved; US: Only least important outcomes are achieved; HUS: Marginally achieved.

#### 5. The extent to which the planned objectives at outcome level (as defined in logframe) have been achieved taking into account the causal links between results, i.e. if activities lead to the expected outputs and then to the aimed outcomes.

- **3.1 Expected results at output and outcome level were achieved (including analysis of contributing factors).**
  - HS: Fully achieved or overachieved; S: Most important outcomes are largely achieved; US: Only least important outcomes are achieved; HUS: Marginally achieved.
  - Key indicators at outcome level have been surpassed by a wide margin – perhaps indicating that they were set too low – on the other hand the results on number of farmers benefitting and increase in yields etc are less important than whether system changes have been made; so low targets at least don’t distort the project to chase targets rather than aim for the more difficult task of creating systemic change.

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144 HS: Fully adequate; S: Largely adequate; US: Only partly adequate; HUS: Marginally or not at all adequate.
145 HS: Fully suited; S: Suited; US: Partly suited; HUS: Not suited.
146 HS: Fully achieved or overachieved; S: Most important outcomes are largely achieved; US: Only least important outcomes are achieved; HUS: Marginally achieved.
6. The extent to which the projects/programmes contribute to the objectives at impact level (as defined in logframe). Note: this sub-criteria is particularly relevant for ex-post evaluations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3.2 Evidence of the impact on the target group, end beneficiaries and market players e.g. on income, quality of life, gender equality (including analysis of contributing factors).</th>
<th>☐ HS(^{147}) ☒ S ☐ US ☐ HUS ☐ N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The have been some notable impacts on systemic changes (feed mill, use of embedded services, improved response to food safety regulation, strengthening of associations)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scaling has occurred significantly in the feedmill area with a reported 85 times sale of improved feed over the lifetime of the project</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The impact in terms of improved income per farmer is less impressive (under CHF50 per farmer per year) and unlikely to lift families from poverty but this average based on project data does not take into account that many may have received only indirect benefits so that a smaller number might have had more significant income benefits.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. The extent to which the outcomes achieved contribute to results related to transversal themes\(^{148}\). (Please add a line for each relevant transversal theme.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3.2 Evidence of the impact on the target group, end beneficiaries and market players e.g. on income, quality of life, gender equality (including analysis of contributing factors).</th>
<th>☐ HS(^{147}) ☒ S ☒ US ☐ HUS ☐ N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender (US)– there has been some attention but the opportunities have not been fully recognised and pursued</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment – the attention to food safety has been a strong feature and highly successful</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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147 HS: Strong evidence of contribution; S: Evidence of contribution; US: Few evidence of contribution; HUS: No contribution.

148 Link to transversal themes of dispatch 2017-2020 and 2021-2024.


150 HS: Positive CER based on a cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA); S: Positive CER, based on qualitative justification; US: Poor CER, based on qualitative justification; HUS: Poor CER demonstrated.
9. If assessable: Cost-benefit ratio of project results.151

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HS152</th>
<th>S</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>HUS</th>
<th>N/A</th>
<th>As above</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

10. Projects/Progr. management, monitoring and steering mechanisms are in place and effectively used for the efficient implementation of activities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HS153</th>
<th>S</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>HUS</th>
<th>N/A</th>
<th>The project was well run and reports delivered on time and in good quality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>☒</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The project was adaptable and a significant shift was made from phase 1 to phase 2 (to focus more on entities higher up the value chain instead of farm level businesses)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>☒</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The task was complex and a proficient team was in place to find market opportunities and to facilitate change without becoming an actor that could not withdraw</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Assessment of sustainability

11. The extent to which the positive results at outcome level will be continued beyond the end of the external support. Considering potential risks in the context.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HS154</th>
<th>S</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>HUS</th>
<th>N/A</th>
<th>There are many elements of the project intervention that are likely to be sustained in particular:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>☒</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>o The use of embed services because there is a profit motive both for the providers and the receivers of the services</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>☒</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>o The food safety measures because of regulation and because of value added in the product (mainly cheese) – as an indication many of the small diaries have hired by themselves (outside the project) specialists to continue food safety measures such as the hazard analysis and critical control point.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>☒</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>o The associations that have been strengthened such as Georgia Diary have built up a base of paid membership that makes the services provided financially sustainable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The measures on disease control and food safety have improved the environmental performance of the entities involved and of the wider sector.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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151 The extent to which the relation between resources (mainly financial and human resources) and time (e.g. delays compared to planning) required and results achieved is appropriate (Cost-benefit ratio - CBR). Further information: http://deza-pcmi-lernbuch-3.prod2.lernetz.ch/module-6-en/2-cost-benefit-and-cost-effectiveness-analyses#Fo218

152 HS: Positive CBR based on a cost-benefit analysis (CBA); S: Positive CBR, based on qualitative justification; US: Poor CBR, based on qualitative justification; HUS: Bad CBR demonstrated.

153 HS: Highly efficient; S: Efficient; US: Partly efficient; HUS: Not efficient.

154 HS: Very likely based on evidence; S: Likely based on evidence; US: Little likelihood based on evidence; HUS: Unlikely based on evidence.
12. The extent to which partner organisations are capable to carry on activities. Capacity includes technical, financial capacity, human resources.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5.1 The interventions were financially and technically sustained/likely to be sustainable (including analysis of contributing factors) – specifically concerning capacity of partner organisations/market players.</th>
<th>□ HS</th>
<th>☑ S</th>
<th>☐ US</th>
<th>☐ HUS</th>
<th>☐ N/A</th>
<th>See above for the entities supported (mainly diaries) and also the associations. The project itself played a large part in stimulating the market and making key investments with grants between 25 and 60% and by providing free or highly subsidised business development services. Although the prospects for sustainability are judged as good, now that the project itself is no longer operating that source of stimulus is no longer in play. Some of the project role has been transferred to embedded services, the journalist function and associations. The need for grants, previously offered by the project, may have been partly offset by improved credit ratings due to compliance with food safety.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13. The ownership by the partner organisation and the institutional framework (e.g. legislation, administration, politics) is considered conducive for the continuation of the activities.</td>
<td></td>
<td>☐ HS</td>
<td>☑ S</td>
<td>☐ US</td>
<td>☐ HUS</td>
<td>☐ N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Additional information (if needed): Click here to enter text.

Project: MOLI -7F-07857
Assessor: Eric Buhl-Nielsen
Date: 15 July 2020

155 HS: Strong capacity (able to further develop without support); S: Reliable capacity (able to continue at achieved level); US: Little capacity (requires further support); HUS: Still too weak capacity.

156 HS: Very likely based on evidence; S: Likely based on evidence; US: Little likelihood based on evidence; HUS: Unlikely based on evidence.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Aspects based on DAC criteria</th>
<th>Measurement criteria applied for the AMSD evaluation (reference to indicators in the AMSD evaluation matrix)</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Justification - compulsory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Assessment of relevance at moment of evaluation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(please write a short explanation with the main points and refer to the chapter(s) where the information that justify your assessment can be found) + in brackets add the strength of evidence /S/US</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 1. The extent to which the objectives of the projects/programmes are consistent with the demands and the needs of the target groups incl. a description of the target groups and their specific needs (e.g. gender,-specific, marginalized groups.) | 1.2 The MSD approach responded to the income and employment challenges and opportunities for target populations, the disadvantaged and poor, also considering gender. 1.3 The MSD approach responded to the resilience challenges and opportunities (in economic, social and environmental terms) of target populations, the disadvantaged and poor, also considering gender. | ☐ ☐ ☒ HS157 ☒ S ☒ US ☒ HUS ☒ N/A158 | The project worked with commercial and semi-commercial farmers (usually 20 to 250 cows) and over 5ha of land which normally required some employment of labour. Whilst not addressing the poorest, one could still classify them within the target population. 
As for other projects - resilience was targeted in terms of improving food safety in small diaries and cooperating with government efforts at controlling animal disease - this ensured compliance with regulations as well as providing a strong basis for maintaining income levels. 
Gender was addressed to some extent also through gender disaggregated data but it was not as strong a feature of the project as others in Georgia. 
Access to finance and unfavourable weather are two largest barriers for small and medium farming operations – however the project was not able to respond to these (although there was a component addressing access to finance). |
| 2. The extent to which the objectives of the projects/programmes are consistent with the demands and the needs of partner country (institutions respectively society) as well as the sector policies and strategies of the partner country. | 2.2 SDC’s strategies and programmes were systematically and sufficiently aligned and complementary to the context in partner countries. | ☐ ☐ ☐ HS159 ☒ S ☒ US ☒ HUS ☒ N/A | The project (like others in Georgia in the MSD area) was well-aligned and supportive of the Georgia Agricultural Development strategy (2015-2020). It also worked closely with national agencies on food safety and disease control. The project manager was a former minister of agriculture which gave the project a good link to government. |

157 HS: Fully consistent and target group-specific; S: Largely consistent; US: Only partly consistent; HUS: Marginally or not at all consistent.
158 N/A applied to all questions, a. if the ToR of the evaluation explicitly exclude the assessment of the criteria and/or of the key aspect(s) or b. if there is no information available to assess the criteria.
159 HS: Obvious consistency with needs of society and in line with relevant sector policies and strategies; S: Consistency .. do.; US: Consistency with needs of society not visible but in line with relevant sector policies and strategies; HUS: Not consistent.
3. The extent to which the design of projects/programmes is adequate to achieve the goal and objectives (articulation of components; level of coordination with all stakeholders and other projects/programmes; comparative advantage of Swiss cooperation; capacity for adaptive management).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assessment of effectiveness</th>
<th>Note: for mid-term/end-of-phase evaluations: likelihood of achievement/contribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4. The extent to which the approaches/strategies to the implementation are best suited to achieve the expected results.</td>
<td>The project was carried out over 5 years in only one phase although there was a review that helped to change the approach on access to finance which was found not to be working well. There were a number of investments made in the last year and it might have been better to continue the project at least for withdrawal or transition phase to ensure adequate monitoring and enhancement of the demonstration effect.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. The extent to which the planned objectives at outcome level (as defined in logframe) have been achieved taking into account the causal links between results, i.e. if activities lead to the expected outputs and then to the aimed outcomes.</td>
<td>Like other projects, key indicators at outcome level have been surpassed by a wide margin – perhaps indicating that they were set too low – on the other hand the results on number of farmers benefitting and increase in yields etc are less important than whether system changes have been made; so low targets at least don’t distort the project to chase targets rather than aim for the more difficult task of creating systemic change. The intended outcomes on access to finance did not occur for two reasons: i) there were flaws in the way it was designed and implemented (as documented in the 2014 review report and ii) the government preferential interest shielding and risks sharing measures supplanted the need for a project based scheme.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

160 HS: Fully adequate; S: Largely adequate; US: Only partly adequate; HUS: Marginally or not at all adequate.
161 HS: Fully suited; S: Suited; US: Partly suited; HUS: Not suited.
162 HS: Fully achieved or overachieved; S: Most important outcomes are largely achieved; US: Only least important outcomes are achieved; HUS: Marginally achieved.
6. The extent to which the projects/programmes contribute to the objectives at impact level (as defined in logframe). Note: this sub-criteria is particularly relevant for ex-post evaluations.

| 3.2 Evidence of the impact on the target group, end beneficiaries and market players e.g. on income, quality of life, gender equality (including analysis of contributing factors). |
| 3.3 Evidence of systemic changes in functions and rules (including analysis of contributing factors). |
| 3.4 Evidence of scale up (including analysis of contributing factors). |

- **HS**163: Strong evidence of contribution; **S**: Evidence of contribution; **US**: Few evidence of contribution; **HUS**: No contribution.
- **N/A**: Not applicable.

The have been some notable impacts on systemic changes – like other projects the project contributed to improved veterinary services, provision of embedded services by intermediaries, improved response to food safety regulation, strengthening of associations (especially the Georgia Dairy, an association of commercial and semi-commercial dairy producers, potato certification).

Scaling has occurred for example it is noted that some 72 farmer were adopting sprinkler irrigation that had been demonstrated by the project. The project also introduced contract farming which has good scope for replication.

The impact in terms of improved income per farmer is less impressive (like for other projects in these value chains it was under CHF50 per farmer per year) and unlikely to lift families from poverty but, as for other projects, this average based on project data does not consider that many may have received only indirect benefits so that a smaller number might have had more significant income benefits.

7. The extent to which the outcomes achieved contribute to results related to transversal themes164. (Please add a line for each relevant transversal theme.)

| 3.2 Evidence of the impact on the target group, end beneficiaries and market players e.g. on income, quality of life, gender equality (including analysis of contributing factors). |
| 5.2 The social, environmental/climate sustainability issues were addressed by MSD programs (including analysis of contributing factors). |

- **HS**165: Strong evidence of contribution; **S**: Evidence of contribution; **US**: Few evidence of contribution; **HUS**: No contribution.
- **N/A**: Not applicable.

Gender and economic empowerment of women was not strong point of the project although it did not ignore it.

Environment – the attention to food safety has been a strong feature and highly successful.

### Assessment of efficiency

8. Cost-effectiveness of project results

| 4.2 Cost-benefit analyses has been presented and provides evidence for implementing MSD approaches. |

- **HS**166: Positive CER based on a cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA); **S**: Positive CER, based on qualitative justification; **US**: Poor CER, based on qualitative justification; **HUS**: Poor CER demonstrated.

The impact assessments and project reporting indicates a high degree of cost effectiveness but it has not been easy to separate direct and indirect beneficiaries or at the project level to determine the cost-effectiveness. For the 25 investments in the potato value chain an estimated cost benefit ratio was slightly under 1, for the 21 investments in the meat/dairy sector the estimated cost-benefit ratio was higher at close to 2.5.

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163 **HS**: Strong evidence of contribution; **S**: Evidence of contribution; **US**: Few evidence of contribution; **HUS**: No contribution.
164 **Link to transversal themes of dispatch 2017-2020 and 2021-2024.**
165 **HS**: Strong evidence of contribution; **S**: Evidence of contribution; **US**: Few evidence of contribution; **HUS**: No contribution.
166 **HS**: Positive CER based on a cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA); **S**: Positive CER, based on qualitative justification; **US**: Poor CER, based on qualitative justification; **HUS**: Poor CER demonstrated.
The meat and dairy value chain also had a higher co-share of the investments contributed by the beneficiary (70%) compared to the potato value chain (51%).

A formal cost-benefit ratio has not been established but estimates are given above.

The project was well run and reports delivered on time and in good quality.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>9. If assessable: Cost-benefit ratio of project results.</th>
<th>HS(^{168}), S, US, HUS, N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10. Projects/Progr. management, monitoring and steering mechanisms are in place and effectively used for the efficient implementation of activities.</td>
<td>HS(^{169}), S, US, HUS, N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Assessment of sustainability

11. The extent to which the positive results at outcome level will be continued beyond the end of the external support. Considering potential risks in the context.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>11. The extent to which the positive results at outcome level will be continued beyond the end of the external support. Considering potential risks in the context.</th>
<th>HS(^{170}), S, US, HUS, N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

As for some of the other projects in Georgia, there are many elements of the project intervention that are likely to be sustained in particular:

- The provision of embed services by intermediaries because there is a profit motive both for the providers and the receivers of the services
- The food safety measures because of regulation and because of value added in the product (meat and dairy).
- The associations that have been strengthened such as Georgia dairy.

The measures on disease control and food safety have improved the environmental performance of the entities involved and of the wider sector.

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\(^{167}\) The extent to which the relation between resources (mainly financial and human resources) and time (e.g. delays compared to planning) required and results achieved is appropriate (Cost-benefit ratio - CBR). Further information: [http://deza-pcmi-lernbuch-3.prod2.lemetz.ch/module-6-en/2-cost-benefit-and-cost-effectiveness-analyses#Fo218](http://deza-pcmi-lernbuch-3.prod2.lemetz.ch/module-6-en/2-cost-benefit-and-cost-effectiveness-analyses#Fo218)

\(^{168}\) HS: Positive CBR based on a cost-benefit analysis (CBA); S: Positive CBR, based on qualitative justification; US: Poor CBR, based on qualitative justification; HUS: Bad CBR demonstrated.

\(^{169}\) HS: Highly efficient; S: Efficient; US: Partly efficient; HUS: Not efficient.

\(^{170}\) HS: Very likely based on evidence; S: Likely based on evidence; US: Little likelihood based on evidence; HUS: Unlikely based on evidence.

\(^{171}\) HS: Strong capacity (able to further develop without support); S: Reliable capacity (able to continue at achieved level); US: Little capacity (requires further support); HUS: Still too weak capacity.
| 12. The extent to which partner organisations are capable to carry on activities. Capacity includes technical, financial capacity, human resources. | 5.1 The interventions were financially and technically sustained/likely to be sustainable (including analysis of contributing factors) – specifically concerning capacity of partner organisations/market players. | ☒ S ☐ US ☐ HUS ☐ N/A | See above for the entities supported and also the associations. The project itself played a large part in stimulating the market and making key investments with grants that averaged close to 50% and by providing free or highly subsidised business development services. The prospects for sustainability are judged as good especially as the target group is the semi-commercial or commercial farmers and the intermediaries, suppliers and buyers higher up the chain. There is also an indication that the government schemes for access to finance are likely to fill the gap left by the project grants as the commercial farmers will find it easier to raise loan finance. Some of the project role has been and like other projects is being transferred to embedded services, the journalist function and associations. |
| 13. The ownership by the partner organisation and the institutional framework (e.g. legislation, administration, politics) is considered conducive for the continuation of the activities. | 5.3 The market systems development changes have been sustained/likely to be sustainable (including analysis of contributing factors). | ☐ HS\(^{172}\) ☒ S ☐ US ☐ HUS ☐ N/A | See above |

Additional information (if needed): Click here to enter text.
Project: RED -07941.
Assessor: Eric Buhl-Nielsen
Date: 15 July 2020

\(^{172}\) HS: Very likely based on evidence; S: Likely based on evidence; US: Little likelihood based on evidence; HUS: Unlikely based on evidence.
### Key Aspects based on DAC criteria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measurement criteria applied for the AMSD evaluation (reference to indicators in the AMSD evaluation matrix)</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Justification - compulsory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. The extent to which the objectives of the projects/programmes are consistent with the demands and the needs of the target groups incl. a description of the target groups and their specific needs (e.g. gender-specific, marginalized groups.)</td>
<td>☒ HS[^173]</td>
<td>The strategy emphasizes increasing agricultural productivity, enhancing the value of agricultural sectors with the creation of local value, combating the effects of climate change and creating jobs and income for young people and women. Food security and nutrition &amp; income of family farms and agricultural enterprises should be improved in a sustainable manner in the scope of the project. The primary target group have been small producers of family farms, in particular young people and women, who currently benefit from little support in terms of access to production services, marketing networks, technical advice and participation in political advocacy platforms. The support included a Conflict Sensitive Project Management approach as an obligation and no longer a choice. HELVETAS Swiss Intercooperation and Swiss Peace have developed this Conflict Sensitive Project Management approach in order in order to be able to continue working in fragile states and contexts affected by violence. The project is considered pertinent in terms of needs of the different actors but specially the way how public private actors collaborate and participle in the dialogue, in the scope of the market system. It has been confirmed by themselves. A system analysis allowed to identify needs and opportunities which made the project very relevant considering the needs of the target groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The extent to which the objectives of the projects/programmes are consistent with the demands and the needs of partner country (institutions respectively society) as well as the sector policies and</td>
<td>☒ HS[^175]</td>
<td>The project has fostered synergies with public actors at the local, regional and national level in order to benefit targeted populations through public policies but also to intensify policy dialogue to improve the institutional framework. Synergies with communication channels (radios) allowed to improve knowledge of targeted population about innovation and good practices. Synergies with other cooperation (SDC and other donors) actions have been also initiated to increase benefits of targeted population.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[^173]: HS: Fully consistent and target group-specific; S: Largely consistent; US: Only partly consistent; HUS: Marginally or not at all consistent.

[^174]: N/A applied to all questions, a. if the ToR of the evaluation explicitly exclude the assessment of the criteria and/or of the key aspect(s) or b. if there is no information available to assess the criteria.

[^175]: HS: Obvious consistency with needs of society and in line with relevant sector policies and strategies; S: Consistency .. do.; US: Consistency with needs of society not visible but in line with relevant sector policies and strategies; HUS: Not consistent.
strategies of the partner country.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3. The extent to which the design of projects/programmes is adequate to achieve the goal and objectives (articulation of components; level of coordination with all stakeholders and other projects/programmes; comparative advantage of Swiss cooperation; capacity for adaptive management).</th>
<th>1.4 The MSD approach responded to the challenges and opportunities for creation of an enabling environment for pro-poor and inclusive market systems.</th>
<th>S</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>HUS</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The SDC &amp; HELVETAS Swiss Intercooperation, declared in the scope of the project being involved in the fight against poverty, which means focusing on projects and support with the most significant and lasting impact in favour of the most disadvantaged. This concern extends to vulnerable and minority groups, marginalized in order to support them in asserting their rights, so as to reduce social imbalances and allow a fairer representation of each individual in decision-making and in access to natural resources. The inclusive system promoted by the project enables inclusive development according to partner farmer organizations and the public and private sector. They are more than ever convinced of their role within the provision of services adapted to their needs. As a result, regional farmers’ organizations gain legitimacy thanks to these services rendered to members who are more inclined to pay their contributions. The creation of jobs under an inclusive and gender approach were possible thanks to long-term partnerships between the private sector and vulnerable producers. State services are better adapted to their territory, the farmers’ needs gaining legitimacy.</td>
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</table>

### Assessment of effectiveness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4. The extent to which the approaches/strategies to the implementation are best suited to achieve the expected results.</th>
<th>4.1 SDC’s procedures (general and financial in particular) and ways of collaboration are conducive to implementing MSD in partner countries or regions? 4.3 SDC and its implementing partners use adequate financial and human resources for effectively implementing MSD programs.</th>
<th>S</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>HUS</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>According to the reports the budgetary implementation, when applying MSD, is lower at the beginning and increases during the project implementation. There have been also delays caused by the difficulty of organisations in reporting their expenditures. It is part of learning process, according to interviewed actors. Prospects of sustainability of the effects are good because the MSD insists a lot on capacity development. It is important to apply MSD but flexibility and adaptation to local conditions is required. Capacity building in MSD approach is key at the beginning and it would be important to see that as part of a “preparation phase” and not of an implementation phase. This may increase efficiency during the “real” implementation period. The project has managed properly human and financial resources. A lack of a preparation phase to build capacities on MSD leads to low efficiency during implementation.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5. The extent to which the planned objectives at outcome level (as defined in logframe) have been achieved taking into account the causal links between</th>
<th>3.1 Expected results at output and outcome level were achieved (including analysis of contributing factors).</th>
<th>S</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>HUS</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Project has achieved 80% of its outputs and outcomes globally. It is early to talk about systemic changes, however the prospects for achievement of expected effects and systemic changes are good. The project actions have promoted the autonomy of the actors and correspond to their needs. Investments are co-financed by peasant organizations. DSM enables organizations to see themselves and to act as a market player. That is a paradigm shift, for the implementer also because he</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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176 HS: Fully adequate; S: Largely adequate; US: Only partly adequate; HUS: Marginally or not at all adequate.  
177 HS: Fully suited; S: Suited; US: Partly suited; HUS: Not suited.  
178 HS: Fully achieved or overachieved; S: Most important outcomes are largely achieved; US: Only least important outcomes are achieved; HUS: Marginally achieved.
results, i.e. if activities lead to the expected outputs and then to the aimed outcomes).

6. The extent to which the projects/programmes contribute to the objectives at impact level (as defined in logframe). Note: this sub-criteria is particularly relevant for ex-post evaluations.

| 3.2 Evidence of the impact on the target group, end beneficiaries and market players e.g. on income, quality of life, gender equality (including analysis of contributing factors). |
| ☐ HS
| ☑ S
| ☐ US
| ☐ HUS
| ☐ N/A |

The creation of jobs, and contributions to gender and social equity have been possible thanks to the role played by the programme in facilitating collaboration between the private sector and vulnerable producers leading to lasting partnerships. The partnership between the farmers’ organisations and the private sector enabled secure and lasting access to the market, an improvement in the quality and quantity of their production thanks to technical supervision and the facilitation of access to quality inputs. State services has been called to secure their territory for investors and maintain a favourable business climate, for example the establishment of infrastructure, security, environmental protection and support for rules and standards, among other. There is evidence for systemic changes in functions related to: improved access to productions inputs; to local services to promote sustainable agriculture at all its stages (storage, processing and marketing); strengthened advocacy & entrepreneurial capacities of producers’ organisations (youth and women particularly). It is too early to find evidence for scaling up, nevertheless there is some evidence that project actions enhanced scaling up of peasant knowledge in sustainable water management techniques and market gardening.

7. The extent to which the outcomes achieved contribute to results related to transversal themes. (Please add a line for each relevant transversal theme.)

3.2 Evidence of the impact on the target group, end beneficiaries and market players e.g. on income, quality of life, gender equality (including analysis of contributing factors).

| ☐ HS
| ☑ S
| ☐ US
| ☐ HUS
| ☐ N/A |

The project has fostered a close coordination between peasant organisations and local and national services for social and environmental issues (Ministry of Environment and sanitation, Centre International de Formation en Agroécologie de Nyéléni (CIFAN) and local social services). This leads to the capitalisation and monitoring of the project actions considering social and environmental issues. Specific adapted techniques and strategies have been designed to improve productivity under consideration of variables as: energetical autonomy (solar energy), agroecological practices respecting the environment and health, social inclusion and gender equity. These efforts require further diagnostics and access to financing to be intensified and scaled up.

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180 Link to transversal themes of dispatch 2017-2020 and 2021-2024.
### Assessment of Efficiency

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>4.2 Cost-benefit analyses have been presented and provides evidence for implementing MSD approaches.</th>
<th>4.1 SDC’s procedures (general and financial in particular) and ways of collaboration are conducive to implementing MSD in partner countries or regions?</th>
<th>4.3 SDC and its implementing partners use adequate financial and human resources for effectively implementing MSD programs.</th>
<th>Cost-benefit presented.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Cost-effectiveness of project results</td>
<td>☑ HS(^{182}) ☒ S ☐ US ☐ HUS ☒ N/A</td>
<td>☐ HS(^{184}) ☐ S ☐ US ☒ HUS ☒ N/A</td>
<td>☒ HS(^{185}) ☐ S ☐ US ☒ HUS ☒ N/A</td>
<td>pending</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>If assessable: Cost-benefit ratio of project results.(^{183})</td>
<td>☐ HS(^{182}) ☐ S ☐ US ☐ HUS ☒ N/A</td>
<td>☐ HS(^{184}) ☐ S ☐ US ☒ HUS ☒ N/A</td>
<td>☒ HS(^{185}) ☐ S ☐ US ☒ HUS ☒ N/A</td>
<td>According to the reports the budgetary implementation, when applying MSD, is lower at the beginning and increases during the project implementation. There have been also delays caused by the difficulty of organisations in reporting their expenditures. It is part of learning process, according to interviewed actors. Prospects of sustainability of the effects are good because the MSD insists a lot on capacity development. It is important to apply MSD but flexibility and adaptation to local conditions is required. Capacity building in MSD approach is key at the beginning and it would be important to see that as part of a “preparation phase” and not of an implementation phase. This may increase efficiency during the “real” implementation period. The project has managed properly human and financial resources. A lack of a preparation phase to build capacities on MSD leads to low efficiency during implementation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Assessment of Sustainability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>5.1 The interventions were financially and technically sustained/ likely to be sustainable (including analysis of contributing factors).</th>
<th>The project has fostered a close coordination between peasant organisations and local and national services for social and environmental issues (Ministry of Environment and sanitation, Centre International de Formation en Agroécologie de Nyéléni (CIFAN) and local social services). This leads to the capitalisation and monitoring of the project actions considering social and environmental issues. Specific adapted techniques and strategies have been designed to improve efficiency during implementation.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>The extent to which the positive results at outcome level will be continued beyond the end of the external support. Considering</td>
<td>☑ HS(^{186}) ☒ S ☒ US ☒ HUS ☒ N/A</td>
<td>☑ HS(^{185}) ☑ S ☐ US ☒ HUS ☒ N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{182}\) HS: Positive CER based on a cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA); S: Positive CER, based on qualitative justification; US: Poor CER, based on qualitative justification; HUS: Poor CER demonstrated.

\(^{183}\) The extent to which the relation between resources (mainly financial and human resources) and time (e.g. delays compared to planning) required and results achieved is appropriate (Cost-benefit ratio - CBR). Further information: [http://deza-pcmi-lernbuch-3.prod2.lemetz.ch/module-6-en/2-cost-benefit-and-cost-effectiveness-analyses#Fo218](http://deza-pcmi-lernbuch-3.prod2.lemetz.ch/module-6-en/2-cost-benefit-and-cost-effectiveness-analyses#Fo218)

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\(^{186}\) HS: Very likely based on evidence; S: Likely based on evidence; US: Little likelihood based on evidence; HUS: Unlikely based on evidence.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>12. The extent to which partner organisations are capable to carry on activities.</th>
<th>5.1 The interventions were financially and technically sustained/likely to be sustainable (including analysis of contributing factors) – specifically concerning capacity of partner organisations/market players.</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13. The ownership by the partner organisation and the institutional framework (e.g. legislation, administration, politics) is considered conducive for the continuation of the activities.</td>
<td>5.3 The market systems development changes have been sustained/likely to be sustainable (including analysis of contributing factors).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HS&lt;sup&gt;187&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>S</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>HUS</th>
<th>N/A</th>
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</tbody>
</table>

The collaboration with key actors as the Federation of peasant unions is considered a main aspect for sustainability of the initiated and achieved market systems development changes. Also the facilitation by the project of business dialogues and in the design of collective strategies, within regional peasants’ organisations, stimulating commercial and financial agreements. FUAPAD plays a direct and essential role to provide interconnected market system services to the peasants’ organisations in partnership with private and local actors (livestock feed market system & organisation of a group to purchasing veterinary products). These two interconnected commercial services boost local hiring, revitalizing a traditional economic activity. FUAPAD has also chosen to boost local cereal market systems.

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<sup>187</sup> HS: Strong capacity (able to further develop without support); S: Reliable capacity (able to continue at achieved level); US: Little capacity (requires further support); HUS: Still too weak capacity.

<sup>188</sup> HS: Very likely based on evidence; S: Likely based on evidence; US: Little likelihood based on evidence; HUS: Unlikely based on evidence.
by offering services that improve the quality of local products and boost their marketing. FUAPAD also participates in the development of local market systems for market garden products in order to improve the food and nutritional security of communities by channelling investment in village market gardens. In this case, FUAPAD plays the role of manager of investment projects stimulating new local markets. The last step, of "systemic response", consisting in formalizing the systemic change, into a new norm, has still not been possible up to this stage.
### Key Aspects based on DAC criteria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measurement criteria applied for the AMSD evaluation (reference to indicators in the AMSD evaluation matrix)</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Justification - compulsory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(please write a short explanation with the main points and refer to the chapter(s) where the information that justify your assessment can be found) + in brackets add the strength of evidence /S/US</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Assessment of relevance at moment of evaluation

1. The extent to which the objectives of the projects/programmes are consistent with the demands and the needs of the target groups incl. a description of the target groups and their specific needs (e.g. gender-specific, marginalized groups).

1.2 The MSD approach responded to the income and employment challenges and opportunities for target populations, the disadvantaged and poor, also considering gender.

1.3 The MSD approach responded to the resilience challenges and opportunities (in economic, social and environmental terms) of target populations, the disadvantaged and poor, also considering gender.

- **HS**
- **S**
- **US**
- **HUS**
- **N/A**

| The point of departure has been the food security under a market system approach and this responded to the needs and opportunities of the target population. The approach also responded to the market opportunities coordinating common efforts from different type of actors (public, private and civil society). Project actions are intended to promote economic growth in the rural and food security sector, assuring at the same time a social improvement. Systemic changes have been achieved in terms of capacity development at territorial level under consideration of gender (but this is still limited). |

2. The extent to which the objectives of the projects/programmes are consistent with the demands and the needs of partner country (institutions respectively society) as well as the sector policies and strategies of the partner country.

2.2 SDC’s strategies and programmes were systematically and sufficiently aligned and complementary to the context in partner countries.

- **HS**
- **S**
- **US**
- **HUS**
- **N/A**

| The project fostered coordination and synergies with other programmes to supporting farmers’ organisations, infrastructures and economic development in intervention areas. Specific training actions and food security plans have been implemented in coordination with other projects. Also SDC modalities are combined in order to be complementary to each other. |

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189 HS: Fully consistent and target group-specific; S: Largely consistent; US: Only partly consistent; HUS: Marginally or not at all consistent.

190 N/A applied to all questions, a. if the ToR of the evaluation explicitly exclude the assessment of the criteria and/or of the key aspect(s) or b. if there is no information available to assess the criteria.

191 HS: Obvious consistency with needs of society and in line with relevant sector policies and strategies; S: Consistency do.; US: Consistency with needs of society not visible but in line with relevant sector policies and strategies; HUS: Not consistent.
### 3. The extent to which the design of projects/programmes is adequate to achieve the goal and objectives

- Articulation of components
- Level of coordination with all stakeholders and other projects/programmes
- Comparative advantage of Swiss cooperation
- Capacity for adaptive management

#### 1.4 The MSD approach

- Responded to the challenges and opportunities for creation of an enabling environment for pro-poor and inclusive market systems.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HS</th>
<th>S</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>HUS</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>✔</td>
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<td>🗞</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The intervention is executed following the local economy and its logic. The project ensured the interactions between public and private and civil society to design and adapt solutions that responded to local market systems. This has been considered a long term process that should provide opportunities for training and allowing each actor to play his role within the market system.

### Assessment of effectiveness

#### 4. The extent to which the approaches/strategies to the implementation are best suited to achieve the expected results.

- SDC’s procedures (general and financial in particular) and ways of collaboration are conducive to implementing MSD in partner countries or regions?
- SDC and its implementing partners use adequate financial and human resources for effectively implementing MSD programs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HS</th>
<th>S</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>HUS</th>
<th>N/A</th>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The organizational set-up of the project and its practical implementation modalities actors to play their role actively within the agricultural sector at regional and national level, which is a factor of institutional sustainability. The procedures for implementing the PAFA are based on a few specific principles, namely: - the process of empowerment of actors based on "do-it-yourself"; the support of family organizations and farms towards autonomy, hence a systemic approach. Globally there is a coherence between budget execution and the expected results. The project human and financial resources are used in an adequate manner. Nevertheless, shortcomings and the many dysfunctions within the regional authorities, hamper the implementation of activities on schedule. The decentralized sector budget support system managed by a weak regional council has been neither effective, efficient nor economical.

#### 5. The extent to which the planned objectives at outcome level (as defined in logframe) have been achieved taking into account the causal links between results, i.e. if activities lead to the expected

- Expected results at output and outcome level were achieved (including analysis of contributing factors).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HS</th>
<th>S</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>HUS</th>
<th>N/A</th>
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</tbody>
</table>

The project has achieved 97% of its outputs and outcomes globally. The project faced in 2020 relevant challenges in the scope of the COVID-pandemic. The interviewed actors agree that the improvements in income of both: producers and value chains federations, as well as in the capacities show good prospects for sustainability. Contributing factors are: i) the emphasis in capacity development (individual + communities as well as professional services) foster a comprehensive territorial development; ii) the generation of own funds within the chain's actors (through producers’ contributions).

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192 HS: Fully adequate; S: Largely adequate; US: Only partly adequate; HUS: Marginally or not at all adequate.

193 HS: Fully suited; S: Suited; US: Partly suited; HUS: Not suited.

194 HS: Fully achieved or overachieved; S: Most important outcomes are largely achieved; US: Only least important outcomes are achieved; HUS: Marginally achieved.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>6. The extent to which the projects/programmes contribute to the objectives at impact level (as defined in logframe). Note: this sub-criteria is particularly relevant for ex-post evaluations.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.2 Evidence of the impact on the target group, end beneficiaries and market players e.g. on income, quality of life, gender equality (including analysis of contributing factors).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3 Evidence of systemic changes in functions and rules (including analysis of contributing factors).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4 Evidence of scale up (including analysis of contributing factors).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| □ HS
| □ S
| □ US
| □ HUS
| □ N/A |
| There is evidence for systemic changes in functions related to: improved access to productions inputs; to local services to promote sustainable agriculture under a value chain based approach; strengthened advocacy entrepreneurial capacities of producers' organisations. The project received a visit from the inspection service of the Ministry of Agriculture to analyse the project contribution at the sectoral level and its potential to scale the value chain model as a public policy. As a result of the visit, the Ministry of Agriculture wishes to replicate the model at the national level (in other regions and for other value chains). The project design, effective management, appropriation and productivity achieved in the potato and milk value chains, were considered relevant for the policy makers. |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>7. The extent to which the outcomes achieved contribute to results related to transversal themes (^{196}). (Please add a line for each relevant transversal theme.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.2 Evidence of the impact on the target group, end beneficiaries and market players e.g. on income, quality of life, gender equality (including analysis of contributing factors).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2 The social, environmental/climate sustainability issues were addressed by MSD programs (including analysis of contributing factors).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| □ HS \(^{197}\)
| □ S
| □ US
| □ HUS
| □ N/A |
| According to actors the main impact to be expected will be the autonomy and sustainability of actions initiated with beneficiaries. The strong emphasis in capacity development has fostered autonomy and sustainability. Further its sector strategy is based on the following main axes: a comprehensive vision of the sector ("value chain" approach); strong participation of all actors (public, private and farmers' organizations); and market driven value creation. Nevertheless, there are structural issues that may affect negatively the project impact: difficulties in accessing financial services" and the lack of a more tailored (value chain driven) national capacity building strategy. The environmental and social sustainability have been two of the main objectives of the project. The promotion of agricultural biodiversity, local products, and the ecologic-agriculture were the main focus points for the adaptation to climate change. Following aspects contributed to social and environmental sustainability according to the midterm review: i) the empowering and capacity building approaches; ii) the networking of actors, and the solutions adapted to each type of actor; iii) the market driven activities; iv) the implemented environmental screening and the Environmental and Social Impact Notices in accordance with the regulations in force; v) the promotion of agro-biology, of energy efficiency, and the sustainable management of production factors. |

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\(^{195}\) HS: Strong evidence of contribution; S: Evidence of contribution; US: Few evidence of contribution; HUS: No contribution. 

\(^{196}\) Link to transversal themes of dispatch 2017-2020 and 2021-2024. 

\(^{197}\) HS: Strong evidence of contribution; S: Evidence of contribution; US: Few evidence of contribution; HUS: No contribution. 

219
### Assessment of efficiency

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>8. Cost-effectiveness of project results</th>
<th>4.2 Cost-benefit analyses has been presented and provides evidence for implementing MSD approaches.</th>
<th>☐ HS&lt;sup&gt;198&lt;/sup&gt; ☑ S ☐ US ☐ HUS ☑ N/A</th>
<th>No cost-benefit presented.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9. If assessable: Cost-benefit ratio of project results&lt;sup&gt;199&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td>☐ HS&lt;sup&gt;200&lt;/sup&gt; ☑ S ☐ US ☐ HUS ☑ N/A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Projects/Progr. management, monitoring and steering mechanisms are in place and effectively used for the efficient implementation of activities.</td>
<td>4.1 SDC’s procedures (general and financial in particular) and ways of collaboration are conducive to implementing MSD in partner countries or regions? 4.3 SDC and its implementing partners use adequate financial and human resources for effectively implementing MSD programs.</td>
<td>☑ HS&lt;sup&gt;201&lt;/sup&gt; ☑ S ☐ US ☑ HUS ☑ N/A</td>
<td>The organizational set-up of the project and its practical implementation modalities actors to play their role actively within the agricultural sector at regional and national level, which is a factor of institutional sustainability. The procedures for implementing the PAFA are based on a few specific principles, namely: - the process of empowerment of actors based on &quot;do-it-yourself&quot;; the support of family organizations and farms towards autonomy, hence a systemic approach. Globally there is a coherence between budget execution and the expected results. The project human and financial resources are used in an adequate manner. Nevertheless, shortcomings and the many dysfunctions within the regional authorities, hamper the implementation of activities on schedule. The decentralized sector budget support system managed by a weak regional council has been neither effective, efficient nor economical.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Assessment of sustainability

| 11. The extent to which the positive results at outcome level will be continued beyond the end of the external support. Considering | 5.1 The interventions were financially and technically sustained/ likely to be sustainable (including analysis of contributing factors). 5.2 The social, environmental/climate | ☐ HS<sup>202</sup> ☑ S ☑ US ☐ HUS ☑ N/A | The environmental and social sustainability have been two of the main objectives of the project. The promotion of agricultural biodiversity, local products, and the ecologic-agriculture were the main focus points for the adaptation to climate change. Following aspects contributed to social and environmental sustainability according to the midterm review: i) the empowering and capacity building approaches: ii) the networking of actors, and the solutions adapted to each type of actor; iii) the market driven activities; iv) the implemented environmental screening |

<sup>198</sup> HS: Positive CER based on a cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA); S: Positive CER, based on qualitative justification; US: Poor CER, based on qualitative justification; HUS: Poor CER demonstrated.<br><sup>199</sup> The extent to which the relation between resources (mainly financial and human resources) and time (e.g. delays compared to planning) required and results achieved is appropriate (Cost-benefit ratio - CBR). Further information: [http://deza-pcmi-lernbuch-3.prod2.lemetz.ch/module-6-en/2-cost-benefit-and-cost-effectiveness-analyses#Fo218](http://deza-pcmi-lernbuch-3.prod2.lemetz.ch/module-6-en/2-cost-benefit-and-cost-effectiveness-analyses#Fo218)<br><sup>200</sup> HS: Positive CBR based on a cost-benefit analysis (CBA); S: Positive CBR, based on qualitative justification; US: Poor CBR, based on qualitative justification; HUS: Bad CBR demonstrated.<br><sup>201</sup> HS: Highly efficient; S: Efficient; US: Partly efficient; HUS: Not efficient.<br><sup>202</sup> HS: Very likely based on evidence; S: Likely based on evidence; US: Little likelihood based on evidence; HUS: Unlikely based on evidence.
| Potential risks in the context. | Sustainability issues were addressed by MSD programs (including analysis of contributing factors). | The strong involvement of the local actors in their economic development assures sustainability to the markets. The local actors got specific training and participated in the development of the markets; therefore, they will be ready to assume a leading role after the support provided by the SDC. Nevertheless actions beyond the project level are required because they exceed the advocacy capacities of project actors and its critical mass. Therefore multilevel and multiactor actions at a very high level are needed to address structural weaknesses at the vocational, professional training, institutional level. |

According to the midterm review the perspective for sustainability is not good in the PAFA project. As evidence they mention following facts: i) the regional department of agriculture does not have a budget specifically dedicated to ensuring the functioning of the Seed Analysis Laboratory of Ségou; ii) there is any financing plan being that fact a risk of non-functionality of the investment; iii) the grant approach to provide non-financial services to farmers' organizations is disconnected from credit opportunities; iv) and there is no strategy for the progressive transfer of these services to the beneficiaries; further the economic sustainability of investments made in the rice sector is not guaranteed, in particular because of the insufficiently remunerative price of rice on the national market. |

**12. The extent to which partner organisations are capable to carry on activities.**
Capacity includes technical, financial capacity, human resources.

| 5.1 The interventions were financially and technically sustained/ likely to be sustainable (including analysis of contributing factors) – specifically concerning capacity of partner organisations/market players. | ☐ HS
☐ S
☒ US
☐ HUS
☐ N/A | See above. |

203 HS: Strong capacity (able to further develop without support); S: Reliable capacity (able to continue at achieved level); US: Little capacity (requires further support); HUS: Still too weak capacity.

204 HS: Very likely based on evidence; S: Likely based on evidence; US: Little likelihood based on evidence; HUS: Unlikely based on evidence.
### Key Aspects based on DAC criteria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measurement criteria applied for the AMSD evaluation</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(reference to indicators in the AMSD evaluation matrix)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Assessment of relevance at moment of evaluation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. The extent to which the objectives of the projects/programmes are consistent with the demands and the needs of the target groups incl. a description of the target groups and their specific needs (e.g. gender-, specific, marginalized groups.)</th>
<th>☒ HS&lt;sup&gt;205&lt;/sup&gt; ☐ S ☐ US ☐ HUS ☐ N/A&lt;sup&gt;206&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.2 The MSD approach responded to the income and employment challenges and opportunities for target populations, the disadvantaged and poor, also considering gender.</td>
<td>The project has intended to improve income of 150.000 vulnerable people by promoting the value chains of fisheries and silvopastoral. Employment creation has been also a target and specific actions benefitting vulnerable people, including women for instance: access to production inputs, improvement of infrastructures and income generating activities. The project is considered pertinent in terms of needs of target groups (women specially), the diversification plays a role very important. It has been confirmed by themselves. The project considered the market system departing from an analysis about competitiveness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3 The MSD approach responded to the resilience challenges and opportunities (in economic, social and environmental terms) of target populations, the disadvantaged and poor, also considering gender.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2. The extent to which the objectives of the projects/programmes are consistent with the demands and the needs of partner country (institutions respectively society) as well as the sector policies and strategies of the partner country.</th>
<th>☒ HS&lt;sup&gt;207&lt;/sup&gt; ☐ S ☐ US ☐ HUS ☐ N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.2 SDC’s strategies and programmes were systematically and sufficiently aligned and complementary to the context in partner countries.</td>
<td>The project fostered coordination and synergies with other programmes to supporting farmers’ organisations, infrastructures and economic development in intervention areas. SDC foresaw from the design phase on, efforts to foster synergies between their projects, in order to allow benefits for all programs. PSEL-Delta played an active role exchanging experiences at regional and local level, and identifying alliances to contribute to the targeted effects targeted and also to contribute to the implementation of the Nexus (through United Nations Committees). Synergies with other Helvetas projects, WHH et ACTED and NRC are mentioned as well.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<sup>205</sup> HS: Fully consistent and target group-specific; S: Largely consistent; US: Only partly consistent; HUS: Marginally or not at all consistent.

<sup>206</sup> N/A applied to all questions, a. if the ToR of the evaluation explicitly exclude the assessment of the criteria and/or of the key aspect(s) or b. if there is no information available to assess the criteria.

<sup>207</sup> HS: Obvious consistency with needs of society and in line with relevant sector policies and strategies; S: Consistency .. do.; US: Consistency with needs of society not visible but in line with relevant sector policies and strategies; HUS: Not consistent.
3. The extent to which the design of projects/programmes is adequate to achieve the goal and objectives (articulation of components; level of coordination with all stakeholders and other projects/programmes; comparative advantage of Swiss cooperation; capacity for adaptive management).

3.1 Expected results at output and outcome level were achieved (including analysis of contributing factors).

4. The extent to which the approaches/strategies to the implementation are best suited to achieve the expected results.

4.1 SDC’s procedures (general and financial in particular) and ways of collaboration are conducive to implementing MSD in partner countries or regions?

4.3 SDC and its implementing partners use adequate financial and human resources for effectively implementing MSD programs.

5. The extent to which the planned objectives at outcome level (as defined in logframe) have been achieved taking into account the causal links between results, i.e. if activities

5.1 Expected results at output and outcome level were achieved (including analysis of contributing factors).

1.4 The MSD approach responded to the challenges and opportunities for creation of an enabling environment for pro-poor and inclusive market systems.

ASSessment of effectiveness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HS</th>
<th>S</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>HUS</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3. The extent to which the design of projects/programmes is adequate to achieve the goal and objectives</td>
<td>☑</td>
<td>HS</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>HUS</td>
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<td>4. The extent to which the approaches/strategies to the implementation are best suited to achieve the expected results</td>
<td>☑</td>
<td>HS</td>
<td>S</td>
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<td>HUS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. The extent to which the planned objectives at outcome level (as defined in logframe) have been achieved taking into account the causal links between results, i.e. if activities</td>
<td>☑</td>
<td>HS</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>HUS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: for mid-term/end-of-phase evaluations: likelihood of achievement/contribution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HS</th>
<th>S</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>HUS</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3. The extent to which the design of projects/programmes is adequate to achieve the goal and objectives</td>
<td>☑</td>
<td>HS</td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>HUS</td>
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<td>HS</td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>HUS</td>
</tr>
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<td>☑</td>
<td>HS</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>HUS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The project considered the market system departing from an analysis about competitiveness. (MLI2). The project has intended to improve income of 150.000 vulnerable people by promoting the value chains of fisheries and silvopastoral. Employment creation has been also a target and specific actions benefitting vulnerable people, including women for instance: access to production inputs, improvement of infrastructures and income generating activities.

The project proved a good level of efficiency. Nevertheless, the project suffered for inefficiency of external actors within the implementation procedures. Project procedures have been adapted according to the local needs in order to ensure an adequate budgetary and technical execution rate. The project has fostered and entrepreneurial spirit but using a collective and inclusive dynamic for the good of all. This required a local capacity for economic modelling and the development of business plans that rely on each other within the same system. The principle “if you believe, I will grow with you” or “if you succeed, I also succeed”. Globally there is a coherence between budget execution and the expected results. The project human and financial resources are used in an adequate manner. Within the applied systemic approach, it has been seen as very relevant to strengthen the local skills and capacities (generation of human capital) of all actors in a coordinated and complementary manner (social capital), in order to avoid delays (especially at the public and association level).

Project has achieved over 90% of its outputs and outcomes globally. All actors must be involved from the beginning allowing them playing their role, (government, private sector and social organizations). The systemic approach has required keeping pace with the beneficiary. The private sector did not exist and the government did everything. The actors learnt to play their own roles. All of this constitutes a long process that is just beginning.

208 HS: Fully adequate; S: Largely adequate; US: Only partly adequate; HUS: Marginally or not at all adequate.
209 HS: Fully suited; S: Suited; US: Partly suited; HUS: Not suited.
210 HS: Fully achieved or overachieved; S: Most important outcomes are largely achieved; US: Only least important outcomes are achieved; HUS: Marginally achieved.
lead to the expected outputs and then to the aimed outcomes).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>6. The extent to which the projects/programmes contribute to the objectives at impact level (as defined in logframe). Note: this sub-criteria is particularly relevant for ex-post evaluations.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.2 Evidence of the impact on the target group, end beneficiaries and market players e.g. on income, quality of life, gender equality (including analysis of contributing factors).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3 Evidence of systemic changes in functions and rules (including analysis of contributing factors).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4 Evidence of scale up (including analysis of contributing factors).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ HS 211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ HUS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The target group, and beneficiaries and market players have been positively impacted by the project: i) Jobs have been created taking into account the target groups exploiting the local resources such as the agro-sylvo-pastoral sector. ii) Production's infrastructures have been improved with good quality, incl. maintenance (for ex. hydro-agricultural infrastructures in Tchankalawol); iii) Local government capacities have been strengthened. Also evidence was found for increased access to improved productions inputs for men and women and mechanisms for conflict resolution at the territorial level. There is evidence for systemic changes in functions related to: improved production's infrastructures; strengthened local government's capacities; improved access to productions inputs for men and women and to mechanisms for conflict resolution at the territorial level.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>7. The extent to which the outcomes achieved contribute to results related to transversal themes 212. (Please add a line for each relevant transversal theme.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.2 Evidence of the impact on the target group, end beneficiaries and market players e.g. on income, quality of life, gender equality (including analysis of contributing factors).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2 The social, environmental/climate sustainability issues were addressed by MSD programs (including analysis of contributing factors).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ HS 213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ HUS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The project performed periodic analysis of the environmental, security, and political context, that allows the SDC to implement a risk management and an adaptation of the strategies, under consideration of social, environmental and climate issues. 2 Plans of environmental and social management at territorial level have been implemented.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Assessment of efficiency**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>8. Cost-effectiveness of project results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.2 Cost-benefit analyses has been presented and provides evidence for implementing MSD approaches.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ HS 214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ HUS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No cost-benefit presented.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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212 Link to transversal themes of dispatch 2017-2020 and 2021-2024.
214 HS: Positive CER based on a cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA); S: Positive CER, based on qualitative justification; US: Poor CER, based on qualitative justification; HUS: Poor CER demonstrated.
9. If assessable: Cost-benefit ratio of project results.\(^\text{215}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>☒ N/A</th>
<th>☐ HS(^\text{216})</th>
<th>☐ S</th>
<th>☐ US</th>
<th>☐ HUS</th>
<th>☒ N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

10. Projects/Progr. management, monitoring and steering mechanisms are in place and effectively used for the efficient implementation of activities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>☐ HS(^\text{217})</th>
<th>☒ S</th>
<th>☐ US</th>
<th>☐ HUS</th>
<th>☒ N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

The project proved a good level of efficiency. Nevertheless, the project suffered for inefficiency of external actors within the implementation procedures. Project procedures have been adapted according to the local needs in order to ensure an adequate budgetary and technical execution rate. The project has fostered an entrepreneurial spirit but using a collective and inclusive dynamic for the good of all. This required a local capacity for economic modelling and the development of business plans that rely on each other within the same system. market, on the principle "if you believe, I will grow with you" or "if you succeed, I also succeed". Globally there is a coherence between budget execution and the expected results. The project human and financial resources are used in an adequate manner. Within the applied systemic approach, it has been seen as very relevant to strengthen the local skills and capacities (generation of human capital) of all actors in a coordinated and complementary manner (social capital), in order to avoid delays (specially at the public and association level).

**Assessment of sustainability**

11. The extent to which the positive results at outcome level will be continued beyond the end of the external support. Considering potential risks in the context.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>☒ HS(^\text{218})</th>
<th>☒ S</th>
<th>☐ US</th>
<th>☐ HUS</th>
<th>☒ N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

The project performed periodic analysis of the environmental, security, and political context, that allows the SDC to implement a risk management and an adaptation of the strategies, under consideration of social, environmental and climate issues. 2 Plans of environmental and social management at territorial level have been implemented.

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\(^{215}\) The extent to which the relation between resources (mainly financial and human resources) and time (e.g. delays compared to planning) required and results achieved is appropriate (Cost-benefit ratio - CBR). Further information: http://deza-pcmi-lernbuch-3.prod2.lernetz.ch/module-6-en/2-cost-benefit-and-cost-effectiveness-analyses#Fo218

\(^{216}\) HS: Positive CBR based on a cost-benefit analysis (CBA); S: Positive CBR, based on qualitative justification; US: Poor CBR, based on qualitative justification; HUS: Bad CBR demonstrated.

\(^{217}\) HS: Highly efficient; S: Efficient; US: Partly efficient; HUS: Not efficient.

\(^{218}\) HS: Very likely based on evidence; S: Likely based on evidence; US: Little likelihood based on evidence; HUS: Unlikely based on evidence.
| 12. The extent to which partner organisations are capable to carry on activities. Capacity includes technical, financial capacity, human resources. | 5.1 The interventions were financially and technically sustained/likely to be sustainable (including analysis of contributing factors) - specifically concerning capacity of partner organisations/market players. | ☐ HS\(^{219}\) ☒ S ☐ US ☐ HUS ☐ N/A | See above. |

| 13. The ownership by the partner organisation and the institutional framework (e.g. legislation, administration, politics) is considered conducive for the continuation of the activities. | 5.3 The market systems development changes have been sustained/likely to be sustainable (including analysis of contributing factors). | ☐ HS\(^{220}\) ☒ S ☐ US ☐ HUS ☐ N/A | Both programmes implemented by Helvetas based their strategy on the capacity development of local actors. Relevant lessons learnt are being extracted from MSD projects implemented parallelly by Helvetas for different donors (Lichtenstein and SDC). Helvetas organized exchange of experiences in 2019 around 3 MSD projects. Being a contributing factor the emphasis on vocational training in Mali and Burkina Faso. |

Additional information (if needed): Click here to enter text.

Project: Programme de Soutien aux Economies Locales du Delta Intérieur du Niger - PSEL-Delta - 7F-03751.04
Assessor: Lida Patricia Rodriguez
Date: 24 November 2020

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\(^{219}\) HS: Strong capacity (able to further develop without support); S: Reliable capacity (able to continue at achieved level); US: Little capacity (requires further support); HUS: Still too weak capacity.

\(^{220}\) HS: Very likely based on evidence; S: Likely based on evidence; US: Little likelihood based on evidence; HUS: Unlikely based on evidence.
### Key Aspects based on DAC criteria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measurement criteria applied for the AMSD evaluation (reference to indicators in the AMSD evaluation matrix)</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Justification - compulsory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(please write a short explanation with the main points and refer to the chapter(s) where the information that justify your assessment can be found) + in brackets add the strength of evidence /S/US</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Assessment of relevance at moment of evaluation

1. The extent to which the objectives of the projects/programmes are consistent with the demands and the needs of the target groups incl. a description of the target groups and their specific needs (e.g. gender-specific, marginalized groups).  

| 1.2 The MSD approach responded to the income and employment challenges and opportunities for target populations, the disadvantaged and poor, also considering gender.  
| ☒ HS  
| ☐ S  
| ☐ US  
| ☐ HUS  
| ☐ N/A  |

1.2 Direct beneficiaries are at least 80,000 small and medium scale fishermen, small-scale farmers, landless and land poor households of which 50 pct. should be women and 30 pct. Disadvantaged (Credit proposals).  

1.3 The GoM project responded to the challenges of over exploitation of natural resources in the Gulf to the detriment of the people living there by promoting participatory natural resource management. (Credit proposals).  

1.3 The project works through strengthening community-led processes to create multi-stakeholder platforms to facilitate a governance structure for the GoM.

2. The extent to which the objectives of the projects/programmes are consistent with the demands and the needs of partner country (institutions respectively society) as well as the sector policies and strategies of the partner country.  

| 2.2 SDC’s strategies and programmes were systematically and sufficiently aligned and complementary to the context in partner countries.  
| ☒ HS  
| ☐ S  
| ☐ US  
| ☐ HUS  
| ☐ N/A  |

2.2 The GoM project’s ambitions demonstrably align with a variety of policy priorities, including the Myanmar Sustainable Development Plan, which clearly states that: “Myanmar’s rich endowment of natural resources proffers a cornucopia of benefits, as well as some risks. The Government of Myanmar recognises that the natural environment is the foundation upon which Myanmar’s social, cultural and economic development may be sustained”. (MTR, 2020, p13)  

2.2 Under a recent re-organization, the Ministry of Livestock, Fisheries and Rural Development (MLFRD) created a department and mandate for rural development. In late 2013, the ministry drafted a strategic framework that is based on locally-led and managed rural development approaches, supported by upgraded township and district government agencies and services. (EP, 2014, p2)

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221 HS: Fully consistent and target group-specific; S: Largely consistent; US: Only partly consistent; HUS: Marginally or not at all consistent.  

222 N/A applied to all questions, a. if the ToR of the evaluation explicitly exclude the assessment of the criteria and/or of the key aspect(s) or b. if there is no information available to assess the criteria.  

223 HS: Obvious consistency with needs of society and in line with relevant sector policies and strategies; S: Consistency .. do.; US: Consistency with needs of society not visible but in line with relevant sector policies and strategies; HUS: Not consistent.
The project has made use of the government-initiated directive that designated the GoM estuary as a protected area and Ramsar site allowing for management through a community-based approach. (EP, 2014, summary). The project responded to illegal fishing - a major problem for the local fishers in the Gulf of Mottama (see fish case study).

3. The extent to which the design of projects/programmes is adequate to achieve the goal and objectives (articulation of components; level of coordination with all stakeholders and other projects/programmes; comparative advantage of Swiss cooperation; capacity for adaptive management).

| 1.4 The MSD approach responded to the challenges and opportunities for creation of an enabling environment for pro-poor and inclusive market systems. |
|---|---|
| □ HS\(^{224}\) | □ S |
| □ US | □ HUS |
| □ N/A | |

Under the new fisheries law – facilitated by the project, the local fishermen have the right to organize and manage co-management zones, including co-patrolling for illegal fishing. (fish case study).

Access to finance through the Revolving Fund (RF) was repeatedly highlighted as a key benefit to the local communities (MTR, 2020, p14)

Assessment of effectiveness

| 4. The extent to which the approaches/strategies to the implementation are best suited to achieve the expected results. |
|---|---|
| 4.1 SDC’s procedures (general and financial in particular) and ways of collaboration are conducive to implementing MSD in partner countries or regions? |
| □ HS\(^{225}\) | □ S |
| □ US | □ HUS |
| □ N/A | |

4.1 SDC invested considerable funds in the project (MTR, 2020). The long-term project (10 years) horizon is very important for achieving the expected results. 4.3 There have been staff changes between implementing partners – 2 stall members from IUCN and BANCA moved to Helvetas but it would be expected that there would be an overall added value to the project of utilising the institutional knowledge and expertise of the two organisations. (MTR, 2020) In April BANCA requested a termination of the contract and stopped the cooperation with the GoMP. After some irregularities in their finance system were discovered and confirmed by an in-depth assessment, they reviewed the cooperation and decided that the financial compensation with the agreed overhead was not sufficient to cover all the cost to implement the projects successfully. The termination was highly regretful for the GoMP activities and set the project back in especially CEPA, SMART monitoring and biodiversity training. (Annual Report 2019, p19)

| 5. The extent to which the planned objectives at outcome level (as 3.1 Expected results at output and outcome level were |
|---|---|
| □ HS\(^{226}\) | □ S |
| □ US | |

By 2019, considerable progress has been made for outcomes 2 and 3; the targets were met and/or exceeded for 4 out of 6 outcomes indicators. (see country note supportive analysis)

\(^{224}\) HS: Fully adequate; S: Largely adequate; US: Only partly adequate; HUS: Marginally or not at all adequate.

\(^{225}\) HS: Fully suited; S: Suited; US: Partly suited; HUS: Not suited.

\(^{226}\) HS: Fully achieved or overachieved; S: Most important outcomes are largely achieved; US: Only least important outcomes are achieved; HUS: Marginally achieved.
have been achieved taking into account the causal links between results, i.e. if activities lead to the expected outputs and then to the aimed outcomes).

6. The extent to which the projects/programmes contribute to the objectives at impact level (as defined in logframe). Note: this sub-criteria is particularly relevant for ex-post evaluations.

3.2 Evidence of the impact on the target group, end beneficiaries and market players e.g. on income, quality of life, gender equality (including analysis of contributing factors).

7. The extent to which the outcomes achieved contribute to results related to transversal themes228. (Please add a line for each relevant transversal theme.)

3.2 Income generation through skill training and livelihood diversification activities have resulted in some women and men receiving additional income and the establishment of self-employment business opportunities. However, the overall impact and sustainability of this requires a thorough evaluation and review. (MTR, 2020)

3.2 GoMP contributed to a substantial decrease in the illegal fishing of the small mesh (nets that were catching large quantities of juvenile fish) which in turn resulted with improved livelihoods for local small-scale fish farmers. "My livelihood is better and I can run another business. I am now doing pig farming too and also contribute to the collective fish farming. My livelihood becomes better. As I am a fishery worker, it is really good for my family in the future because of the increased amount of fish." (Mackay et al., 2019; illegal fishing case study)

3.3 The project has assisted with developing a robust governance structure from the village through the State/Region level up to the Union level. Both the vertical and horizontal structures are sound and provide an excellent framework for future decision-making and management of the natural resources of the GoM.

3.4 No evidence of scale up was found.


228 Link to transversal themes of dispatch 2017-2020 and 2021-2024.

it is really good for my family in the future because of the increased amount of fish.”
(Mackay et al., 2019; illegal fishing case study)

5.2 The long-term sustainability remains challenging, especially with regards to environmental and ecological monitoring, patrolling and assessment. Without adequate funding, it will be a challenge to demonstrate the long-term sustainability and wise use of natural resources.
(MTR, 2020)

### Assessment of efficiency

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>8. Cost-effectiveness of project results</th>
<th>4.2 Cost-benefit analysis has been presented and provides evidence for implementing MSD approaches.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>☐ HS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☑ S</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☒ US</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ HUS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☒ N/A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2 The ex-ante CBA analysis of GoMP was done separately for each component at individual farmers’ level and the aggregated results (including related project administered funds) showed a positive internal rate of return (IRR) if expectations are met (CBA, 2018, summary). The benefits are at risk from a range of factors and the project needs to elaborate a more detailed assessment beyond the value chains considering the wider values to society. In the paddy value chain, the performance remains positive if the number of farmers involved reaches 3’000 after 4 years. However, the project has invested considerable funds and the profitability is fragile with a cost-benefit ratio near to 1 and it is not clear how this would change, and particularly over the long-term, if all project costs were included and a thorough assessment of other externalities, such as water pollution, loss of biodiversity, soil erosion, increased emissions through greater transport requirements, etc. were taken into account. The CBA reports that the benefits for fishermen and fish collectors are marginal and at risk from a range of external factors. The sensitivity analysis showed that the model is quite sensitive to fish price fluctuations, and to declining fish stock. The ex-ante CBA only provides an insight to the cost efficiencies associated with the project. Ex-post CBA needed. (MTR 2020)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>9. If assessable: Cost-benefit ratio of project results, 231</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>☐ HS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☑ S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☒ US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ HUS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☒ N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A cost-benefit ratio has not yet been established</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>10. Projects/Progr. management, 4.1 SDC’s procedures (general and financial in particular) and monitoring and evaluation officer part of the project staff</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>☐ HS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☑ S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring and evaluation officer part of the project staff</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

230 HS: Positive CER based on a cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA); S: Positive CER, based on qualitative justification; US: Poor CER, based on qualitative justification; HUS: Poor CER demonstrated.
231 The extent to which the relation between resources (mainly financial and human resources) and time (e.g. delays compared to planning) required and results achieved is appropriate (Cost-benefit ratio - CBR). Further information: http://deza-pcmi-lermbuch-3.prod2.lemnetz.ch/module-6-en/2-cost-benefit-and-cost-effectiveness-analyses#Fo218
232 HS: Positive CBR based on a cost-benefit analysis (CBA); S: Positive CBR, based on qualitative justification; US: Poor CBR, based on qualitative justification; HUS: Bad CBR demonstrated.
233 HS: Highly efficient; S: Efficient; US: Partly efficient; HUS: Not efficient.
| monitoring and steering mechanisms are in place and effectively used for the efficient implementation of activities. | ways of collaboration are conducive to implementing MSD in partner countries or regions? 4.3 SDC and its implementing partners use adequate financial and human resources for effectively implementing MSD programs. | ☐ US ☐ HUS ☐ N/A | The greenway app used for monitoring of the on-farm expenses and income for farmers |

**Assessment of sustainability**

11. The extent to which the positive results at outcome level will be continued beyond the end of the external support. Considering potential risks in the context.

5.1 The interventions were financially and technically sustained/likely to be sustainable (including analysis of contributing factors).

5.2 The social, environmental/climate sustainability issues were addressed by MSD programs (including analysis of contributing factors).

☐ HS234 ☐ S ☒ US ☐ HUS ☐ N/A

5.2 The long-term sustainability remains challenging, especially with regards to environmental and ecological monitoring, patrolling and assessment. Without adequate funding, it will be a challenge to demonstrate the long-term sustainability and wise use of natural resources (MTR, 2020)

5.1 Too early to judge whether GoMP will be sustainable. There is no exit strategy yet for the GoM project as it is designed as 3 phase project – and is in phase 2 - sustainability will be at the centre of the last and exit phase. But the project plans to hand over the responsibility and the ownership by the end of phase 2 to a government multi-stakeholder platform – the Coastal Resource Management Committee. Whether the Government will take over the funding of the CRMC end of project remains to be seen. (MTR, 2020; country note Myanmar)

However, the strategy to empower the associations to make demand on the government seems to work as the various anecdotal examples have underscored (see case on illegal fishing)

See above

12. The extent to which partner organisations are capable to carry on activities. Capacity includes technical, financial capacity, human resources.

5.1 The interventions were financially and technically sustained/likely to be sustainable (including analysis of contributing factors) – specifically concerning capacity of partner organisations/market players.

5.3 The market systems development changes have been sustained/likely to be

☐ HS235 ☐ S ☒ US ☐ HUS ☐ N/A

There is no exit strategy yet for the GoM project as it is designed as 3 phase project – and is in phase 2. But the project plans to hand over the responsibility and the

See above

13. The ownership by the partner organisation and the institutional

5.3 The market systems development changes have been sustained/likely to be

☐ HS236 ☐ S ☒ US

There is no exit strategy yet for the GoM project as it is designed as 3 phase project – and is in phase 2. But the project plans to hand over the responsibility and the


---

234 HS: Very likely based on evidence; S: Likely based on evidence; US: Little likelihood based on evidence; HUS: Unlikely based on evidence.  
235 HS: Strong capacity (able to further develop without support); S: Reliable capacity (able to continue at achieved level); US: Little capacity (requires further support); HUS: Still too weak capacity.  
236 HS: Very likely based on evidence; S: Likely based on evidence; US: Little likelihood based on evidence; HUS: Unlikely based on evidence.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Framework (e.g. legislation, administration, politics) is considered conducive for the continuation of the activities.</th>
<th>Sustainable (including analysis of contributing factors).</th>
<th>Ownership by the end of phase 2 to a government multi-stakeholder platform – the Coastal Resource Management Committee.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>☐ HUS</td>
<td>☐ N/A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Additional information (if needed): Click here to enter text.
Project: 7F-09030 GoM Myanmar
Assessor: Susan Ulbaek and Ivan Naletilic
Date: 15.01.2020
### Key Aspects based on DAC criteria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measurement criteria applied for the AMSD evaluation (reference to indicators in the AMSD evaluation matrix)</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Justification - compulsory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. The extent to which the objectives of the projects/programmes are consistent with the demands and the needs of the target groups incl. a description of the target groups and their specific needs (e.g. gender-specific, marginalized groups).</td>
<td>☐ HS\textsuperscript{237} ☑ S ☒ US ☐ HUS ☐ N/A\textsuperscript{238}</td>
<td>Using an MSD approach, the project aims to increase the productivity and quality of small-holder rubber production with the impact objective being to increase the well-being (not only income) of men and women small holders and tappers. Landless tappers considered to benefit, if productivity and quality goes up. Attention to gender participation, (gender disaggregated data) – however only end phase 2 more focus on the need for more direct interventions to address gender inequalities. Rubber market prices have not been conducive the past 8 years. The project’s understanding of the impact of the wider rubber market is insufficient. The success of the project in creating well-being for small holders and tappers ultimately will depend on the business case for small holder production of rubber and its competitiveness in the global market. The project recognises this in a backward way, as there is a concern that labour costs for tappers will increase – eroding the potential profitability for the small holder. This is at odds with Swiss development objectives focussing on poverty reduction and “leave no-one behind”. The project responded to land security issues by supporting small holders’ formal recognition as landowners or land leasers (30 years) increasing their well-being and opportunity to invest in land.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The extent to which the objectives of the projects/programmes are consistent with the demands and the needs of partner country (institutions respectively society) as well as the sector policies and programmes were systematically and sufficiently aligned and complementary to the context in partner countries.</td>
<td>☐ HS\textsuperscript{239} ☐ S ☒ US ☐ HUS ☐ N/A</td>
<td>The project is aligned to government strategies that seek to develop rubber as a cash export crop. The project seeks to introduce market systems changes into the sector, which is found to be highly relevant as Myanmar transition towards a more market based economic system. The project seeks to contribute to the development of a rubber market in Myanmar, including though the support for a Rubber Law still under consideration, (establishing a Rubber Exchange and possibly a Rubber Development Fund funded by taxes on rubber), as well as platforms for cooperation between actors in the Mon State, including the private sector. However, the main focus has been on up-stream</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{237} HS: Fully consistent and target group-specific; S: Largely consistent; US: Only partly consistent; HUS: Marginally or not at all consistent.

\textsuperscript{238} N/A applied to all questions, a. if the ToR of the evaluation explicitly exclude the assessment of the criteria and/or of the key aspect(s) or b. if there is no information available to assess the criteria.

\textsuperscript{239} HS: Obvious consistency with needs of society and in line with relevant sector policies and strategies; S: Consistency do.; US: Consistency with needs of society not visible but in line with relevant sector policies and strategies; HUS: Not consistent.
strategies of the partner country.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3. The extent to which the design of projects/programmes is adequate to achieve the goal and objectives (articulation of components; level of coordination with all stakeholders and other projects/programmes; comparative advantage of Swiss cooperation; capacity for adaptive management).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.4 The MSD approach responded to the challenges and opportunities for creation of an enabling environment for pro-poor and inclusive market systems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ HS</td>
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<tr>
<td>☒ S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☒ US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☒ HUS</td>
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<tr>
<td>□ N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The project defined a number of shortcomings, including market deficiencies (lack of information), lack of credit, out-migration, limited technologies, improper tapping and a poor regulatory framework, insecure land tenure, etc. The project responded to some of the challenges faced by small holders by working with meso partners – Associations, Government State level, research institutes – to facilitate change first and foremost in the production of rubber through introduction of new technologies, and land security. Also, few activities related to processing of rubber. In 2019 an Innovation Fund was established to provide small scale loans primarily related to the rubber sector. Issues related to long term finance for the rubber sector not addressed directly, but through support for documentation of land tenure to be used as an asset. In phase 3, there will be more focus on downstream value chain activities. There are activities related to diversification of income for small holders in light of the difficulties faced in the rubber market.

The MSD approach initially not very well understood by other donors, and the government. The risk of other donors starting to hand out grants identified, but not reported on.

**Assessment of effectiveness**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4. The extent to which the approaches/strategies to the implementation are best suited to achieve the expected results.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.1 SDC’s procedures (general and financial in particular) and ways of collaboration are conducive to implementing MSD in partner countries or regions?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☒ HS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☒ S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☒ US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☒ HUS</td>
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<tr>
<td>□ N/A</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

SDC project procedures with one project in 3 phases allow for adjustment between phases.

Note: for mid-term/end-of-phase evaluations: likelihood of achievement/contribution.

| 240 HS: Fully adequate; S: Largely adequate; US: Only partly adequate; HUS: Marginally or not at all adequate. |
| 241 HS: Fully suited; S: Suited; US: Partly suited; HUS: Not suited. |
effectively implementing MSD programs.

5. The extent to which the planned objectives at outcome level (as defined in log frame) have been achieved taking into account the causal links between results, i.e. if activities lead to the expected outputs and then to the aimed outcomes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3.1 Expected results at output and outcome level were achieved (including analysis of contributing factors).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>☐ HS\textsuperscript{242}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☒ US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ HUS</td>
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<tr>
<td>☐ N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Depending on facilitation of collaboration, the MSD approach is often slow in disbursing in the beginning which can lead to pressures to spend and to get activities going.

There are a number of good output results with regards to small holders increase in productivity based on improved practices. It is still early to report progress against outcomes but based on a study of a small group of small holders there are signs that outcomes related to increased productivity and more secure land tenure are being met. There also appears to be some good results at the broader systems level, including extension service provided through associations, also to areas not reached by government services; strengthening partnerships and collaboration; and supporting the regulatory framework for Rubber production and marketing, yet to be finalised and approved. The project has not been effective in reaching tappers, and entry points for ensuring more active participation of women in the value chain have only recently (2019) been identified.

6. The extent to which the projects/programmes contribute to the objectives at impact level (as defined in logframe). Note: this sub-criteria is particularly relevant for ex-post evaluations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3.2 Evidence of the impact on the target group, end beneficiaries and market players e.g. on income, quality of life, gender equality (including analysis of contributing factors).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>☐ HS\textsuperscript{243}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☒ US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ HUS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ N/A</td>
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</table>

There is still a 3\textsuperscript{rd} phase being planned. The impact level is defined as a rubber market system that is more resilient, competitive, environmentally sensitive and inclusive, that is some time out in the future also depending on factors beyond the project, as is the impact defined as enhanced well-being of women and men small holders and tappers as this will also depend on factors outside the control of the project. Comments above regarding the wider market context also applies her. The results framework does not pick up on the reference to environmentally sustainable, hence it is not clear how the project will contribute towards this part of the goal.

7. The extent to which the outcomes achieved contribute to results related to transversal themes\textsuperscript{244}. (Please add a line for each relevant transversal theme.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3.2 Evidence of the impact on the target group, end beneficiaries and market players e.g. on income, quality of life, gender equality (including analysis of contributing factors).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>☐ HS\textsuperscript{245}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☒ US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ HUS</td>
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<tr>
<td>☐ N/A</td>
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</table>

Enhanced land tenure security is found to in itself contribute to the wellbeing of small holders. Gender and WEE strategy 2019 – and gender equality will be given more attention in the last phase. Environmental sustainability addressed sporadically, e.g. with regards to the use of chemicals in the processing. Deforestation associated with rubber plantations has come more to the forefront in the second phase. GRO sees sustainable national rubber production as a long-term goal and sees it role as facilitating the inclusion of small holders and tappers in a dialogue on SNR.

\textsuperscript{242} HS: Fully achieved or overachieved; S: Most important outcomes are largely achieved; US: Only least important outcomes are achieved; HUS: Marginally achieved.

\textsuperscript{243} HS: Strong evidence of contribution; S: Evidence of contribution; US: Few evidence of contribution; HUS: No contribution.

\textsuperscript{244} Link to transversal themes of dispatch 2017-2020 and 2021-2024.

\textsuperscript{245} HS: Strong evidence of contribution; S: Evidence of contribution; US: Few evidence of contribution; HUS: No contribution.
5.2 The social, environmental/climate sustainability issues were addressed by MSD programs (including analysis of contributing factors).

### Assessment of efficiency

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>8. Cost-effectiveness of project results</th>
<th>4.2 Cost-benefit analyses have been presented and provides evidence for implementing MSD approaches.</th>
<th>□ HS(^{246}) □ S □ US □ HUS ☒ N/A</th>
<th>No cost benefit analysis has been made.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9. If assessable: Cost-benefit ratio of project results,(^{247})</td>
<td>□ HS(^{248}) □ S □ US □ HUS ☒ N/A</td>
<td>A cost -benefit ratio has not yet been established</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Projects/Progr. management, monitoring and steering mechanisms are in place and effectively used for the efficient implementation of activities.</td>
<td>4.1 SDC’s procedures (general and financial in particular) and ways of collaboration are conducive to implementing MSD in partner countries or regions? 4.3 SDC and its implementing partners use adequate financial and human resources for effectively implementing MSD programs.</td>
<td>□ HS(^{249}) □ S □ US □ HUS □ N/A</td>
<td>The project has invested considerable resources in training of staff in MSD.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Assessment of sustainability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>11. The extent to which the positive results at</th>
<th>5.1 The interventions were financially and technically</th>
<th>□ HS(^{250}) □ S</th>
<th>Generally, it is too early to assess whether system changes are sustainable. More secure land tenure should have a lasting impact on small holder’s well-being.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

\(^{246}\) HS: Positive CER based on a cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA); S: Positive CER, based on qualitative justification; US: Poor CER, based on qualitative justification; HUS: Poor CER demonstrated.  
\(^{247}\) The extent to which the relation between resources (mainly financial and human resources) and time (e.g. delays compared to planning) required and results achieved is appropriate (Cost-benefit ratio - CBR). Further information: [http://deza-pcmi-lernbuch-3.prod2.lernetz.ch/module-6-en/2-cost-benefit-and-cost-effectiveness-analyses#Fo218](http://deza-pcmi-lernbuch-3.prod2.lernetz.ch/module-6-en/2-cost-benefit-and-cost-effectiveness-analyses#Fo218)  
\(^{248}\) HS: Positive CBR based on a cost-benefit analysis (CBA); S: Positive CBR, based on qualitative justification; US: Poor CBR, based on qualitative justification; HUS: Bad CBR demonstrated.  
\(^{249}\) HS: Highly efficient; S: Efficient; US: Partly efficient; HUS: Not efficient.  
\(^{250}\) HS: Very likely based on evidence; S: Likely based on evidence; US: Little likelihood based on evidence; HUS: Unlikely based on evidence.
outcome level will be continued beyond the end of the external support. Considering potential risks in the context.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Sustainability</th>
<th>Analysis of Contributing Factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>Sustained/likely to be sustainable</td>
<td>Including analysis of contributing factors</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is too early to conclude on the sustainability of the system changes related to production of rubber. Long term sustainability is linked to the business case for rubber, and whether small holders can produce a quality and quantity of rubber that meet market demand including possibly that it is sustainably produced. The project is set up with use of model farmers and demo-plots and it is envisioned that through partnerships with Associations, retailers and DoA to seek to establish replicability and spread of knowledge about better farming practices over and beyond farmers participating in farmers meetings and trainings. To contribute to technical sustainability, collaboration with an international research institute has been established.

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12. The extent to which partner organisations are capable to carry on activities. Capacity includes technical, financial capacity, human resources.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intervention</th>
<th>Sustainability</th>
<th>Capacity Assessment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>Sustained/likely to be sustainable</td>
<td>Including analysis of contributing factors</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Capacity building of Associations and market dealers, but too early to assess whether this will be sustainable. Cost sharing of activities between the project and the associations – which associations expect they cannot be able to fund after exit of the project.

GRO has supported CIRAD to facilitate the long-term presence of an international agricultural research organisation in Myanmar to support the development of a national research and development programme for rubber and strengthen capacity at institutional level (e.g. DoA and academic institutions). CIRAD currently has one expert based in Myanmar and will need to generate funding to continue its presence.

13. The ownership by the partner organisation and the institutional framework (e.g. legislation, administration, politics) is considered conducive for the continuation of the activities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Market Systems Development Changes</th>
<th>Sustainability</th>
<th>Evidence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>Sustained/likely to be sustainable</td>
<td>Including analysis of contributing factors</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

See above

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Additional information (if needed): Click here to enter text.

Project: GRO 7F-08844.02.
Assessor: Susan Ulbaek
Date: 04.12.2020

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251 HS: Strong capacity (able to further develop without support); S: Reliable capacity (able to continue at achieved level); US: Little capacity (requires further support); HUS: Still too weak capacity.

252 HS: Very likely based on evidence; S: Likely based on evidence; US: Little likelihood based on evidence; HUS: Unlikely based on evidence.
InovAgro highly relevant in Northern Mozambique. Brought in a new approach building on market actors in a context that was known for donor supported failures including government extension services. The project is highly relevant for growth in Northern Mozambique, where agriculture is the only feasible option for inclusive economic growth as nearly all households depend on agriculture characterized by low productivity and high transaction costs. According to the project document focus on poor households (less than USD1.90 day). Gender mainstreamed into the activities of the project (goal of 40 pct.) - well reflected in the log frame. Recognition that women's agency needs specific attention to support income generation and economic security. (Only picked up in the log frame with regards to other actors (donors, private investors investing in agriculture using the MSD approach.) Recognition of need to strengthen resilience to climate impact - climate variability identified as a risk. (Only picked up in log frame with regards to other actors). The amount set-aside in the project document 3rd phase for project activities specifically addressing gender and resilience – CHF 40,000 for 3 years.

The project also supports the enabling environment for private sector actors in the agricultural sector – in practice focussing on improved seed. This also includes donor collaboration to spread the use of the MSD approach. And it supports knowledge generation and dissemination.
3. The extent to which the design of projects/programmes is adequate to achieve the goal and objectives (articulation of components; level of coordination with all stakeholders and other projects/programmes; comparative advantage of Swiss cooperation; capacity for adaptive management).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1.4 The MSD approach responded to the challenges and opportunities for creation of an enabling environment for pro-poor and inclusive market systems.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>☒ HS256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ HUS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The project helped establish a private sector driven model for distribution of primarily improved seed but also other agricultural input leading to higher production and productivity and increased sales and income for small holder farmers. The project worked on the demonstration principle of supporting model farms that could then be copied. Seed companies and trades provided the training. Midway through phase II, InovAgro identified the Commodity Aggregator Traders (CATs) as a potential vehicle to increase efficiency in the marketing channels through which smallholder produce could reach formal markets.

The project was adaptive and innovative in its approach seeking to address other constraints facing small scale farmer e.g. in finance and land titling.

The projects support for enabling environment involved the platform APROSE for discussion and development of market driven seed policies. Introduction of legislation and training of private sector seed inspectors.

4. The extent to which the approaches/strategies to the implementation are best suited to achieve the expected results.

| 4.1 SDC’s procedures (general and financial in particular) and ways of collaboration are conducive to implementing MSD in partner countries or regions? |
| 4.3 SDC and its implementing partners use adequate financial and human resources for effectively implementing MSD programs. |
| ☒ HS257 |
| ☐ S |
| ☐ US |
| ☐ HUS |
| ☐ N/A |

The project implementers are very knowledgeable about the MSD approach and seeks to apply it also in other spheres – including land titling. The capacity for the MSD approach is very low in Mozambique – the project trains people, some of whom then go to Maputo and get better jobs. Their skills are sought after as more donors – according to the project – move towards MSD like approaches.

5. The extent to which the planned objectives at outcome level (as defined in logframe) have been achieved taking into account the causal links between

| 3.1 Expected results at output and outcome level were achieved (including analysis of contributing factors). |
| ☐ HS258 |
| ☒ S |
| ☐ US |
| ☐ HUS |
| ☐ N/A |

Towards the end of phase 3, the results of the project are reported as satisfactory. Some of the outcomes are even surpassed. The production and productivity figures for almost all value chains were higher above national average yield but still below the regional benchmark due to improved seeds and other inputs and improved agricultural practice. Smallholder farmers reported increased sales in a number of the project years due to increased volumes and good prices for some of the value chains (especially sesame, maize and soya) and high demand by the rural population.

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256 HS: Fully adequate; S: Largely adequate; US: Only partly adequate; HUS: Marginally or not at all adequate.
257 HS: Fully suited; S: Suited; US: Partly suited; HUS: Not suited.
258 HS: Fully achieved or overachieved; S: Most important outcomes are largely achieved; US: Only least important outcomes are achieved; HUS: Marginally achieved.
Commodity Aggregators Traders (CATs). The input services providers reported 127% (2019) increase of their sales, which is more than the year target. Projects most important contribution to agricultural development in Northern Mozambique is in building a nascent commercial seed distribution system, private sector led extension services and establishing an output market for small holders to sell their produce. In addition, the project supported savings (albeit at a very low level), and land titling, where the biggest contribution was in developing a model that made it cheaper compared to normal donor funded models to access titles which should lead to more small holders accessing titles.

Outcomes related to the functioning of the policy platform and getting more donor agencies to work based on market principles (MSD) as well as knowledge and information sharing is still progressing towards achieving outcomes.

The project is currently looking into ways to enhance financing opportunities through the formal banking system in addition to the savings groups.

### 6. The extent to which the projects/programmes contribute to the objectives at impact level (as defined in logframe).

Note: this sub-criteria is particularly relevant for ex-post evaluations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3.2 Evidence of the impact on the target group, end beneficiaries and market players e.g. on income, quality of life, gender equality (including analysis of contributing factors).</th>
<th>☐ HS (^259) ☑ S ☑ US ☑ HUS ☑ N/A</th>
<th>The project has had a positive impact on the livelihood of participants, albeit not enough to lift people out of poverty. A rough calculation shows that the income increase of the second phase was about CHF25 a year per household. Naturally, income levels vary with prices and weather impact. Income increases in 2019 reported to be about CHF100 per small scale farmer. The project document targeted poorer farmer, but in practice the project has worked with all small holder farmers. There is no attempt to measure different income levels of participants nor to ascertain whether the target group – the poorer farmers - have access to inputs or they are simply too expensive. This aspect is only picked up in this last year.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.3 Evidence of systemic changes in functions and rules (including analysis of contributing factors)</td>
<td>☐ HS (^259) ☑ S ☑ US ☑ HUS ☑ N/A</td>
<td>There is good evidence of systemic changes at the level of the enabling environment – although the claim to the project leading to the introduction of a market approach in the seed sector has not been verified in the available documentation. At the systems level in the region there is also good evidence of systems changes for input distribution and output marketing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4 Evidence of scale up (including analysis of contributing factors)</td>
<td>☐ HS (^267) ☑ S ☑ US ☑ HUS ☑ N/A</td>
<td>□ HS (^267) ☑ S ☑ US ☑ HUS ☑ N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{259}\) HS: Strong evidence of contribution; S: Evidence of contribution; US: Few evidence of contribution; HUS: No contribution.

\(^{260}\) Link to transversal themes of dispatch 2017-2020 and 2021-2024.

\(^{261}\) HS: Strong evidence of contribution; S: Evidence of contribution; US: Few evidence of contribution; HUS: No contribution.
5.2 The social, environmental/climate sustainability issues were addressed by MSD programs (including analysis of contributing factors).

Gender and climate issues to some extent dealt with as externalities for which the project hesitates to burden private sector actors.

The project has not assessed impact on social issues neither at the community level nor at the household level.

### Assessment of efficiency

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>8. Cost-effectiveness of project results</th>
<th>4.2 Cost-benefit analyses have been presented and provides evidence for implementing MSD approaches.</th>
<th>☐ HS\textsuperscript{262} ☐ S ☐ US ☐ HUS ☒ N/A</th>
<th>There is no cost benefit analysis made yet.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

| 9. If assessable: Cost-benefit ratio of project results\textsuperscript{263} | 4.1 SDC’s procedures (general and financial in particular) and ways of collaboration are conducive to implementing MSD in partner countries or regions? 4.3 SDC and its implementing partners use adequate financial and human resources for effectively implementing MSD programs. | ☐ HS\textsuperscript{265} ☒ S ☒ US ☒ HUS ☒ N/A | A formal cost-benefit ratio has not been established but estimates are given above. |

| 10. Projects/Progr. management, monitoring and steering mechanisms are in place and effectively used for the efficient implementation of activities. | 5.1 The interventions were financially and technically | ☐ HS\textsuperscript{266} ☐ S | The project is run very professionally – with extensive reporting and strong and detailed follow-up from SCO in Maputo. |

### Assessment of sustainability

| 11. The extent to which the positive results at | The project is in phase 3 and considerable effort is going into working on exit plans focussing on building the capacity of input suppliers and agro-dealers to continue | ☒ HS | |

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\textsuperscript{262} HS: Positive CER based on a cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA); S: Positive CER, based on qualitative justification; US: Poor CER, based on qualitative justification; HUS: Poor CER demonstrated.

\textsuperscript{263} The extent to which the relation between resources (mainly financial and human resources) and time (e.g. delays compared to planning) required and results achieved is appropriate (Cost-benefit ratio - CBR). Further information: [http://deza-pcmi-lernbuch-3.prod2.lernetz.ch/module-6-en/2-cost-benefit-and-cost-effectiveness-analyses#Fo218](http://deza-pcmi-lernbuch-3.prod2.lernetz.ch/module-6-en/2-cost-benefit-and-cost-effectiveness-analyses#Fo218)

\textsuperscript{264} HS: Positive CBR based on a cost-benefit analysis (CBA); S: Positive CBR, based on qualitative justification; US: Poor CBR, based on qualitative justification; HUS: Bad CBR demonstrated.

\textsuperscript{265} HS: Highly efficient; S: Efficient; US: Partly efficient; HUS: Not efficient.

\textsuperscript{266} HS: Very likely based on evidence; S: Likely based on evidence; US: Little likelihood based on evidence; HUS: Unlikely based on evidence.
outcome level will be continued beyond the end of the external support. Considering potential risks in the context.

5.2 The social, environmental/climate sustainability issues were addressed by MSD programs (including analysis of contributing factors).

5.1 The interventions were financially and technically sustained/likely to be sustainable (including analysis of contributing factors) – specifically concerning capacity of partner organisations/market players.

12. The extent to which partner organisations are capable to carry on activities. Capacity includes technical, financial capacity, human resources.

Although the amounts provided by the project to each seed company or agro-dealer are not large, they are an important factor in the results achieved. Even if the seed companies and agro-dealers continue their marketing/trading activities, it is not clear how and why they would continue the extension services provided currently, particularly in the output market where traders not supported by the project are setting up buying posts in more locations.

There is no analysis of potential market distorting impacts from selecting some companies/traders over others. Nor is there analysis related to who benefits, and impacts on communities/households.

Support for the enabling framework – including legislation related to private sector financed seed inspection – is well entrenched. Work with national entities to ensure a system of checks and balances (private seed controllers). Not clear why this would be better than the government system.

The project set out to be a catalyst for market-based solutions in the agricultural sector. The project implementors are engaged in several similar MSD projects in Mozambique. Knowledge from this project is intended to be share with government and other donors in the region and at national level through the APROSE – seed

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267 HS: Strong capacity (able to further develop without support); S: Reliable capacity (able to continue at achieved level); US: Little capacity (requires further support); HUS: Still too weak capacity.
platform – in order that other donors follow the same approach. Annecdotal evidence that this is the case.

The impact study carried out by the project in collaboration with IFPRI is expected to shed more detailed light on the impact at the macro level and the household level and will be important for understanding dynamics of the market development that the project has set in motion, and who the beneficiaries are.

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13. The ownership by the partner organisation and the institutional framework (e.g. legislation, administration, politics) is considered conducive for the continuation of the activities.</td>
<td>5.3 The market systems development changes have been sustained /likely to be sustainable (including analysis of contributing factors).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ HS</td>
<td>☒ S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☒ US</td>
<td>☐ HUS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ N/A</td>
<td>See above</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Additional information (if needed): The above information is based on project documentation and discussions with SCO and the project implementers. Independent sources MTR 2019 and a preview of the Impact Study. Project: InovAgro 7F-06353.03. Assessor: Susan Ulbæk Date: 05.12.2020

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268 HS: Very likely based on evidence; S: Likely based on evidence; US: Little likelihood based on evidence; HUS: Unlikely based on evidence.
### Key Aspects based on DAC criteria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measurement criteria applied for the AMSD evaluation (reference to indicators in the AMSD evaluation matrix)</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Assessment of relevance at moment of evaluation</strong></td>
<td><strong>Justification - compulsory</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. The extent to which the objectives of the projects/programmes are consistent with the demands and the needs of the target groups incl. a description of the target groups and their specific needs (e.g. gender,-specific, marginalized groups.)</td>
<td>☒ HS²⁶⁹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 The MSD approach responded to the income and employment challenges and opportunities for target populations, the disadvantaged and poor, also considering gender.</td>
<td>☒ HS²⁶⁹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3 The MSD approach responded to the resilience challenges and opportunities (in economic, social and environmental terms) of target populations, the disadvantaged and poor, also considering gender.</td>
<td>☒ HS²⁶⁹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The extent to which the objectives of the projects/programmes are consistent with the demands and the needs of partner country (institutions respectively society) as well as the sector policies and strategies of the partner country.</td>
<td>☒ HS²⁷⁰</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 SDC’s strategies and programmes were systematically and sufficiently aligned and complementary to the context in partner countries.</td>
<td>☒ HS²⁷¹</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

²⁶⁹ HS: Fully consistent and target group-specific; S: Largely consistent; US: Only partly consistent; HUS: Marginally or not at all consistent.

²⁷⁰ N/A applied to all questions, a. if the ToR of the evaluation explicitly exclude the assessment of the criteria and/or of the key aspect(s) or b. if there is no information available to assess the criteria.

²⁷¹ HS: Obvious consistency with needs of society and in line with relevant sector policies and strategies; S: Consistency .. do.; US: Consistency with needs of society not visible but in line with relevant sector policies and strategies; HUS: Not consistent.
3. The extent to which the design of projects/programmes is adequate to achieve the goal and objectives (articulation of components; level of coordination with all stakeholders and other projects/programmes; comparative advantage of Swiss cooperation; capacity for adaptive management).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1.4 The MSD approach responded to the challenges and opportunities for creation of an enabling environment for pro-poor and inclusive market systems.</th>
<th>☐ HS(^{272})</th>
<th>☑ S</th>
<th>☑ US</th>
<th>☑ HUS</th>
<th>☑ N/A</th>
<th>The provision of cheap solutions at the farm level was found very relevant as an alternative to larger storage facilities that were often not available or not trusted. The MSD approach was chosen in order to find sustainable solutions building on connecting the market. When such market connections start to function, the system offers the users a range of options. However, the time needed to establish the market connections was underestimated particularly in Benin, and the approach of facilitation was initially not very well understood for neither market actors, NGO partners, governments nor beneficiaries. And the approach was challenged as other projects continued to distribute inputs for free. The technologies promoted went through a test and trial before the project settled on – earlier harvest and promotion of bags and metal silos small scale. The project relied on simple and practical methods including measuring moisture and better drying surfaces, in addition to bags and silos. The project moved from a focus on storage technologies to a more comprehensive way of addressing postharvest losses. In Benin traditional knowledge of how to store food was used and improved.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assessment of effectiveness</td>
<td>Note: for mid-term/end-of-phase evaluations: likelihood of achievement/contribution</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. The extent to which the approaches/strategies to the implementation are best suited to achieve the expected results.</td>
<td>4.1 SDC’s procedures (general and financial in particular) and ways of collaboration are conducive to implementing MSD in partner countries or regions? 4.3 SDC and its implementing partners use adequate financial and human resources for effectively implementing MSD programs.</td>
<td>☐ HS(^{273})</td>
<td>☑ S</td>
<td>☑ US</td>
<td>☑ HUS</td>
<td>☑ N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. The extent to which the planned objectives at outcome level (as defined in logframe) have been achieved taking into account the causal links between results, i.e. if activities lead to the expected 3.1 Expected results at output and outcome level were achieved (including analysis of contributing factors).</td>
<td>☑ HS(^{274})</td>
<td>☑ S</td>
<td>☑ US</td>
<td>☑ HUS</td>
<td>☐ N/A</td>
<td>The end of project evaluation concludes that overall achievements are remarkable although more successful in some areas than others. The project enhanced food security as well as improved income for direct beneficiaries as they were able to sell later in the season when the prices were higher, and where capacitated to sell in groups also fetching a higher price. The increase in household level income in 2019 in Mozambique is estimated at USD70 for maize and USD 44 for pulses, whereas the similar figures for Benin are USD169 and USD 65. Project direct beneficiaries were around 12000 households. In addition, as many as 50,000-60,000 households is estimated to have adopted some of the practices. This</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{272}\) HS: Fully adequate; S: Largely adequate; US: Only partly adequate; HUS: Marginally or not at all adequate.  
\(^{273}\) HS: Fully suited; S: Suited; US: Partly suited; HUS: Not suited.  
\(^{274}\) HS: Fully achieved or overachieved; S: Most important outcomes are largely achieved; US: Only least important outcomes are achieved; HUS: Marginally achieved.
The knowledge is also institutionalised as it is now incorporated into government agricultural policies as well as agricultural training centres curricula.

The use of simple technologies proved very successful. With regards to storage the hermetic bags was found very successful in particular in Mozambique. The idea to improve the traditional granaries in Benin proved very scalable as the technology was known. In addition, it provided an added benefit of giving work to local artisans.

The project also provided capacity building for farmers associations, extension staff. For this more training of the project staff was recommended.

6. The extent to which the projects/programmes contribute to the objectives at impact level (as defined in logframe). Note: this sub-criteria is particularly relevant for ex-post evaluations.

3.2 Evidence of the impact on the target group, end beneficiaries and market players e.g. on income, quality of life, gender equality (including analysis of contributing factors).

3.3 Evidence of systemic changes in functions and rules (including analysis of contributing factors).

3.4 Evidence of scale up (including analysis of contributing factors).

☐ HS 275  S
☐ US
☐ HUS
☐ N/A

Target group benefitted, see above. Impact on poverty marginal as the intervention was narrow, see above. But improved food security and reduced vulnerability to famine. (Benin 5 pct. of project beneficiaries report that they do not have food last 24 months, compared to 30 pct. in the control group. In Mozambique the numbers are 12 pct. in comparison to 32 pct.)

Positive impact on gender equality, although the initial expectations of women benefitting was not met. Still women benefitted also as now more active participants in management committees of farmers associations, the instrument for access to credit in Benin also benefitted women in particular.

Systemic changes at the intervention level:

- Improved handling and storage of crops and reduced losses,
- Agro-dealers trained to promote PHM and PHT in their business. Business case in supply of hermetic bags and tarpaulins
- Artisan training in making silos.
- Training of supporting functions: Extension services, local actors, farmers associations
- Credit – VICOBA groups extends loans for PHM – attempts to link to more forma credit providers.
- Linkages between suppliers (agro-dealers, local agents) and users. Not possible to get large agro-dealers interested in the project. Extension staff help with the linkages between suppliers and user – for a small commission!
- Institutionalisation of PHM in curriculum
- Impact on policies at national and Pan African level

There was good uptake of the PHM – two important factors – extreme weather provided a background for interest in investing in food security and storage (Mozambique after cyclone 2019) and the other was increased risks to food safety

related to the use of chemicals to preserve grain – deadly accidents with use of aflatoxin.

There is evidence of scale up as partners are also promoting the new PHM technologies. In Mozambique, the project triggered the private sector to invest in the built up of a distribution network for hermetic bags, and in Benin a new collective storage programme is being tested. Some other donors are potentially going to use the experience.

7. The extent to which the outcomes achieved contribute to results related to transversal themes.

(Please add a line for each relevant transversal theme.)

| 3.2 Evidence of the impact on the target group, end beneficiaries and market players e.g. on income, quality of life, gender equality (including analysis of contributing factors). | ☐ HS
☑ S
☐ US
☐ HUS
☐ N/A |
---|---|---|
Small holders impacted by climate variability and extreme weather. There is attention to climate change adaptation – in all aspects of the project. Part of the problem and a contributing factor to changes taking place.

8. Cost-effectiveness of project results

| 4.2 Cost-benefit analyses have been presented and provides evidence for implementing MSD approaches. | ☐ HS
☑ S
☐ US
☐ HUS
☐ N/A |
---|---|---|
Cost benefit analyses made. But the baseline production data in general is not quite adequate. But even with very conservative estimates of additional household gains from using PHM practices and technologies, there is a positive benefit to cost ratio BCR of 1.60. Project own data suggests 2.20. The evaluation suggests that if the project had seen earlier that Benin was not ready for metal silos and focused more on warrantee system – impact might have been bigger. It is also suggested that more budget for dissemination might have made a bigger impact for creating a market.

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270 Link to transversal themes of dispatch 2017-2020 and 2021-2024.
278 HS: Positive CER based on a cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA); S: Positive CER, based on qualitative justification; US: Poor CER, based on qualitative justification; HUS: Poor CER demonstrated.
9. If assessable: Cost-benefit ratio of project results.\(^{279}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(\square) HS(^{280})</th>
<th>(\checkmark) S</th>
<th>(\square) US</th>
<th>(\square) HUS</th>
<th>(\square) N/A</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>See above</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

10. Projects/Progr. management, monitoring and steering mechanisms are in place and effectively used for the efficient implementation of activities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(\square) HS(^{281})</th>
<th>(\checkmark) S</th>
<th>(\square) US</th>
<th>(\square) HUS</th>
<th>(\square) N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Good collaboration between SDC and the project is noted. The evaluation points to the high level of commitment of the collaborators in the project teams and many of the partners have made the achievements possible.</td>
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</table>

### Assessment of sustainability

11. The extent to which the positive results at outcome level will be continued beyond the end of the external support. Considering potential risks in the context.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(\square) HS(^{282})</th>
<th>(\checkmark) S</th>
<th>(\square) US</th>
<th>(\square) HUS</th>
<th>(\square) N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>It is very early to conclude that the activities will be sustained. There appears to be good reason to expect that the policy impetus given to PHM in Africa – and to which this project contributed – is sustainable. Beneficiaries have improved knowledge of PHM as have many local partners – extension services, agro-dealers and local NGOs. The market connections will depend on continued and increasing demand. In itself the project is too small and too narrow to really built a market. PHM is now on the agenda, and it is expected that other donors will continue to support, some maybe using an MSD approach.</td>
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</table>

12. The extent to which partner organisations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(\square) HS(^{283})</th>
<th>(\checkmark) S</th>
<th>(\square) US</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Partners have been capacitated to promote PHM solutions, and there is strong local ownership of the technically sound and feasible solutions. There was a clear demand for knowledge about PHM in extension and in agricultural research bodies.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{279}\) The extent to which the relation between resources (mainly financial and human resources) and time (e.g. delays compared to planning) required and results achieved is appropriate (Cost-benefit ratio - CBR). Further information: [http://deza-pcmi-lernbuch-3.prod2.lemetz.ch/module-6-en/2-cost-benefit-and-cost-effectiveness-analyses#F0218](http://deza-pcmi-lernbuch-3.prod2.lemetz.ch/module-6-en/2-cost-benefit-and-cost-effectiveness-analyses#F0218)

\(^{280}\) HS: Positive CBR based on a cost-benefit analysis (CBA); S: Positive CBR, based on qualitative justification; US: Poor CBR, based on qualitative justification; HUS: Bad CBR demonstrated.

\(^{281}\) HS: Highly efficient; S: Efficient; US: Partly efficient; HUS: Not efficient.

\(^{282}\) HS: Very likely based on evidence; S: Likely based on evidence; US: Little likelihood based on evidence; HUS: Unlikely based on evidence.

\(^{283}\) HS: Strong capacity (able to further develop without support); S: Reliable capacity (able to continue at achieved level); US: Little capacity (requires further support); HUS: Still too weak capacity.
are capable to carry on activities. Capacity includes technical, financial capacity, human resources.

sustainable (including analysis of contributing factors) – specifically concerning capacity of partner organisations/market players.

☐ HUS
☐ N/A

Agricultural extension, associations and local NGOs need continued funding. Other donors are active in this area. It is a risk that it was not possible to involve larger agro dealers – smaller agro-dealers were only willing to take limited risks and opted for bags and tarpaulins.

☐ N/A

13. The ownership by the partner organisation and the institutional framework (e.g., legislation, administration, politics) is considered conducive for the continuation of the activities.

5.3 The market systems development changes have been sustained /likely to be sustainable (including analysis of contributing factors).

☐ HS
☐ S
☒ US
☐ HUS
☐ N/A

The policies adopted with the support of the project as well as other projects will be conducive to further development of PHM. Other donors are also funding PHM: Germany and Japan are large donors and active on the policy front as well – the policy changes are unlikely to have taken place on the backdrop of this intervention alone.

Sustainability of the project as such depends on increased demand for PHM solutions and private sector actors willing and interested in responding to the demand.

Additional information (if needed): This assessment is based on the Final Report, End of Project Evaluation, Postharvest Management in Sub-Saharan Africa, June 2020, and Capitalization of Experience of the SDC Africa Post Harvest Management Portfolio.
Project: Postharvest Management in Sub Saharan Africa 2013-2020
Assessor: Susan Ulbaek
Date: 18. December 2020

284 HS: Very likely based on evidence; S: Likely based on evidence; US: Little likelihood based on evidence; HUS: Unlikely based on evidence.
### Key Aspects based on DAC criteria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measurement criteria applied for the AMSD evaluation (reference to indicators in the AMSD evaluation matrix)</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Justification - compulsory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(please write a short explanation with the main points and refer to the chapter(s) where the information that justify your assessment can be found) + in brackets add the strength of evidence /S/US</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Assessment of relevance at moment of evaluation

1. The extent to which the objectives of the projects/programmes are consistent with the demands and the needs of the target groups incl. a description of the target groups and their specific needs (e.g. gender-specific, marginalized groups).

   1.2 The MSD approach responded to the income and employment challenges and opportunities for target populations, the disadvantaged and poor, also considering gender.

   1.3 The MSD approach responded to the resilience challenges and opportunities (in economic, social and environmental terms) of target populations, the disadvantaged and poor, also considering gender.

   - HS
   - S
   - US
   - N/A

   The Catalist 2 project addressed agriculture productivity in mega-clusters and creation of local and regional markets covering Rwanda, Burundi and Eastern part of DRC bordering Rwanda and Burundi. The project improved small holders’ access to agricultural inputs - not least fertilizers, improved seeds and knowledge (soil fertility management) as well as post-harvest practices. The ensuing increase in yields led to enhanced food security and opportunities for commercialisation of part of the crops leading to increased income for small holders as well as increased off-farm employment opportunities.

2. The extent to which the objectives of the projects/programmes are consistent with the demands and the needs of partner country (institutions respectively society) as well as the sector policies and strategies of the partner country.

   2.2 SDC’s strategies and programmes were systematically and sufficiently aligned and complementary to the context in partner countries.

   - HS
   - S
   - US
   - N/A

   There was strong ownership and buy-in from the Government of Rwanda in particular. The security and political situation in Burundi deteriorated over the course of the project and hence the support for the project. In DRC the project worked with local governments in North and South Kivu that supported the project. An important underlying assumption was that a regional project on development of agricultural value chains would contribute to regional integration, peace and stability. When the project began in 2012, the expectations were that Rwanda, Burundi and Eastern DRC would become more integrated and interdependent, and that CATALIST – by fostering profitable, market-driven agriculture, creating business links and supporting joint policy development – would contribute to this process. But, as the evaluators also pointed out, this assumption is difficult to validate, and the related achievements hard to measure. National and regional instability is caused or exacerbated by complex factors, embedded in the history of the region, in ethnic
conflicts, power struggles, illegal mining, the existence of numerous armed groups in eastern DRC, poverty, the prevalence of informal trading and smuggling, and large variations in government presence. Development of agricultural value chains will not solve these problems, though inclusive economic development definitely is an important contributing factor. The lack of opportunities to support regional integration through regional projects was part of the reason for not continuing the project.

### Assessment of effectiveness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4. The extent to which the approaches/strategies to the implementation are best suited to achieve the expected results.</th>
<th>4.1 SDC’s procedures (general and financial in particular) and ways of collaboration are conducive to implementing MSD in partner countries or regions? 4.3 SDC and its implementing partners use adequate financial and human resources</th>
<th>☐ HS☐ S ☑ US ☐ HUS ☐ N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

The mega-cluster approach centered around a few select value chains ensured that the interventions within each value chain were connected, and that the project to conduct in-depth analyses of each value chain, clearly identify actors and their roles, and encouraged value addition, specialization, and market segmentation. This encouraged players to specialize – for example the potato value chain now has varieties targeted at specific markets (e.g., ware potatoes vs chips), specialized seed producers, and private enterprises offering screenhouses for growing mini-tubers. The larger scale of mega clusters also helped attract private investors, e.g., processors who can now source raw material from a much larger producer pool. This development was most evident in Rwanda.

The project in hindsight may have focused too much on cash crops/monocropping and for some small holders that entailed a risk to their food security, see under sustainability.

The project worked involving a range of partners, government, local government incl. extension services, market actors (investors and agro-dealers), farmers associations, local NGOs to provide the service and provide training and capacitation of small holders.

The project was a co-financing operation implemented by International Fertilizer Development Centre and Wageningen University, also involving and NL, and SDC only joined in phase 2.

| ☒ HS ☑ S ☐ US ☐ HUS ☐ N/A |

Note: for mid-term/end-of-phase evaluations: likelihood of achievement/contribution

288 HS: Fully adequate; S: Largely adequate; US: Only partly adequate; HUS: Marginally or not at all adequate.

289 HS: Fully suited; S: Suited; US: Partly suited; HUS: Not suited.
The results of the project are impressive. Impacted nearly 1 million farm households, of whom 389,000 (35% women) were directly involved in project activities: 250,573 in Rwanda, 71,889 in Burundi and 66,232 in DRC. Crop yields increased substantially, with project farmers obtaining yields two to seven times the national average. For example: maize 4.03 t/ha vs 1.04 t/ha, potatoes 24 vs 6 t/ha, cassava 15 vs 1.95 t/ha, beans 2 vs 0.82 t/ha (representative data from Rwanda, 2015B season). Project interventions led to additional production of over 1 million tons (cereal equivalent, cumulative, 2012-2016): 775,130 t in Rwanda, 140,426 t in Burundi and 109,144 t in DRC. Farm incomes rose by 20% in DRC and 17% in Rwanda. This was lower than the targeted 30%, because much of the additional production was consumed on-farm, not sold, i.e., better nutrition rather than higher income. Incomes remained flat in Burundi as a result of political instability and large-scale displacement of rural populations.

The evaluation noted that the use of income is difficult to assess, but interviews and observations indicated that additional income was used for basic needs, which was also an indication of poverty levels among project beneficiaries. The money went towards school fees, house repairs, basic health insurance, access to electricity in some cases, and small investments in land or production. Clearly, farmers are better off than before; and are eating more, consuming a share of the additional production. In addition, beneficiaries’ social status (as reflected by their ability to spend on social events, marriages etc) has significantly improved.

Contributing factors for reaching so many small holders was that the project worked through a range of different actors (local government, local NGOs, and farmers associations), used communication (radio) very effectively also to reach women, that were not always able to participate in trainings and fairs.

The larger geographical areas and more structured nature of megACLusters enabled project teams to work at a more strategic level, to address policy and institutional constraints that local actors face. The same factors also attracted greater support from policy makers as project teams were able to support government decision makers with better data and analyses. Together, this resulted in significant improvements in the institutional environment for farming and agribusiness in all three countries. CATALIST and its sister project PreFER contributed to government policies that led to making inputs more accessible to farmers. Other policy developments include approval of the national fertilizer policy in Rwanda, the land...
3.4 Evidence of scale up (including analysis of contributing factors).

The evaluation noted that the most important asset created by CATALIST is the social capital and the knowledge base — the farmers who learned new techniques or connected to new markets, the government and NGO agronomists who developed new skills, the institutionalization of strategic analysis and gender aspects in value chain development, the knowledge acquired by government officials on the policy dimensions of input value chains.

The project also ran into difficulties as it promoted new farming techniques. Changing a traditional system based on resilience to a market-oriented system requires a certain level of confidence and security. Higher demand is an incentive for farmers to increase production, but farmers are hesitant to invest and take risks. Market security through contracts and loans to procure inputs are important. But bulk buyers in particular, demand a quality that farmers often cannot deliver. The product is rejected, leaving the farmer in debt. Also, exposure to risks is increasing, with ever smaller landholdings, adverse weather conditions, climate change and crop diseases (see below). Examples are cassava brown streak disease in southern Rwanda and the drought in the maize area in eastern Rwanda that left many farmers without harvests and in debt. Attempts at creating a weather insurance system, to which the project contributed, did not succeed.

7. The extent to which the outcomes achieved contribute to results related to transversal themes.

(Please add a line for each relevant transversal theme.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>7. The extent to which the outcomes achieved contribute to results related to transversal themes</th>
<th>3.2 Evidence of the impact on the target group, end beneficiaries and market players e.g., on income, quality of life, gender equality (including analysis of contributing factors).</th>
<th>☐ HS²⁹³</th>
<th>☑ S</th>
<th>☑ US</th>
<th>☐ HUS</th>
<th>☑ N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.2 The social, environmental/climate sustainability issues were addressed by MSD programs (including analysis of contributing factors).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

There was some indication that gender in particular had been empowered — understanding better the importance of investing in agricultural production through participation in training and having a better influence on use of household income. At the same time women continued to be less represented in decision making for a — e.g., farmers associations.

²⁹² Link to transversal themes of dispatch 2017-2020 and 2021-2024.
## Assessment of efficiency

| 8. Cost-effectiveness of project results | 4.2 Cost-benefit analyses has been presented and provides evidence for implementing MSD approaches. | □ HS\(^{294}\)
□ S
□ US
□ HUS
□ N/A | A formal cost benefit analysis has not been made. CATALIST-2 had a budget of around US$ 30 million. Did the results justify the investment, was the project was effective and efficient? The external evaluation addressed these questions by comparing CATALIST to other projects with similar interventions. They concluded the project was both efficient and effective but noted that the way budget and activities were defined did not always permit clear attribution, e.g., relating specific expenses to specific activities or outcomes. The project was mandated to support, but not to invest in, local agribusiness, so the largest part of the budget was spent on human resources and related costs for project staff, consultants, or personnel from partner agencies. A small amount was used for to purchase equipment such as winnowing machines, direct paddy seeders and pelletizing machines; in most cases the beneficiaries shared 50% of the cost. *(Final report)* |
| 9. If assessable: Cost-benefit ratio of project results. \(^{295}\) | | □ HS\(^{296}\)
□ S
□ US
□ HUS
□ N/A | A formal cost -benefit ratio has not been established |
| 10. Projects/Progr. management, monitoring and steering mechanisms are in place and effectively used for the efficient implementation of activities. | 4.1 SDC’s procedures (general and financial in particular) and ways of collaboration are conducive to implementing MSD in partner countries or regions? 4.3 SDC and its implementing partners use adequate financial and human resources for effectively implementing MSD programs. | □ HS\(^{297}\)
□ S
□ US
□ HUS
□ N/A | The project was run very professionally but with high staff input. |

\(^{294}\) HS: Positive CER based on a cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA); S: Positive CER, based on qualitative justification; US: Poor CER, based on qualitative justification; HUS: Poor CER demonstrated.

\(^{295}\) The extent to which the relation between resources (mainly financial and human resources) and time (e.g. delays compared to planning) required and results achieved is appropriate (Cost-benefit ratio - CBR). Further information: [http://deza-pcmi-lernbuch-3.prod2.lernetz.ch/module-6-en/2-cost-benefit-and-cost-effectiveness-analyses#Fo218](http://deza-pcmi-lernbuch-3.prod2.lernetz.ch/module-6-en/2-cost-benefit-and-cost-effectiveness-analyses#Fo218)

\(^{296}\) HS: Positive CBR based on a cost-benefit analysis (CBA); S: Positive CBR, based on qualitative justification; US: Poor CBR, based on qualitative justification; HUS: Bad CBR demonstrated.

\(^{297}\) HS: Highly efficient; S: Efficient; US: Partly efficient; HUS: Not efficient.
### Assessment of sustainability

11. The extent to which the positive results at outcome level will be continued beyond the end of the external support. Considering potential risks in the context.

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5.1 The interventions were financially and technically sustained/ likely to be sustainable (including analysis of contributing factors).</td>
<td>☐ HS(^{298}) □ S ☒ US ☐ HUS ☐ N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2 The social, environmental/climate sustainability issues were addressed by MSD programs (including analysis of contributing factors).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The final report noted: “The project worked through other organizations (facilitators), already present in the region, in order to ensure sustainability of the interventions. Nevertheless, the comprehensive nature of project interventions – combining technology, training, and linkages – have provided a basis for sustainability. For example, local organizations, which led implementation, have the capacity to sustain CATALIST initiatives (with assistance from future programs) long after the project closes.” Many other donors are active with MSD and BSD approaches in agriculture not least in Rwanda, also making attribution difficult. It is highly unlikely that activities carried out by local NGOs and farmers associations are financially and technical sustainable at this stage. Other donors are actively supporting FFS and agricultural extension.

The project itself assessed prospects for sustainability to be good pointing to the size of the market that had been created. Each of mega cluster included tens of thousands of producers. Training and market linkages initiated by CATALIST are likely to continue after the project closes, simply because of the size and breadth of partnerships and government ownership not least in Rwanda, and the huge size of the market. Also, the mega cluster approach was better suited for farmers’ organizations, which are usually organized around a particular crop or product. Consequently, mega clusters were able to accelerate the scaling up of trials or pilot programs. Sustainability thus goes beyond the farming system (crop choice, soil and water management, ability to respond to external shocks like drought or disease outbreaks). Sustainability also depends on the reliability and viability of markets and the enabling environment created by government policies and interventions. CATALIST has worked on all these factors.

During the years of implementation, climate change variability effects became more apparent, according to farmers as well as technical field staff. Rains had become more erratic; farmers found they had sown too early or too late. Droughts had occurred in parts of the Kivus; in early 2016, severe drought in eastern Rwanda ravaged the maize harvest. The project duration was too short to clearly discern trends related to climate change, but land scarcity and the tendency to switch from traditional systems to monocultures (for markets) make smallholder farmers ever more vulnerable to adverse climate effects.

The final report on the project concluded by weighing the poverty food security aspects against promotion of more high risk monoculture farming and pointing to the lack of insight on the impact of climate variability:

Considering that the majority of project beneficiaries were small farmers with limited access to inputs and with high vulnerability, the project design should (in

---

\(^{298}\) HS: Very likely based on evidence; S: Likely based on evidence; US: Little likelihood based on evidence; HUS: Unlikely based on evidence.
hindsight) have had a broader focus, i.e. on sustainable agriculture production systems in the context in which they function, rather than a focus on increasing production in a specific value chain. A project like CATALIST should have a dual approach, supporting the development of inclusive value chains where possible, and increasing resilience of systems in the framework of concepts like climate smart agriculture, landscape management, eco-agriculture, and watershed management. An extension system based mainly on a farmer field school concept cannot address these issues. It needs to be supplemented by a broader approach which supports collective action by farmers in a landscape approach. *(Final report page 26-27)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>12. The extent to which partner organisations are capable to carry on activities. Capacity includes technical, financial capacity, human resources.</th>
<th>5.1 The interventions were financially and technically sustained/ likely to be sustainable (including analysis of contributing factors) – specifically concerning capacity of partner organisations/market players.</th>
<th>☐ HS(^{299}) ☐ S ☒ US ☐ HUS ☐ N/A</th>
<th>See above</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13. The ownership by the partner organisation and the institutional framework (e.g. legislation, administration, politics) is considered conducive for the continuation of the activities.</td>
<td>5.3 The market systems development changes have been sustained /likely to be sustainable (including analysis of contributing factors).</td>
<td>☐ HS(^{300}) ☐ S ☒ US ☐ HUS ☐ N/A</td>
<td>See above</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Additional information (if needed): The above information is based on the Final Report on CATALIST 2 November 2016 and the External Evaluation of the 2nd phase of the CATALIST 2 project Project: CATALIST 7F-08391.01 Assessor: Susan Ulbæk Date: 05.12.2020

\(^{299}\) HS: Strong capacity (able to further develop without support); S: Reliable capacity (able to continue at achieved level); US: Little capacity (requires further support); HUS: Still too weak capacity.

\(^{300}\) HS: Very likely based on evidence; S: Likely based on evidence; US: Little likelihood based on evidence; HUS: Unlikely based on evidence.
Annex G Terms of Reference

Invitation procedure

Terms of reference for


for the implementation period
March 1, 2020 to February 28, 2021

Berne, January 13, 2020
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## 1 Terms and abbreviations

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A+FS</td>
<td>Agriculture and Food Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC</td>
<td>Award Criteria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCA</td>
<td>Climate Change Adaptation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLP</td>
<td>Core Learning Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E+C</td>
<td>Evaluation and Corporate Controlling Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e+i</td>
<td>employment and income network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excl.</td>
<td>exclusive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDFA</td>
<td>Federal Department of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPFS</td>
<td>Global Programme Food Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GTC</td>
<td>General Terms and Conditions of Business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i.e.</td>
<td>id est – that is to say</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M4P</td>
<td>Making Markets Work for the Poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Max.</td>
<td>Maximum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSD</td>
<td>Market Systems Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPO</td>
<td>Federal Ordinance of 11 December 1995 on Public Procurement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>Suitability Criteria</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCO</td>
<td>Swiss Cooperation Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDC</td>
<td>Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEVAL</td>
<td>Schweizerische Evaluationsgesellschaft</td>
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<tr>
<td>ToRs</td>
<td>Terms of Reference</td>
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<tr>
<td>VAT</td>
<td>Value-added tax</td>
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<tr>
<td>VC</td>
<td>Value Chain</td>
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<tr>
<td>VCA</td>
<td>Value Chain Approach</td>
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<tr>
<td>VCD</td>
<td>Value Chain Development</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
2 Purpose of this document
This document contains the requirements relating to the mandate for project "Independent Evaluation of SDC’s Performance in Agricultural Market Systems Development 2013-2019." It serves as a template for the bidder to submit his or her offer. Contracts are awarded according to the invitation to tender procedure according to Art. 35 PPO. At least three bids shall be collected and the Terms of Reference are additionally published on FDFA-Website (Website FDFA). The bidder submitting the economically most favourable bid will be awarded the mandate.

3 Goal and content of the mandate

3.1 Background
The Evaluation and Corporate Controlling Division (E+C) of the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) conducts independent thematic evaluations to gain evidence of SDC’s contribution to international cooperation results at institutional level. E+C is outside the operational line and reports to the Director General of SDC. This backward and forward-looking evaluation shall thereby support SDC in achieving the objectives of the Dispatches on Switzerland’s International Cooperation and in contributing to the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals as set out in the Agenda 2030. Ultimately, the evaluation shall formulate recommendations on how Agricultural Market Systems Development may be addressed in future by SDC.

3.2 Prior involvement
Experts, who have worked for SDC in the past five years (except having conducted other external evaluation or review mandates for SDC) or have any other strong linkages or dependencies with the FDFA, are excluded from this assignment in order to avoid conflicts of interests.

3.3 Objectives
Almost 10 years ago, in 2010, SDC and SECO jointly published the “Report on Effectiveness. Swiss development cooperation in the agricultural sector.” Since then, more and more emphasis has been placed on involving the private sector in development cooperation interventions. It is now time to revisit the performance of SDC in the sector with a particular focus on market facing interventions.

Purpose
The purpose of this evaluation is to provide evidence on the performance of Market Systems Development programmes in agriculture in SDC, in particular on how they contribute to increasing income, supporting food security, reducing poverty, and improving resilience and livelihoods of smallholder farmers. The findings and recommendations are expected to inform SDC’s strategic and operational decision making, to enhance institutional learning and to inform SDC’s constituency, the Swiss parliament and the public.

The evaluation shall identify 1) successes, difficulties (including failures) as well as good practices of how Market System Development (MSD) in agriculture is being implemented within SDC and assess to which extent and how ‘good practices’ could be systematically applied within SDC. 2) A comparison or benchmarking of SDC’s performance compared to international practices is a second, important element of the evaluation. 3) The evaluation should assess the effectiveness and rate of achievement of projects and programmes.

Objectives
In line with the above-mentioned purpose, the evaluation shall assess the relevance, coherence, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability of SDC agricultural MSD
programmes and projects of all 4 SDC domains (South Cooperation, Cooperation with Eastern Europe, Humanitarian Aid, and Global Cooperation).

The evaluation shall assess to which extent SDC’s operationalisation of the MSD approach ensure that:
i) SDC’s activities respond to relevant challenges in developing agricultural market systems and contribute to poverty alleviation, inclusion of target populations, and targeting the vulnerable, including the poor and women;

  ii) SDC’s programs/projects are consistent with partner countries’ development priorities, country assistance strategies and Dispatches on Switzerland’s International Cooperation;

  iii) The expected results are being achieved and the areas of success or in need of improvement are being appropriately addressed;

  iv) The Market Systems Approach has been efficiently managed (by SDC and its implementing partners) in order to reach high leverage effects (outreach and scaling up);

  v) The sustainability of the activities and good agricultural practices (i.e. ecologically sustainable, climate change resilient, and agro-ecological sound) are achieved.

The evaluation shall further assess the degree and results of SDC’s international engagement in MSD further development, learning and knowledge exchange.

The evaluation will provide findings, conclusions and recommendations on whether and how SDC’s approaches can be strengthened from a strategic and operational point of view.

### 3.4 Content of the mandate, terms of reference

#### Scope

The framework for this evaluation is set by the Dispatches on Switzerland’s international cooperation (2013-16 and 2017-20), as well as a previous assessment in the agricultural sector in 2010. The evaluation shall thus cover those activities implemented during a period of seven years (2013-2019).

#### Process

The following work plan suggests the dates and responsibilities for the different activities of the evaluation process. This work plan will eventually be adapted by the evaluation team during the inception phase.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Responsibilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elaboration Draft Approach Paper including draft portfolio analysis</td>
<td>November 2019</td>
<td>E+C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st CLP meeting in Berne: Finalize Approach Paper</td>
<td>03.12.2019</td>
<td>E+C / CLP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The challenges are: prevalence of poverty in rural areas; degradation of soils; the fragmentation of agricultural land holding of smallholders; rural-urban migration, depopulation of rural areas, and underuse of agricultural land; limited technological development and limited adaptation of existing technologies in agriculture with linked stagnant agricultural productivity and revenues leading to declining attractiveness of agricultural professions; and limited provision of services and amenities in rural areas.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Responsibilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deadline to submit offers</td>
<td>07.02.2020</td>
<td>Evaluators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysis of the offers</td>
<td>21.02.2020</td>
<td>E+C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviews with candidates, if necessary</td>
<td>26.02.2020</td>
<td>E+C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision on award</td>
<td>28.02.2020</td>
<td>E+C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contract signed with evaluators</td>
<td>First week of March 2020</td>
<td>E+C</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Responsibilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>2nd CLP meeting: Kick-off in Berne</strong> (with evaluation team) + first round of interviews for inception phase (in Berne and on phone)</td>
<td>13.03.2020</td>
<td>CLP / Evaluators / E+C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elaboration of the Inception Report: evaluation objectives and questions, evaluation design, methodology</td>
<td>March 2020</td>
<td>Evaluators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3rd CLP meeting:</strong> Feedback to Inception Report (with evaluation team)</td>
<td>Beginning of April 2020</td>
<td>Evaluators / CLP / E+C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finalization of the Inception Report (incorporation of comments by SDC)</td>
<td>April 2020</td>
<td>Evaluators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistic and administrative preparation of evaluation visits, workshops, etc.</td>
<td>March-April 2020</td>
<td>Evaluators / E+C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desk study</td>
<td>May 2020</td>
<td>Evaluators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviews with stakeholders, partners, focus group and workshops, if relevant</td>
<td>April-May 2020</td>
<td>Evaluators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field visits in up to 5 countries</td>
<td>May-June 2020</td>
<td>Evaluators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4th CLP meeting:</strong> Capitalization workshop on intermediate results (with evaluation team)</td>
<td>July 2020</td>
<td>CLP / Evaluators / E+C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data analysis and elaboration of draft report</td>
<td>July 2020</td>
<td>Evaluators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>5th CLP meeting in Berne:</strong> Feedback on draft report. Review of lessons learnt and recommendations (with evaluation team)</td>
<td>August 2020</td>
<td>CLP / Evaluators / E+C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presentation and discussion at External Reference Group</td>
<td>August 2020</td>
<td>Evaluator, E+C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final Report</td>
<td>September 2020</td>
<td>Evaluators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presentation at SDC Directorate and SDC staff</td>
<td>October 2020</td>
<td>Evaluators, E+C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDC Senior Management Response</td>
<td>November 2020</td>
<td>Directorate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Publication</td>
<td>December 2020</td>
<td>E+C</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Methodology**

The independent evaluation team will assess the evaluation objectives and questions in a **neutral and objective** way. The overall evaluation approach should represent an adequate
mix of **formative and summative elements**. Selected steps from within developmental evaluation (see Michael Quinn Patton 2010) are to be considered when appropriate. The evaluation team shall review and assess existing facts, processes, tools and instruments. The evaluation team shall use or develop adequate rubrics and instruments for assessing all information, interviews etc. within the evaluation. Their findings, conclusions and recommendation shall be evidence based and formulated in an open constructive non-judging manner. The findings and recommendations are expected to inform SDC’s strategic and operational decision making, to enhance institutional learning, and to inform SDC’s constituency, the Swiss parliament and the public. The evaluation is expected to make use of a series of **different methodological instruments**, such as the following:

- **Portfolio Analysis** of SDC’s engagement in Market Systems Development in Agriculture;
- **Review of relevant documents** from SDC (e.g. evaluation reports; credit proposals; end of phase reports; guiding documents) partners (program and evaluation reports, case studies, etc.) and other donors (for comparison), as well as research;
- **8-10 case studies** with 3 to 5 field missions, including interviews with SDC’s field staff, project/programme and policy stakeholders;
- **Interviews** and/or **focus group discussions** with SDC staff in Berne from all operational departments (Humanitarian Aid, South Cooperation, East Cooperation, Global Cooperation) and with selected cooperation offices (virtual communication);
- **Interviews** with **other relevant persons**, especially from implementing partners, knowledge partners, and other donors;
- **Online surveys** as assessed relevant.

The evaluation team will develop a **rigorous and appropriate methodology** during the inception phase, together with a **Theory of Change**, which will set the framework for the evaluation. It is important that the methodology is appropriate for assessing both the operational and institutional aspects of the evaluation. As already mentioned the **indicative key questions** are only suggestions and shall be reviewed by the evaluation team during the inception phase.

The **Core Learning Partnership** (CLP) shall be involved in drafting the **recommendations** to SDC management. Therefore, elements of **participatory / developmental evaluation** can be integrated. Developmental evaluation is tailored to complex environments and sees the evaluator as combining the rigour of evaluation (evidence-based and objective) with the role of enhancing a program’s capacity, by means of using evidence in reflective thinking on its work. SDC’s staff should learn during the entire evaluation process - not just at the end. Including such an approach will not only increase the utility of the evaluation, but will also support SDC’s on-going commitment to develop stronger analyses, program designs, as well as capacities in monitoring and evaluation.

**Indicative Evaluation Questions**

The question catalogue below is a first draft and has been developed by E+C and reviewed by the CLP. During the inception phase, the appointed evaluation team will further refine and prioritize the questions in consultation with E+C and the CLP. **Relevance** - The extent to which a program is suited to the priorities and policies of the target group, recipient and donor.

- To what extent are MSD objectives and approaches of SDC relevant to ensuring
  1. increase in income and employment for target populations, the disadvantaged and poor, also considering gender;
II. increased resilience (in economic, social and environmental terms) of target populations, the disadvantaged and poor, also considering gender; and
III. the creation of an enabling environment for pro-poor and inclusive market systems?

- To what degree do SDC’s strategies and programs systematically and sufficiently taking into account context, existing businesses and partner country strategies and to what degree are they deploying different instruments in relation to fostering inclusive markets?

**Coherence** – The compatibility of the intervention with other interventions in a country, sector or institution.

- To what degree are SDC’s operational and institutional MSD approaches appropriate for achieving the objectives set out by the Dispatch? In comparison with similar approaches by other Donor Agencies, what are the advantages and disadvantages of the approaches chosen by SDC?
- Are SDC’s strategies and programmes systematically and sufficiently aligned and complementary to partner countries’ and other donors’ strategic plans? How do they fit with structural changes in the concerned economy, i.e. the transformation from economies dominated by the first sector to service oriented economies?

**Effectiveness** - The extent to which a program attains its objectives.

- To what degree do SDC’s programs contribute to systemic changes in markets? Are there specific improvements for the disadvantaged, rural poor and women (differentiating along the rural-urban continuum)?
- To what extent did the MSD programs achieve their objectives (impact, outcome, outputs)?
- Which factors contribute to or hinder the effective achievement of their objectives (impact, outcome, outputs)?

**Efficiency** - Were the results achieved in a cost-effective way?

- Are SDC’s procedures (general and financial in particular) and ways of collaboration conducive to implementing MSD in partner countries or regions?
- To what extent do cost-benefit analyses provide evidence for implementing MSD approaches?
- Are SDC and its implementing partners using adequate financial and human resources for effectively implementing MSD programs?

**Impact** - The positive and negative changes produced by development interventions.

- What observable effects (intended or unintended, positive or negative) of MSD programs on beneficiaries, market players and others can be evidenced?
- In what ways were the lives of communities (differentiating along the rural-urban continuum), especially the poor, disadvantaged, and women, affected by SDC programs?
- Are there synergies with other approaches and interventions, e.g. projects focusing on vocational skills development or local economic development?
- Do project scale-up and have SDC projects been scaled through or leveraged other interventions, in particular of multilateral organisations? What were the facilitating factors in those cases?
• Are there signs of (potential) larger scale transformations induced by SDC interventions?

Sustainability - To what extent will the effects be maintained when SDC’s support ends?
• How successful are SDC programs in developing market systems? What evidence is available with regard to sustained change?
• Which factors enhance the sustainability of SDC approaches in (dynamic) market contexts?
• To what extent are social and environmental sustainability issues addressed by MSD programs?
• To what degree were good agricultural practices (i.e. ecologically sustainable, climate change resilient, soil conserving, and agro-ecological sound) promoted and achieved?
• Has SDC support contributed to sustainably strengthen market systems?

Deliverables

The following deliverables are required:

Inception Report
An Inception Report is prepared by the evaluation team - after an initial review of relevant documentation and some initial interviews. It shall present:
• the results of first round of interviews and the desk review;
• conceptual framework(s) to be used in the evaluation (including a draft Theory of Change which presents SDC’s logic regarding the thematic priority areas);
• the key evaluation questions and methodology;
• analytical framework for answering the evaluation questions with rubrics or assessment scales that will be used for assessing the information, data sources and collection, sampling and key indicators;
• rational for selection of case studies, respectively countries that will be visited, considering a balanced choice between geographical regions, types of interventions and contexts, ongoing / completed interventions, etc. In doing so, the evaluation team shall consider differences related to context (developing countries, countries in transition, …), to the economic sectors and to the differing complexity of a market systems; first draft list of interviewees.

The Inception Report also includes a timeline for the evaluation process. It shall explain the strengths, weaknesses and limitations and the means used to address these limitations. The evaluation team should suggest a tentative structure of the final report.

The Inception Report should be written in English and should not exceed 20 pages excluding annexes. It will be addressed to the evaluation management division (E+C), but will be discussed with the CLP in Berne.

Evaluation Report by Evaluation team
• A fit-to-print evaluation report302 in English containing findings, conclusions and recommendations, whereby the conclusions must be clearly derived from the findings and the recommendations be clearly based on the conclusions.
• The evaluation report should not exceed 30 pages (including an executive summary; excluding annexes), and must be coherent with the E+C formatting guidelines. The

302 According to the formatting guidelines of SDC Evaluation and Corporate Controlling Division
report should contain clear references of the important information/data available in the annexes. The executive summary should correspond to the DAC-Standards and should not exceed 2 to 3 pages.

- Additionally, a short and concise presentation (PowerPoint) shall be prepared by the evaluation team for SDC’s use.
- The quality of the evaluation report (and process) will be assessed with quality criteria, listed in Annex 8: Evaluation Quality Assessment of the Approach Paper (Annex 5 to this document).

Communication
Communication is key – both for institutional learning within SDC and accountability towards the Parliament and the public. The following deliverables with regards to communication are required:

- Meetings with the Core Learning Partnership (CLP) at key moments of the evaluation;
- Regular exchange with E+C;
- Presentation of the Final Report to the Directorate of SDC (and eventually prior to that: presentation of intermediate results to the Directorate);
- To be determined at later point during the evaluation: Presentation and discussion of the final report with an External Reference Group (towards the end of the process).
- Key messages for external communication, which are clear, concise and easy to understand.

These key messages will be used for the production of info-graphs for external communication.

Roles and responsibilities during the evaluation

SDC Senior Management (Directorate)
SDC’s Directorate approves the Approach Paper and expresses their stand on the evaluation recommendations through the Senior Management Response.

Core Learning Partnership (CLP)
The Core Learning Partnership (CLP) accompanies the evaluation process. Throughout the process, the CLP is engaged in learning through interactive reflection with the evaluation team. The CLP comments on the evaluation design (Approach Paper, draft Inception Report) and the draft evaluation report. At the capitalisation workshop, the CLP receives and validates the evaluation findings, conclusions, lessons learnt and recommendations. The evaluation process will include periodic engagement of the CLP members and/or other relevant SDC staff for following activities:

- Provide support to the evaluation team in better understanding SDC’s approaches, structures and working processes;
- Comment the Approach Paper and Inception Report and provide feedbacks to the draft evaluation report;
- Draft the Senior Management Response, in consultation with Domains’ leaderships (or alternatively, draft the Senior Management Response to be discussed with the leadership of each domain prior to the finalisation) to be approved by the Directorate of SDC.

The CLP is composed of representatives of each operational domain of SDC (Humanitarian Aid, South Cooperation, Global Cooperation, and Cooperation with Eastern Europe).
External Reference Group
Considering the importance of the subject, an External Reference Group could take stock of the evaluation results and give feedback to the findings. This will be decided at a later point during the evaluation. The group would be composed of representatives from Swiss Parliament, Swiss Federal Administration, Swiss Academia, and Swiss NGO (exact membership to be determined) and meet with the consultants to give feedback on the draft final report and provided possible input for drafting the Senior Management Response.

Independent Evaluation Team
SDC’s Evaluation and Corporate Controlling Division will contract an evaluation team that is independent of the FDFA, especially of SDC, and has not been involved in activities covered by this evaluation. The evaluation team should offer expertise regarding evaluation and partnership development, innovative thinking, the ability to combine established methods with new approaches and to critically discuss, evaluate and share results with stakeholders throughout the evaluation process.

The evaluation team shall consist of a team of at least two experts with complementary expertise and experience. More particularly, the evaluators are expected to bring along the following evaluation and subject matter expertise and experience:

- Experience and up-to-date knowledge in the field of Market Systems Development, Agriculture and Food Security, LNOB and environment;
- Strong analytical and editorial skills, ability to synthesize and write intelligibly for different audiences;
- Professional experience and skills in robust evaluation methodologies and in evaluating strategies, programs, partnerships, and institutional processes/change;
- Ability to apply the DAC-OECD and SEVAL (or equivalent) evaluation standards;
- Knowledge of the Swiss development cooperation system;
- Experience in (evaluating) bilateral development cooperation.

Furthermore, the evaluators are expected to have:

- Ability to steer complex processes involving a multiplicity of stakeholders through participatory methods;
- Competency with gender and governance issues (application of gender sensitive evaluation methodologies);
- Ability to work and communicate in English, plus excellent writing skills in English. German, French and Spanish comprehension is a must (good reading skills). Good communication in German, French and Spanish is an additional asset;
- Experience in developing communication content for a wider public.

Evaluation Management
- The evaluation management’s main responsibility is to manage and supervise the entire process of the evaluation. The evaluation management formulates the Approach Paper, commissions the evaluation team, and approves the Inception Report and the Evaluation Report by the evaluation team in consultation with the CLP. Furthermore, the evaluation manager drafts and administers the contract with the evaluation team and ensures that the evaluators receive appropriate logistical support and access to information.
- The management coordinates the CLP and their meetings and shall facilitate the review and validation of lessons learnt and recommendations (evaluation team, CLP). If required, the management also facilitates the elaboration of the action plan for the
Senior Management Response with realistic follow-up actions and it is responsible for the publication and dissemination of the evaluation report.

- The evaluation management consists of following staff: Reto Thönen, E+C.
- The final evaluation report will be prepared by E+C. It will consist of the evaluation report and the Senior Management Response by SDC’s Directorate.

References

DCED. https://www.enterprise-development.org/
SDC Agriculture and Food Security Shareweb. https://www.shareweb.ch/site/Agriculture-and-FoodSecurity
SDC employment and income network, e+i (June 2017). Managing MSD projects. Internal guidance paper for SDC head office and cooperation office staff
SDC employment and income network, e+i (May 2012). Women’s Economic Empowerment and Making Markets Work for the Poor (M4P)
SDC Employment and Income Shareweb. https://www.shareweb.ch/site/EI/Pages/Home.aspx
3.5 Volume of the mandate

A total number of 150-170 working days between March 2020 and February 2021 may be allocated to the evaluation team (international and local experts), see chapter 3.4, Process. These working days should also include the activities of 5 international trips to up to 5 countries in Africa, Asia, Europe and Latin America for field visits and 6 trips to Berne, Switzerland. Trips will have to be approved by E+C.

The exact number of field visits and the destination countries as well as the number of trips to Switzerland will be defined during the inception phase.

The evaluation team shall consist of a team of at least two experts with complementary expertise and experience. The estimated level of effort for the team in person-days is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Person-days</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Kick-off and initial interviews</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Desk review</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Inception report</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Interviews, etc.</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Field visits incl. preparations</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Capitalisation workshop, incl. preparation</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Draft final report, incl. analysis</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Final report</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total ca.</strong></td>
<td><strong>150</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All the price details must be indicated in Swiss Francs (CHF), excl. VAT. The price excl. VAT includes in particular insurance, allowances, social costs, transport, customs etc.

The bidder will not be reimbursed for any costs arising from the preparation or submission of this bid.

3.6 Time frame, target dates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deadline</th>
<th>Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Monday 13.01.2020</td>
<td>Invitation of at least 3 bidders and publication of the mandate on the FDFA website</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monday 20.01.2020</td>
<td>Expression of interest by email to <a href="mailto:sektion.evaluationcontrolling@eda.admin.ch">sektion.evaluationcontrolling@eda.admin.ch</a> and dispatch of annexes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wednesday 22.01.2020</td>
<td>Questions by email to <a href="mailto:section.evaluationcontrolling@eda.admin.ch">section.evaluationcontrolling@eda.admin.ch</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friday 24.01.2020</td>
<td>Sharing of the questions and answers with all the interested bidders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friday 07.02.2019</td>
<td>Deadline for submitting offer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friday, 28.02.2020</td>
<td>Awarding of mandate and notice to unsuccessful bidders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First week of March 2020</td>
<td>Signing of contract</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beginning of March 2020</td>
<td>Start of the Mandate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4. Formal aspects of the invitation to tender

4.1 Contracting authority
SDC’s Evaluation and Corporate Controlling Division manages the award procedure and is also the direct mandating party for the bidder.

Federal Department of Foreign Affairs FDFA
Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation SDC
Evaluation and Corporate Controlling Division
Freiburgstrasse 130
3003 Berne
Switzerland
Email: sektion.evaluation-controlling@eda.admin.ch

4.2 Type of procedure
Procurement in the invitation to tender is in accordance with the Federal Ordinance of 11 December 1995 on Public Procurement, PPO, SR 172.056.11.

The award of contract cannot be contested.

5. Suitability criteria
The bidder must prove and thoroughly fulfil without reservation or modification the following suitability criteria; otherwise, the bid will not be further considered.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SC</th>
<th>Suitability criterion</th>
<th>Verification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SC1</td>
<td>Information of bidder</td>
<td>The bidder has to fill in the bidder information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC2</td>
<td>Acceptance GTC</td>
<td>The bidder shall explicitly confirm, without limitation or modification, the acceptance of the FDFA’s General Conditions of Business (GTC) as per annex 2 of the present tender document.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC3</td>
<td>Legal Status</td>
<td>The bidder confirms to fulfil the legal requirements according to his status.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Legal persons and institutions

- Natural persons

- For Self-employed persons (*see information below)
  This criterion is only to be met by self-employed persons, whereby they submit valid proof (not older than two years) of professional independence in accordance with 'AHV' law.
  Proof (not older than two years) provided by the responsible social insurance authority at which the company/person is registered.
For Employed persons (** see information below) Bidders who do not qualify as self-employed in accordance with 'AHV' law and non-legal persons (AG, GmbH, etc.) are considered as employed persons for whom the FDFA, as contracting authority, must pay the statutory social insurance contributions.

- Declaration of agreement that all social insurance contributions are to be paid by the contracting authority.
- Indication of 'AHV' number and date of birth. Foreign nationals who do not have a 'AHV' number only indicate their date of birth.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SC</th>
<th>Suitability criterion</th>
<th>Verification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SC4</td>
<td>Experience</td>
<td>Written proof of the references giving at least the following data: Name of company and address of contact person(s) and telephone number(s); Time and place of execution of the mandate; Volume of the executed mandate; Description of the provided services; The contracting authority reserves the right to contact the contact persons indicated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC5</td>
<td>Acceptance e-billing: Contractors are obliged to submit an electronic bill to the FDFA if the contract value is above CHF 5'000 (excl. VAT). For Information on the electronic billing see annex 3.</td>
<td>Written confirmation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC6</td>
<td>Personnel resources and availability: The consultants confirm to be able to fulfil the mandate and their availability during the indicated period including for the indicated dates of the field trip.</td>
<td>Written confirmation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC7</td>
<td>Contact person: Single person of contact responsible for carrying out the evaluation.</td>
<td>Written confirmation mentioning the name of the person.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC8</td>
<td>Language skills: The bidder must be proficient in English (orally and writing). The bidder must be able to read and understand documents in German, French, and Spanish.</td>
<td>Written confirmation and overview of team members and language skills.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC9</td>
<td>Independence from the evaluation subject: Proven independence (non-linkage, close relation or any other issue that might bias the evaluation process or result) from the SDC.</td>
<td>Written confirmation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*) Information for self-employed (Natural person, mandate type B)
Please note: The awarding of longer-term mandates to self-employed persons (individual companies) can lead to their economic dependence on the contracting authority which can lead to result in the reclassification of the contractor in accordance with 'AHV' law (Alters- und Hinterlassenen Versicherung = Federal Old-age, Survivors' and Invalidity Insurance).

**) Financial offer for employed persons (Natural person, mandate type A)  
Offsetting employers' social insurance contributions: To ensure comparability of financial bids between employed persons (type A) and contractors (type B), FDFA will increase the value of the bids of type A contractors by 10% in the comparison to take into account the employer's social insurance contributions Contributions to the occupational pensions If the total remuneration to be contractually agreed is subject to the Occupational Pensions Act (OPA) (second pillar), the contribution to be paid must be clarified with the responsible
pension institution on a case-by-case basis. The OPA employer contributions must be added to the gross remuneration to create comparability of bids.

6 Award criteria

Of the valid offers submitted, the contract will be awarded to the economically most favourable bid.

Offers will be assessed according to the following award criteria and weighting:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AC</th>
<th>Award criterion</th>
<th>Weighting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Understanding of the mandate</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Proposed methodology, approach and timeline.</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Qualification, experience and expertise of the organization</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Qualifications of proposed consultants (CVs)</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Clarity of financial offer</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6 Financial offer - Overall price

The overall price is to be submitted only together with the budget form as per annex 4. The overall amount (excl. VAT) across the mandate will be estimated using the following formula:

\[ \text{Score} = M \times \left( \frac{P_{\text{min}}}{P} \right)^2 \]

where:
- \( P_{\text{min}} \) = price of cheapest bid
- \( P \) = price of bid being assessed
- \( M \) = Max. points

Total 100%

Award criteria are evaluated on a scale of 0 to 5.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Fulfilment and quality of the criteria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Cannot be established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Very bad fulfilment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Bad fulfilment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Average fulfilment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Good fulfilment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Very good fulfilment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Information not available
- Information is incomplete
- Data quality is very poor
- Information relates inadequately to the requirements
- Data quality is poor
- Information globally responds inadequately to the requirements
- Data quality is adequate
- Information focuses well on requirements
- Data quality is good
- Information clearly relates to the achievement of outputs
- Data quality is excellent
7. Composition and content of the offer

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Contents</th>
<th>Max. No. pages</th>
<th>SC/AC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>00</td>
<td>Cover letter with signature(s)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td>Form «Bidder Information»</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>SC 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02</td>
<td>Acceptance of GTC</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>SC 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03</td>
<td>Legal documents</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>SC 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04</td>
<td>Proof of references</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>SC 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05</td>
<td>Acceptance e-billing</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>SC 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06</td>
<td>Confirmation personal resources</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>SC 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07</td>
<td>Information contact person</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>SC 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08</td>
<td>Language skills</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>SC 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09</td>
<td>Independence from the evaluation subject</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>SC 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Understanding of the mandate</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>AC 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Proposed methodology, approach and timeline.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>AC 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Qualification, experience and expertise of the organization</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>AC 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Qualifications of proposed consultants (CVs)</td>
<td>3 pages per CV</td>
<td>AC4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 14      | Financial proposal: submit the financial proposal in accordance with Annex 5 Budget form in CHF currency. The financial proposal must include the estimated costs for (according point 3.4, process):  
  - 10 case studies and a proposal for 5 field visits to Africa, Asia, Europe and Latin America  
  - 4 visits to Berne of the evaluation team (except local consultants) for the Kick-Off/first round of interviews, the discussion of the inception report, capitalisation workshop as well as draft evaluation report  
  - 2 visits to Berne of the team leader for the presentation and discussion of the evaluation report to the Directorate and the presentation to an External Reference Group (the other meetings and interviews will take place via video call/phone).  
  If applicable, VAT must be offered separately. | 1 narrative page + budget form | AC 5, AC 6 |

8 Additional points to be noted by the bidder

8.1 Address for submission of offers
Email: sektion.evaluation-controlling@eda.admin.ch
Subject: Offer Evaluation Agricultural Market System Development

8.2 Language of documents, language of bids
The bid must be submitted in English. The documents are available in either English, French or German.

8.3 Expression of interest in submitting an offer and receiving documents
Interested bidders can express their interest by email to the contact person named under point 8.1 until January 20, 2020 and will receive the annexes to these terms of reference.

8.4 Answering questions
Questions concerning the awarding of the mandate in question can be sent by January 22, 2020 to the contact person named under point 8.1 by email. The answers will be made available by January 24, 2020 by email to all bidders who have expressed an interest in submitting an offer.

8.5 Deadline for submitting a bid and validity
The bid must be sent by email to the contact address stated under point 8.1 by February 7, 2020 at the latest with the following note: Offer Evaluation Agricultural Market System Development.

The Evaluation and Corporate Controlling Division will acknowledge receipt of the offers to all bidders per email within one working day.

The bid is valid for up to 180 days after the aforementioned date for submission.

Please submit the financial proposal in CHF (excl. VAT).

8.6 General Terms and Conditions of Business (GTC)
GENERAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF BUSINESS (GTC) OF THE SWISS FEDERAL DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (FDFA) FOR MANDATES (TYPE A for employed persons AND TYPE B for legal persons and institutions).
These General Conditions of Business (GTC) shall be deemed accepted by the contractor on submission of the offer.

8.7 Conclusion of contract
The contract is concluded subject to the prior approval of credits by FDFA.

8.8 Negotiations
Remain reserved.

8.9 Bidding consortia
Consortia of bidders are permitted. Should FDFA conclude the Contract with several Contractors (consortium), all parties must sign, having first designated a person to represent the consortium vis-à-vis FDFA. The representative is expressly authorized to act for and on behalf of the consortium members. The consortium members shall be jointly and severally liable. Consortia members are allowed to participate exclusively in one bid. The bidder lists all members and their roles.

8.10 Subcontractors
Subcontractors are permitted, subject to the prior approval of the awarding entity. Subcontractors are allowed to participate in several bids. If the bidder engages subcontractors in order to carry out the work, the bidder will assume overall responsibility.
It will list all the subcontractors involved, together with the roles allocated to them, in annex 1 "Bidder information". Any contractual delegation by the contractor of performance of all or part of the present contract to subcontractors shall be subject to the prior written consent of the contracting authority. Subcontractors and their personnel must satisfy all conditions stipulated in the present contract and the appendices thereto. In the event that the contractor delegates performance of all or part of the contract, the contractor shall bear sole liability for the acts of any subcontractors.

8.11 Confidentiality
All information of any kind that comes to the attention of the bidder in connection with the tendered mandate of the awarding authority is to be treated as confidential. The content of the present tender may only be made available to persons taking part in the preparation of the bid.
The tender documentation may not be used for any other purposes than preparation of the bid, even in extracts.
Bidders treat facts as confidential that are not public knowledge or publicly available. In cases of doubt, facts are to be treated as confidential. This obligation to secrecy remains valid even after conclusion of the tender procedure.
The awarding authority undertakes to maintain confidentiality about this bid towards third parties subject to the reserve of statutory publication requirements.

8.12 Integrity clause
Bidders undertake to take all necessary measures to avoid corruption, especially not to offer or accept payments or other advantages.
Bidders who violate the integrity clause are required to pay a contractual penalty to the contracting authority amounting to 10% of the contract sum or at least CHF 3,000 per violation.
The bidder notes that a violation of the integrity clause leads as a rule to the cancellation of the award or to early termination of the contract by the contracting authority for important reasons. The Parties shall inform each other in case of any well-founded suspicions of corruption.

8.13 Protected rights
All protected rights that arise from executing the mandate shall be transferred to the contracting authority.

9 Annexes
The annexes will be sent separately to the interested bidders (see point 8.3. above).

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<tr>
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<td>Form „Bidder Information“</td>
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